- Ariad v. Eli Lilly (Written Description): Ariad has filed its opening brief in the en banc Federal Circuit challenge to the statutory basis for a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from enablement requirement. The patentee’s strongest arguments are textual and historic. Although done with tact and persuasive skill, the brief asks the court to read the statute: “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.” [File Attachment: Ariad v. Lilly Plaintiffs-Appellees Principal Brief.pdf (509 KB)]
- Forest Group v. Bon Tool False Marking Case: The question on appeal is whether mass production of a falsely marked product constitutes a single instance of false marking. If the Federal Circuit agrees, the false marking statute will continue to have no impact because damages are limited by statute to $500 or less per offense. Judges Rader, Plager, and Moore will likely issue a decision in January. In oral arguments, the court struggled with the potential problem of “marking trolls” — suggesting that an amicus in this case is “pretty close to that.”
- USPTO Website: Out of Beta
- Patent Reform: Senator Leahy has suggested a Senate debate on patent reform “before the end of the year.”
- Board of Patent Appeals: Numbers are in for FY2009 (ending September 30, 2009). 15,349 appeals docketed; 6,757 appeals completed; 12,489 appeals pending at the end of the FY. The Board took heroic efforts to increase its throughput by over 35% in FY2009. However, the Board was already operating in a deficit and the number of cases received in FY2009 is more than double that of FY2008.
- Board of Patent Appeals II: Despite the backlog, the Board reports an average pendency of only 7.7 months (calculated from assignment of appeal number to decision date).
- Patent Law Jobs:
-
- Vestas is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent attorney in Houston.
- Covidien is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent and trademark attorney in Boulder, Colorado.
- Metabolix is looking to hire an experienced intellectual property manager in Lowell, Massachusetts with a focus on polymer science.
Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 132
- Ariad v. Eli Lilly (Written Description): Ariad has filed its opening brief in the en banc Federal Circuit challenge to the statutory basis for a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from enablement requirement. The patentee’s strongest arguments are textual and historic. Although done with tact and persuasive skill, the brief asks the court to read the statute: “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.” [File Attachment: Ariad v. Lilly Plaintiffs-Appellees Principal Brief.pdf (509 KB)]
- Forest Group v. Bon Tool False Marking Case: The question on appeal is whether mass production of a falsely marked product constitutes a single instance of false marking. If the Federal Circuit agrees, the false marking statute will continue to have no impact because damages are limited by statute to $500 or less per offense. Judges Rader, Plager, and Moore will likely issue a decision in January. In oral arguments, the court struggled with the potential problem of “marking trolls” — suggesting that an amicus in this case is “pretty close to that.”
- USPTO Website: Out of Beta
- Patent Reform: Senator Leahy has suggested a Senate debate on patent reform “before the end of the year.”
- Board of Patent Appeals: Numbers are in for FY2009 (ending September 30, 2009). 15,349 appeals docketed; 6,757 appeals completed; 12,489 appeals pending at the end of the FY. The Board took heroic efforts to increase its throughput by over 35% in FY2009. However, the Board was already operating in a deficit and the number of cases received in FY2009 is more than double that of FY2008.
- Board of Patent Appeals II: Despite the backlog, the Board reports an average pendency of only 7.7 months (calculated from assignment of appeal number to decision date).
- Patent Law Jobs:
-
- Vestas is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent attorney in Houston.
- Covidien is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent and trademark attorney in Boulder, Colorado.
- Metabolix is looking to hire an experienced intellectual property manager in Lowell, Massachusetts with a focus on polymer science.
Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 132
- Ariad v. Eli Lilly (Written Description): Ariad has filed its opening brief in the en banc Federal Circuit challenge to the statutory basis for a written description requirement that is separate and distinct from enablement requirement. The patentee’s strongest arguments are textual and historic. Although done with tact and persuasive skill, the brief asks the court to read the statute: “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.” [File Attachment: Ariad v. Lilly Plaintiffs-Appellees Principal Brief.pdf (509 KB)]
- Forest Group v. Bon Tool False Marking Case: The question on appeal is whether mass production of a falsely marked product constitutes a single instance of false marking. If the Federal Circuit agrees, the false marking statute will continue to have no impact because damages are limited by statute to $500 or less per offense. Judges Rader, Plager, and Moore will likely issue a decision in January. In oral arguments, the court struggled with the potential problem of “marking trolls” — suggesting that an amicus in this case is “pretty close to that.”
- USPTO Website: Out of Beta
- Patent Reform: Senator Leahy has suggested a Senate debate on patent reform “before the end of the year.”
- Board of Patent Appeals: Numbers are in for FY2009 (ending September 30, 2009). 15,349 appeals docketed; 6,757 appeals completed; 12,489 appeals pending at the end of the FY. The Board took heroic efforts to increase its throughput by over 35% in FY2009. However, the Board was already operating in a deficit and the number of cases received in FY2009 is more than double that of FY2008.
- Board of Patent Appeals II: Despite the backlog, the Board reports an average pendency of only 7.7 months (calculated from assignment of appeal number to decision date).
- Patent Law Jobs:
-
- Vestas is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent attorney in Houston.
- Covidien is looking to hire an experienced in-house patent and trademark attorney in Boulder, Colorado.
