Tag Archives: Abstract Idea

Judge Mayer: Subject Matter Eligibility Must be Decided First Even if Not Raised by Either Party on Appeal

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By Dennis Crouch

Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2013)

I recently posted on Alexsam’s pending litigation in the Eastern District of Texas. In that case, the jury sided with the patentee Alexsam and rejected the defendants’ arguments that the patent was invalid. The appeal here involves the same patents directed to a system for activating gift cards at the time that they are purchased. See U.S. Patent No. 6,000,608. The most interesting aspect of the decision comes from Judge Mayer’s dissent where he argued that asserted patent claims “disclose nothing more than an abstract idea for making a business run more efficiently, thereby failing to meet the subject matter eligibility requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101.”

The claim issue (Claim 57) reads as follows:

A multifunction card system comprising:

a. at least one card having a unique identification number encoded on it, said identification number comprising a bank identification number approved by the American Banking Association for use in a banking network;

b. a transaction processor receiving card activation data from an unmodified existing standard retail point-of-sale device, said card activation data including said unique identification number;

c. a processing hub receiving directly or indirectly said activation data from said transaction processor; and

d. said processing hub activating an account corresponding to the unique identification number, thereby permitting later access to said account.

To reach his conclusion that the claim fails to disclose eligible subject matter, Judge Mayer first began by identifying the core inventive concept of the claim. Here, the idea behind the patent is that it allows a card to be activated by swiping it through the terminal used for processing credit card transactions rather than having a dedicated activation terminal. The benefit of that approach is that no special equipment is needed for activating gift cards and the patent application states that no new technology is required in order to allow standard point-of-sale devices to activate gift cards.

The way Judge Mayer describes this setup immediately raises novelty and obviousness concerns in my mind. Indeed, Judge Mayer writes that the case “presents the anomalous situation in which a patentee attempts to preserve the validity of his claims by arguing that they contain nothing new.” Ordinarily, when patent claims “contain nothing new,” they are found invalid for lacking novelty or nonobviousness. Indeed, millions of patent claims are rejected each year by the USPTO for this very reason. And, the primary thrust of the US patent examination system is to ensure that patents are only issued for inventions that are sufficiently new. In this case, the defendants argued that claims were obvious and anticipated as a matter of law. However, instead of addressing that issue that was actually appealed, Judge Mayer focused on the Subject Matter Eligibility that was not raised on appeal – seeing subject matter eligibility as a threshold issue that must be decided first:

Whether claims are directed to statutory subject matter is a “threshold” question, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010), which must be addressed before this court can consider subordinate issues related to obviousness and infringement. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“Flook”) (emphasizing that “[t]he obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented” so as to determine whether it falls within the ambit of section 101 “must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious” (emphasis added)); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Only if the requirements of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor allowed to pass through to the other requirements for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and . . . non-obviousness under § 103.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In our 2010 article, Professor Robert Merges and I argued that the law does not require the “threshold” question be decided in any particular order. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1673 (2010). Indeed, thresholds are crossed all throughout a journey. Judge Mayer is in the minority on this point of doctrinal ordering. Although rejecting some of our arguments, the CLS Bank plurality opinion agreed with Merges and myself that “district courts may exercise their discretion to begin elsewhere when they perceive that another section of the Patent Act might provide a clearer and more expeditious path to resolving a dispute.” (Citing Merges & Crouch).

The second major problem with Judge Mayer’s dissent is the implicit ruling that Subject Matter Eligibility is not waivable and instead should be raised sua sponte by an appellate court. Here, the §101 eligibility question was not raised by the defendant-appellants in the appeal, nor were they discussed in oral arguments. In the past, both Judges Mayer and Dyk have raised §101 issues sua sponte on appeal — essentially finding that subject matter eligibility questions are on par with the issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Finally, Judge Mayer’s decision highlights the failure the CLS Bank decision – because there was no majority opinion in that case, Judge Mayer did not feel the need to even cite that recent pronouncement by the court that directly relates to the case at hand.

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Sanctions: The district court awarded sanctions to the patentee for the defendants’ litigation misconduct in failing to provide to satisfy the appropriate discovery requests regarding the accused systems. The sanction was quite harsh. In particular, the district court deemed several accused systems were infringing as a sanction for ITD’s failure to disclose the fact that its cards contain BINs in their card numbers. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the sanction. I suspect that the “Patent Abuse Reduction Act” would further embolden accused infringers to play discovery games by avoiding disclosing key information or admitting key facts that would greatly simplify the litigation.

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Unpaid License Still a License: Some of IDTs systems use the MasterCard computer network. That is important because MasterCard has obtained a license from Alexsam to practice the invention. The agreement specifically states that other parties (such as IDT) that are using the MasterCard computer network will be “deemed sublicensed under an implied sublicense.” As part of the agreement, MasterCard is also required to report the total number of licensed transactions to Alexsam at the end of each month, and to pay a fee for each transaction. In this case, however, MasterCard never reported IDT as a sublicensee or paid the required royalties. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with IDT that the MasterCard related sales were licensed and that IDT is therefore not liable for those. In reaching its conclusions, the court noted that the MasterCard agreement did not condition the sublicense on payment of the royalties. Further, the court the cited to its decision in Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2010-1176, 2011 WL 1944067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) where it held that failure to pay royalties “did not convert authorized sales into unauthorized sales.”

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What Is Happening In Vermont? Patent Law Reform From The Bottom Up

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Guest post by Camilla A. Hrdy, Resident Fellow at the Yale Law School Information Society Project.

Although there have been various proposals for curbing abusive threats of patent litigation by Patent Assertion Entities (PAE’s), or so-called patent “trolls,” and the Federal Circuit appears willing to sanction PAE’s for baseless lawsuits, the U.S. Patent Act does not directly address the problem. Dissatisfied with this situation, the state of Vermont has just passed a new and innovative law amending its Consumer Fraud statute to prohibit “bad faith assertions of patent infringement” against individuals or companies based in Vermont. The law creates a factor-based test for courts to determine when acts constitute “bad faith assertions,” and lists several non-exhaustive factors that courts may consider as evidence of bad faith, including sending demand letters that lack basic information about the infringement claim or that seek payment of unreasonable royalty fees. Targets of bad faith assertions can bring actions (in state or federal district court1) to obtain compensatory damages and exemplary damages, plus costs and fees. Vermont’s Attorney General simultaneously filed a complaint under existing Vermont consumer protection law against a PAE that sent out demand letters to thousands of small businesses in Vermont and around the country.

Some commentators suggest Vermont’s new law is preempted by federal patent law. This is not necessarily the case – so long as courts apply the law in a way that satisfies the Federal Circuit’s standard for a finding of “bad faith.” This requires, at minimum, “clear and convincing evidence” that the infringement assertions are “objectively baseless” to avoid dismissal on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. As the Federal Circuit explained in Globetrotter, the idea is that patent holders should not be penalized simply for asking the government to enforce their patent rights. That said, as Vermont Attorney Justin McCabe points out, if courts do adhere to the Federal Circuit’s current standard, this will certainly weaken the Vermont law’s utility as a supplement to current options.

Putting aside the question of whether the Vermont law will be preempted, should it be? According to Eric Goldman, we should be wary of state-by-state contributions to patent law (and IP law in general) for numerous reasons, including higher costs for patent owners to enforce their rights and comply with different or inconsistent state standards. Goldman concludes that while he would “enthusiastically favor a nation-wide threats action,” if the choice is between no threats action at all versus state-level threats actions, he might favor the former.

I disagree.

There are certainly costs to introducing decentralization into the patent system, just as there are for any area of law where state and federal governments have concurrent power (immigration, tax, corporate law, to name just a few). But the creation of a novel, state-level solution to the problem of unfounded patent assertions highlights the reasons we accept some of these costs by continuing to support a system of dual sovereignty. Robust federalism can produce a range of benefits, including involvement from local officials in designing policies to support their jurisdictions’ development goals, promoting intergovernmental competition and experimentation, and diffusing authority among different sovereigns in order to avoid consolidation of power in a single lawmaking body or administrative agency (i.e. the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).

But for federalism to actually benefit patent law and innovation policy generally, states require some autonomy to disagree with federal patent policy and to use state law to grow local innovation ecosystems, like California has with Silicon Valley. According to the preamble of the new law, Vermont is “striving to build an entrepreneurial and knowledge based economy.” State representatives decided the law will facilitate their goal of attracting IT and other knowledge based companies facing costly threats of litigation from PAE’s. Vermont has every right to make this attempt, and we should encourage other states to do the same.

Obviously, as the Supreme Court has made clear, state laws should be preempted when they interfere with the goals and objectives of federal patent law. But Vermont’s law doesn’t: like U.S. patent law, it strives to promote innovation and does not interfere with inventors’ decision to file for U.S. patents and disclose information about their inventions to the public.2 Far from needlessly raising the cost for patent owners to enforce their rights, Vermont’s local solution to a national problem is a prime example of how federalism is supposed to work.

