Injury vs. Discovery: The Goldilocks Problem and Copyright’s Statute of Limitations

Patent

by Dennis Crouch & Tim Knight

The Supreme Court will hold its conference on May 29, 2025, to decide whether to grant certiorari in RADesign, Inc. v. Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (No. 24-768), a case that could fundamentally reshape how copyright’s three-year statute of limitations operates. The petition, which has attracted significant attention from copyright scholars and practitioners, presents a deceptively simple question with profound implications: whether a copyright infringement claim “accrues” when the infringement occurs (the “injury rule”) or when the copyright holder discovers or reasonably should have discovered the infringement (the “discovery rule”).  Although the circuit courts all appear to agree that some form of a discovery rule should persist, we believe the deeper question is the rule’s form.  We believe in this case that the district court offered the better approach by permitting the discovery rule, but only after taking a contextual approach requiring reasonable diligence that considers the copyright holder’s circumstances while maintaining meaningful protections against fraudulent concealment.

Michael Grecco, a professional photographer, took photographs of model Amber Rose in 2017, wearing shoes designed by Ruthie Davis. Grecco alleges that Davis’s company, RADesign, reposted some of these photos on its website and social media platforms without authorization.  Although the photos were posted in 2017. Grecco claims he did not discover this infringement until February 2021 and filed suit in October 2021, four years after the alleged infringement began but less than one year after his claimed discovery.

The copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), requires any lawsuit be filed “within three years after the claim accrued,” and RADesign moved to dismiss the case as time-barred since it was filed four years after the infringing acts. The district court agreed, although it did consider whether to extend the statute of limitations based upon the copyright holder’s delay in discovering the infringement.  Applying a “reasonable diligence” standard, the court concluded that someone in Grecco’s position—specifically, a sophisticated copyright holder with extensive enforcement experience—should have discovered the infringement within the three-year limitations period.  This sophistication includes the filing of 100+ copyright infringement actions. Grecco’s own complaint touted his extensive history of actively policing infringements and litigation, making late discovery implausible under those specific circumstances.

On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the discovery rule uniformly determines when copyright claims accrue, irrespective of a plaintiff’s sophistication or enforcement history. According to the panel, there is no special diligence standard for sophisticated plaintiffs; instead, the discovery rule must be applied objectively, uniformly, and without presumptions. Since the complaint itself did not conclusively show that Grecco should have discovered the infringement earlier, the Second Circuit reinstated the suit.  One takeaway from the Second Circuit decision is that it creates the anomalous result where undercapitalized first-time participants with no legal experience or monitoring capabilities are asked to conduct the same level of monitoring as the  largest, most sophisticated copyright holder with vast monitoring resources.  We think this is wrong.  To be clear, we are not necessarily arguing for two different standards, but rather an approach that places the reasonableness within the factual context – what would have been reasonable for the copyright holder to do in the given situation.

Further, the objective standard adopted by the Second Circuit is not in the spirit of the discovery rule. The core of the discovery rule is based on a known or should have known standard. While there may be a debate on the requisite level of monitoring diligence by the copyright holder, the Second Circuit essentially eliminates this standard. Rather, the appellate court’s opinion more effectively reduces the discovery rule to merely a knowledge standard.

RADesign’s pending Supreme Court petition challenges the Second Circuit’s interpretation and presents the following question: Does a copyright infringement claim accrue when the infringement occurs (injury rule) or when the infringement is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered (discovery rule)? The petition is set for conference on May 29, 2025, with extensive briefing and amici participation already completed. This includes an excellent amicus brief from Prof. Tyler Ochoa.  Although the circuit courts appear to be continuing to maintain a discovery rule in copyright cases, Justice Gorsuch’s 2024 dissent in Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy argued strongly against the discovery rule as inconsistent with the statutory text and traditional limitations principles. (more…)

Inherent Disclosure and Implicit Construction

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

Sigray, Inc. v. Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc., --- F.4th --- (Fed. Cir. 2025)

The Federal Circuit established an important precedent regarding inherent disclosure and implicit claim construction in this IPR appeal, holding that the Board's  purported interpretation of the prior art was rather an implicit claim construction that neither party requested.  The decision, went rely heavily on the Federal Circuit inherency decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), allowing for inherency finding even for miniscule or undetectable features found in the prior art.  As I dug into the case though, I was surprised to find that the PTAB did not cite or reference SmithKline, nor did any of the briefs filed in the appeal.  As Judge Dyk wryly stated at oral arguments: "but of course, nobody showed them the SmithKline case." 

