Search Results for: "means plus function"

Means-Plus-Function Claims in Patent Eligibility and Infringement Analyses

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by Dennis Crouch

Means-plus-function claims have generally been disfavored because of the tendency of courts to  either (1) narrowly construe their scope when corresponding structure is detailed in the specification or (2) render them invalid as indefinite when the specification lacks sufficient corresponding structure. If Impact Engine's petition is well received, there is a good chance that this historically popular claim style will see a revival. 

The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Impact Engine v. Google has again raised the issue of over the proper treatment of MPF, this time regarding patent eligibility and infringement analyses. Appeal No. 22-2291  (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024).  I had skipped a write-up of the non-precedential decision, but now Impact Engine has petitioned for en banc review, arguing that

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USPTO ARP Panel Restores MPF Sanity, but Still Rejects Xencor’s Claims

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by Dennis Crouch

In a new Appeals Review Panel (ARP), the USPTO has clarified the Office's position on means plus function claims -- explaining that the specification need not describe statutory equivalents to satisfy the written description requirement.  The outcome here shows value for the intentional use of means-plus-function limitations as a mechanism for expanding patent scope when genus claims are otherwise unavailable.

Still the court maintained the written description rejection on other grounds -- finding that the broad preamble "method of treating a patient" to be limiting and not adequately supported by the specification.  Perhaps on remand the patentee will amend the preamble to instead claim a "means of treating a patient." 

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Preemption Lost: The Federal Circuit’s Abandonment of Supreme Court Patent Eligibility Doctrine

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by Dennis Crouch

One of the most perplexing aspects of patent eligibility doctrine involves the role of preemption - the concern that patents might lock up basic tools of scientific and technological work in ways that limit individual liberty and or that may unduly block fundamental progress.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that these  preemption concerns "undergird" and "drive" the judicially created exceptions to patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Yet in practice, the Federal Circuit has consistently regarded evidence of preemption (or the lack thereof) as basically irrelevant when determining whether or not a particular claimed invention is patent-eligible.  Even the complete absence of preemption "does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  There is a clear disconnect here between the doctrine's theoretical framework as designed by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit's practical application.

This disconnect between theory and practice creates two significant concerns. Most directly, the Federal Circuit's dismissal of preemption appears to be a failure to faithfully apply the Supreme Court's precedent. At the same time though, the disconnect also raises a more fundamental question: if preemption analysis can be so readily discarded in practice, perhaps the Court's theoretical focus on preemption fails to capture the true policy concerns driving patent eligibility doctrine.

The recently filed petition in Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC asks the Supreme Court to resolve this tension -- particularly suggesting that the court restore preemption analysis to its central role in patent eligibility determinations. The case also raises what I see as a particularly compelling argument involving means-plus-function claims, where Congress has already struck a balance between functional claiming and specific structural limitations through 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).  ImpactEnginePetitionforCertiorari.

Means-Plus-Function Claims in Patent Eligibility and Infringement Analyses

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The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents: An “Anachronistic Exception” Lives Another Day

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

I have been following the Steuben Foods appeal for the past year - thinking that it may be the case where the Federal Circuit nails in the coffin on the reverse doctrine of equivalents. The new decision ultimately left this question open, but it provides a fascinating exploration of three distinct doctrines of equivalence in patent law:

  • The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents (RDOE): This centuries-old defense, originating from the Supreme Court's 1898 Boyden Power-Brake decision, allows an accused infringer to escape liability even when their device falls within the literal scope of the claims. A key question here was whether this doctrine even survived the 1952 Patent Act.
  • The Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE): This traditional doctrine allows patent holders to prove infringement even when the accused device falls outside the literal scope of the claims. In this case, the court examined whether continuous sterilant addition could be equivalent to intermittent addition.
  • Means-Plus-Function Equivalents: Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), means-plus-function claims cover not only the corresponding disclosed structure but also its equivalents. The court here analyzed whether rotary wheels could be equivalent to the disclosed conveyor structures.

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