As I argue in a forthcoming article and a recent essay, given the benefits of state involvement in patent law and innovation policy, federal courts should be wary of preempting state laws that attempt to influence national patent policy. I hope the Vermont law is the first, not the last, of its kind, and that it inspires other states to take a greater role in helping federal institutions fix the patent system’s problems. Meanwhile, innovators themselves – whether businesses aggrieved by PAE’s or inventors who are dissatisfied with patent law’s emphasis on propertization versus free access to knowledge – should begin to actively encourage their state and local governments to dissent against federal patent norms by experimenting with laws to make the system work better for everyone. We may ultimately decide that some, or even all, state patent policy innovations are not workable in practice. But the results of a bottom up reform movement will inevitably surprise us. And this is the point.

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1. Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, and the jurisdiction statute was recently amended to clarify that “[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.” 28 U.S.C. §    338(a). However, if none of the claims for relief under the Vermont law necessarily requires the resolution of a patent law issue, then federal district courts would not have jurisdiction absent diversity citizenship. See ClearPlay, Inc. v. Nissim Corp., 602 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

2. The same cannot be said for state trade secret laws, which we permit despite the risk that inventors of patentable inventions will keep their inventions secret, due to the independent benefits derived from more information sharing within companies and protection of valuable, if not always patentable, information from misappropriation by competitors. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490-93 (1974).

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Court Finds Many Software Patents Ineligible

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by Dennis Crouch

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)

In a much awaited en banc decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the patent ineligibility of Alice Corp’s claims to a computerized method, a computer-readable medium containing computer instructions, and a computer system that implements those instructions.  The ten-member en banc panel released seven different decisions. While none of the opinions garnered majority support, seven of the ten judges agreed that the method and computer-readable medium claims lack subject matter eligibility.  And, eight of the ten concluded that the claims should rise and fall together regardless of their claim type.

All of the judges recognized that the test for patent eligibility under section 101 should be “a consistent, cohesive, and accessible approach” that provides “guidance and predictability for patent applicants and examiners, litigants, and the courts.”  However, the judges hotly disagree as to the pathway that will lead to that result.

The leading five-member opinion written by Judge Lourie provides three guideposts for its analysis:

  • First and foremost is an abiding concern that patents should not be allowed to preempt the fundamental tools of discovery—those must remain “free to all . . . and reserved exclusively to none.” . . . [T]he animating concern is that claims should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; a patent-eligible claim must include one or more substantive limitations that, in the words of the Supreme Court, add “significantly more” to the basic principle, with the result that the claim covers significantly less. Thus, broad claims do not necessarily raise § 101 preemption concerns, and seemingly narrower claims are not necessarily exempt. What matters is whether a claim threatens to subsume the full scope of a fundamental concept, and when those concerns arise, we must look for meaningful limitations that prevent the claim as a whole from covering the concept’s every practical application.
  • Next, the cases repeatedly caution against overly formalistic approaches to subject-matter eligibility that invite manipulation by patent applicants. . . . Thus, claim drafting strategies that attempt to circumvent the basic exceptions to § 101 using, for example, highly stylized language, hollow field-of-use limitations, or the recitation of token post-solution activity should not be credited.
  • Finally, the cases urge a flexible, claim-by-claim approach to subject-matter eligibility that avoids rigid line drawing.

Abstract Ideas are Disembodied Concepts: Alice Corp’s claims are drawn to methods of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third party intermediary (a supervisory institution) empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their obligations before allowing the exchange to be completed.  This essence, the method is a form of third-party escrow that helps overcome the risk of fraud and non-payment. In thinking about that method, the court determined that it is an abstract idea because it is a “disembodied” concept that is a basic building block of human ingenuity and untethered from any real-world application.  Lourie writes:

CLS describes that concept as “fundamental and ancient,” but the latter is not determinative of the question of abstractness. Even venerable concepts, such as risk hedging in commodity transactions, see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, were once unfamiliar, just like the concepts inventors are unlocking at the leading edges of technology today. But whether long in use or just recognized, abstract ideas remain abstract. The concept of reducing settlement risk by facilitating a trade through third-party intermediation is an abstract idea because it is a “disembodied” concept, In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), a basic building block of human ingenuity, untethered from any real-world application. Standing alone, that abstract idea is not patent-eligible subject matter.

After identifying the portion of the claim directed to an abstract idea, Judge Lourie then looked to see whether “the balance of the claim adds ‘significantly more.’” Answering that question in the negative, the court found the claims lack eligibility.

Writing in Dissent, Chief Judge Rader disagreed with the court’s decision. He writes:

I enjoy good writing and a good mystery, but I doubt that innovation is promoted when subjective and empty words like “contribution” or “inventiveness” are offered up by the courts to determine investment, resource allocation, and business decisions. Again, it is almost . . . well, “obvious” . . . to note that when all else fails, it makes sense to consult the simplicity, clarity, and directness of the statute.

As I start my next quarter century of judicial experience, I am sure that one day I will reflect on this moment as well. I can only hope it is a brighter reflection than I encounter today.

 


 

 

Patent-Conscious Preparation for a Summer at the Beach

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Guest Post by Marketa Trimble

As the America Invents Act slowly fades as a cocktail party topic, your conversation might gravitate to your upcoming summer vacation at the beach. Don’t worry, this conversation will present opportunities for patent-spirited discussions as well.

Last month, while preparing a presentation on U.S. IP law for a class of fashion design and communications students in Milan, Italy, I came across a patent that changed my perspective on a summer beach vacation. U.S. patent 8,371,043, applied for on August 1, 2008 (two provisional applications were filed earlier), and issued on February 12, 2013, concerns “a molded shoe featuring a 3 dimensional figure (e.g., an animal or character)” that is perfect footwear for any child’s day of fun at the beach.

I wanted to include a utility patent in a series of examples of how individual types of IP rights under U.S. law, which is often presented as deficient in its limited protection of fashion, might provide some protection to some aspects of fashion. However, this particular utility patent was not a good introduction to U.S. patent law for the students – it certainly was not suitable to explain the “law on the books,” although it was appropriate to illustrate the “law in action.” By the point in the semester when I spoke to the class, the students had a pretty good idea of IP law as it exists in European countries, and they seemed to be eager to learn about U.S. IP law. They took copious notes when I talked about section 101 and the conditions for patentability under U.S. law. But when I showed the slide with the molded shoe patent the pens went down and the eyebrows went up.

U.S. patent 8,371,043 covers a shoe that

“has a sole having a bottom surface that comprises a series of projections and recesses that form a print for an animal or character, to thereby obtain an imprinting surface; and an upper, attached to the sole, having an outer surface that comprises a series of projections and recesses that form a three dimensional figure (e.g., an animal figure or a character figure). The sole and upper are substantially formed from molded plastic; the projections and recesses of the animal imprinting surface allow one wearing the shoe to make imprints on a soft surface, and the three dimensional figure on the outer surface of the upper relates to the print of the imprinting surface.” (Abstract that substantially tracks Claim 1)

It was telling that the students, on seeing the drawings of the invention, almost uniformly exclaimed: “Crocs!” Indeed, to an average consumer the shoe in the drawings might resemble Crocs, which have been on the market since about 2002, and it might surprise the public that the assignee of the patent is not Crocs, Inc., but Polliwalks, Inc. The idea of putting the face of an animal or a character on the tip of a shoe and a corresponding surface print on the bottom of the shoe might have been non-obvious to a PHOSITA but did not seem non-obvious to the students, who knew of various fabric shoes featuring animals and characters – shoes that very likely had preceded the invention in the patent. Nor did having a sole that makes an imprint corresponding to the shape of the sole impress the students as non-obvious. In the end the class agreed that issues of patentability are complex and that the students were not likely to be in a position to second-guess a complicated assessment of non-obviousness.

What was perhaps more troublesome about the patent, though, was that it extends to “[a] method of making an animal imprint on a surface with a molded shoe” (Claim 11). If you have any doubts about the link to a day at the beach you should know that the surface in the patent is identified as “a soft surface that includes dirt, mud, sand or clay” (Claim 12). With the exception of sale representatives and designers of competitor-infringers who might engage in making imprints with patent infringing products, the only other people likely to infringe the method claims appear to be consumers using patent infringing products – children who, as the patent applicant assures us, “enjoy exploring and learning about new things” (as written in the Background of the Invention). Apparently, these “things” will now include patent infringement.

Of course, your children will not infringe the method claims if you purchase a pair of the shoes that are sold by the patent owner or with the patent owner’s consent – we know that the patent owner’s right to control the disposition of the shoe is exhausted upon the first authorized sale of the shoe, and that the patent owner’s right to control the use of the patented method that is substantially embodied in the product will be exhausted upon the first authorized sale of the product as well. But if you purchase “knock-offs” of the shoes or other shoes that infringe the patent, your child might end up being a patent infringer.