- Metabolix is looking to hire an experienced intellectual property manager in Lowell, Massachusetts with a focus on polymer science.
USPTO Fees: Look for Increases
Gary Locke (Secretary of Commerce) has again indicated the Obama Administration’s support for the pending patent reform bill S. 515. [Letter]. The letter also suggests that the PTO should be given authority to raise its fees, including “a limited interim fee adjustment.”
For many years, the PTO has been funded entirely by user fees. I hope that the same can continue to avoid such direct Congressional control over PTO spending. But the PTO clearly needs money, and the alternative of cutting PTO services is likewise highly unappealing. The third alternative: raise fees.
In the past, I have reported that patent applicant behavior is relatively inelastic to PTO fee changes. Although a 15% increase in fees would reduce the number of applications, the total revenue would increase.
If the PTO is going to increase fees – how should it structure that increase? Notably, should more the burden be placed on (1) standard application fees; (2) issue and maintentance fees; or (3) luxury fees for excess claiming (20+) extensions of time? All Universities qualify for the small-entity fee reduction. Does that still make sense?
Notes: The letter from Locke also promotes the idea of worksharing between patent offices when the same invention is being examined in multiple locations.
Supreme Court Indicates Interest in International Exhaustion Case
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A. (Supreme Court 2009)
The Supreme Court has asked the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the Obama Administration’s view on this pending international copyright exhaustion case. The law of exhaustion in copyright and patents run roughly parallel, and the outcome of this case will likely alter US patent law as well.
Under the first sale doctrine (aka exhaustion), once a copyright (or patent) owner has made an authorized sale of a protected product, the owner no longer has rights in that particular copy. This allows the authorized purchaser to re-sell the particular product.
Omega sells its watches for a higher price in the US than it does elsewhere. The discount retailler Costco purchased genuine Omega watches from overseas (through an importer) and began to sell them in its US stores. The question on appeal is whether Omega’s authorized foreign sale exhausted its US copyright.
Under the Copyright Act’s first-sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), the owner of any particular copy “lawfully made under this title” may resell that good without the authority of the copyright holder. In Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998), this Court posed the question presented as “whether the ‘first sale’ doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported copies.” In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit held that Quality King (which answered that question af-firmatively) is limited to its facts, which involved goods manufactured in the United States, sold abroad, and then re-imported. The question pre-sented here is:
Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the first-sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.
In Fuji Photo Film Co. v. ITC, 474 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit held that US patent rights are only exhausted “through a first sale in the United States.” In that case, the Court recognized that “a different rule applies in copyright cases.” However, at least one district court has held that the Supreme Court’s 2008 Quanta decision is inconsistent with this Federal Circuit precedent. See LG Electronics, Inc. v. Hitachi, 2009 WL 667232 (N.D.Cal. 2009)
If it takes the case, the Supreme Court is likely to link the parallel patent and copyright doctrines.
One of my former students (Shourin Sen) has been following the case on his copyright focused site: Exclusive Rights.
Expanding First Action Interview Pilot Program
“Washington — The Commerce Department’s United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) today announced that it is expanding its First Action Interview Pilot Program in which an applicant is entitled to an interview with the patent examiner prior to the first office action on the merits in a new utility application. The program will expand to additional technology areas for a six-month period beginning on October 1, 2009. . . .
. . . [The] patent process benefits when interaction between the applicant and the examiner are enhanced at the beginning of examination because patentability issues can be resolved early when the applicant and the examiner discuss them one-on-one. For the applications involved in the initial pilot, the First-Action Allowance rate increased six-fold when compared to applications from the same technology area not involved in the pilot. . . .
Currently, an applicant may request an interview prior to a first action. Granting of an interview is within the discretion of the examiner who has not yet reviewed the case, and the applicant may be required to identify relevant documents and explain how the invention is patentable over these documents.
Under the expanded pilot program, the examiner will conduct a prior art search and provide the applicant a pre-interview communication, which is a condensed preview of objections or rejections proposed against the claims. Within 30 days from the issue date of the pre-interview communication, the applicant must either choose not to have a first action interview with the examiner, or schedule the interview and file a proposed amendment or remarks (arguments).”
Details: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/faipp_v2.htm.
Bilski Briefs: Supporting the Government (In Name)
UPDATE: More briefs added Oct 5, 2009, 11:30 am
The final round of amicus briefs have been filed in the pending Supreme Court case of Bilski v. Kappos. Mr. Bilski is appealing the Federal Circuit's en banc rejection of his patent application. In that decision, the court held that Bilski's claimed method of hedging risk did not qualify as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the method was neither tied to a particular machine nor transformative of any physical article. Bilski challenges this "machine-or-transformation" test as unduly narrow. Bilski's legal position was supported in a large set of amicus briefs including a strong textualist argument made by Professor John Duffy.
Briefs supporting the government position have been filed. As summarized below, the vast majority of briefs also reject the Federal Circuit's machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of patentable subject matter for a claimed process. In my summaries, I have attempted to capture what I learned from each brief, of course the briefs and arguments are much more extensive and nuanced than my squibs suggest.
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Kauffman Foundation: Business method patents are harmful and should not be allowed. The long history of US patentable subject matter indicate that a patentable process must provide a technological advance. Likewise the mere fact that a process uses a machine or computer does not immediately render the process patentable subject matter. Rather to be patentable, the advance must be a technological advance. EFF etc amicus brief.pdf.
