by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit's 1993 decision in In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993), set an important boundary on the use of inherency in obviousness determinations. I recently reread the case and wanted to reintroduce the case that continues to be regularly cited in both patent prosecution and litigation.

Rijckaert involved a patent application for a magnetic recording apparatus that established a precise mathematical relationship between time expansion/compression and three variables: α (the wrapping angle of tape around the drum), n (the number of head pairs), and M (non-recording intervals). This relationship—expressed as α*n/(180*(M+1))—allowed for optimal track filling on the magnetic tape.  The approach was designed to allow reduction of acoustic noise by positioning heads close together with rigid mechanical coupling, while maintaining proper signal timing and track alignment regardless of drum wobble or other mechanical imperfections.  The PTO rejected the application as obvious two prior art references, despite neither reference teaching the claimed relationship or even discussing all three variables in combination.

The Board of Patent Appeals upheld the rejection by assuming that the relationship would be inherently satisfied if one assumed specific values for the variables. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed, emphasizing that the prior art failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness because it neither disclosed nor suggested the claimed relationship.

by Dennis Crouch

Although the Supreme Court permits color itself to serve as a trademark, the cases have generally not been strongly supportive. The Federal Circuit's recent decision on green medical examination gloves fits this standard like a ... glove. In re PT Medisafe Technologies (Fed. Cir. April 29, 2025). The decision particularly focuses on color mark genericness, holding that the dark green color for chloroprene medical examination gloves was "so common in the industry that it cannot identify a single source."

by Dennis Crouch

Last week, Acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart vacated Final Written Decisions invalidating two semiconductor patents, remanding the cases back to the PTAB with instructions to permit discovery into potential privity relationships. Semiconductor Components Industries, LLC v. Greenthread, LLC, IPR2023-01242, IPR2023-01243, IPR2023-01244 (April 24, 2025). This represents a significant rebuke of the PTAB's handling of time-bar issues and privity allegations under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), and is yet another general victory for patentees seeking relief from IPR cancellations. IPR2023-01242 -1243 -1244 Semiconductor v Greenthread DR Decision

Although the privity issue is juicy because it suggests backroom dealing, two additional aspects of the decision may end up being more important: the Board's refusal to hear certain arguments about prior art disclosures and its improper exclusion of district court claim construction orders.

by Dennis Crouch

In 2024, the USPTO released its AI inventorship guidance that established a "significant contribution" standard for human inventorship for AI-assisted innovation situations. This short essay argues that the USPTO's approach creates a fundamental legal inconsistency with patent law's bedrock requirement of complete human conception. Because the USPTO's approach lacks both legal weight and legal merit, it ultimately threatens the validity of patents covering inventions generated with substantial AI-assistance.

By Dennis Crouch

Although most of our fare is IP related, I have also been keeping an eye on other Federal Circuit cases.  On April 28, 2025, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in  one of those, Soto v. US, a case could significantly impact thousands of combat-disabled veterans seeking retroactive benefits. The Court will decide whether veterans can receive full retroactive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) payments or are instead limited to six years of backpay under the federal Barring Act.

Background: Marine veteran Simon Soto served in Mortuary Affairs during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he retrieved fallen service members, often under combat conditions. This obviously stressful assignment led to severe PTSD, resulting in his medical retirement in 2006. In December 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs rated him 100% disabled due to combat-related PTSD, which qualified him for CRSC under a 2008 program expansion that opened benefits to all medically retired veterans with combat-related disabilities.

However, Soto did not apply for these benefits until 2016, approximately eight years after becoming eligible. While the Navy approved his claim, it only provided retroactive payments dating back six years (to December 2010), citing the six year statute of limitations found in the "Barring Act." 31 U.S.C. § 3702.  Soto argues that the CRSC statute itself (10 U.S.C. § 1413a) contains its own settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act's time limitation.  The Barring Act provides "authority to settle claims" against the U.S. Government, and particularly identifies a settlement process with the six-year statute of limitations to be used "except as provided [by] another law."  The question then is whether the CRSC statute does, in fact, provide, alternative settlement authority.  The basic problem is that the CRSC statute does not expressly state that it is providing "settlement" authority and it contains no statute of limitations.  On this second point, Soto suggests that the absence of a SOL is a feature

As I wrote last November, the Federal Circuit split 2-1 in reversing the district court's ruling in favor of Soto. Judge Todd Hughes, writing for the majority, applied a formalist approach requiring specific statutory language. Hughes concluded that nothing in the CRSC statute expressly supersedes the Barring Act, looking for "magic words" such as specific authorization to "settle" claims or an alternative limitations period.  Judge Jimmie Reyna dissented, advocating for a more functional analysis that would benefit the disabled veterans. Reyna argued that the majority's test was unnecessarily rigid, pointing out that over a century ago, the Supreme Court defined "settle" in this context to simply mean making an administrative determination of the amount of money due on a claim. In his view, the CRSC process unquestionably meets that definition. This divide between Hughes and Reyna reflects a broader philosophical tension I've observed across multiple cases, with Hughes typically adopting a text-focused formalist approach and Reyna favoring a more purposive or justice-oriented analysis that considers practical impacts.

"You only get one shot, do not miss your chance to blow. This opportunity comes once in a lifetime, yo." Emenim

The Federal Circuit recently affirmed the District of Delaware's denial of Franz Wakefield's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), underscoring the importance of timely raising arguments during the normal appeal process. Wakefield v. Blackboard Inc., Nos. 2024-2030 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 2025).

