by Dennis Crouch

One of the more shocking patent decisions of 2023 was Judge Alsup’s holding in Sonos, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. C 20-06754 WHA, 2023 WL 6542320 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2023).  The scathing opinion left two Sonos multi-zone smart-speaker patents unenforceable due to prosecution laches and a rejection of the $32 million jury verdict.  Sonos had amended its claims after after learning of Google’s particular product, and Judge Alsup found that approach inequitable, concluding that the patentee was “wringing fresh claims to read on a competitor’s products from an ancient application.”  But, Sonos’ prosecution approach in the case is a widespread practice in the field and so the case raises significant questions about both patent enforcement strategies and equitable loss of rights based upon “late claiming” where claims are amended in response to market conditions.

The Appeal Brief: A Closer Look

Sonos has now filed an appeal brief that challenges Judge Alsup’s decision on several grounds, emphasizing the fairness of their patent prosecution process and arguing against the application of prosecution laches. The brief details the timeline of Sonos’s patent filings, innovations, and claim amendments, arguing these were done in good faith and within the bounds of patent law norms.  I’ll reprint the introduction here:

The district court has strong views about “the way the patent system should work.” But those views conflict with the Patent Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court’s precedent. Undeterred, the district court rewrote patent law and reconstituted the judicial role to erase a $32.5 million jury verdict and throw out other patent claims that should have been tried.

To override the jury verdict, the district court recast the doctrine of prosecution laches in an unprecedented way to declare two of Sonos’s patents unenforceable. The court recognized that Sonos prosecuted the patent family diligently through several continuation applications off a 2006 provisional application. The court also acknowledged that Sonos did nothing that extended its patents’ terms. Yet the court held that Sonos took too long to prosecute the specific claims it asserted against Google here. The court was most troubled that Sonos added the asserted claims in a continuation application after Google brought its infringing products to market. But Sonos disclosed the invention years before Google even began investing in those products, and informed Google about that patent family. In fact, Sonos had already secured patents in the same family with broader claims covering Google’s products. At any rate, “amend[ing] [to] insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product” is not “in any manner improper”—and, in fact, is entirely compatible with Congress’s design. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). If this Court condones this novel application of prosecution laches, it will endanger many thousands of patents secured through standard continuation practice and discourage the early and complete disclosure of new innovations.

The district court also found the asserted claims invalid on the ground that Sonos did not supply adequate written description as of the claimed priority date. The court had previously rejected Google’s summary judgment motion on written description, and Google did not try that defense or a priority-date challenge to the jury. Yet the court took the reins of Google’s defense and crafted a narrative of Sonos’s subterfuge to justify its invalidity ruling. The court hinted at this story for the first time in the middle of trial, but waited until after trial to recount it fully, depriving Sonos of any opportunity to present testimony refuting it. The court found that written description for the asserted claims depended on a single sentence that Sonos added to the specification by amendment in 2019. It ignored that the specification contained additional support for the claims and the sentence in question had been incorporated by reference into every earlier application in the priority chain. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Sonos had tricked the Patent Office into allowing the amendment. That finding was inconsistent with the record evidence and depended on multiple disputed facts that would have been for jurors to decide—if anyone had ever presented the issues to them.

These intrusions into the jury’s domain were not isolated to the two patents that went to trial. On two other patents, the district court granted Google summary judgment of invalidity. But it did so only by resolving factual disputes about the prior art. This is not how Congress said the patent system should work, nor how the Federal Rules say the judicial system should work. This Court should reverse the post-trial laches and invalidity rulings on the ’885 and ’966 patents. And it should vacate the summary judgment rulings on the ’615 and ’033 patents to allow Sonos to try its case to a jury.

SonosBrief.

The outcome of the appeal could have significant implications for how patents are prosecuted and enforced. A reversal of Judge Alsup’s ruling might affirm the validity of strategic claim amendments, provided they are done within the legal boundaries.  Conversely, upholding the decision could set a precedent that restricts how patent holders can amend claims in response to emerging technologies and competitors.