Red Hat: Software methods do not become patentable simply because they are tied to a computer. Benson. Download 08-964bsacRedHatInc.
William Mitchell College of Law IP Institute: This case does not properly present the issue of patentability of claims that include a mix of statutory and non-statutory subject matter. The court should wait for an appropriate case to decide that issue. Parsing Section 101 provides few real answers as to patentable subject matter. Download 08-964 William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Institute.
SFLC (Moglen and Ravicher): Standing alone, software is not patentable. This result is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft v. AT&T that “[a]bstract software code [uninstalled in a machine] is an idea without physical embodiment.” 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007). Download 08-964 Software Freedom Law Center.
SIIA: The patent eligibility of software is well established and should not be disturbed. Download 08-964 Software & Information Industry Association.
Knowledge Ecology Int'l: The goal of the system is to encourage progress, not to reward inventors. Further, patent protection is not a "necessary policy intervention to reward successful investment in new medical technologies. . . . [M]any of the greatest medical advances have benefited significantly, and in some cases exclusively, from mechanisms that exist completely outside of the patent system." Download 08-964 Knowledge Ecology International.
Mark Landesmann: The evidence of the negative social impact of business method and software patenting is properly directed at the PTO's allowance of patents that were not substantially novel and that were not properly disclosed or claimed. There is no evidence that patents on novel, non-obvious and properly disclosed business-method process inventions create any harm. Download 08-964 Mark Landesmann.
Nevada State Bar Ass'n: The machine-or-transformation test harms emerging Nevada businesses – especially in the growing areas of solar energy, gaming, and digital communications. Download 08-964bsacintellectualpropertysectionnevadastatebar.
American Bar Ass'n: The court should use an incremental approach to excluding claims to subject matter where patenting does not make sense and creates a problem. Categorical limits such as the machine-or-transformation test may limit innovation. That said, the "[p]atent law should not interfere with the exercise of human intellect by granting a monopoly on processes in which thinking is central." A specific target of the ABA is to eliminate patents covering tax planning methods. Download 08-964 American Bar Association.
American Insurance Ass'n: Regardless of their novelty, insurance policies should not be the subject of patent protection – even when combined with a computer. Download 08-964 American Insurance Association.
Bank of America, Google, et al.: The patent laws should bar patentability of "accounting methods, tax mitigation techniques, financial instruments, and other means of organizing human behavior—or software used to implement those methods." Download 08-964 Bank of America et al..
Bloomberg: Limiting a method to use on a general purpose computer should not render the method patentable. Download 08-964 Bloomberg.
CCIA: It is important that the Federal Circuit eliminated the overbroad State Street test. The current tension in the patent system can largely be traced to that unprecedented over-expansion of the system. Tight limits on patentable subject matter are important because (inter alia) of the strict liability nature of patent infringement. "Tying patentability to physical subject matter is not a perfect solution. However, it limits the reach of patents in important ways that can significantly reduce the risks of inadvertent infringement and the scope of potential liability."Download 08-964 Computer & Communications Industry Association.
FFII: Patents on business methods have been considered and were rejected by the Statute of Monopolies in 1623. Patents greatly harm the Free & Open Source Software (FOSS) movement. Download 08-964 Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure.
Professors Menell and Meurer: The Constitution creates a real limit on patentable subject matter – i.e., the subject matter of the patent must be within the "useful Arts." Economic evidence indicates that business method patents (especially internet related business methods) are harmful. 08-964 bsac Menell.pdf.
Law Professors and the AARP (Including Josh Sarnoff): Patents should only cover "inventions in the application." Patents can not cover "non-inventive applications of public domain science, nature, and ideas." The right interpretation of the statute requires that the invention "reside in the application, rather than in a discovery preceding or employed by it. This is because the science, nature, or ideas must be treated as if they are already in the prior art, i.e., are publicly known and free for all to use. Absent invention in applying such discoveries, there is simply no invention to patent." 08-964 bsac Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP.pdf.
Microsoft, Philips, and Symantec: Nobody (except Bilski) believes that his claims deserve patent rights. The machine-or-transformation test should not be seen as the exclusive test of patentable subject matter of a process claim – in part because the test has already "proven overly difficult to implement in practice." Like Professor Hollaar, Microsoft would simplify the test by requiring that the invention "involve one or more disclosed physical things." Today's computers – although complex – are not fundamentally different from Babbage's 1836 mechanical computer. Process claims that use computers should be patentable. Am Brief.pdf.
Professor Hollaar and the IEEE: Just restating the general principles of patentable subject matter is unhelpful. Rather, clear rules are needed – especially because the subject matter question is most frequently addressed by patent examiners who have little legal training and little time to ponder abstractions. A clear and time-tested rule would be: A process is patentable subject matter when it involves making or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. This means that software method patents that require a computer would be patentable, but Bilski's method of hedging would not be patentable. bilski-sc-amicus.pdf.