The Milan students wondered about the utility of patenting a method that is likely to be infringed primarily – if not only – by consumers. Does the patent owner really plan to sue consumers for patent infringement when consumers walk on U.S. beaches? Is that an ideal public relations strategy? Are the method claims really just hooks for potential indirect infringement claims? Or did the applicant simply apply for whatever protection that was available?

U.S. patent 8,371,043 was certainly issued in time to be a conversation topic before the upcoming summer at the beach. It provides excellent material for a discussion of U.S. IP protection for fashion and the value of U.S. patents. It also allows you to revive the America Invents Act as cocktail party conversation and point out that the AIA, while making some revolutionary changes to U.S. patent law, certainly does not solve all of the issues of the U.S. patent system.

Guest Post by Prof. Michael Risch: The Securitization of Patents

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Guest post by Michael Risch, Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.

My forthcoming article in Duke Law Journal, The Securitization of Patents, argues that the best way to create patent markets might be to start treating portfolios as securities. A full draft is accessible at this SSRN page. The article makes four basic points:

  1. Aggregation and trading is not limited to non-practicing entities – everyone is doing it.
  2. Companies are trading aggregated patent portfolios as they do other patent instruments, either through sale or licensing.
  3. Aggregation is beneficial, even critical, for efficiency; this is directly contrary to the conventional wisdom.
  4. Based on the above, markets might be improved by applying securities treatment to patent portfolios.

[NB: I focus on portfolios, not individual patents. I also focus on sale and licensing of patents, not the initial patent grant. The paper explains why in more space than I have here.]

When I first wrote Patent Troll Myths, there was very little empirical data about NPEs. Since then, such research has exploded, with new data every week seemingly counting the number of NPEs and their cases. This data, though helpful, leaves a lot to be desired, I think. First, there is a rarely a real apples-to-apples comparison with the activity of product companies (and when there is, the comparison is not very granular). To that end, I’ve been developing a matched data set for my Patent Troll Myths data so we can test what real differences in quality and quantity, if any, exist. Second, the data largely ignores licensing practices, which can be quite similar. To be fair, licensing data is difficult to come by, but without it, normative determinations are difficult. Third, studies like mine, which look at the provenance of NPE patents, are rare.

These issues lead to my first point: aggregation is not just for trolls anymore, if it ever was. The public is becoming a bit more aware of this with new focus on privateering, the outsourcing of patent enforcement by product companies to licensing and assertion specialists. The idea that aggregation is just fine when a product company does it, but suddenly evil when those same patents transferred to a third party has never sat well with me. And regardless of moral considerations, the fact of the matter is that patent aggregation is everywhere.

My second point follows from the first: aggregated portfolios are being used as assets, and traded as such by all sorts of companies. This is nothing new; people have been writing about patents as a new asset classes for a while now. Transactions are getting bigger, however, and they are hitting the news. Perhaps no transaction better illustrates my point than the recent Kodak patent auction. First, Kodak offered its patents for sale as a financing strategy in bankruptcy. Second, the eventual buyer was a consortium including, among others, Microsoft (a product company); Intellectual Ventures (a licensing company, but also one that litigates, but also one that aggregates defensively; and RPX (a defensive aggregator). This one transaction is my argument in a nutshell: everyone is aggregating, and they are doing so in buy/sell type transactions for financial purposes.

My third point is that such aggregation is not always (or necessarily often) a bad thing. This is decidedly against the conventional wisdom. Companies with large portfolios surely have the ability to cause “royalty stacking,” but in practice this is less likely than if many separate parties enforced those same patents. Litigation looks much the same; regardless of the size of the portfolio, courts are just not going to hear a case asserting 1000 patents. Only a few (at most 5 or 10) patents will be at issue, and then the aggregator looks like anyone else. Similarly, in negotiations, the parties usually haggle over a few “lead” patents. This is little different than negotiation with the owner of few patents – with one big exception. When you come to terms with the aggregator, you can settle and license hundreds or maybe thousands of patents at once. Not so with single-patent owners. These folks line up one after another, asserting a few patents at a time. The biggest NPEs will often assert patents obtained by individual inventors; would product makers really rather that the inventors assert their own patents separately? Maybe, before a time when people figured out a viable mechanism for funding patent assertion, but now that individuals might seek funding for enforcing their own patents, a single aggregator must surely be a better option than many inventor plaintiffs.

There is one difference with aggregated portfolios, of course. When the parties are done haggling over the lead patents, the portfolio owner always has more to discuss while the small patent holder has none. But rather than being the greatest cost of the portfolio, a seemingly bottomless portfolio is its greatest benefit.

And that is my fourth point: when parties are trading portfolios, the haggling should be over price instead of quality and infringement. In a large enough portfolio holding patents directly related to a particular product, there will surely be some number of patents that are both valid and infringed. The question is how many, and how much it will cost to find them.  A central thesis of my article is that treating portfolios as securities will help lower transactions costs in a variety of ways by limiting the litigation costs of finding those infringing patents and instead better pricing patents in the market.  For you legal sticklers, I didn’t just make this up: the paper looks at portfolios under the Supreme Court’s famous Howey test and concludes that such treatment is at least plausible under the law.

How might securities laws benefit markets? Not in the traditional “public offering” way. I suspect that most transactions would be excluded from the registration requirements. However, such transactions might be regulated as dark pools, and require clearinghouse treatment that makes such transactions public. Further, stock fraud laws might require the disclosure of information that might affect portfolio value. For example, patent holders who know of anticipatory prior art might be required to disclose it rather than keep it secret. Perhaps most important, accepting that portfolios are simply financial transactions might drive efforts to develop objective portfolio pricing. The goal of such pricing schemes is to determine a portfolio’s price even though the parties cannot agree on the price of any of the particular patent in the portfolio.  I examine several pricing strategies that might work (and several destined to fail) in the paper.

There is obviously much more in this paper than I can write here. I detail my arguments in the full paper.

AMP v. Myriad Gene Patenting Oral Arguments

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By Dennis Crouch

Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 12-398 (Supreme Court 2013) oral argument transcript.

The Supreme Court held oral arguments today in the much watched Gene patent case pending before the US Supreme Court. Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah own several patents covering particular isolated human genes, seemingly man-made complementary DNA that mimics the natural DNA sequence, methods for obtaining the DNA, and methods for using the DNA to test for disease. The major breakthrough made by the Myriad Scientists was to discover the naturally occurring sequence of DNA that codes for early-onset breast cancer. These are the so-called BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. This was a huge breakthrough and has been applied to save many lives. However, historic patent law is clear that the mere information discovered is not patentable. That information could be classified as both a natural phenomenon and an abstract idea—both of which lack patent eligibility. So, instead of patenting the information, the researchers applied molecular biology tools (conventional at the time) to isolate the DNA, and create cDNA. It was those structures and methods that Myriad patented, although the innovative heart of each patent claim remained the particular unpatentable genetic sequence. A group of public-minded researchers and groups challenged the patents. Arguing on their behalf is Chris Hansen of the ACLU. Myriad called patent law expert Greg Castanias for its arguments. And, acting as amicus curae, Donald Verrilli argued on behalf of the US Government.

My take is that the court is likely to find cDNA patentable because of the man-made nature of the molecule and hold that purely isolated molecules will only be patentable if their function is significantly altered because of the isolation. This result depends upon the court buying Myriad's argument that cDNA is the equivalent of recombinant DNA whose sequence is designed by the inventors. One risk of the decision for patentees is that the court appears poised to place additional weight on the obviousness analysis. Here, it is also clear that the court does not trust the USPTO to make these determinations. As Justice Kagan mentioned "the PTO seems very patent happy".

AMP's attorney Chris Hansen began his argument with the strongest possible approach – arguing that Myriad's recognition that the BRCA genes "correlate with an increased risk of breast or ovarian cancer . . . [was] made by nature . . . [and] Myriad does not deserve a patent for it." Mr. Castanias disagreed – "What Myriad inventors created in this circumstance was a new molecule that had never before been known to the world."

A first focus of the argument was on whether the isolated DNA has a new function – different from that found in the human body.

JUSTICE ALITO: Isolated DNA has a very different function from the DNA as it exists in nature. And although the chemical composition may not be different, it — it certainly is in a different form. So what is the distinction?

MR. HANSEN: Well, I don't think it has a new function, Your Honor, with respect. I believe that what — Myriad has proffered essentially three functions for the DNA outside the body as opposed to inside the body. The first is we can look at it. And that's true, but that's not really a new function. That's simply the nature of when you extract something you can look at it better.

The second two rationales that Myriad has proffered are that it can be used as probes and primers. Three of the lower court judges found that full-length DNA, which all of these patent claims include, cannot be used as probes and primers. But more important, finding a new use for a product of nature, if you don't change the product of nature, is not patentable. If I find a new way of taking gold and making earrings out of it, that doesn't entitle me to a patent on gold. If I find a new way of using lead, it doesn't entitle me to a patent on lead.

