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By Dennis Crouch
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex (Fed. Cir. 2011)
The case focuses on Sanofi’s patent covering clopidrogrel bisulfate tablets sold under the trade name Plavix. ($4.5 billion in annual sales). In 2001, the generic drug manufacturer Apotex filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the FDA – requesting that it be allowed to manufacture a generic version on the drug and alleging that Sanofi’s patent was invalid. Sanofi sued for infringement.
Pre-Judgment Agreement to Limit Damages: May 2006, the parties came to a limited agreement that any actual damages for infringement would be limited to “50% of Apotex’s net sales.” The agreement stated that:
If the litigation results in a judgment that the ‘265 patent is not invalid or unenforceable, Sanofi agrees that its actual damages for any past infringement by Apotex, up to the date on which Apotex is enjoined, will be 50% of Apotex’s net sales of clopidogrel products . . . . Sanofi further agrees that it will not seek increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
Apotex subsequently began marking its generic product before being stopped a few weeks later by a preliminary injunction. After Sanofi won the infringement trial, the judge set damages for that infringement at 50% of net sales plus interest. In dollar figures, damages were $442 million and the interest charge was $107 million. The district court had agreed that it should be bound by the prior agreement between the parties, but held that the agreement only limited damages and did not limit interest.
Contract Specification: Of course the contract could have spelled-out whether the limitation applied to interest charges, and the parties most certainly considered that issue during negotiations. But, for whatever, reason, they chose not to specify in the contract whether interest charges should be limited. Thus, the court was forced to consider the proper default rule for this situation.
At the Federal Circuit, Apotex argues that the interest payment should be included as part of the damage award and that the judgment therefore exceeds the agreed upon 50% damage limitation. In a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit has sided with Apotex – holding that the phrase “actual damages” as used in the contract “include[s] all damages necessary to compensate Sanofi for Apotex’s infringement.”
Because prejudgment interest is a form of compensatory damages, the district court erred by awarding additional prejudgment interest pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284.
In the majority opinion, Judge Moore relied both on the contractual language and on the history of compensatory damages that traditionally include both a reasonable royalty calculated at the point of infringement and interests charges for the delay in payment. Both of those elements are part of the “actual damages” calculation necessary to fully compensate the patent holder for past infringement. This follows the view espoused by the Supreme Court in its 1983 case involving General Motors where the court wrote:
An award of interest from the time that the royalty payments would have been received merely serves to make the patent owner whole, since his damages consist not only of the value of the royalty payments but also of the forgone use of the money between the time of infringement and the date of judgment.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983).
Patent Act Damages: As usual, the language of the Patent Act is somewhat ambiguous on the meaning of damages. The first paragraph of Section 284 calls for an award of “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” One view of this provision would require damages to be, at a minimum, a combination of a reasonable royalty plus interests and costs. In my view, however, the better plain meaning interpretation of Section 284 is that a court is required to award damages (minimum of reasonable royalty) and in addition must award interest and costs.
The appellate panel rejected the parties’ analysis of the language of the patent act as irrelevant – holding instead that “actual damages” was a contract term and that the interpretation therefore does not depend upon any statutory language.
While interesting, these arguments neither illuminate nor resolve the issue before us – the meaning of “actual damages” in the May 2006 agreement. The agreed upon “actual damages” are a creature of contract and not of the Patent Act. By entering into the May 2006 agreement, the parties decided that the agreement itself – not § 271(e)(4)(C) or § 284 – would govern the appropriate measure of damages from Apotex’s infringement.
Writing in Dissent, Judge Newman would have applied the usual background rule that interest is different from damages as a primary driving factor in interpreting the contract. In that framework, the contractual limitation on damages would not apply to limit interest as well.
My colleagues err in reading the contract’s silence on interest for infringement as meaning that the parties intended and agreed to forgo the interest to which the patentee is entitled by statute and precedent. I must, respectfully, dissent
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By Andrew Dhuey
“I’m following your case at the Federal Circuit – would you please send me a PDF of the parties’ briefs? Thanks in advance.” Patent litigators and prosecutors throughout the nation have been sending emails with this request for years, relying on the kindness of strangers for a professional courtesy. They do this because there is usually no easy way for them to obtain Federal Circuit briefs. The reason for that is the Court – charged by Congress to resolve the most important technology disputes in the world – still does not have electronic case filing (ECF).