American Medical Association: The machine-or-transformation test should not supplant the requirement that a patent claim "address a technology." A patent should not be allowed to cover "every possible application of a scientific observation." Rather, claims should be limited to "a particular new and useful application or use of the observation. The Supreme Court should use this case to make a statement especially directed to "overreaching claims in the life sciences. . . . Such patents chill research, and patents such as those in Labcorp and Prometheus chill talking and thinking of ideas by making talking and thinking into a tort." 08-964 bsac The American Medical Association.pdf.
Adamas Pharma and Tethys: Section 101 should be interpreted in a way that is objective, predictable, and not duplicative of the other patentability requirements. The machine-or-transformation (MoT) test does not meet any of these requirements. The Federal Circuit test also violates US treaty obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA and potentially subject the US to trade disputes adjudicated at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under these US-initiated treaties member countries agreed to offer patent rights "in all fields of technologies." A major purpose of the agreements was to ensure that countries offered a full scope of patent rights, and by limiting the scope of rights, the US "will no longer be able to credibly argue in Special 301 trade disputes that failure to protect healthcare inventions made by cutting-edge U.S. companies constitutes inadequate protection of intellectual property rights." Some Congressional intent can be gleaned from the legislative history of Section 287(c) of the patent act. As originally proposed, that provision would have limited the subject matter eligibility of medical and diagnostic methods. After some debate, a compromise was reached to continue to allow their patenting, but to limit the remedies available. 08-964 bsac Adamas Pharmaceuticals.pdf.
Robert Sachs and Daniel Brownstone: Software should be patentable and has been for a long time. The Federal Circuit test greatly confuses the issue. Although software is an abstraction from the physical world, it is not "abstract." SF-5270929-v1-Bilski_v_Doll_Amicus_Brief_of_R_Sachs_and_D_Brownstone_as_amici_curiae_2009-08-06.PDF.
Big Internet Retailers, including Crutchfield, Overstock, and LL Bean: Patent Trolls are hurting online retailers and one way to stop them is to eliminate business method patents (including software business method patents). In effect, business method patents amount to a tax on Internet commerce. (The companies don't mention – unlike offline retailers – internet companies are often exempt from paying sales tax…) Internet Retailer Amicus Brief.pdf.
Brief of CASRIP (U. Washington): The US Constitution sets a bound on the scope of patentable subject matter – limiting them to the Constitutionally proscribed "useful Arts" as that term was understood at ratification. For new methods, one key is to consider the purpose of the method. Methods of entertaining a cat using a laser and telling a joke into a microphone should not be patentable regardless of their tie to particular machines because neither of those functions have ever "been considered a useful Art, and surely . . . is not the kind of discovery that the Patent Clause contemplates." Some methods also exist that should be patentable even though they fail the machine-or-transformation test. Despite its problems, the machine-or-transformation test is "superior to its competitors in filtering out preemptive claims to basic principles." However, it should not be the sole test of eligibility. Bilski's claim is unpatentable because hedging against price inflation (the purpose of the method) is not within the useful Arts. CASRIP am cur brf.pdf.
PTO Deputy Director: Sharon Barner
The USPTO has announced that Sharon Barner of Foley & Lardner has agreed to become Deputy Director of the USPTO. Barner is the head of Foley’s large IP department and has been a supporter of Obama since his youthful days in the Illinois legislature. As was the case with Kappos, Barner will be taking an extreme pay cut, opening herself to public criticism; and moving to DC. She should be applauded for her willingness to become a public servant. Under the law, the USPTO Director has the power to nominate his Deputy, but the actual appointment is done by the Secretary of Commerce (Locke).
The patent office has substantial problems that need to be addressed and that would be addressed regardless of who is in charge at the PTO. The benefit of Kappos & Barner is that have decades of patent law experience and are both committed to building a better patent system for the long-term. They understand how patents are actually used and the motivation behind patentee actions. Hopefully, this means that the eventual changes to the system will be more successful; have fewer unintended consequences; and be less likely to unduly antagonize those already invested in the system.
Barner was on my (rather long) short-list of potential Federal Circuit nominees to replace Judge Schall who is moving to Senior Status next week. Many members of the patent litigation bar are calling for a district court judge to be nominated. Judge Kathleen O’Malley (N.D. Ohio) likely tops the list along with Judge Patti Saris (D.Mass.).
Another University Patent Ownership Dispute: Stanford Loses Rights Based on Researcher’s Side Agreement
Stanford v. Roche (Fed. Cir. 2009) 08-1509r.pdf
Using federal NIH funding, Stanford scientists developed and patented a method of using PCR to measure HIV virus concentration in blood plasma. The development was done in partnership with the PCR leader Cetus. The Cetus PCR business was later purchased by Roche, and Stanford subsequently offered to license the patent rights to Roche (for a substantial royalty). After negotiations stalled, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement. Roche claims that it has ownership rights or – at least – shop rights to the patents based on its acquisition of Cetus’s PCR assets. The district court (Judge Patel, N.D. Cal.) rejected Roche’s claim of rights, but did find the patents invalid as obvious (on summary judgment).
Roche’s Ownership: Roche raised ownership rights both as a counterclaim and as a defense. The district court held those claims barred by California’s statute of limitations. On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held that the general statute of limitations does not operate to block defenses in litigation. Rather, “[u]nder California law, a defense may be raised at any time, even if the matter alleged would be barred by a statute of limitations if asserted as the basis for affirmative relief.” (Quoting Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal. 4th 42, 51 (2001)). Likewise, the statute of limitations to claiming rights does not apply when ownership is raised as a challenge to a plaintiff’s standing to sue. “It is well settled that questions of standing can be raised at any time and are not foreclosed by, or subject to, statutes of limitation.”