As I mentioned, everyone recognizes that Myriad made a major advance in our understanding of human genetics. The focused then turned to how Myriad should be rewarded.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Hansen, could you tell me what you think the incentives are for a company to do what Myriad did? If you assume that it takes a lot of work and takes a lot of investment to identify this gene, but the gene is not changed in composition, and what you just said is that discovering uses for that gene would not be patentable even if those new — even if those uses are new, what does Myriad get out of this deal? Why shouldn't we worry that Myriad or companies like it will just say, well, you know, we're not going to do this work anymore?

MR. HANSEN: Well, we know that would not have happened in this particular case, Your Honor. We know that there were other labs looking for the BRCA genes and they had announced that they would not patent them if they were the first to find it. We also know that prior to the patent actually being issued, there were other labs doing BRCA testing and Myriad shut all that testing down. So we know in this particular case that problem would not have arisen.

But the point of the whole — the whole point of the product of nature doctrine is that when you lock up a product of nature, it prevents industry from innovating and — and making new discoveries. That's the reason we have the product of nature doctrine, is because there may be a million things you can do with the BRCA gene, but nobody but Myriad is allowed to look at it and that is impeding science rather than advancing it.

MR. HANSEN: [Further], taxpayers paid for much of the investment in Myriad's work. I [also] think you get enormous recognition.

SCALIA: Well, that's lovely.

MR. HANSEN: But I think that we know that that's sufficient. We know it's sufficient with respect to these two genes. We also know it's sufficient with respect to the human genome.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I just don't think we can decide the case on the ground, oh, don't worry about investment, it'll come. I just don't think we can do that.

The patented cDNA is not found in the human body, but instead was manufactured by the researchers by using a discovered enzyme to convert mRNA created in the body back in to the more stable DNA form.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: [cDNA] is artificially created in the laboratory, so it's not bound in nature. It's not taking a gene and snipping something that's in nature. And yet you claim that can't be patented. The introns are taken out, the exons are left in, and they're sequenced together. Give me your brief argument on that. I read your brief, but it is not a product of nature; it's a product of human invention.

MR. HANSEN: There are two big differences between cDNA and DNA. The first is exactly the one Your Honor just discussed, which is that the introns, the noncoding regions, have been removed. That is done in the body, by the body. That's done in the process of DNA going to mRNA. What the scientist does who's creating the cDNA is they take the mRNA out of the body and then they simply have the natural nature-driven nucleotide binding processes complement the mRNA. So that if the mRNA has a C, the scientist just puts the corresponding nucleotide in there and nature causes them to bind up. The scientist does not decide -­

JUSTICE BREYER: I know, but I don't see the answer, because I gather, if I — if I've read it correctly, that when you have an R — the messenger RNA does not have the same base pairs. There's a U or something instead of an A or whatever it is.

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

JUSTICE BREYER: So when you actually look, if you could get a super-microscope and look at what they have with the cDNA, with their cDNA, you would discover something with an A, not a U. Is it AU? Is that the one?

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Okay. So — so you would discover something with an A there, you see, and you wouldn't discover something with a U there. And there is no such thing in nature as the no-introns AGG, whatever, okay? It's not there. That's not truly isolated DNA. But you can go look up the Amazon, wherever you want. Hence the question. Now, on that one, how? How is that found in nature? The answer is it isn't.

MR. HANSEN: Well, but I would suggest, Your Honor, that the question is not whether it is identical to something in nature. The question is whether there was a human invention involved, whether it is markedly different from what is found in nature.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that goes to obviousness. That does not in my mind go to the issue of whether it's patent eligible. You may have a very strong argument on obviousness, but why does it not -­it's creating something that's not found in nature at all.

. . . CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I — I thought the basic general approach here was we have a very expansive view of what is patent eligible and then we narrow things through things — issues like obviousness and so on. Why — wouldn't it make more sense to address the questions at issue here in the obviousness realm?

. . . . JUSTICE ALITO: This case has been structured in an effort to get us to decide this on the broadest possible ground . . . it's just about 101, it's not about any other provision of the Patent Act. Why should we do that?

. . . . JUSTICE BREYER: Ah. Then — then watch what you're doing. That's very, very interesting, because, really, we are reducing, then, 101 to anything under the sun, and — and that, it seems to me, we've rejected more often than we've followed it.

As it should, the discussion eventually worked its way to the patenting of ideas.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's a failure of the patent law. It doesn't patent ideas.

MR. HANSEN: And it shouldn't patent ideas, and — but it also makes the point that isolated gene and the gene in the body are the same.

. . .

GENERAL VERRILLI: The claim that isolated DNA is a human invention rests entirely on the fact that it is no longer connected at the molecular level to what surrounded it in the body. But allowing a patent on that basis would effectively preempt anyone else from using the gene itself for any medical or scientific purpose. That is not true about a patent on cDNA. A patent on cDNA leaves the isolated DNA available for other scientists and other — and others in the medical profession to try to generate new uses. . . . [T]he position of the United States is that [as a conceptual matter] cDNA is patent eligible.

. . .

JUSTICE KAGAN: The first person who found a chromosome and isolated it, I think we can all say that that was a very useful discovery. And the question is, can you then — can the person who found that chromosome and isolated it from the body, could they have gone to the PTO?

A decision in the case is expected in June.

Do the Wright Brothers Deserve a Patent for their Flying Machine?: Why Eliminating Software Inventions from the Patent System Makes No Sense.

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Guest Post by Martin Goetz

Imagine that the digital computer and the stored computer program (software) existed in the late 1800's. If so, there is a high probability that the Wright Brothers would have used a computer program to control the three-axis control system in their 1903 Flying Machine patent application. If they did, we would call the patent they received in 1906 a software patent. Further imagine that today's anti-patent zealots who preach that all software consists of abstract ideas, mental processes or mathematics were thrown back in time to the late 1800's. And finally imagine that they were successful in their stated goal to eliminate all software patents through an act of Congress. Had that really happened, the Wright Brothers would not have received a patent for what is recognized as one of the greatest inventions of the 20th century.

Think of all the great inventions in the 20th century. Many would have used a software program as they implemented and disclosed their inventions. Would we be better off today if there was no patent protection for those software inventions?

For the last 50 plus years, the nature of software and of software products has been significantly distorted by opponents of software patents. But their argument to eliminate all software patents makes no sense unless their goal is to eliminate the entire patent system.

Here's why it makes no sense….

Article 29 of the TRIPS guidelines covering "Disclosure Obligations" states "…An applicant for an invention shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention…." If the best mode includes software (a computer program), then that disclosure would describe the software through diagrams, flow charts, and descriptive text.

According to Wikipedia "there is no legal definition of a software patent". Let's look at two possible definitions.

Definition 1: If the definition of a software patent is that, if in the Disclosure of the invention, there is a description of a computer program (in whole, or in part) then the patent would be called "software patent". A "Software patent", under this definition, would be found in many industries, e.g., Software, Telecommunications, Manufacturing, Transportation, Appliances, Medical, Robotics—to name a few.

Said another way… In many industries inventions contain software programs as part of their disclosures. Take the Robotics/Medical Devices sector, where very sophisticated computer programs can control an artificial limb. How the artificial limbs are designed and constructed may be the invention. Or the invention may be how the computer program(s) interacts with the artificial limb. Or the invention may be a combination of both elements.

A more recent real life invention is the artificial retina, a robotics/medical device which offers partial vision for the blind. It's described as a camera, transmitter, and cable to video processor (software) connected to the brain.

So those that want to eliminate software patents, by design or by ignorance, would eliminate all robotic/medical device inventions where the disclosure includes a computer program.

Definition 2: Anti-Software patent zealots might argue that the definition of a "software patent" is when the disclosure of the invention only describes a computer program and a computer. And then their goal would be to have Congress change the Patent System to eliminate the issuance of "software only patents". But that would be catastrophic for the Software Industry, where many of their inventions are software only. This industry is made up of thousands of companies and is recognized as one of the top three manufacturing industries in the world .With annual worldwide revenues well over $ 300 Billion this industry needs (and wants) just as much patent protection as other industries.

Many software product companies can be thought of as high-technology manufacturing entities. Many of their products are state of the art, developed in a competitive, fast-moving environment that requires rapid response to meet user demand. Some of their products can be all software i.e., Google's search program or they could be a combination of software and hardware circuitry and/or devices i.e., Google's driverless car or the 3-D printer.