In the federal judiciary, ECF is now operational in all appellate and district courts, save two: the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Some Supreme Court justices are comically unfamiliar with such cutting-edge technologies as texting and email, though the Chief Justice probably does know more about pagers than the typical 20-something today. Fortunately, the technological backwardness of the Supreme Court’s case filing system is of no consequence – you can get just about any petition or merits stage brief you might want from SCOTUSblog, the American Bar Association and other online sources.
At the Federal Circuit, however, odds are you have only three options when seeking a brief or motion: i) pay several hundred dollars for a messenger to go to the Court and copy it, ii) pay Westlaw or Lexis a similar amount to download it (if available) or iii) ask an attorney in the case for the favor of a PDF (tip: ask really nicely).
The Court’s long delay in implementing ECF is puzzling. In case after case, Federal Circuit judges and their law clerks demonstrate their ability to learn and analyze extremely complex technologies in widely disparate fields. Why then is the Court lagging behind every regional circuit court and all district courts in the nation when it comes to adopting technology in its own operations?
ECF is not a newcomer to the federal courts. District courts started using ECF in 2002; circuit courts in 2005. On June 28, 2007, then Chief Judge Michel announced that the Court hoped to utilize ECF in fall 2007. Since then, nothing. Well, slightly more than nothing. This message appears on Federal Circuit electronic docket sheets: “The following documents, filed after 8/13/07, are available for download: official caption, entry of appearance, certificate of interest. No other case documents are available electronically.” I can scarcely imagine any documents of less interest to others than captions, entries of appearances and certificates of interest, yet these are the ones you can obtain electronically.
The Federal Circuit’s lack of ECF is not merely a hassle for lawyers in search of briefs and motions. Scores of non-lawyers, including inventors, veterans, federal employees and vaccine-case claimants, represent themselves in Federal Circuit appeals. That rather challenging task would be less daunting if they had easy access to well-written appellate briefs of experienced counsel.
Federal Circuit judges, please consider this an amicus filing from someone who has great respect for you and the Court – it is time to roll out ECF.
By Dennis Crouch
Excellent practitioner guides are often described as the “Bible for ___.” Peter Menell’s “Patent Case Management Judicial Guide” might fit into this category as the patent litigator’s Bible. However, I see some disconnect in the bible naming process. Although the Christian Bible does include rules of practice, it turns out that those rules are regularly ignored. Many practicing Christians instead see the Bible as more simply providing a source of faith as well as some general guidance.
It is in this broader context that that I see Professor Rob Merges’ new book Justifying Intellectual Property
as a new Bible for Intellectual Property. In his 2011 Harvard University Press book, Merges explains his faith in intellectual property and how the basis for his faith provides general guidance for the structure of a well designed intellectual property system.
Merges is an excellent writer, but the reading is still dense – largely because Merges bases his arguments on the philosophic writings of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls. In reading the book, I am continually referring to the original sources (via the public domain and an internet search). This takes time, energy, and active reading, but will be rewarding for any patent attorney looking to live a purpose filled life.
Merges also believes that utilitarianism is important to intellectual property. However, that justification has always lacked power because proof that the IP system really works has turned out to be “impossibly complex.” In the end, utilitarianism or consequentialism offer only a hollow purpose. As Merges writes in his introduction “[m]aximizing utility, I have come to see, is not a serviceable first-order principle of the IP system. It is just not what IP is really all about at the deepest level.” It makes sense to me that any true right needs more justification than can be provided by an econometrician. (My conclusion may well be based on the large number of economists that I know with failed moral compasses.) To be clear, Merges argues that the IP system should be designed efficiently and in a way that generally benefits society. His point, however, is that utilitarianism does not fully justify the property rights. Rather, for Merges, concerns of efficiency, along with proportionality, dignity, and non-removal are all “midlevel” principles that, though important, are not fundamental justifications. At the fundamental level, Merges relies upon deontological ethics derived from Locke (justification for appropriation), Kant (individual freedoms), and Rawls (distributive justice). By threading together these historic lines of thought, Merges provides an ethical foundation both for the establishment of property rights for creative contributions to society as well as for substantive limits to those rights.