The law of patent ownership is somewhat complex because it involves a mixture of state law (or the law of the local jurisdiction) and federal law. State contract law serves as the baseline, but federal law (esp. Federal Circuit law) creeps into many situations. Here, for instance, the Federal Circuit has held that the “question of whether contractual language effects a present assignment of patent rights, or an agreement to assign rights in the future, is resolved by Federal Circuit law.”
One of the listed inventors first signed an agreement with Stanford – promising to assign any future inventions that emerged from his employment. Later, the inventor signed an agreement with Cetus agreeing “to hereby assign” his interests. Under Federal Circuit law, these two contracts are treated differently. And, although the Cetus agreement came later, the company could claim equitable title immediately at the moment of invention while Stanford needed to actually obtain an assignment. The company also automatically held legal title in the patent application at the moment it was filed. (The inventor did not sign an assignment to Stanford until after filing).
“[B]ecause Cetus’s legal title vested first, Holodniy no longer retained his rights, negating his subsequent assignment to Stanford during patent prosecution.”
Recordation of Rights: Patent ownership regularly transfers without the new owner recording the assignment with the USPTO. Recordation is not required, but it does offer some benefits. Notably, where two entities both claim ownership (as there are in this case), a second assignee can hold title if it records first.
A [prior] assignment . . . shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage. 35 U.S.C. 261
One caveat in the statute is that the subsequent assignee must be a bona fide purchaser – i.e., take “without notice” and pay “valuable consideration.” Here, the Federal Circuit found that Stanford was at least on inquiry notice of the relationship between the inventor and Cetus and the potential for a rights-transfer.
Standing:
Stanford cannot establish ownership of Holodniy’s interest and lacks standing to assert its claims of infringement against Roche. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Stanford’s infringement claim and should not have addressed the validity of the patents. The district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss Stanford’s claim for lack of standing.
Notes:
- Stanford would have won the case (at least the ownership issue) if it had written its employee agreement to automatically transfer rights upon creation of the invention. Best practices in patent law dictate that patent ownership (and right to sue) be always maintained in a single entity.
- In Gerber Scientific Int’l v. Satisloh AG, No. 3:07-CV-1382, (D. Conn., September 25, 2009, order) (P. Dorsey), the court held that the assignment of patent rights in the original case did not include later-filed continuations-in-part (CIPs). “Although courts have found variously worded assignments to include CIPs, Defendants are correct that there is no binding precedent holding that an assignment with the exact terms cited above includes CIPs.” The Court has certified that issue for interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit who will likely hear the case. [Zura]
Changing the USPTO Count System: Incrementally
USPTO Director David Kappos has announced a set of proposed changes to the patent examiner count system. The proposed changes are not dramatic, but they may have some incremental benefit of reducing RCE churning (see below). The proposal also provides for an additional hour of examination time per case with the expectation that the added time will be used up-front in an interview or in preparing a quality first office action on the merits (FAOM).
The Count System: Under the current count system, examiners receive “counts” for various actions and must meet a certain quota every two-weeks. (The quota varies according to art unit and examiner grade.) Under the rules, one count is awarded when the examiner issues an initial office action rejection and a second count is awarded when the case is disposed-of. Because no counts are awarded for second or subsequent office action rejections, the current system is supposed to encourage examiners to quickly move a case to its conclusion.
RCE Churning: When an applicant files a request for continued examination (RCE), the examiner receives a count as a disposal. At that point, the current count system treats the application as new – thus the examiner can receive a second count for mailing another office action rejection and one more count for eventually allowing the application to issue as a patent. Thus, by “forcing” the RCE, the examiner receives four counts instead of only two. (Note – “Forcing” is in quotation marks because examiner’s do not actually applicants to file RCEs.) A similar practice takes place with restrictions where the examiner pushes an applicant to divide a single patent application into multiple applications. In that scenario, the examiner can at times earn multiple counts for reexamining what are essentially identical inventions.
The proposed package would make some modifications – focusing especially on RCE practice. Under the proposal, the first RCE would only be worth 1.75 total counts (rather than 2) and any subsequent RCE can only be worth 1.5 counts. Examination of the original application would still be worth the same 2 counts, but the distribution is slightly shifted. Under the proposal, the first office action on the merits (FAOM) would garner 1.25 counts; a final rejection earns 0.25 counts; and eventual disposal leads to 0.5 more counts. If no final rejection is issued, then the disposal would be worth 0.75 counts. Thus, examiners will still receive credit for examining RCE’s – just less credit than before. The proposal does not appear to address the restriction practice.
Encouraging substantive interviews: The proposal would also regularly grant one-hour of “non-examining time” for preparing for and conducting interviews. This would effectively reduce the examination quota of examiners who conduct interviews.
Examiner Mistakes: The PTO management appears to have come to an agreement with the examiner union POPA on these reforms, although the membership will still be asked for their approval. Interestingly, the documents distributed by the joint task force appears to show some changes on the review of examiners for mistakes in office actions. Notably, the proposal would not allow an examiner to be negatively treated “based upon a single clear error in Patentability Determination” even if the examiner has already received a warning for prior mistakes.