Wakefield, proceeding pro se, sought to reopen a judgment invalidating his U.S. Patent No. 7,162,696 based on indefiniteness grounds more than two years after the district court's original judgment and more than a year after the Federal Circuit's affirmance. The Federal Circuit panel of Judges Lourie, Dyk, and Chen had little difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Rule 60(b) motion untimely. As the court emphasized, Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal.

by Dennis Crouch

While a design patent can technically claim priority to a prior utility patent, that approach takes some planning and forethought to ensure that the utility patent's drawings and disclosure sufficiently show possession of the specific ornamental design features that will later be claimed in the design application.  Ideally, the drawings in the utility filing would be identical to those later included in the design application.

This situation is exemplified by the Federal Circuit's recent decision In re Floyd (Fed. Cir. April 22, 2025) (non-precedential).  The claimed design is a cooling blanket -- with the drawings showing a 6x5 array pattern.  The priority filing included a 6x6 array, a 6x4 array, and a statement that the array could include a plurality of array layouts.  But, the priority filing did not specifically and expressly include the 6x5.  The result: priority claim denied for lack of written description.

The case also illustrates the "daylight" between written description and anticipation standards, creating a trap where an applicant's own published application can both fail to provide written description support yet anticipate a later filing.  In this case, although Floyd's prior published application was insufficient as a priority document, the court found it served perfectly well as an anticipatory reference.

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit's AI-patent decision this week affirmed a district court's dismissal of the claims as ineligible, holding that "generic" machine learning technology is itself an abstract idea. Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp., No. 2023-2437 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).

In its decision, the court acknowledged the growing importance of machine learning, and exerted some care in limiting its holding:

Machine learning is a burgeoning and increasingly important field and may lead to patent-eligible improvements in technology. Today, we hold only that patents that do no more than claim the application of generic machine learning to new data environments, without disclosing improvements to the machine learning models to be applied, are patent ineligible under § 101.

At oral arguments, the patenee's attorney Robert Fredrickson (Goodwin) explained that one reason his client did not claim a new algorithm is that it would have raised 101 issues:

This wasn't an invention of a new machine learning technique, because that would fall into another one of this court's section 101 traps, is if the claim is improving the mathematical algorithm or making machine learning better, then we're claiming the natural law, the mathematical algorithm itself.

That question --  scope of protection for new machine learning algorithms -- will be left for another day.

by Dennis Crouch

Back when he was a law professor here at Mizzou, I recall taking with Sen. Josh Hawley about his favorite Supreme Court case - Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  The case has come to stand for the principle of judicial review, establishing the Supreme Court's authority to determine the constitutionality of laws and executive actions.  In the recent Federal Circuit case Xerox v. Facebook, Xerox relied on Marbury in a novel constitutional argument challenging the relationship between the PTAB and and Article III courts when it comes to claim construction -- arguing that the executive branch (the PTAB) is violating separation of powers principles by ignoring Article III court opinions. If you recall, the USPTO and PTAB have historically interpreted claims using broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) rather than the standard approach outlined in Phillips v. AWH.  But, the USPTO changed its approach a few years ago and linked the standards -- with the result that the issue should not simply be ducked.

The basic question: does the PTAB have to follow a district court's prior claim construction of a patent term under principles of stare decisis?

by Dennis Crouch

Google has skipped its chance to respond to Cellspin's petition for writ of certiorari  in a case raising questions about judicial recusal standards. In Cellspin Soft v. Fitbit, the petitioner asks the Supreme Court to address when federal judges must recuse themselves under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and whether appellate courts must determine recusal issues before reaching the merits of a case.  The petition stems from patent infringement litigation initiated by Cellspin against several technology companies, including Fitbit (owned by Google), asserting Bluetooth media upload patents.

The recusal issue emerged after N.D. Cal. Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted summary judgment of non-infringement to all defendants. Cellspin subsequently filed a motion seeking the judge's recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, which governs judicial disqualification. The motion was based primarily on two grounds: (1) the judge's spouse worked as an operating partner at Ajax Strategies, a venture capital firm with financial ties to Google (seemingly as co-investors), and (2) the judge personally owned investments in a hedge fund worth between $5-25 million with undisclosed investments.

by Dennis Crouch

In a precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit has denied SAP's mandamus petition seeking to transfer its patent infringement case from the Marshall Division to the Sherman Division within the Eastern District of Texas -- and also change judges. In re SAP America, Inc., No. 2025-118 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2025).   Although SAP made good arguments in the case, they just were not good enough to overcome the particularly high burdens for transfer and mandamus.

Although it has failed, the bold petition is a continuation of the successful extra-legal campaign that turned Judge Albright's Waco courtroom back into a ghost town. On the legal side, the decision highlights the high bar for obtaining mandamus relief in disputes over convenient venue, particularly for intra-district transfers under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).  The case is also notable as the first Federal Circuit appeal brought by Kathi Vidal since leaving her role as USPTO director and rejoining her old 1,000 attorney firm Winston & Strawn. Matthew Berkowitz (Reichman Jorgensen) and his team successfully defended against the mandamus petition, which the court decided without oral arguments. (I also hope that neither of them are too upset by their ChatGPT image remakes)

by Dennis Crouch

In April 2025, President Trump took initiative to sharply increased tariffs on imports, citing trade imbalances and reciprocity. In response, major trading partners such as the European Union (EU), China and others are considered countermeasures that go beyond tit-for-tat tariffs. President Trump's actions were ostensibly driven by the large U.S. trade deficit in goods, but it also threatens key areas of U.S. strength – namely services, intellectual property (IP), and foreign investment where the U.S. runs global surpluses that far outpace the goods deficit. This asymmetry means that broad U.S. tariffs on goods can be met by partners' retaliation in areas where U.S. firms rely heavily on foreign markets. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) can include a variety of impediment to open markets reducing access without raising a customs duty. NTMs have been a major aspect of global trade initiatives over the past several decades--with the U.S. most often pushing our global partner nations to reduce barriers and provide open markets with free trade. That world has now changed.