Sonos lead appellate counsel is Joshua Rosenkranz (Orrick), and the team includes George Lee (Lee Sullivan).  Dan Bagatell (Perkins Coie) is lead appellate counsel for Google.  Google has 40 days to file its responsive brief.

by Dennis Crouch

Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman has been fighting for her right to judge after charges implicating her fitness for office.  Earlier this month, a committee of federal judges upheld Newman’s one-year suspension from new case assignments for refusing to cooperate with a misconduct investigation.  Newman had separately sued her colleagues in DC District Court, but Judge Cooper has now dismissed most of that lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds. While a few counts remain, the court’s ruling deals a serious blow to Judge Newman’s attempt to challenge the judiciary’s self-policing procedures.  Newman v. Moore, 23-cv-01334 (D.D.C., February 12, 2024). Newman v. Moore Decision. (more…)

I have a poll running LinkedIn about whether the Federal Government should more aggressively use its march-in rights to ensure public access to federally funded inventions. Add your vote: LinkedInVote

Yesterday in my patent prosecution course, students turned to AI tools to help them draft patent claims.  None of the AI-proposed claims were ready for prime-time, but they served as a useful starting point as the students organized their thoughts.  More and more attorneys are turning to these same AI tools to help them be more productive and efficient while delivering a higher quality work product.  It is tough, for instance, to read all the prior art. AI tools can help mine the references for potential obviousness problems — and provide a pin cite to the key language in the art.

USPTO Director Vidal recently released a new memorandum concerning the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in patent office proceedings.  directorguidance-aiuse-legalproceedings. The memo recognizes that AI tools can be powerful both for applicants and for USPTO examiners.  But, AI tools cannot be used to avoid ethical duties.  The memo thus provides firm guidance that existing ethics rules on candor and misconduct apply even when AI tools are used to generate legal filings and evidence. This comes on the heels of several high-profile cases of “AI hallucination” outside of the PTO context, where language models like ChatGPT produced false information that lawyers presented as fact or law.

For example, submissions to the USPTO generally require a signature, and by affixing a signature, the signatory-who has to be a person-certifies, among other things, that “All statements made therein of the party’s own knowledge are true,” that “all statements made therein on information and belief are believed to be true,” that “after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” any “legal contentions are warranted by existing law” or “by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension … or reversal of existing law,” and that “factual contentions have evidentiary support” or likely will have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Quoting from USPTO Rule 11.18.  This rule is based directly on the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure , Rule 11 that has been applied in the AI context.  Dir. Vidal goes on to highlight a few particular circumstances:

• Simply assuming the accuracy of an AI tool is not a reasonable inquiry.  
• A submission (including an AI-generated or Al-assisted submission) that misstates facts or law could also be construed as a paper presented for an improper purpose because it could “cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of any proceeding before the Office.”
• Etc.

Be careful out there everyone!

by Dennis Crouch

The Judicial Conduct and Disability Committee has denied Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman’s petition challenging the Federal Circuit Judicial Council’s misconduct finding against her. The Committee includes seven Federal Judges from around the country, chaired by Fourth Circuit Judge Traxler. The particular finding here is an affirming the Federal Circuit’s determination that Judge Newman committed serious misconduct by refusing to undergo a requested medical examination to assess whether she has a disability rendering her unable to discharge her judicial duties. In re Newman.

The complaint originated in March 2023 when the Federal Circuit Chief Judge Moore identified concerns about Judge Newman’s fitness for office based on incidents suggesting significant cognitive impairment. A Special Committee of Federal Circuit judges was appointed to investigate whether Judge Newman has a disability. The Committee ordered Judge Newman to undergo neurological and neuropsychological testing to make this determination. Judge Newman refused, arguing the special Committee lacked reasonable basis for the testing and her due process rights were violated.

The Special Committee and Judicial Council (consisting of all Federal Circuit judges except for Judge Newman) found Judge Newman’s refusal to comply constituted serious misconduct under the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. Her failure to cooperate meant that her “fitness” could not be determined.  As sanction, Judge Newman was barred from hearing cases for one year, subject to renewal if she continues refusing to comply.

In her petition to the Broader Committee, Judge Newman argued the Council abused discretion by not transferring her case to another circuit and that alleged due process violations established good cause for her noncompliance. She also challenged the sanction as exceeding the Council’s authority.