The proposal also includes a new “formal policy” of “working on the earliest filed applications on [an examiner’s] Regular New Case docket first.” This would block the game played by some examiners of cherry picking easier cases to examine earlier.
Documents: briefing_for_corps_final_draft-093009.pdf
Claim Construction: A Structured Framework*
Guest post by Professor Peter S. Menell (UC-Berkeley School of Law); Matthew D. Powers (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP); and Steven C. Carlson (Fish & Richardson PC)
The construction of patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent case. It is central to evaluation of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant issues such as unenforceability, enablement, and remedies. Yet jurists and scholars have long lamented the challenges of construing patent claim terms. The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), stands as the most authoritative decision on claim construction doctrine. But while putting to rest various controversies, many core tensions in claim construction persist. Moreover, the decision itself does not provide a step-by-step approach to construing claims. This commentary provides a structured road map.
Bilski Briefing: Government Argues that Section 101 “Processes” are limited to “technological and industrial processes.”
Bilski v. Kappos (Supreme Court 2009) 08-964bsUnitedStates.pdf
In its responsive brief, the Obama Administration asks the Supreme Court to confirm that a patentable process must be tethered to technology – either “directed to the operation of a particular machine or apparatus” or “involve the transformation of matter into a different state or thing.”
Interpreted in light of the historical scope and development of the patent laws, as well as the statutory context, the term “process” encompasses all technological and industrial processes, broadly conceived. But it does not extend patent-eligibility beyond those bounds, to methods of organizing human activity that are untethered to technology—e.g., methods by which people conduct economic, social, or legal tasks, such as entering into contracts, playing poker, or choosing a jury. Such methods fall outside of the broad expanse of technological and industrial fields that “the statute was enacted to protect.” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). Because petitioners’ hedging method relates solely to human conduct, untethered to any technology—any machine or transformation of matter—it falls outside the coverage of Section 101.
. . .
This Court has long recognized that the distinguishing feature of a technological process is that it concerns a particular machine or apparatus or effects a transformation of matter to a different state or thing.
Although Bilski’s claim does not relate directly to software, the machine-or-transformation could be seen to limit the patentability of software processes acting on a general purpose computer (as opposed to a “particular machine”). The Government brief suggests that the Federal Circuit test leaves software substantially patentable when tied to a general purpose computer – citing favorably to In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[A] general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.”).
In any event, the machine-or-transformation test contemplates that many forms of “software” inventions are patent-eligible. . . . [However,] software code that is claimed by itself, uncoupled from any storage medium or computer, may be nothing more than “an idea without physical embodiment,” and therefore would not be patent-eligible.
Here, the brief did not address the reality that a software process can be “technological and industrial” without be limited in its association to a particular computer.
As a fall-back, the Government appears to suggest an additional exception to the patentable subject matter test for “methods of organizing human activity.”
Methods of organizing human activity are not patent-eligible “process[es]” within the meaning of Section 101.
The brief spends a considerable amount of time focusing on the statutory interpretation on the word “process” and its predecessor “useful arts” – paying special attention to provide an originalist style analysis. Here, the government attempts to show that finance (i.e., business methods) were not originally considered useful arts. Additionally, the government argued that even though tremendous advances took place in finance and insurance industries during the 18th and 19th centuries, those innovations were not traditionally patented.
In sum, because the initial patent statutes were intended to foster the “useful arts,” they were directed to technological and industrial inventions, as opposed to fields of purely human activity—including financial and economic activity unconnected to technology—which fell within the sciences or liberal arts.
Amicus briefs in support of the government position are due this Friday.
Bits and Bytes No. 131
- IP Czar: George Mason visiting professor Victoria Espinel has been selected as the IP Enforcement Coordinator for the Administration – known as the IP Czar. The role will likely be more focused on international trademark and copyright issues rather than patent law issues. Her nomination must be confirmed by the senate. [LINK]
- DC in DC: Next Thursday (1:30 p.m., October 1), I’ll be the opening speaker in GWU’s IP Speaker Series. My presentation considers the proposed first-to-file legislation and includes a new set of data the (low) frequency that applicant’s attempt to rely on their invention date during prosecution. The talk is open to GWU students, alumni as well as “friends.” Other speakers include Edward Walterscheid (Oct. 27); Zahr Stauffer (Oct. 29); Joseph Miller (Nov. 5); and Chris Cotropia (Nov. 19). [LINK]
Bits and Bytes No. 131
- IP Czar: George Mason visiting professor Victoria Espinel has been selected as the IP Enforcement Coordinator for the Administration – known as the IP Czar. The role will likely be more focused on international trademark and copyright issues rather than patent law issues. Her nomination must be confirmed by the senate. [LINK]
- DC in DC: Next Thursday (1:30 p.m., October 1), I’ll be the opening speaker in GWU’s IP Speaker Series. My presentation considers the proposed first-to-file legislation and includes a new set of data the (low) frequency that applicant’s attempt to rely on their invention date during prosecution. The talk is open to GWU students, alumni as well as “friends.” Other speakers include Edward Walterscheid (Oct. 27); Zahr Stauffer (Oct. 29); Joseph Miller (Nov. 5); and Chris Cotropia (Nov. 19). [LINK]
Bits and Bytes No. 131
- IP Czar: George Mason visiting professor Victoria Espinel has been selected as the IP Enforcement Coordinator for the Administration – known as the IP Czar. The role will likely be more focused on international trademark and copyright issues rather than patent law issues. Her nomination must be confirmed by the senate. [LINK]
- DC in DC: Next Thursday (1:30 p.m., October 1), I’ll be the opening speaker in GWU’s IP Speaker Series. My presentation considers the proposed first-to-file legislation and includes a new set of data the (low) frequency that applicant’s attempt to rely on their invention date during prosecution. The talk is open to GWU students, alumni as well as “friends.” Other speakers include Edward Walterscheid (Oct. 27); Zahr Stauffer (Oct. 29); Joseph Miller (Nov. 5); and Chris Cotropia (Nov. 19). [LINK]
Using Reexaminations to Avoid Willfulness Damages
Most patents currently being reexamined at the PTO are also being litigated in parallel proceedings in district court. This rise in importance of parallel reexaminations leads directly to both Constitutional controversies and practical problems. Although the Federal Circuit has nimbly attempted to avoid the problem, the truth is that both the PTO (an Article II executive agency) and the Article III Courts focus on the same question of validity of patent claims. These races to conclusion raise questions of both separation of powers and res judicata.