This case involved x-ray optics, with claims requiring "magnification of the projection x-ray stage is between 1 and 10 times." Although neither party ever asked for claim construction, the appellate panel went ahead to determine that this claim scope - based upon its "plain meaning" - "includes tiny, even undetectable, magnification" rejecting the PTAB's implicit construction that seemed to require a meaningful divergence from parallel.

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Perlmutter v. Trump: Does the President Control the Copyright Office?

Patent

By Dennis Crouch

In an extraordinary lawsuit filed today, Register of Copyrights Shira Perlmutter has sued President Trump and several administration officials, challenging her purported removal from office and the President's attempt to install Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche as acting Librarian of Congress. Perlmutter v. Blanche, No. 25-cv-1659 (D.D.C. filed May 22, 2025). The case raises fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the unique status of the Library of Congress within our constitutional structure.

The controversy began on May 8, 2025, when President Trump fired Librarian of Congress Dr. Carla D. Hayden via email. Two days later, the administration terminated Ms. Perlmutter, who had served as Register of Copyrights since 2020.   The President then purported to appoint Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche as acting Librarian of Congress under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) as well as Paul Perkins as acting Register of Copyrights. When Mr. Blanche's representatives arrived at the Library on May 12 to assume control, Library staff refused to recognize his authority and contacted the Capitol Police.  The standoff crystallized a fundamental question: Does the President have the power to unilaterally control Congress's library and the US Copyright office housed within?

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Rapunzel, Rapunzel, Let Down Your Generic Hair (and Let Us In)!

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

Rebecca Curtin – a law professor and parent who purchases princess dolls – filed a TTAB opposition against United Trademark Holdings’ application to register the mark “RAPUNZEL” for dolls and toy figures (Class 28). Curtin alleged the mark should not be registered because “RAPUNZEL” is a generic name, is merely descriptive, and fails to function as a trademark for doll products. UTH moved to dismiss the opposition, arguing that Curtin lacked standing (i.e., lacked “entitlement to a statutory cause of action”) under the Lanham Act’s opposition provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1063. Initially, the TTAB allowed Curtin’s case to proceed – relying on the Federal Circuit’s older, more permissive standing test from Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which had held that “any person who believes that she would be damaged” by a registration may oppose if she shows a real interest and a reasonable belief of harm. But by the final decision, the TTAB reversed course. Citing the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), and the Federal Circuit’s own decision in Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Board dismissed Curtin’s opposition for lack of a statutory cause of action. The TTAB concluded that “mere consumers” generally are not entitled to oppose a trademark registration under § 1063, because their interests fall outside the zone of interests protected by that statute.

The Federal Circuit has now affirmed that dismissal in Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 23-2140 (Fed. Cir. May 22, 2025).  Judge Hughes penned the opinion holding that: to oppose a trademark under § 1063, an individual’s interests and alleged injuries must fall within the Lanham Act’s protected zone of interests, and those injuries must be proximately caused by the mark’s registration.  See also, Rebecca Curtin, Zombie Cinderella and the Undead Public Domain, 85 Tennessee Law Review 961 (2018).

Although all modern theories indicate that consumer protection is a primary purpose of trademark law, Curtin’s consumer-focused concerns did not satisfy the statutory requirements (according to the court).  Still, I'm drawn by her arguments -- as Curtin's attorney Ryan Morris (Workman Nydegger) explained:

With regard to the purposes of the Lanham Act, it absolutely has everything to do with consumers. . . . The interests of the consumers are at the heart of the Lanham Act. And to exclude them arbitrarily doesn't make a lot of sense.

Oral args. 29:05.

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The Remedies Remedy is Almost Complete: EcoFactor v. Google

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in EcoFactor v. Google marks a significant tightening of standards for admitting patent damages expert testimony. The court (in an 8–2 split) overturned a $20 million jury award by excluding the patentee’s expert evidence as insufficiently reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Moore treated what traditionally might have been viewed as a factual dispute over “comparable” license agreements as, instead, a matter of contract interpretation for the court. In doing so, the majority held that the trial judge failed in his gatekeeping duty by allowing the jury to hear an expert opinion founded on speculative leaps—namely, the assumption that prior licensees agreed to a particular royalty rate that was not reflected in the actual license terms. Two dissenting judges (Judges Reyna and Stark) each criticized the court for overstepping the proper scope of Rule 702 and for usurping the jury’s role in weighing evidence.  As I discuss below, I believe that the dissents have the better view of this case.  [Read the Decision]