The Committee upheld the misconduct finding and sanction.  It found the Chief Judge and Judicial Council properly exercised discretion not to request a transfer per the Rules’ exceptional circumstances standard. Judge Newman’s due process arguments also failed since she received required procedures and access to evidence. The one-year case suspension comported with the Council’s responsibility to ensure effective court administration under the circumstances and was “not grossly in excess of other suspensions imposed under the Act.”

By unanimously affirming the finding against Judge Newman, the Committee reinforced judicial councils’ broad authority to investigate disability complaints and impose sanctions for noncompliance. However, its opinion indicates that a transfer may be warranted if, for instance, Judge Newman calls Judicial Council members as witnesses regarding her fitness in future Judicial Council proceedings.

Judge Newman’s lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit is ongoing, with the district court considering the motion to dismiss filed by her co-judges.  Newman v. Moore, et al., Docket No. 1:23-cv-01334 (D.D.C. Filed May 10, 2023).

The Federal Circuit is hearing oral arguments today in the design patent case of  LKQ Corporation v. GM Global Technology Operations LLC 21-2348.  Judge Stoll’s opinion in the case sides with the patentee GM on the issue of obviousness — affirming a PTAB decision in favor of the patentee.  LKQ’s appellate team led by Prof. Mark Lemley argues that Federal Circuit’s obviousness standard (known here as the Rosen-Durling test) makes it too difficult to actual reject or cancel design patent claims.  Lemley argues for a much more flexible and common sense approach as required by KSR.  The USPTO’s amicus agrees Federal Circuit law should be expanded, but not as far as suggested by LKQ.  GM argues for the status quo.

According to the listing, the en banc panel today consist of Chief Judge Moore,  and Circuit Court Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll, and Stark.  Not listed is Judges Cunningham and Newman.  

Livestream below: (more…)

by Dennis Crouch

LKQ’s brief for today’s en banc rehearing begins with the following interesting statement: “As with utility patents, the U.S. Constitution and the Patent Act prohibit design patents on ordinary innovations.” It is the Constitutional question that is most interesting and calls forth the concurring opinion by Justice Douglass in the Great A&P Case.

The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents—gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge. . . . The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to govern.

Great A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156 (1950). Although case applied pre-1952 law, the reminder here is poignant. Justice Douglas goes on:

It is worth emphasis that every patent case involving validity presents a question which requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution. . . .  The Congress does not have free reign, for example, to decide that patents should be easily or freely given. . . . Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge. That is why through the years the opinions of the Court commonly have taken ‘inventive genius’ as the test. It is not enough that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of science.

The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard; and the question of validity of a patent is a question of law.

Id.   Later, in Deere, the Supreme Court suggests found that the newly written Section 103 was properly seen as statutory codification of the court’s standard “which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts.”  And, that standard is derived from the Court’s understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s requirement that the patent laws be designed to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”

The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).

Bringing this back to design patents and the LKQ case, the patent challenger here does not deeply engage with the constitutional question, but rather appears to use it as a constant interpretative reminder. GM’s brief does not mention the Constitution or its requirement to “promote the Progress.”  Likewise, none of the Federal Circuit’s obviousness decisions from the past year discussed the doctrine in light of the Constitutional requirement.

by Dennis Crouch

On Monday, February 5, 2024, the Federal Circuit will sit together for the first time in years to hear an en banc patent case.  In LKQ Corporation v. GM Global Technology Operations LLC, the court will consider whether to apply a more stringent obviousness test to design patents.  In a 2010 article, I concluded that “the current design patent examination system operates as a de facto registration system” with very little obviousness analysis except in cases of clear copying.  Although design patent examination has become more rigorous, obviousness rejections remain relatively rare in comparison to their utility patent brethren.

Oral arguments will include the 11 Federal Circuit judges (absent Judge Newman) along with Mark Lemley (arguing for the accused infringer and seeking a more rigorous obviousness test); Joe Herriges (arguing for the patentee GM largely seeking to preserve the status quo); and USPTO Acting Solicitor Farheena Rasheed (for amicus USPTO).  The case particularly focuses on whether the Supreme Court’s flexible test for obviousness from KSR v. Teleflex also applies to design patents.  In particular, the Federal Circuit’s Rosen-Durling test for design patent obviousness requires a primary reference as a starting point that is “basically the same” as the design being patented.  Lemley would throw out this approach entirely.  In its brief, the USPTO agrees that KSR requires more flexibility and that Rosen-Durling is “overly restrictive in several respects.” However, the USPTO suggests retaining the basic framework as a standard approach to obviousness, while permitting other approaches as necessitated by particular cases — allowing for both flexibility and the application of common sense.