Justifying Intellectual Property is a fascinating book and I will likely post a second discussion of the book after I finish reading the second half. The book does not have all the answers and, in my view, is not always correct. It does, however offer a new framework for understanding intellectual property with a particular focus on why it makes sense to offer property rights for creative enterprises.
Info:
Univ. of New Hampshire School of Law in Concord, N.H. (formerly Franklin Pierce) is looking to hire a new full-time professor of patent prosecution practice. As many patent attorneys know, patent prosecution is already a major component of UNH’s patent law program.
“The person who is hired for this position must be able to teach and continue to develop a program of instruction that provides students with the skills needed to prosecute patent applications, including claims drafting and patent application preparation and procedures. The course includes a weekly lecture component that is given by the patent prosecution professor and small sections with practicing patent attorneys that are managed by the patent prosecution professor. By the end of this two-semester program, students will have drafted a complete patent specification and claims, responded to various USPTO Office Actions, and learned to prepare additional documents for filing with the USPTO.”
UNH is also willing to accommodate individuals interested in combining teaching responsibilities with an ongoing law practice or other professional obligation.
Links:
This week, US Congress ratified a negotiated free trade agreement with (South) Korea. The agreement includes a major section on intellectual property law.
Agreed to terms include the requirements that each nation:
The agreement must also be ratified by the Korean National Assembly. Read the US-Korean agreement here: /media/docs/2011/10/asset_upload_file273_12717.pdf. US Congress also passed similar agreements with the Latin American Nations of Panama and Columbia.
Design Registration? The agreements all additionally call for the parties to “make all reasonable efforts to ratify or accede to … the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (1999) and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1989).” The United States is not currently a signatory to either of these agreements.
Further agreements in the air: The US passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act has been taken as a signal that further harmonization efforts may also be successful. In particular, it appears that many nations would be willing to implement a new US-style grace period at least if they are limited activities subsequent to a non-commercializing public disclosure authorized by or derived from the patent applicant or inventor.
PatLit is part of a family of excellent IPKat blogs created by UK attorney Jeremy Phillips. As you might guess, the website has a European focus, although not exclusively so. In a recent post, Michael Thesen wrote about the ongoing patent litigation between Samsung and Apple – with a focus on a German preliminary injunction based upon a European Design Registration. The following is reproduced with permission.
* * *
A preliminary injunction granted on the request of Apple for preventing the sales of Samsung's Galaxy Pad in most of Germany has recently caused a fairly big swivet in the IP community. This 1st instance case, featuring an industrial design and a defendant citing somewhat flimsy evidence, has even found its way to the hall of fame of "patent wars" in minimum time.
What is surprising from a patent litigator's point of view is how simple this is. How is it possible that a preliminary injunction is granted based on an unexamined right? [DDC Note: Unlike US Design Patents, Europe Design Rights are registered without substantive examination.]
As everywhere, the decision to grant a preliminary injunction requires a careful balancing of the right owner's interest in preventing damages of irreparable nature and the defendant's interest in a fair procedure. For any kind of protective right, doubts in the validity and doubts in the question of infringement will lead to a refusing decision in order to safely avoid erroneous judgments due to precipitate action.
In patent matters, even a successfully completed examination procedure is not necessarily sufficient to prove the enforceability with a sufficient degree of certainty (at least in Germany). Rather, additional conditions have to be met. In the case of unexamined utility models, the burden of substantiating the enforceability is at the plaintiff's side, which must produce at least the results of a professional search carried out on the subject-matter of the utility model or a positive decision of an invalidity procedure.
Nothing of this kind can be found in the judgment of the Düsseldorf court – the reason being fairly simple: the validity is legally presumed in Art. 85(1) of the Community Design Regulation (CDR), i.e. the court has to treat the community design as valid. This legal presumption may be challenged by way of a counterclaim. However, this shifts the burden of proof/substantiation to the defendant's side. The applicability of Art. 85(1) CDR to interim relief has been questioned, but is generally accepted as far as the author of this note knows.