If the patent application contains a true invention it should be irrelevant whether or not the invention is disclosed as a "software only" implementation. The following are two examples of inventions from the Software Industry to illustrate my point of view

Back in November 2012 Microsoft stated in a press release "Microsoft researchers have demonstrated software that translates spoken English into spoken Chinese almost instantly, while preserving the unique cadence of the speaker's voice—a trick that could make conversation more effective and personal." Certainly the way Microsoft's researchers accomplished this complex translation is not obvious. And I have is little doubt that Microsoft will try to protect its research investment with a patent application. But its patent claims could not be that it invented "speech recognition" or "language translation", or even "voice to voice translations". Patents for Voice and Speech Recognition patents go back well over 30 years with IBM having over 200 speech recognition patents. And there have been language translation patents for many years But Microsoft could invent a new way to do voice recognition and language translations and at the same time retain the cadence of the speaker's voice. And, let's imagine, the invention would use a standard headphone and the headphone would not be part of the disclosure. Such a patent on that invention would be software only (and a computer) in its disclosure. But what if the invention needed a special set of headphones (a device), was integral to the invention, and was part of the disclosure? Is a speech recognition/translation/cadence and special headphone invention any more innovative than a "speech recognition/translation/cadence" software only invention?

In 2000, a renowned inventor, Ray Kurzweil received a patent named Reading System which Reads Aloud from an Image Representation of a Document. The patent disclosure shows a diagram of a monitor, scanner, speakers, and a PC computer composed of a processor, storage and a keyboard. The essence of the disclosure and the invention is a logic chart describing a machine system which interacts with a speech synchronizer and the various devices.

The first sentence of the abstract in the patent stated "a reading system includes a computer and a mass storage device including software comprising instructions for causing a computer to accept an image file generated from optically scanning an image of a document."

At that time, Ray Kurzweil's company, Kurzweil Educational Systems marketed a special purpose hardware/software system called the Kurzweil 3000 Reading Machine which was marketed to the blind and poor readers. They received a patent on this invention in 2000. Today the company sells a software only system called Kurzweil 3000 and continues to have the protection of the patent system through his original 2000 patent and with additional patents e.g., Reducing processing latency in optical character recognition for portable reading machine — another software only patent.

Few would argue that the Kurzweil 3000 Reading Machine was not an invention and not deserving of a patent.

What these zealots should be arguing is that many software patents issued by the US Patent Office, including most business-method patents, should never have been issued because of their obviousness. With that I heartily agree. To their credit, the Patent Office and the Courts are today grappling with how to recognize obviousness in a patent application. A very difficult challenge, to say the least.

But let's stop calling a true invention that includes a computer program in its disclosure a software patent. In fact, let's eliminate the phrase "a software patent" from our vocabulary.

END

Doctrinal Precedence Among the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Patent Act, and the Sherman Act

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Guest post by Professor Brett M. Frischmann (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law)

On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a case concerning reverse payment settlements of patent litigation.  The court granted cert on the following issue:

Whether reverse-payment agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying patent litigation was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as the court below held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful (as the Third Circuit has held).

In this brief post, I suggest a way to decide the issue in a manner that resolves the apparent tensions between the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Patent Act, and the Sherman Act. To my knowledge, the argument I make does not appear explicitly in the briefs, although Scott Hemphill made a related argument in his 2006 NYU Law Review article, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem.

Hatch-Waxman should be given substantial priority in the analytical framework that courts employ when resolving antitrust claims about reverse payment settlements of patent litigation. Here is why. Both antitrust law and patent law are general-purpose, industry-agnostic legal regimes. Antitrust law regulates competition generally. It aims to sustain competition and constrain anticompetitive practices, and it does so with very general legal prescriptions that courts must apply in a wide range of different contexts. Patent law aims to encourage innovation by giving inventors the right to exclude others from a patented invention. Patent law also consists of very general legal prescriptions that the PTO and courts must apply in a wide range of different contexts. In both antitrust and patent, sector-specific, industry-specific, or even context-specific rules do arise over time in the courts or agencies. But the statutory law enacted by Congress is general-purpose.

Hatch-Waxman is special-purpose and industry-specific, and it also happens to be last-in-time. Congress enacted Hatch-Waxman to accomplish specific ends through specific means. Of course, Hatch-Waxman is a complex regulatory regime, and there are various tradeoffs reflected in the law that may have been necessary to get it passed. But Hatch-Waxman primarily aimed to induce competition in drug markets when such competition is feasible, and one of the central means for accomplishing this end is litigation over patent validity.1 Thus, Hatch-Waxman envisioned two particular types of competition—first, competition in courts between owners of drug patents and generic drug companies, and second, competition in drug markets between brand firms and generics. Reverse payment settlements stifle both types of competition.

What do I mean when I say that Hatch-Waxman should be given substantial priority in the analytical framework that courts employ when resolving antitrust claims about reverse payment settlements of patent litigation? The antitrust-patent interface has been the source of substantial consternation—how do we resolve tensions that might arise among competing legal principles and values? Regardless of how one comes out on how to resolve or understand the interface, it is largely irrelevant to this particular set of issues. Hatch-Waxman replaces general patent law in this context. As a result, it supplies the relevant principles and values, and it significantly narrows the range of relevant arguments that a court should entertain in an antitrust suit. Simply put, broad claims about principles and values derived from patent law should not carry much, if any, weight. For example, claims about the impact of reverse payment settlements, or their prohibition, on patent law's "incentives to innovate" are red herrings. Similarly, arguments about weak vs. strong patents are also red herrings because there is nothing in Hatch-Waxman itself that draws a distinction between weak and strong. (It is worth noting that even for "really strong" patents, litigation over patent validity also provides the public with greater certainty about the validity of those patents.) Finally, claims about the general judicial economy of encouraging settlement are also irrelevant because Hatch-Waxman directly employs litigation as a means to facilitate competition.

Antitrust scrutiny of reverse payment settlements of patent litigation need not get bogged down in discussions of patent law or judicial economy. Congress has spoken clearly and specifically and chosen to use patent litigation as a means to induce competition. Reverse payment settlements of patent litigation are precisely the sort of agreements that antitrust law directly regulates, usually through a rule that says such agreements are per se unlawful. An agreement not to compete in the forum specified by Hatch-Waxman is no different than competitors expressly agreeing not to compete in any other market; it looks like various types of cases where per se illegality is generally accepted as a legitimate rule (e.g., bid rigging, market division).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court could reasonably declare reverse payment settlements of Hatch-Waxman-based patent litigation per se unlawful. Alternatively, the Court could declare the settlements in question presumptively unlawful and then put the burden on the defendants to rebut the presumption.

Reverse payment settlements stifle both types of relevant competition noted above. Competition of the first type (competition in courts between owners of drug patents and generic drug companies) is always stifled. The same might be said about competition of the second type (competition in drug markets between brand firms and generics), although some argue that settlements sometimes may increase competition of the second type where a patent would be found valid (if actually litigated) because the settlement allows the generic company to enter the market earlier than otherwise would be the case. Presumably, the Court should choose between per se illegality and presumptive illegality based on its evaluation of this argument.

If the Court takes this latter route, the types of evidence and arguments relevant to rebutting the presumption should be limited substantially by Hatch-Waxman. As noted above, Hatch-Waxman specifies the types of relevant competition and if given the priority it deserves, it would preclude various generic arguments from being made.

===

FN1: As Scott Hemphill put it, "the Hatch-Waxman Act is a deliberate effort to promote consumer access through litigated challenges." See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1553 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925919. He goes on: "Since litigation is the instrument by which the regulatory arrangement accomplishes its ends, it is difficult to argue that an end-run on the instrument is consistent with the scheme." Much of the argument I am making derives from ideas in Scott's article and conversations we have had over the years.

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Oral Arguments Lead to More Questions

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By Dennis Crouch

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp (Fed. Cir. 2013)

On February 8, 2013, the Federal Circuit held oral arguments en banc in this important subject matter eligibility dispute that focuses on the extent that software can be patented. Under Federal Circuit rules, en banc rehearings include all of the regular circuit court judges as well as any other judge who sat on the original panel. For this case, the nine regular members of the court were joined by Senior Judge Richard Linn who sat on the original panel and penned the opinion of the court that has offended so many anti-software-patent advocates. In the opinion, Judge Linn cabined-in the definition of “abstract” with regard to computer implemented inventions and also indicated that §101 should only be used to invalidate a claim when that result is “manifestly evident.” [UPDATED] With a ten-member panel the accused infringer (CLS Bank) needs six votes to overturn the original panel decision. With a ten member panel, six votes are needed to win. Since the original appellate decision was vacated, this appeal comes directly from the district court. As such, a five-five tie will affirm the lower court holding of invalidity.  While I suspect that Linn’s language putting Section 101 on the back burner will not survive, I suspect that at least some claims will be seen to pass muster under Section 101.

The parties are in relative agreement on many points. None of the parties seriously argue that software per se is patentable – apparently assuming that software apart from its computer implementation always embodies an abstract idea. All of the parties also agreed that a computer specially designed to perform a particular function can also be patentable. The dispute centers on what test should be used to determine when you have such a “specialized computer” and on whether Alice Corp’s claimed invention meets that standard.

Most notably absent from the oral arguments was any discussion of the meaning of an “abstract idea.” Of course it is the ambiguity in the definition of abstract idea that is causing most of the confusion regarding subject matter eligibility.

