by Dennis Crouch
Rebecca Curtin – a law professor and parent who purchases princess dolls – filed a TTAB opposition against United Trademark Holdings’ application to register the mark “RAPUNZEL” for dolls and toy figures (Class 28). Curtin alleged the mark should not be registered because “RAPUNZEL” is a generic name, is merely descriptive, and fails to function as a trademark for doll products. UTH moved to dismiss the opposition, arguing that Curtin lacked standing (i.e., lacked “entitlement to a statutory cause of action”) under the Lanham Act’s opposition provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1063. Initially, the TTAB allowed Curtin’s case to proceed – relying on the Federal Circuit’s older, more permissive standing test from Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which had held that “any person who believes that she would be damaged” by a registration may oppose if she shows a real interest and a reasonable belief of harm. But by the final decision, the TTAB reversed course. Citing the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), and the Federal Circuit’s own decision in Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Board dismissed Curtin’s opposition for lack of a statutory cause of action. The TTAB concluded that “mere consumers” generally are not entitled to oppose a trademark registration under § 1063, because their interests fall outside the zone of interests protected by that statute.
The Federal Circuit has now affirmed that dismissal in Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 23-2140 (Fed. Cir. May 22, 2025). Judge Hughes penned the opinion holding that: to oppose a trademark under § 1063, an individual’s interests and alleged injuries must fall within the Lanham Act’s protected zone of interests, and those injuries must be proximately caused by the mark’s registration. See also, Rebecca Curtin, Zombie Cinderella and the Undead Public Domain, 85 Tennessee Law Review 961 (2018).
Although all modern theories indicate that consumer protection is a primary purpose of trademark law, Curtin’s consumer-focused concerns did not satisfy the statutory requirements (according to the court). Still, I'm drawn by her arguments -- as Curtin's attorney Ryan Morris (Workman Nydegger) explained:
With regard to the purposes of the Lanham Act, it absolutely has everything to do with consumers. . . . The interests of the consumers are at the heart of the Lanham Act. And to exclude them arbitrarily doesn't make a lot of sense.
Oral args. 29:05.