In practice, the short time scale of procedures in interim relief, the lack of search possibilities comparable to those available for patents and utility models and an official search result to start with leaves the defendant defenseless. This has a further crucial effect on the question of infringement because the defendant has practically no possibility to substantiate the existing design corpus such that the judge has to presume a high degree of freedom of the designer and thus a large scope of protection (cf. Art 10(2) CDR).
Further, the Hagen District court holds that the damages caused by infringements of industrial designs are more likely to be of irreparable nature as compared to patents because the industrial value of the former lies primarily in its individual character, which would be "diluted" when admitting counterfeits during the procedure of the merits, whereas the value of the patent basically lies in its technical advantages which are, as such, not affected by counterfeits on the market.
In particular in the world of telecommunication patent wars there is one further feature of industrial designs which makes them frightening weapons: they are not essential for standards and, thus, not subject to FRAND agreements. As a matter of course, there is no way to obtain interim relief against a global competitor on the basis of a standard-relevant patent.
In other words, you need not bother with being fair, reasonable and non-discriminative when using industrial designs.
The result is that industrial designs are tools which are largely underestimated in the portfolio of most of the IP right holders. Design rights are not expensive, powerful, can be enforced rapidly, easy to understand even for less experienced judges or customs officers, not susceptible for translation errors even in China, and deserve a decent fraction of every company's IP budget.
The original post can be found here: http://patlit.blogspot.com/2011/10/industrial-designs-wonder-weapon-for.html.
By David S. Almeling
Last month, President Obama signed into law the America Invents Act, enacting the most significant reform to patent law in a half-century. Last week, Senators Herb Kohl and Christopher Coons introduced an amendment to the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act (the "amendment"), which would, for the first time, provide a federal right of civil action for trade secret owners. In a press release announcing the amendment, Senator Coons stated it "would allow for a single, uniform, nationwide cause of action instead of the patchwork of state laws now in place, and would elevate trade-secret intellectual property on the same level as copyright, trademark and patent violations."
Although it's a step in the right direction, the amendment falls short. This article summarizes the amendment and explains why it's not a complete solution to the problems it seeks to solve.
Our State-Based Trade Secret Regime
Unlike trademarks, copyrights, and patents, trade secrets are not governed primarily by federal statute. Each state retains its own autonomous trade secret law. The inevitable result is that trade secret law differs from state to state. For example:
With these interstate discrepancies comes a host of problems. A case's outcome may depend on the state in which suit is brought; the result in Kansas City, Missouri, may be different from the result across the river in Kansas City, Kansas. Another problem is the additional burden on plaintiffs and defendants, who must research which jurisdiction's laws are most favorable to their case, and on courts, which must decide between the competing laws. Such differences also create uncertainty, and thus cost, about which court will decide the dispute and what law that court will apply. Such differences impose further costs on trade secret owners who operate in multiple states, as they must protect trade secrets in a way that complies with the laws of each state.
The Amendment
The amendment would amend the federal Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), which criminalizes certain types of trade secret misappropriation, to include a right of civil action for anyone "aggrieved by a violation of section 1832(a)." Section 1832(a) is one of the two types of conduct prohibited under the EEA, and it applies to misappropriating trade secrets related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate commerce knowing or intending that the misappropriation will injure the trade secret owner.
This new right of action would be limited to trade secret owners who provide a "sworn representation . . . that the dispute involves either substantial need for nationwide service of process or misappropriation of trade secrets from the United States to another country."
The amendment provides various forms of relief, including injunctive relief, damages, exemplary damages, and reasonable royalties. Significantly, the amendment also authorizes a court to issue a seizure order for property "used or intended to be used . . . to commit or facilitate the commission of the violation alleged in the civil action."
The amendment would not preempt any other law: "Nothing in the amendments made by this section shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section 1838 of title 18, United States Code, or to preempt any other provision of law."
The Amendment is Limited
Among the amendment's limitations:
I spoke with a member of Senator Kohl's staff, who said that one purpose of the amendment is to expand the current framework of the EEA by providing a limited federal right of civil action. That is a laudable first step, but the amendment won't fix the patchwork problem because the only way to eliminate differences among states is to preempt state laws.