For decades, patent attorneys have known that software can be patentable if properly claimed in a way that directs attention away from the software nature of the invention. I suspect that the rule-of-thumb for patent eligibility will focus on complexity of the relationship between software and hardware. And, if that is the case patent attorneys will renew their reputation for taking simple ideas and making them appear quite complex.

Mark Perry represented the accused infringer (CLS Bank) and argued that one starting point for subject matter eligibility is the notion that a process accomplished “entirely in the human mind or made with pen and paper” cannot be patent eligible. Further, merely speeding-up that process by using a computer does not somehow transform the process into a patentable invention – “it simply accelerates the process.” The bulk of the questioning focused whether CLS had overgeneralized the claims. For instance, when Mr. Perry began reading from the patent’s invention summary he was stopped by Judge Linn who responded that every claim can be distilled to an abstract summary but “that’s not the way that we assess patent eligibility or patentability.”

Judge Moore focused the questioning on the CLS Bank claim that included the most physical structure. Claim 26 of the ‘375 patent reads as follows:

26. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation between parties, the system comprising:

a communications controller,

a first party device, coupled to said communications controller,

a data storage unit having stored therein

(a) information about a first account for a first party, independent from a second account maintained by a first exchange institution, and

(b) information about a third account for a second party, independent from a fourth account maintained by a second exchange institution; and

a computer, coupled to said data storage unit and said communications controller, that is configured to

(a) receive a transaction from said first party device via said communications controller;

(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction between said first party and said second party after ensuring that said first party and/or said second party have adequate value in said first account and/or said third account, respectively; and

(c) generate an instruction to said first exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution to adjust said second account and/or said fourth account in accordance with the adjustment of said first account and/or said third account, wherein said instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said first exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution.

Judge Moore rightly suggested that a computer by itself is clearly a machine and subject-matter eligible. She queried then, how can a more particular invention – the computer with particular functionality – be ineligible? Perry offered two responses. First, he argued that the claim here is really method claim masquerading as a machine claim – that method itself is an abstract idea and the addition of the computer hardware does not make the claims eligible. Further, Perry argued that the claims here are not directed to any particular computer but instead a generic system. Judges Moore and Newman then queried whether the real focus should be on obviousness. Perry admitted that the claims may also be invalid under Section 103, but that the Supreme Court has indicated that Section 101 is a threshold inquiry. In addition, he argued, Section 101 inquiries are often easy because they do not require substantial discovery.

Perry also suggested that the requirement for extensive particular hardware rightly favors companies like CLS Bank and Google who spend millions of dollars to build systems that actually work rather than companies like Alice who merely develop a “McKinsey Report” and file for patent protection.

With Ray Chen on the sideline pending confirmation of his Federal Circuit judicial nomination, Deputy Solicitor Nathan Kelley stepped up and primarily sided with CLS Bank – arguing that software per se cannot be patent eligible because it is an abstract idea and that merely connecting software to a computer is likewise patent ineligible. The oddball test suggested by the PTO borrows the separability concept from copyright law. In copyright, a useful article is only copyrightable if the original expression is at least conceptually separable from the utility of the article. The PTO argues that an inseparability requirement should be put in place for computer implemented inventions. Under that construct, a computer implemented invention that applies an abstract idea would only be patent eligible if the computer is inseparably and inextricably linked to the invention. In oral arguments, Kelley suggested that the approach requires the “fact finder” to “go deeper” in considering whether an inextricable link exists. Mr. Kelly did agree (on questioning from Judge Moore) that the focus in this process should be on the language of the claims.

What the PTO wants out of this is a practical test that its examiners can follow rather than just the notion of an “abstract idea.” I believe that the agency would have been better served if he had focused on that point rather introducing a new concept into the law that does little or nothing to resolve ambiguity.

Adam Perlman argued for the patentee (Alice Corp) and likewise did not defend software patents. Rather, Perlman argued that his client’s patents were technology-focused inventions that wove together software and hardware in a way that “creates a new machine” that clearly satisfies the requirements of Section 101.

There was some back and forth about preemption. Neither party mentioned this, but a point relevant to preemption is likely CLS’s allegations at the district court level that it did not infringe the patents.

The Federal Circuit will likely take a few months to decide this appeal. An important issue will be to see whether the court decides this case quickly or waits for the Supreme Court to release its decision in Myriad. Although not computer implemented, the outcome of Myriad case could impact the law here.

En Banc Arguments This Week

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by Dennis Crouch

On February 8, 2013 (this Friday), the Federal Circuit will sit en banc and hear arguments on two important patent cases. In CLS Bank v. Alice Corp the court will focus on the patenting of inventions implemented through software. The two particular questions highlighted in the en banc order are:

a. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?; and

b. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

In addition to the parties, the Federal Circuit has also granted leave for the USPTO to participate at oral arguments. The USPTO’s brief focused on practical mechanisms for the process of determining § 101 eligibility. The agency wrote “the essential question under § 101 is whether the claim, properly construed, incorporates enough meaningful limitations to ensure that it amounts to more than a claim for the abstract idea itself . . . This Court should identify a non-exhaustive list of factors for district courts and examiners to consider in resolving that essential question on a case-by-case basis.”

The second patent case (argued first on the 8th) is that of Robert Bosch v. Pylon Mfg. In Bosch, the court is focusing on the “final judgment rule” that limits a losing party’s right to appeal until the district court judgment is finalized. Particularly, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2)  indicates that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over patent appeals once the case is “final except for an accounting.  The basic question on appeal is: Define “an accounting.”  The en banc order asks two particular questions:

a) Does 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain appeals from patent infringement liability determinations when a trial on damages has not yet occurred?

b) Does 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain appeals from patent infringement liability determinations when willfulness issues are outstanding and remain undecided?

In its brief of the case, the U.S. Government argued that “accounting” encompasses the damage award. As such, the Government argues that appeal is appropriate once liability is determined. 

At the Supreme Court, oral argument in Bowman v. Monsanto (patent exhaustion doctrine) is scheduled for February 19; and FTC v. Watson (reverse payment settlements) is scheduled for March 25. Arguments for Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
have not yet been scheduled.

2012 Trends: New Life in the Doctrine of Equivalents

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Guest post by Donald S. Chisum, Chisum Patent Academy

Looking back at the approximately 125 precedential decisions on patent law of the Federal Circuit in 2012, I asked myself: are there any new trends? One trend smiled back: an increase in the number of decisions on the doctrine of equivalents. There were eight, and, surprisingly, four of them showed judicial favor toward application of the doctrine.

Since 1997, the Federal Circuit, with the encouragement of the Supreme Court, has developed various restrictions and limitations on the doctrine. This has led some commentators to assert that the doctrine of equivalent is “dead.” See Allison & Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955 (2006-2007). That obituary may have been premature. The Supreme Court created the doctrine in 1850 and twice rejected frontal assaults: in 1950 and 1997. The 2012 Federal Circuit decisions show that well supported assertions of equivalency cannot be dismissed.

In particular, Chief Judge Rader wrote two opinions, expanding beyond what was necessary to decide the cases before him. In one, he emphasized that “the Supreme Court declined to let numerous contentions bury the doctrine.” Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog (Dec. 4, 2012). In Deere, Judge Rader attempted to clarify “misperceptions” about the “vitiation” limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. For a comment on Judge Rader’s discussion of vitiation, see Dennis Crouch, Reviving the Doctrine of Equivalents, Patently-O at https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/rader-reviving-the-doctrine-of-equivalents.html.

In the other case, Judge Rader stressed that the doctrine is particularly appropriate when an accused equivalent is made possible only by technological improvements after a patent’s effective filing date. Energy Transportation Group v. William Demand Holdings (Oct. 12, 2012). Judge Rader has long espoused the view that the doctrine should be available when equivalents are not foreseeable but not when the opposite was true. A competent draftsperson should write claims to cover literally equivalents that were foreseeable at the time the application for the patent was prosecuted.

Also significant were two opinions by other judges. In one, the court addressed the recurring issues of equivalency applied to numerical and range limitations and to qualifiers such as “substantially.” Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical (Sept. 28, 2012). The majority, by the recently-appointed Federal Circuit Judge Wallach, held that a claim, which required that a drug tablet layer have “substantially all” of an ingredient, and which was construed to mean “at least 90%,” was properly found infringed by equivalency by an accused tablet that had only 85% of the ingredient in the layer.

In another case, the court, in an opinion by Judge Prost, held that a district court erred in applying the “disclosure-dedication” rule and thus erred in granting summary judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Sandisk Corp. v. Kingston Technology Co., Inc. (Oct. 9, 2012).

In the other four cases, the Federal Circuit concluded, essentially, that asserted equivalents were not sufficiently equivalent or involved completely missing claim limitations or failure to claim literally well-known interchangeable elements. Technology Patents LLC v. T-Mobile Ltd. (Oct. 17, 2012); Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc. (Sept. 4, 2012); General Electric Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (July 6, 2012); Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC (June 22, 2012).

