From Sculptors to Headnotes: Chiseling Out Copyright Protection for Westlaw Content

by Dennis Crouch

In a surprising decision today, Judge Stephanos Bibas ruled that ROSS Intelligence's use of Westlaw content to train its legal AI system constituted copyright infringement. Thomson Reuters Enter. Ctr. GmbH v. Ross Intel. Inc., No. 1:20-cv-613-SB (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2025).  I have been following a number of AI intellectual property challenges. Most of these have favored the makers and users of AI over the owners of the IP (typically copyright holders).

In 2023, Judge Bibas largely denied Thomson Reuters' motions for summary judgment on copyright infringement and fair use. Thomson Reuters Enter. Ctr. GmbH v. Ross Intel. Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 467 (D. Del. 2023). However, while preparing for the scheduled August 2024 trial, the judge reconsidered his earlier ruling.  The new opinion granted Thomson Reuters summary judgment on direct copyright infringement for 2,243 specific headnotes (detailed in a sealed appendix), including a finding of no fair use.  It looks like the only remaining factual issue for trial regarding these headnotes is whether some of their copyrights have expired.  There are also another set of headnotes that the judge concluded were not original enough to be clearly copyrightable -- those would go to a jury for consideration. [Read the Decision: 1739288038966]


To continue reading, become a Patently-O member. Already a member? Simply log in to access the full post.

The Death of Google’s Patents?

By John F. Duffy* [File Attachment (42 KB)]

            The Patent and Trademark Office has now made clear that its newly developed position on patentable subject matter will invalidate many and perhaps most software patents, including pioneering patent claims to such innovators as Google, Inc.

            In a series of cases including In re Nuijten, In re Comiskey and In re Bilski, the Patent and Trademark Office has argued in favor of imposing new restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter set forth by Congress in § 101 of the Patent Act.  In the most recent of these three—the currently pending en banc Bilski appeal—the Office takes the position that process inventions generally are unpatentable unless they “result in a physical transformation of an article” or are “tied to a particular machine.”[1] Perhaps, the agency has conceded, some “new, unforeseen technology” might warrant an “exception” to this formalistic test, but in the agency’s view, no such technology has yet emerged so there is no reason currently to use a more inclusive standard.[2]  

            The Bilski en banc hearing attracted enormous attention, and yet there has remained a sense among many patent practitioners that the PTO’s attempts to curtail section 101 would affect only a few atypical patent claims.  The vast bulk of patents on software, business and information technology are thought by some not to be threatened because those innovations are typically implemented on a machine—namely, a computer—and the tie to a machine would provide security against the agency’s contractions of § 101.  Even if that view were right, the contraction of patent eligibility would be very troubling because the patent system is supposed to be designed to encourage the atypical, the unusual and the innovative.  But that view is wrong.

            The logic of the PTO’s positions in Nuijten, Comiskey and Bilski has always threatened to destabilize whole fields of patenting, most especially in the field of software patents.  If the PTO’s test is followed, the crucial question for the vitality of patents on computer implemented inventions is whether a general purpose computer qualifies as a “particular” machine within the meaning of the agency’s test.  In two recent decisions announced after the oral arguments in the Bilski case, Ex parte Langemyr (May 28, 2008) and Ex parte Wasynczuk (June 2, 2008),[3] the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has now supplied an answer to that question: A general purpose computer is not a particular machine, and thus innovative software processes are unpatentable if they are tied only to a general purpose computer.  


To continue reading, become a Patently-O member. Already a member? Simply log in to access the full post.

First Amendment Finally Reaches Patent Law

The big news from Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec (Fed. Cir. 2016) is not that the court found IV's content identification system patents invalid as claiming ineligible subject matter.  (Although that did happen). Rather, the big event is Judge Mayer's concurring opinion that makes "make two points: (1) patents constricting the essential channels of online communication run afoul of the First Amendment; and (2) claims directed to software implemented on a generic computer are categorically not eligible for patent."

Read Judge Mayer's opinion in full:

MAYER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I agree that all claims on appeal fall outside of 35 U.S.C. § 101. I write separately, however, to make two points: (1) patents constricting the essential channels of online communication run afoul of the First Amendment; and (2) claims directed to software implemented on a generic computer are categorically not eligible for patent.


To continue reading, become a Patently-O member. Already a member? Simply log in to access the full post.