So if the amendment won't work, what law will? One that provides a private right of action for all types of trade secret misappropriation and that preempts inconsistent state law. One, quite simply, that replaces the current state-based trade secret regime with a federal one.
David Almeling is a counsel with O'Melveny & Myers in the firm's San Francisco office. This article does not purport to represent the views of O'Melveny or its clients.
by Dennis Crouch
Jeff Schox recently sent me a copy of his new book on patent law: Not So Obvious: An Introduction to Patent Law and Strategy. Schox uses the $39 paperback for the patent class he teaches to Stanford engineering students. The book is written in plain language and is clearly designed to be read by engineers wanting a first-cut understanding of the patent system and its purpose. In addition to patentability and infringement, the book also includes a nice chapter on inventorship and ownership rights.
In the past, I have often recommended the "Patent it Yourself " book by David Pressman to inventors and others wanting to better understand the process. The problem with Pressman's book is that it has become so lengthy (596 pages) that it is no longer an easy resource for those more casually involved in the system. Schox book likely fills that gap. (PIY is still a great resource for those more deeply involved in prosecution.)
Do others have recommendations of patent law resources for inventors who want to better understand the system without actually becoming patent agents?
Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., 10-cv-4645 (E.D. Pa. October 4, 2011)
by Dennis Crouch
In September 2010, Tyco Fire filed suit against Victaulic alleging infringement of two fire sprinkler system patents. U.S. Patent Nos. 7,793,736 and 7,819,201. Almost one-year into the lawsuit, Tyco Fire filed a pair of reissue application with the PTO – admitting that that both patents have defects that need correcting. The reissue applications request that the PTO narrow the subject matter being claimed with the apparent hope of avoiding an adverse invalidity decision in court.
![Patentlyo087_small[1]](https://cdn.patentlyo.com/media/images/2011/10/6a00d8341c588553ef01539234f3ca970b-800wi.jpg "Patentlyo087_small[1]")
After filing the reissue applications, the patentee requested that the district court stay the litigation pending the outcome of the reissue. In response, Victaulic cited my post from January 2011 identifying the average five-year pendency for reissued patents. In a brief filed under seal, Tyco's attorneys from Morgan Lewis called my post "unreliable" and "unsubstantiated" because it was found in a blog.
In deciding the issue, the judge correctly found that the reissue will certainly take some time even if my post regarding the average delay does not exactly predict the path for Tyco's applications. A potential important difference is that my data reflects the average for all reissue prosecutions but does not separate-out cases going through expedited reissue. See MPEP § 1442.
In the end, the judge refused to stay the litigation based upon the potential delay and the fact that the reissue does not appear to be likely to narrow the issues in the litigation. In addition, the court found that the reissue was motivated by claim construction questions posed by the defendant in the litigation. This timing issue (first seeing the claim construction arguments, then filing for reissue) raised "alarm bells" with the judge who identified the move as a potential "litigation gambit" intended to give the plaintiff a tactical advantage.
Stay denied.
Note: I contacted the Morgan Lewis attorneys who submitted the brief for a comment on what was particularly unreliable or unsubstantiated regarding my post. They have not responded.
In re Stepan Co. (Fed. Cir. 2011)
by Dennis Crouch
This is an important administrative patent law case holding that when the Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI) affirms a rejection based upon a new factual finding, it must identify the holding as a new ground for rejection. This holding benefits patent applicants because it creates a right to either reopen prosecution or request a rehearing based upon the new ground.
Here, the examiner rejected Stepan's claims as anticipated and obvious. Stepan had submitted a Rule 1.131 affidavit claiming a prior invention date in order to antedate one of the references. However, the examiner gave the affidavit no legal effect based upon the judgment that a prior public use of a portion of the invention qualified as 102(b) prior art because it occurred more than one year before the application filing date.
In the administrative appeal, the Board ruled that the applicant could claim priority to an earlier application and that, therefore the the prior art was no longer 102(b) prior art. However, the Board affirmed the rejection after holding that the prior use was still 102(a) prior art because the content of the Rule 1.131 affidavit was insufficient to prove Stepan's prior invention rights.