I see this case as part of a crafted doctrinal transformation that I call the “Remedies Remedy,” that began with the Supreme Court’s undermining of injunctive relief in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) and was then followed by a series of Federal Circuit decisions tightening the requirements for proving monetary damages. For example, the court abolished the old 25% rule of thumb for royalties as arbitrary and unreliable (Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)), reinforced the requirement to apportion damages to the patented feature’s value (LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), and demanded closer scrutiny of “comparable” license agreements used as benchmarks (Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). The thrust of these cases is a clear message: patent damages must be grounded in sound economic reasoning and actual evidence, not rules of thumb or tenuous analogies.  And, without sufficient expert testimony, juries will not be permitted to hear the evidence. (more…)

Federal Circuit Confronts “Divide and Conquer” Briefing Strategy in Patent Appeal

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

In a display of judicial frustration with attorney conduct, the Federal Circuit (i.e., Chief Judge Moore) recently confronted two appellants for apparently attempting to circumvent word count limitations through a "divide and conquer" briefing strategy.  The parties have responded to the court's show cause order in Focus Products Group International v. Kartri Sales Co., and we are now waiting for the court to act both on the merits of the case and potential sanctions.

The conduct dispute centers on how appellants Kartri Sales and Marquis Mills structured their briefs in appealing a district court decision that found the parties infringed both patents and trade dress related to shower curtain designs. The case was heard before a Federal Circuit panel consisting of Chief Judge Moore, along with Circuit Judges Clevenger and Chen. Patrice Jean of Hughes Hubbard & Reed represented Kartri Sales, Donald Cox his own firm represented Marquis Mills, and Morris Cohen of Goldberg Cohen represented the Sure Fit appellees.

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An IDS is Now the Best Defense Against IPRs: Ecto World v. RAI

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

In a significant development for PTAB practice, Acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart has issued a precedential decision that conclusively establishes IDS-cited art as grounds for discretionary denial while creating a narrow exception for "mega-IDSs." Ecto World, LLC v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc, IPR2024-01280_paper_13_20250519. The case places a burden on petitioners to demonstrate examiner error in situations where the ground for the IPR petition relies upon art that had been formally considered by the examiner during original prosecution.

This decision comes amid Stewart's broader transformation of PTAB practice since early 2025, characterized by the rescission of prior guidance limiting discretionary denials, the introduction of bifurcated review processes separating discretionary decisions from merits analysis, and the Director's personal involvement in discretionary determinations. The cumulative effect signals a decisive shift toward a more patent-owner friendly posture at the USPTO, with IPR institution rates reportedly dropping significantly over the past two months.

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Thin Ice That Held: Samsung’s IPR Strategy Survived Scrutiny at the Federal Circuit

Patent

by Dennis Crouch

Power2B, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., Nos. 23-2184, 24-1399, 24-1400 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2025)

Two key canons of claim construction are that of claim differentiation and claim term differentiation - each patent claim  is presumed to have its own scope and coverage, as is each element of each claim.  The use of different terms in different claims "connotes different meanings." CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  But, these are not an incredibly strong presumptions, and the court has regularly construed different terms in separate claims to cover the same subject matter. See, Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

In its recent decision in Power2B v. Samsung, the Federal Circuit found another case where differing language did not differ the construction.  Power2B, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., Nos. 23-2184, 24-1399, 24-1400 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2025). The patents at issue describe a handheld device that uses a light-emitting stylus with various functionality.   The PTAB sided with petitioner Samsung on almost all claims of the two challenged patents: US7952570 and US8547364. But, a divided PTAB found that claim 20 of '364 patent had not been proven unpatentable, with the majority concluding that Samsung had not properly argued the "generating control signals by the input circuitry" limitation of claim 20.  On appeal, Samsung argued that the Board abused its discretion because that claim 20 limitation was not materially different from claim 13's "output indication" limitation, which Samsung had properly addressed, and that these different terms merely expressed the same concept.  Samsung that nothing in the specification or claims identifies any difference between an "output indication" and a "control signal."

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WIPO Adopts Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, and Associated Traditional Knowledge

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by Dennis Crouch

For many years, there have been concerns about "biopiracy" - the misappropriation of genetic resources (GR) and traditional knowledge (TK) from indigenous peoples and local communities, often in developing countries. Biopiracy involves researchers or companies obtaining GR or TK, using it to develop commercial products like medicines, and obtaining patents without adequately compensating or getting permission from the original TK/GR holders.