A practical issue is raised by Microsoft in the i4i case relates to the relevance of non-dispositive reexamination events to the question of willful infringement. In Microsoft’s case, the ex parte reexamination request was initially granted, and that grant was followed by a non-final office action rejection. On appeal, Microsoft argued that the PTO’s rejections of i4i’s claims on obviousness grounds should result in a per se finding that its its infringement defenses were not objectively reckless. Rather, according to Microsoft, the PTO’s grant of reexamination and non-final rejection at least serve to prove that its defenses were credible. i4i argues on the other side that the non-dispositive reexamination events are irrelevant because of the different standard for review, different claim construction approach, and lack of finality.
At the Santa Clara Law School conference that I attended yesterday, one panelist made a seeming reasonable suggestion – that courts should begin to reexamination results once an applicant agrees to amend or cancel claims being asserted during litigation. At that point, it is a foregone conclusion that the resulting reexamination certificate will not confirm the patentability of those pre-amended claims.
BPAI Statistics
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has seen a tremendous upswing in its workload over the past couple of years. The swing was largely triggered by the prospect of rules limiting the filings of requests for continued examination (RCEs). However, it appears that applicants and patent attorneys – who are now familiar with the process – are continuing to see appeals as a viable alternative even though the RCE limits appears dead-in-the-water. Of course, the appeals have also been driven by the increasing percentage of applications being finally rejected by examiners.
In a recent presentation, BPAI Chief Judge Fleming provided a useful survey of the “state of the Board.” Highlights below.
- In FY2009, the BPAI is expected to have decided over 7,000 cases. That represents more than a 40% increase over FY2008.
- In addition, it is expected that over 15,000 cases will have been docketed to the BPAI in FY2009. That number is well over double those docketed in FY2008. This leaves an ‘inventory’ of about 12,500 cases.
In its current form, the BPAI cannot keep up with demand. By the end of FY2010, Judge Fleming expects the backlog to extend over 21,000 cases. The office currently has a three-prong approach to fixing the situation: (1) hiring more BPAI judges; (2) hiring more patent attorneys who essentially serve as law clerks, drafting opinions that are eventually approved by the Board; and (3) improving BPAI efficiency.
Notes:
View the presentation: bpai_092109.pps
Using Claim Terms and their Synonyms
Edwards Lifesciences v. Cook, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2009)
The four Edwards patents all relate to internal blood-vessel grafts for treating aneurisms. The grafts are designed to be inserted endovascularly without the need for open surgery. After construing the claims, N.D. Cal. District Court Judge Jeffrey White granted summary judgment of non-infringement to the two defendants, Cook and Gore. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Lumpy Claim Construction: Patent claim construction serves as a prime example of how litigators can take a simple issue and make it quite complicated. For their part, judges are keen to limit the issues. A common approach in claim construction is to group similar claim terms together and give them identical meaning. In this case, the patent used the terms “graft,” “graft body,” graft structure”, “bifurcated base structure,” and “bifurcated base graft structure.” Examining these terms, the appellate panel agreed that these terms could properly be analyzed together because the applicant had used them “interchangeably in the specification,” at least with respect to the disputed differences.
This risk of synonymous meaning is not necessarily bad. Using various terms to describe the same idea helps to flesh out the detail and scope of the idea. However, in most cases, applicants would probably be better off emphasizing distinctions between similar terms. The distinctions may well be useful for ensuring varied claim coverage.
The point from this case is that the distinctions between similar terms must be explicitly emphasized if the applicant wants to have confidence that it can later rely on the differences.
Broadening Claims:During prosecution, Edwards seemingly broadened some of its claims by amending the “intraluminar graft” elements to simply “graft” elements. Despite that change, the court found that the specification’s written description still required that all grafts be intraluminal.