Writing for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judge Prost vacated the Board's decision — holding that the Board's factual finding on the sufficiency of the content of the affidavit was a new factual finding that was not a basis of the examiner's rejection being reviewed and, therefore, that the Board must identify the affirmed rejection as a new ground of rejection.
Notice does not focus on the applicant’s arguments divorced from the examiner’s rejections of record that are actually appealed to the Board. Instead, it focuses on the “adverse decisions of examiners” during prosecution which form the basis of the Board’s scope of review. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Because Stepan did not have prior notice of the Board’s intent to craft and rely on new findings of fact to support a §§ 102(a)/103(a) rejection and because it failed to identify this rejection as a new ground, Stepan’s notice rights were violated. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3); 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Had the Board labeled its rejection as a new ground of rejection, Stepan could have reopened prosecution to address the newly-alleged deficiencies in its Declaration with the examiner.
Note: Although this case involves an ex parte reexamination, the principles here apply equally with ordinary ex parte examination. However, the decision will not apply to the new post grant review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith AIA because the review goes directly to the Board (the newly named Patent Trial and Appeal Board or PTAB) rather than an examiner.
Atlantic Research Marketing Systems (ARMS) v. Troy Industries (Fed. Cir. 2011)
By Dennis Crouch
This appeal stems from a 2007 patent infringement and business tort lawsuit filed by ARMS against its former employee and current competitor (Mr. Troy). ARMS' reissue patent claims a firearm hand-guard with an attachment point at the firearm's barrel nut. The original patent application included both the barrel nut attachment and a sleeve support as claim limitations. However, the reissue patent does not require the sleeve support. That change is important for the case because TROY's competing hand-guard uses the barrel nut as the single attachment point.
On summary judgment the district court ruled the patent invalid for failing the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 p1.
Written Description Requirement: Section 112 p1 of the Patent Act requires that a patent specification include "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same." In Ariad, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that this provision creates the separate and distinct requirements of written description and enablement. The test for written description considers whether, after reading the original specification, one of skill in the art would understand that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention. Most written description cases arise in situations like this where the patentee has amended its claims well after the application filing date.
Although not cited here, this case is similar to the Federal Circuit's Gentry Gallery decision where an element in the original claims was omitted in a broader-amended claim. In Gentry Gallery, the original application was directed to a pair of recliners with controls located on a console. The amended claims removed any restriction on the console location. The Federal Circuit held those broader claims invalid because "the patent disclosure did not support claims in which location of recliner controls was other than on the console."
On appeal here, the Federal Circuit agreed that the broader claims are invalid under the written description requirement because it the specification does not provide any evidence that the inventor invented a hand-guard that uses the barrel nut as the one and only attachment point.
[I]t is undisputed that the written description for the '465 patent does not disclose to a person of ordinary skill in the art an invention where the yoke/barrel nut attachment point provides complete support for the handguard accessory. Claims 31-36, however, clearly cover such a design. Put differently, claims 31-36 [as amended] exceed in scope the subject matter that [the inventor] chose to disclose to the public in the written description. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment invalidating claims 31-36 for failing to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Mr. Swan used the reissue process to impermissibly obtain claims unsupported by the written description.
ARMS had also sued TROY for trade secret violation and argued in court that ARMS version of the barrel-nut-only attachment was a trade secret stolen by TROY. That testimony bolstered the court's conclusion that the asserted claims lacked the written description support to cover a barrel-nut-only attachment.
[ARMS] cannot now "have it both ways" by reaching back and relying on the disclosures in the '245 patent to claim an invention he was purposely shielding from the public.
Trade Secret Violation: Although TROY won the patent dispute, the jury found troy liable for trade secret misappropriation and breach of a fiduciary duty to his former employee. The award was $1.8 million in damages under Massachusetts Trade Secret Law. (Massachusetts has not adopted the UTSA). As noted above, the alleged trade secret is the method of attaching the hand-guard to a firearm using only the barrel nut. The jury was instructed that any protectable trade secret must go beyond what was disclosed in the '245 patent. Based upon that instruction, the Federal Circuit affirmed – finding no clear error.
This strategy worked perfectly for ARMS who would likely be satisfied winning either patent infringement or trade secret misappropriations. Although the court clearly sympathized with TROY's position, it noted that the legal positions taken by the two parties meant that ARMS was likely to win one of its claims.