On Feb 6 I am gathering online for a Suffolk Law School event to debate the case and its potential outcome and impact.  I will be joining Suffolk professor Sarah Burstein along with Meredith Lowry (Wright Lindsey); Darrell Mottley (Banner + Howard University); and Laura Sheridan (Google). See you there (REGISTRATION).

by Dennis Crouch

The new petition for certiorari filed by Liquidia raises some interesting questions about the ongoing race between inter partes review proceedings and district court litigation.  Liquidia Techs v. United Therapeutics Corp., 23-804 (US), on petition for writ of certiorari from United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

UTC won its infringement suit against Liquidia with a holding that its patent covering treprostinil administration by inhalation were valid and infringed. (US10716793).  While the appeal was pending, the PTAB sided against the patentee and found the claims unpatentable as obvious.  In the appeal, however, the Federal Circuit refused to give credence to the PTAB decision – finding that litigation was still “pending” and “non-final.” The claims had not actually been cancelled yet – since the Director only issues the certificate confirming unpatentability after any appeal. Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that IPR decisions do not have issue-preclusive (collateral estoppel) effect until the decision is affirmed on appeal, or the parties waive their right to appeal. Citing XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

Liquidia’s petition argues that the PTAB’s final-written decision should be given preclusive effect in parallel litigation even if an appeal is pending, just like would be done for a district court opinion. (more…)

by Dennis Crouch

Ficep begins its petition for certiorari with a brilliant statement of how its patented steel manufacturing method has won numerous awards and complements for its innovative approach, been copied by competitors, and led to numerous successful sales. Despite these clear indicia of patentability, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims — affirming the lower court’s judgment on appeal.

That the invention was an important real-world manufacturing innovation was, as a factual matter, thoroughly established. The improvement was touted as enabling vastly more efficient and superior manufacture of components – not just by Petitioner’s experts, but also in the defendant’s advertising. There was industry recognition applauding the “innovation.” There was copying by competitors. There was successful litigation and licensing. And there was specific customer demand for the improvement to the manufacturing process. That is, every objective indicium of inventiveness that this Court has identified was present in the technological, traditionally patent-eligible, setting of manufacturing lines.

Ficep petition for certiorari.  But, in the Federal Circuit’s view, facts are confined to the obviousness analysis, and Ficep’s patent is invalid because it is directed to an abstract idea. Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp., No. 2022-1590, 2023 WL 5346043 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2023).  The petition goes on to ask three questions:

1. Does a claim directed to patent-eligible subject matter (here, manufacturing) nevertheless become ineligible as “abstract” if the process is improved using automation? (and should an “abstract-idea” behind a claim to a patent-eligible process be identified and, if so, how and at what level of abstraction?)
2. What is the appropriate standard for determining whether a claim is “inventive,” conferring eligibility under Alice Step 2, including whether objective evidence of inventiveness and technological improvement is relevant?
3. Is either what a claim is “directed to” and whether that is abstract, or whether a claim is “inventive” as articulated in Alice step 2, only for a judge to decide as a legal matter or does it include fact issues and, if the latter, are they for a jury?

SCT No. 23-796.  This case again highlights the need for clearer guidance from the Supreme Court on when a patent claim directed to an industrial process should be considered an abstract idea and therefore patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

• Ficep Cert Petition
• Ficep FedCir Decision

For its part, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step test for patent eligibility established in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). At step one, the court determines whether the patent is “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept like an abstract idea. If so, then at step two the court searches for an “inventive concept” beyond the ineligible concept.

Here, the Federal Circuit held Ficep’s patent claims to be directed to the abstract idea of “extracting and transferring information from a design file to a manufacturing machine.” The court characterized the focus of the claims as “automating a previously manual process” that a human operator used to perform. Further finding no inventive concept at step two, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the claims were patent ineligible under § 101.