One may ask: why would there be renewed judicial interest in the doctrine of equivalents? One possibility: developments in other areas of patent law, such as the “abstract idea” restriction on Section 101 patent eligible subject matter, are creating pressures on patent applicants to formulate claims that are specific and narrow in literal scope. Courts may use a more robust doctrine of equivalents to provide a scope of protection that is determined to be appropriate in view of the patent’s disclosure, the prior art, and the development of the pertinent technology after a patent’s effective filing date.

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Software Patentability On the Briefs

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by Dennis Crouch

Briefing continues in the CLS Bank software patent case.  The accused infringer (CLS Bank) has filed its brief arguing that the Alice patent lacks any core inventive concept and therefore lacks subject matter eligibility under Section 101 of the Patent Act.  Briefs in support of CLS and those nominally in support of neither party have also been filed.  Alice will file its brief in January and I expect a set of additional briefs in support.  As in the Bilski case, Alice's asserted claim here is one that appears invalid on other grounds — namely obviousness.  However, the district court ruled on summary judgment (and before claim construction) that the claim was invalid as lacking patent eligiblity under Section 101.

The text of the asserted claim is below:

A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;

(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;

(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order; and

(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

In its first opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court ruling – finding that the claim did not merely encompass an abstract idea but instead embodied a practical implementation that fits within the scope of patent eligible subject matter.  In a subsequent en banc order, the court asked that the parties focus on two particular questions of law: 

I. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computerimplemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?

II. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computerimplemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

I have attempted to extract some core elements of each brief. I should note that all of these brief have much more nuance than is shown. I attempted to categorize the briefs filed on behalf of neither party. My approach was quite subjective and I am confident that others would have classified them in a different manner. 

Practical keys here are (1) whether subject matter eligibility is about the inventive concept or instead more focused on the scope of a well construed claim; (2) invention

Party Brief:

In Support of CLS (Defendant)

  • File Attachment: BSA Software Alliance–ISO CLS.pdf (169 KB) Business Software Aliance believes that software should be patentable, but not the software at issue here. 

    "Simple economics makes clear that, if patent protection for software were curtailed, the adverse consequences would be swift and severe. . . . Two factors are of particular significance—whether a claim can be implemented solely via a mental process or necessarily relies upon a machine for execution; and whether the claim uses an abstract idea or law of nature in a way that is novel, useful, and limited. When an invention falls short under both of these standards, it most likey is not patentable under Section 101. . . . Assessed under this framework, the software at issue here is not patentable. . . . It is plain that credit intermediation long preexisted computer implementation, and that it is a process that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human with pencil and paper. In addition, the computer aspect of the claims here does not add anything of substance to the mental process at issue. The computer implementation of the abstract idea is not limited in any fashion. And there is no suggestion that the process here is in anyway dependent upon computer technology to accomplish the directed end."

  • Download EFF–ISO CLS Patents are causing more harm than benefit. This is especially true for software patents that regularly include broad functional claims. However, Section 101 analysis is problematic because of its ambiguity. The EFF brief argues that the way to cure this is to more broadly interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) so that functional software claims be given limited scope under the Federal Circuit's Means-Plus-Function doctrine. This approach stems from a recent article by Mark Lemley and fits directly within the avoidance doctrine that Professor Merges and I suggested in our 2010 article.
  • File Attachment: CCIA–ISO CLS.pdf (200 KB) Prometheus requires an inventive concept to pass 101.
  • File Attachment: Clearing House Ass'n–ISO CLS.pdf (819 KB)  Banking industry brief argues that "threshold" language means that "the Section 101 inquiry is the first step in the legal framework to determine patentability" and should be rigorously enforced.  
  • File Attachment: Google et al.–ISO CLS.pdf (982 KB).  Google acknowledges the difficulty with the abstract idea test because the term "abstract" is so difficult to define.  However, Google argues that the abstract ideas are much easier to identify individually than to define generally. This is roughly the same as know-it-when-you-see-it test for obscinity.  Google also writes that "abstract patents are a plague on the high-tech sector."
  • File Attachment: Stites Amicus Brief.pdf (262 KB) "The software patent game is a less than a zero sum game for the participants and has a large inhibiting effect on software innovation." Stites argues that the court should simply eliminate software patents.

 In Support of Neither Party, but Promoting a Stronger § 101 Requirement

  • File Attachment: British Airways et al–ISO Neither Party.pdf (191 KB) Supreme Court has rejected the "course-filter" "manifestly-evident" approach offered by the original CLS panel. Whether a claim fails under Section 101 can ordinarily be determined very early in a case and without and detailed claim construction.
  • File Attachment: Profs Hollaar & Trzyna–ISO Neither Party.pdf (217 KB) The only way to draw a clear and reasonable line on subject matter eligibility is to focus on its link to technology.
  • File Attachment: Juhasz Law Firm–ISO Neither Party.pdf (285 KB) "The test to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible "abstract idea" should be whether steps that are central to the claim (i.e., not token extra-solution activity) have a "physical" or "virtual" link to a specific real or tangible object."
  • File Attachment: Koninklijke Philips–ISO Neither Party.pdf (549 KB) An applicant and patentee should have the burden of proving that the claimed software implementation is subject matter eligible.
  • File Attachment: Internet Retailers–ISO Neither Party.pdf (2454 KB) Simply rewriting a method claim as a system or storage medium cannot render the claim subject matter eligible. The Federal Circuit should empower district courts to make 101 determinations very early in cases – well before claim construction or the completion of discovery. "The savings to the parties in money and the courts in time are self-evident. And those savings are more likely to be obtained in precisely those cases in which the patents are least likely to be valid or valuable, cases brought under low-quality patents. Judicious application of Section 101 is likely to winnow out the worst patents at the lowest cost."

In Support of Neither Party, but Promoting a Weaker § 101 Requirement

  • File Attachment: IP Owners Ass'n–ISO Neither Party.pdf (301 KB) Software is generally patentable under Section 101. However, a claim "must describe the use of [a] computer with sufficient detail to avoid preempting other uses of the idea and the computer implementation must be a meaningful and significant element of the invention." A detailed claim construction is ordinarily necessary to determine whether that claim is directed to statutory subject matter.
  • File Attachment: CLS-Bank_v_Alice_USA-amicus-ISO-Neither-Party.pdf (311 KB) See this.
  • File Attachment: Sigram Schindler–ISO Neither Party.pdf (474 KB) The abstract idea test is sufficiently defined.
  • File Attachment: NY IP Law Ass'n–ISO Neither Party.pdf (735 KB) Efforts in some decisions to dissect the claim into old and new parts or computer and non-computer elements, should be rejected as squarely inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), and Bilski. "NYIPLA does not agree that method, system and storage medium claims should ipso facto rise and fall together. Rather, each claim (regardless of its type) should be considered independently as a whole to determine whether it is directed to patent-eligible subject matter."
  • File Attachment: IP Law Ass'n of Chicago–ISO Neither Party.pdf (1024 KB) Subject matter eligibility should be broad and flexible. IPLAC's test is similar to the government's factor's in its brief. However, the tone of the IPLAC questions suggest broader eligibility. When a claim includes a computer program, IPLAC would ask: "(a) Are the claims drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory, because if so, they do not become nonstatutory simply because they use a mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer. Diehr. (b) Are process claims, as a whole, without regard to the novelty of any element or steps, or even of the process itself, nothing more than a statutory process and not an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, because if so, they are not nonstatutory. (c) Do the claims implement or apply a formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), because if so, the claims are statutory. (d) Do the claims apply the laws to a new and useful end, because if so, they are statutory."
  • File Attachment: Conejo-Valley-Bar-Assn–ISO-Neither-Party.pdf (1589 KB) There is no need for a strong section 101 eligibility requirement because the other sections of the patent act do the work already.
  • File Attachment: IBM–ISO Neither Party.pdf (1624 KB) "In the exceptional case when the patent eligibility of a computer implemented invention is not readily apparent, the functional requirement of a computer counsels in favor of patent eligibility." Methods are different from systems and are different from storage media. As such, the subject matter eligibility issues are also different and thus, a system claim might be patent eligible while its parallel method claim may be ineligible.

Patenting Software: Obama Administration Argues “Sometimes”

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By Dennis Crouch

CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp (Fed. Cir. 2012)

The US Government has filed its amicus brief in the pending en banc CLS Bank case that focuses on the patentability of software systems. Download CLS-Bank_v_Alice_USA-amicus-ISO-Neither-Party. The brief generally rejects the idea that software per se represents patentable subject matter but is favorable toward the patenting of computerized applications that either improve computer performance, use technology in a unique technological way, or transform the local environment.