Troy's argument illustrates the inherent tension Atlantic Research created by contending that Troy misappropriated trade secrets, while simultaneously asserting that the products Troy developed with the misappropriated trade secrets infringed its patent. In response, Troy contended that Atlantic Research's patent disclosed the trade secret, but also contended that the patent asserted against it was invalid for failing to disclose a written description of a handguard that attaches solely at the barrel nut. These conflicting positions left little room for either party to prevail on both claims.
The problem: In the end, the Federal Circuit vacated the jury verdict on a "jury taint" issue. One juror brought a plumbing clamp from home during deliberations to show other jurors and the appellate panel held that the judge should have taken more dramatic steps to ensure that the clamp did not have any "prejudicial effect on the jury as a whole."
Is it really a First-to-File Patent System?
102(b) (1) reads:
The language of 102(b)(1) could cause lots of controversy. Essentially if an inventor puts his invention or disclosure on the internet or discloses it any public way, he/she has one year from that date to file a patent application, and the disclosure would not count as prior art against the inventor. However, the disclosure would count as prior art for a later inventor, which seems to suggest a First-to-Invent system. This creates an incentive for inventors to disclose inventions immediately so as to bar other inventors and receive an early priority date. I expect litigation about this topic and the many situations that could arise.
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In a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay, Professor Joshua Sarnoff (DePaul) highlights a set of important problems in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. The essay, titled Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act focuses primarily on the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and its implications regarding the patentability of material that was either wholly or partially derived from another source.
Legislation sometimes is enacted that obviously requires either immediate revision or creative administrative and judicial interpretation. The new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s derivation and prior art provisions fall in that category. Whether or not the move from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system is viewed as good policy and as authorized by the Constitution, the particular changes made to the prior art provisions may not prevent or invalidate patents on inventions derived from others, i.e., when the applicant has obtained knowledge of an invention from another, original inventor and then files for a patent on the same or a similar invention. In particular, obvious inventions made with unauthorized derived knowledge will now be patentable, given the elimination of prior art section § 102(f). Absent creative interpretations by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts, the new derivation proceedings will not prevent a first filer from obtaining a patent even if the first filer’s invention is merely an obvious extension of information derived from another. Further, the new act adds a narrow and poorly understood category of prior art that may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the currently well-understood boundaries of the public domain. I discuss these problems in detail below.
There is some hope that Congress and the Administration will take Professor Sarnoff’s concerns to heart.
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Journal 12 (sarnoff.2011.derivation).
In a new Patently-O Patent Law Journal essay, Professor Joshua Sarnoff (DePaul) highlights a set of important problems in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. The essay, titled Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act focuses primarily on the elimination of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and its implications regarding the patentability of material that was either wholly or partially derived from another source.
Professor Sarnoff writes:
Legislation sometimes is enacted that obviously requires either immediate revision or creative administrative and judicial interpretation. The new Leahy-Smith America Invents Act's derivation and prior art provisions fall in that category. Whether or not the move from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system is viewed as good policy and as authorized by the Constitution, the particular changes made to the prior art provisions may not prevent or invalidate patents on inventions derived from others, i.e., when the applicant has obtained knowledge of an invention from another, original inventor and then files for a patent on the same or a similar invention. In particular, obvious inventions made with unauthorized derived knowledge will now be patentable, given the elimination of prior art section § 102(f). Absent creative interpretations by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts, the new derivation proceedings will not prevent a first filer from obtaining a patent even if the first filer's invention is merely an obvious extension of information derived from another. Further, the new act adds a narrow and poorly understood category of prior art that may generate years of needless litigation to re-settle the currently well-understood boundaries of the public domain. I discuss these problems in detail below.
There is some hope that Congress and the Administration will take Professor Sarnoff's concerns to heart.
Read the article: Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Review 12 at /media/docs/2012/10/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf.
Prior Patently-O Patent Law Journal Articles include:
Patent Jobs
Steve Jobs is listed as a co-inventor of dozens of patents – many of them reflecting the iconic and revolutionary designs associated with Apple. Jobs died today and is already missed.
My first Steve Jobs computer was the Apple II c in 1984.