In its cert petition, Ficep contends that the Federal Circuit misapplied Alice in a way that conflicts with precedent and casts doubt on patents for industrial innovations. Ficep argues that its claims are directed to an eligible manufacturing process under Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which held that a rubber curing method did not become patent ineligible simply because one step used the Arrhenius equation to automate timing of when to open the presses. According to Ficep, the Federal Circuit improperly focused on one aspect of its claims—data extraction and transfer—rather than evaluating the claims as a whole, which require physical manufacture of components. Ficep also presented extensive evidence of its patented system’s superiority over prior manufacturing methods, which it contends demonstrates a technological advance under step two of Alice that the Federal Circuit wrongly dismissed.

Lets look at the claim at issue for just a moment. Claim 7 below claims an “apparatus for automatic manufacture of an object” and requires, among other things, “at least one manufacturing machine [that] manufactures the components” after receiving dimensions from a computing device.  Although the court agreed that the claim requires hardware, the court noted that the actual advance here is simply automating the previously manual process of transferring information from a CAD design model to a manufacturing machine.  The court found that, in a general sense, that automation process is an abstract idea.  And, that the patent claims offer no specific technological improvement that would transform the ineligible idea into a patent eligible.  But, the patentee here argues that the closest Supreme Court case on point is not Alice, but rather Diehr, which would favor eligibility.

7. An apparatus for automatic manufacture of an object, comprising:

a computing device adapted to create a design model of an object having multiple individual components, at least two of the individual components defining an intersection at which the two components are in contact with one another;

at least one programmable logic controller in communication with the computing device and with at least one manufacturing machine;

a receiver associated with the programmable logic controller for receiving the design model of the object;

a database unit adapted to store the design model received at the receiver;

a processor which is associated with the programmable logic controller and extracts from the design model a plurality of dimensions of components which define a plurality of components of the object;

wherein the processor identifies a plurality of intersection parameters which define the intersection of the two components;

wherein the processor extracts from the design model the intersection parameters;

a transmitter associated with the processor for transmitting the intersection and machining parameters and the component dimensions from the programmable logic controller to the at least one manufacturing machine; and

wherein the at least one manufacturing machine manufactures the components based at least in part on the transmitted component dimensions and on the transmitted intersection and manufacturing parameters.

In focusing on Diehr, the patentee here is raising a difficult issue that the the  Supreme Court’s landmark 1980 decision is effectively dead, even though it has not been rejected or repudiated by the Supreme Court. Rather, it was favorably cited in the Supreme Court’s recent trio of Bilksi, Mayo, and Alice.

Zombie Precedent: Ficep contends that its claims are analogous to the patent-eligible claims in Diamond v. Diehr for a rubber curing method that used the Arrhenius equation to calculate when to automatically open the presses. Ficep argues that like Diehr, its claims as a whole are directed to an eligible manufacturing process—namely manufacturing steel building components—even if one aspect involves automation based on extracting data like intersection parameters. But, the lower courts are not applying Diehr because they see that case as in conflict with the more recent trio. In its petition, Ficep asks the Supreme Court to make a statement on this issue — either confirm or overrule Diehr.

On the inventiveness issue that I started with in this post, the patentee here asks for guidance on Step-2 of Alice/Mayo and for a recognition that technological advance is a fact question for a jury to decide alongside parallel questions in obviousness and anticipation analysis.

= = =

The patentee-petitioner is represented by Matthew Lowrie and his team from Foley & Lardner.  Peddinghaus’s responsive brief is due Feb 23, 2024.  Their attorneys have not filed an appearance, but I expect they will still be represented by Nathaniel Love and his Sidley Austin team that includes Stephanie Koh and Leif Peterson.

David Lat has a great new podcast with Judge Pauline Newman and asks listeners to “evaluate the 96-year-old jurist’s mental acuity for yourself by listening to this podcast.”: https://davidlat.substack.com/p/integrity-an-interview-with-judge-pauline-newman

Lat also includes several video clips for those who would like to see Judge Newman as she speaks: https://davidlat.substack.com/p/6-video-clips-of-judge-pauline-newman