Public Accessibility of Prior Art: PTO Must Provide Evidence of Indexing Date
In re Lister (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Lister is attempting to patent his method of playing golf that allows a player to tee-up each shot (except for hazards and greens). He filed his patent application in 1996. Two years prior, however, Lister had registered a copyright on his manuscript describing the game (acting pro se).
Based on the copyright submission, the examiner rejected the application as anticipated under Section 102(a) and barred under Section 102(b). The Board, however, eliminated the Section 102(a) rejection because “[Dr.] Lister could not have disclosed his own invention before he invented it.” However, the board did agree that manuscript’s availability at the copyright office did constitute prior publication under the statutory bar of Section 102(b). The touchstone for publication under Section 102(b) is public accessibility.
[The Board] concluded that an interested researcher would have been able to find the manuscript by searching the Copyright Office’s catalog by title for the word “golf” in combination with the word “handicap.” Additionally, the Board found that an individual seeking to view the manuscript would have been able to do so by visiting the Copyright Office. Finally, the Board rejected Dr. Lister’s arguments that the inconvenience of visiting the Copyright Office and the Copyright Office’s rules prohibiting individuals from making copies of the manuscript precluded a finding of public accessibility. With respect to the unavailability of copies, the Board found that the inventive concept was straightforward enough that it could be understood and retained by a person of ordinary skill in the art upon reading the manuscript without any need to obtain a copy.
Although there was no evidence that anyone actually looked at the manuscript, the Board held that public accessibility does not require that the document have been actually accessed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed – finding that (1) the availability of a manuscript in the copyright office does not necessarily meet the accessibility requirement of Section 102(b); and (2) in this case, the PTO did not prove that the document was publicly accessible.
This case is akin to other “library” cases where prior art is found covered in dust in a secluded section of a library. In those cases, the material is considered public if “it could be located by persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence.”
Here, the court found that the Library of Congress records did not create accessibility because those records were (at that time) not searchable by subject or keyword. Rather the LOC records could on be searched by title (beginning with the first word of the title of the article) or author last name.
The automated catalog was not sorted by subject matter and could only be searched by either the author’s last name or the first word of the title of the work.
On the other hand, LOC records (although not the full manuscript text) are also available through Westlaw and Dialog. In its decision, the appellate panel indicated that the search features available through those paid services were sufficient to make the records “publicly accessible.” However, the record did not indicate when Lister’s records became available through Westlaw or Dialog and thus those sources cannot be relied on as prior art.
Absent evidence of the date that the disclosure was publicly posted, if the publication itself does not include a publication date (or retrieval date), it cannot be relied upon as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) or (b). Quoting M.P.E.P. § 2128.
. . . .
Essentially, the evidence shows that at some point in time Westlaw and Dialog incorporated the Copyright Office’s automated catalog information about the Lister manuscript into their own databases. There is no indication as to when that occurred or whether it was prior to the critical date. We see little difference between the evidence in this case and a situation in which an examiner comes across an undated reference that discloses an invention for which an applicant is seeking the patent. We surely would not view the mere existence of the reference in the latter scenario as prima facie evidence that it was available prior to the applicant’s critical date.
. . . absent any evidence pertaining to the general practices of the Copyright Office, Westlaw, and Dialog, or the typical time that elapses between copyright registration, inclusion in the Copyright Office’s automated catalog, and subsequent incorporation into one of the commercial databases, any presumption along those lines would be pure speculation.
On remand, the PTO can legitimately reject the application again if it can prove that the LOC records were available through Westlaw or Dialog more than one year prior to the 1996 patent application date.
President Obama’s Strategy for American Innovation
President Obama’s speech today focused on its newly formed “strategy for American innovation” — his “strategy to foster new jobs, new businesses, and new industries by laying the groundwork and the ground rules to best tap our innovative potential. . . . [R]ooted in a simple idea: that if government does its modest part, there’s no stopping the most powerful and generative economic force that the world has ever known, and that is the American people. . . . [Beginning with] the building blocks of innovation: education, infrastructure, research.”
The Administration’s policy paper focuses briefly on two aspects of intellectual property and patent law divided between a need for strong international enforcement and a call for reform of the US system.
Enforce our trade agreements to ensure access for American products abroad. Over the last eight years the enforcement of trade agreements slowed dramatically, with the United States bringing only an average of three WTO cases per year – as opposed to the approximately 11 annually from 1995 to 2001. In this era, the United States lost its focus on ensuring that other countries lived up to their promises to open their markets, not violate America’s intellectual property, and not use dumping or subsidies to penetrate America’s markets. Under President Obama, USTR and the Department of Commerce are committed to a new emphasis on enforcing our existing agreements.
Protect intellectual property rights. Intellectual property is to the digital age what physical goods were to the industrial age. We must ensure that intellectual property is protected in foreign markets and promote greater cooperation on international standards that allow our technologies to compete everywhere. The Administration is committed to ensuring that the United States Patent and Trademark Office has the resources, authority, and flexibility to administer the patent system effectively and issue high-quality patents on innovative intellectual property, while rejecting claims that do not merit patent protection.
The administration’s talking points on the USPTO link-in with Professor Rai’s calls for greater patent office power and autonomy – “ensuring that the [USPTO] has the resources, authority, and flexibility to administer the patent system efficiently.”