Some well-known examples of alleged biopiracy include: patents on wound-healing properties of turmeric, which had long been known in India; patents related to neem tree extracts, also used for centuries in India; Japanese and American patents on extracts of the African "Hoodia" cactus, traditional used by San people to stave off hunger; and a US patent on the Amazonian "ayahuasca" vine, considered sacred and used in ceremonies by indigenous peoples. You can see a Sean Connery look-alike doing this in my image below.

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) member states have adopted a groundbreaking new treaty addressing patent rights in the context of these genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. The WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, and Associated Traditional Knowledge, finalized on May 24, 2024,

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USPTO Adapts to CAFC’s New Guidelines: What Design Patent Examiners Need to Know

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by Dennis Crouch

On May 22, 2024, the day after the Federal Circuit's en banc LKQ v. GM decision, the USPTO issued a memorandum to its examiners providing updated guidance and examination instructions in light of the court's overturning of the long-standing Rosen-Durling test for determining obviousness of design patents. The memo, signed by USPTO Director Kathi Vidal, aims to immediately align USPTO practices with the more flexible approach outlined by the Federal Circuit, which eliminated the rigid requirements that: (1) a primary reference be "basically the same" as the claimed design, and (2) secondary references be "so related" to the primary reference that features in one would suggest application to the other.  This is a major shift in examination practice for design patents so it will be important to watch the developments to see whether the office ramps up design examination.

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Speck v. Bates: Federal Circuit’s Two-Way Test for Pre-Critical Date Claims Limits Belated Interferences and Derivation Proceedings

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by Dennis Crouch

Speck v. Bates, No. 23-1147 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2024)

In likely one of the last interference proceeding appeals, the Federal Circuit has applied a "two-way test" to determine whether pre-critical date claims and post-critical date claims are "materially different" under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1). The court found that Bates' post-critical date claims in its U.S. Patent Application No. 14/013,591 were time-barred because they were materially different from Bates' pre-critical date claims.

Although the decision is based upon an interference proceeding, the same provision is found within the new version of 135(b) that covers

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Decoding Patent Ownership beginning with Core Principles

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by Dennis Crouch

In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a district court's grant of summary judgment that an inventor, Dr. Mark Core, had automatically assigned a patent associated with his PhD thesis to his then-employer and education funder TRW.  Core Optical Techs., LLC v. Nokia Corp., Nos. 23-1001 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024). The key issue was whether Dr. Core developed the patented invention "entirely on [his] own time" under his employment agreement. The majority opinion written by Judge Taranto and joined by Judge Dyk held the contract language was ambiguous on this point and remanded for further factual development to determine the parties' intent.  Judge Mayer dissented.

Although not discussed in the court's decision, the appellant brief includes a suggestion that the Federal Circuit should "narrow or overrule" the automatic assignment law seen in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and its progeny

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Federal Circuit Overrules Rosen-Durling Test for Design Patent Obviousness

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by Dennis Crouch

In a highly anticipated en banc decision, the Federal Circuit has overruled the longstanding Rosen-Durling test for assessing obviousness of design patents. LKQ Corp. v. GM Global Tech. Operations LLC, No. 21-2348, slip op. at 15 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024) (en banc). The court held that the two-part test's requirements that 1) the primary reference must be "basically the same" as the claimed design, and 2) any secondary references must be "so related" to the primary reference that features from one would suggest application to the other, "impose[] limitations absent from § 103's broad and flexible standard" and are "inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent" of both KSR (2007) and Whitman Saddle (1893). Rejecting the argument that KSR did not implicate design patent obviousness, the court reasoned that 35 U.S.C. § 103 "applies to all types of patents" and the text does not "differentiate" between design and utility patents.  Therefore, the same obviousness principles should govern.  This decision will generally make design patents harder

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Cellect or Reject? SCOTUS Asked to Consider Fate of ODP Doctrine

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by Dennis Crouch

In its new petition for certiorari in Cellect LLC v. Vidal, No. __ (U.S. May 20, 2024), Cellect argues that the Federal Circuit erred in upholding the PTAB's (PTAB) invalidation of Cellect's four patents based on the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). The key issue is whether ODP can cut short the patent term extension provided by the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). Meanwhile, Dir. Vidal is looking to extend the power of ODP via rulemaking. This is an important case coming at an important time. 

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