The Federal Circuit recently issued a decision in Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Technology Limited, No. 2023-1194 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024), reversing Judge Alan Albright's finding that certain claims of Maxell's patent covering rechargeable lithium-ion battery indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (112(b)). U.S. Patent No. 9,077,035.
The case provides important cover for patent prosecutors who inelegantly add narrowed limitations from the dependent claims into the independent claims without rewriting or deleting the corresponding broader element descriptions already there.
The Federal Circuit has affirmed the PTAB's finding that Pfizer's pneumococcal vaccine patent is obvious, but has vacated and remanded the Board's denial of Pfizer's motion to amend certain claims. Pfizer Inc. v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., No. 19-1871 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2024); U.S. Patent No. 9,492,559. Pfizer v. Sanofi Opinion.
I am super excited to be part of a big interdisciplinary conference this week here at the University of Missouri where we'll be focusing on AI and Society: Government, Policy, and the Law. Co-hosted by the Truman School of Government and Public Affairs and the University of Missouri School of Law, this two-day event on March 7-8, 2024, will bring together a diverse group of experts to explore four main themes: AI in Government, Impact of AI on Democracy, Government Regulation and AI, and Creating an AI Ready Public Sector; and a collection of the papers will be published in the Missouri Law Review.
The Federal Circuit held oral arguments on March 4, 2024 in the important patent case of Celanese Int'l. v ITC, 22-1827 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
The question: Under the AIA, does sale of a product by the patent applicant prohibit the patentee from later patenting the process used to make the product?
Elon Musk was instrumental in the initial creation of OpenAI as a nonprofit with the vision of responsibly developing artificial intelligence (AI) to benefit humanity and to prevent monopolistic control over the technology. After ChatGPT went viral in late 2022, the company began focusing more on revenue and profits. It added a major for-profit subsidiary and completed a $13+ billion deal with Microsoft -- entitling the industry giant to a large share of OpenAI's future profits and a seat on the Board.
In a new lawsuit, Elon Musk alleges that OpenAI and its CEO Sam Altman have breached the organization's founding vision. [Musk vs OpenAI].
The six PTAB decisions reviewed below provide insight into the application of 35 USC 101 in cases involving more than just computer hardware and software. While the claims in each decision recite physical devices or molecules, the PTAB still found most to be ineligible as directed to an abstract idea and lacking an integrated inventive concept beyond well-understood, routine conventional activities. A core parallel across the decisions is the PTAB's focus on whether the additional elements in the claims, including the physical components, integrate the judicial exception into a practical application or provide significantly more.
I wanted to consider some recent PTAB jurisprudence on patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The following post reviews four recent eligibility cases. In all four cases the PTAB found the claims lacked eligibility. Two of the cases affirmed examiner rejections while the other two added eligibility as a new grounds for rejection after finding that the examiner erred in their 102/103 rejections. All four cases here involve communications technology where the patent applicant was seeking to claim the functional operational steps without describing any new "technology." I have a second post coming with recent device 101 cases from the PTAB.
The recent Federal Circuit decision in AlexSam, Inc. v. MasterCard Intl. Inc. provides a lesson into the importance of carefully drafting—and understanding—the scope of licensing terms, especially covenants not to sue. Of importance to this case is understanding both their scope and their duration. The second half of the post delves into the jurisdictional hook that allowed the Federal Circuit to hear this case, even though it originated as a state law breach of contract claim, as well as analyzing whether MasterCard's invalidity declaratory judgment counterclaim was truly compulsory, as required for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. The post also notes a curious empaneling of judges. 22-2046.OPINION.2-28-2024_2277625.
Earlier this week, the USPTO published updated examination guidelines regarding obviousness determinations under 35 U.S.C. §103. While these new guidelines are not legally binding, they offer important insight into how the Office plans to apply an even more flexible approach to obviousness -- something Director Vidal sees as mandated by the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). (2500 words).
Overall the guidance here suggests that the office is looking to make non-obviousness a larger hurdle via increased flexibility. Still, the guidelines spend some time on the requirements of a prima facie case; the necessity of both evidence and reasoning to support any obviousness rejection; and consideration of all evidence before the examiner. Obviousness is already the most common rejection - with the vast majority of applications being initially rejected as obvious. It will be interesting to see whether the rates go up even further following this new guidance.
This post breaks down the guidelines and walks through some potential strategies for patent applicants.
A jury in Judge Albright's W.D.Tex. court sided with Amazon - finding no infringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed -- particularly affirming Judge Albright rejection of Freshub's post-verdict motions. Freshub, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 22-1391 (Fed. Cir. Feb 26, 2024). In a cross-appeal, Amazon argues that the district court should have found the patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. That appeal was also rejected. Freshub v Amazon.
No Reversible Error in Denying Inequitable Conduct
I want to use this blog post to focus on the finding of no inequitable conduct.
The Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on February 21 in an important copyright case - Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy. The central issue is whether copyright plaintiffs can recover damages for infringing acts that occurred more than three years before filing suit, under the "discovery accrual rule."
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently published examination guidance and a request for comments on the treatment of inventorship for inventions created with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions.
The key takeaway here is that the USPTO believes that an AI-developed invention is patentable so long as a human satisfies the joint-inventorship standard of "significantly contributing to the invention." A human who provides a significant contribution may be the sole inventor and original owner, even in situations where the AI provided the greater contribution.
The PTO's approach here is fairly broad and will likely serve current AI use cases in most situations because most AI invention models of today are tightly controlled and managed by humans rather than simply arising from AI autogeneration or broad prompting. Thus, from a practical effect, there will likely be at least one natural person who satisfies the joint inventorship standard in the vast majority of cases. (Recognizing here that mere control of an AI is insufficient. Rather, the human must provide significant inventive contribution).
Although I am very sympathetic to recognizing human contributions, I also want a patent system that broadly encourages innovation without either prescribing or proscribing particular approaches. The flexibility of this guidance allows room for both human and machine intelligence to intersect in the creative process. But, we should continue monitoring the effects the policy to ensure it does not unduly constrain AI's eventual capacity to autonomously formulate inventive concepts. But for now, the USPTO's basic framework reasonably balances competing interests.
But, the USPTO's approach is not fully grounded in the law because it allows for patenting of an invention in a situation where no human or combination of humans fully conceived of and originated the invention. Rather, we are simply looking for at least one human who provided a significant contribution. The guidance does not particularly address this issue and, by declining to specifically justify the legal grounds why human "significant contributions" suffice even without complete conception, the USPTO leaves the door open to contrary arguments. Opponents could contend that full conception remains legally required for inventorship and that this expansion of the inventorship doctrine exceeds the statutory language. It is not clear who will have standing to make this particular argument.
Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman has been fighting for her right to judge after charges implicating her fitness for office. Earlier this month, a committee of federal judges upheld Newman's one-year suspension from new case assignments for refusing to cooperate with a misconduct investigation. Newman had separately sued her colleagues in DC District Court, but Judge Cooper has now dismissed most of that lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds. While a few counts remain, the court's ruling deals a serious blow to Judge Newman's attempt to challenge the judiciary's self-policing procedures. Newman v. Moore, 23-cv-01334 (D.D.C., February 12, 2024). Newman v. Moore Decision.
I am super excited to be part of a big interdisciplinary conference this week here at the University of Missouri where we'll be focusing on 