Unlike some recent briefs, this has been filed with the support of both the USPTO and the DOJ. The brief suggests a claim-by-claim subject matter analysis that begins with claim construction and only then asks "whether the challenged claim, properly construed, incorporates enough meaningful limitations to ensure that it amounts to more than a claim for the abstract idea itself." The brief then lists a set of factors that the government sees as important in making that determination:

  • Is the computer only nominally or tangentially related to the performance of the invention?
  • Is the computer generically recited or, instead are specific, unconventional computer equipment or tools required?
  • Is the invention focused primarily on non-technological fields or does the invention improve the ability of a computer to function as a computer?
  • Is the computer used generically for its automation or communication functions or does the computer manipulate particular data in particular, specific, and useful ways?
  • Is the abstract idea merely described within a particular environment or is the abstract idea part of an invention that transforms its environment.
  • Are the computer related elements merely conventional steps described at a high level of generality in a way that would be employed by anyone wanting to apply the abstract idea.

Each of these determinations is riddled with problems as is the potential weighting in an overall abstract-idea analysis. However, the overall approach adds substantially to the the

The brief suggests that all claimed features can contribute to subject matter eligibility, but some caution should be used to not allow "mere 'drafting effort designed to monopolize [an abstract idea] itself'" (quoting Mayo). Regarding the product/process divide, the government writes that the form of the claim should not impact subject matter eligibility because those differences come from the "draftsman's art" rather than the invention itself.

Perhaps attempting to endear itself to the Federal Circuit, the brief implicitly criticizes Supreme Court patent decisions by arguing that "the §101 inquiry should focus on the actual language of each challenged claim, properly construed, not a paraphrase or parody of the claims. Unfortunately, the government does not have any Supreme Court precedent to back-up this argument.

As a final point, the government brief argues that the presumption of validity associated with patent rights lead to a conclusion that a patent can only be invalidated on subject matter eligibility grounds based upon "clear and convincing evidence." Reading between the lines, this seems to mean that any conclusions draw from the factors above must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. While §101 eligibility may be a question of law, the government additionally argues that it is a factual question as to whether "limitations recited in a claim do not, in practice, impose any meaningful limitations on their claim scope." Of course, prior to issuance or during post-grant review there is no presumption of validity.

Related articles
CLS Bank v. Alice: The "Nothing More Than" Limitation on Abstract Ideas
Director Kappos: Some Thoughts on Patentability
Federal Circuit To Announce Whether Software is Patentable?: En Banc Rehearing on Section 101 Issues
Ultramercial v. Hulu: Computer Programs and Patentable Subject Matter
Federal Circuit Continues Split on Patentable Subject Matter
Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?
Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Challenges Chief Judge Rader's Broad Notion of Software Patentability
CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Patenting Software Ideas
Ongoing Battles over Patentable Subject Matter

Moving Away from Beauty as a Factor in Design Patent Validity

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Guest Post by Professor Andrew W. Torrance. This post is a shortened version of Professor Torrance’s recently published article titled Beauty Fades: An Experimental Study of Federal Court Design Patent Aesthetics, Journal of Intellectual Property, Volume 19, Issue 2 (2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156943.

Introduction    

Courts are rarely asked to judge beauty. Such a subjective practice would normally be anathema to the ideal of objective legal standards. However, one area of federal law has a long tradition of explicitly requiring courts to make aesthetic decisions: the law of design. Examination of design patent law offers unique insight into how aesthetic considerations have been, and are currently, employed by courts to make legal decisions.

In the United States, patent law offers protection for inventions originating within diverse fields of endeavor. In addition to utility and plant patents, design patents represent a third category of patent rights, which are available to inventors of "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture . . . ." (35 U.S.C. §171). Since they were first made available in 1842, more than 630,000 design patents have issued in the United States. The very first design patent was issued to George Bruce in 1842 to protect a new "Type" font (U.S. Patent No. D1). Later design patents issued to protect such iconic designs as the Statue of Liberty (D11,023, granted to Auguste Bartholdi) and the Coca-Cola bottle (D48,160, granted to H. Samuelson). Over the past several years, design patents have enjoyed a resurgence in popularity, with applications to the United States Patent and Trademark Office increasing markedly (Steven L. Oberholtzer, The Basic Principles Of Intellectual Property Law 6, 2d ed. 2009).

Not unsurprisingly, many courts have interpreted U.S. design patent law to require an element of artistry. Although no such requirement was explicitly present in the original design patent statute, the Patent Act of August 29, 1842 (ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543), judicial interpretations of the ornamentality requirement often appeared to necessitate that designs possess features that were aesthetically pleasing to the human eye. In Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1961), the court mandated that "[a patented design must] be the product of aesthetic skill and artistic conception." As recently as 1989, in dicta from Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148, the U.S. Supreme Court echoed the view that, to be patentable, designs must be visually attractive, explaining that, "[t]o qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability." Thus, the legal requirement that a design patent be "ornamental" was long interpreted to necessitate artistry or an aesthetically pleasing effect.

Roughly coincident with the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") in 1982, design patent law doctrine appeared to change direction, as aesthetic considerations were deemphasized in deciding the validity of designs claimed in patents. This shift was decisively heralded a decade later, in Seiko Epson v. Nu-Kote International, 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (1999), when the CAFC stated "the 'ornamental' requirement of the design statute means that the design must not be governed solely by function. . . ." So well accepted has the non-artistic interpretation of the law become that law firms now generally counsel their clients that aesthetic considerations hold little relevance for design patents. To illustrate how well accepted this principle is, consider the following statement about design patent law on page 7 of The Basic Principles of Intellectual Property Law (Second Edition, 2009), a primer of intellectual property law freely distributed to potential clients by the venerable law firm, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione: "There is no requirement that the design be artistic or pleasing to the eye." The trend away from aesthetic interpretations of the ornamentality requirement has brought U.S. design patent law closer to that in other jurisdictions, such as the European Union and Canada, where aesthetic considerations appear to play little role in determining the validity of design patents or registrations.

Experiment and Results

An experimental approach was used to test the hypothesis that aesthetic considerations in design patent law have, indeed, diminished over the last thirty years. All design patents from 1982 (that is, the creation of the CAFC) to 2010 in which a court made a final determination of validity or infringement were identified, and each design patent therein scored for validity and infringement. Then, in a controlled experiment, human subjects were asked to score the attractiveness of all the patented designs at issue in these cases.

The experimental results indicate that, at the beginning of the time period considered, patents claiming the least attractive designs were most likely to be found invalid, those claiming designs of intermediate attractiveness fared better in terms of validity, but were found to have been infringed relatively less often, and patents claiming the most attractive designs were most likely to be found both valid and infringed. In other words, aesthetically pleasing designs claimed in patents tended to fare better in court than did less attractive designs. However, the results also indicate that, while the attractiveness of patented designs found valid, whether infringed or not, has changed little since 1982, the average attractiveness of patented designs found invalid has risen markedly over time. In fact, in contradistinction to the situation early in the time period surveyed, the attractiveness of a design claimed in a patent has now become a poor predictor of judicial outcome. Design beauty appears to have ceased to be a useful predictor of judicial outcome in design patent litigation.

A few of the experimental results of this study are illustrated below. Complete results for all litigated design patents, by type of court (that is, all federal courts, federal district courts, and the CAFC), and litigation outcome (that is, validity, invalidity, infringement, and non-infringement) can be found in the full version the article, available as a free download at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156943.

FIGURE 1 is a scatterplot graph that depicts the mean attractiveness of all design patents according to the year in which a court ruled on their validity or infringement. FIGURE 1 also shows the results of a linear regression of these data. The regression analysis shows very little change (y = 0.0132x – 21.511, R² = 0.0146) in the attractiveness of patented designs from 1982 to 2010.

FIGURE 2 is a scatterplot graph that depicts the mean attractiveness of all design patents found invalid by a court by year of court ruling. FIGURE 2 also shows the results of a linear regression of these data. The regression analysis shows a more substantial rise (y = 0.0495x – 93.82, R² = 0.2183) in the attractiveness of patented designs found invalid from 1982 to 2010.


Discussion

a. Overall stability in attractiveness

For most of the categories of outcome and types of courts considered there was little change in the measured attractiveness of patented designs from 1982 to 2010. These results apply to patented designs found to be (1) valid but not infringed and (2) both valid and infringed, and pertain to results from both federal district courts and the CAFC. These data show little evidence that the attractiveness of patented designs held valid (whether infringed or not) changed from 1982 to 2010 across most categories of outcome and types of court.

b. Rise in attractiveness of PATENTED designs HELD INVALID

The most striking pattern in the data involves patented designs finally found invalid by a court. The data indicate a marked rise in measured attractiveness of these patented designs from 1982 to 2010. This pattern is remarkably consistent whether considered across all federal courts (y = 0.0495x – 93.82, R² = 0.2183), in federal district courts (y = 0.0442x – 83.227, R² = 0.213), or in the CAFC (y = 0.0968x – 188.48, R² = 0.2363). These results roughly match an observed shift in design patent doctrine away from an aesthetics requirement occurring since the advent of the CAFC. From 1982 to 2010 courts became increasingly likely to find attractive patented designs invalid. By contrast, the data suggest that, during the early years of the time period studied, less aesthetically attractive patented designs were more likely to be found invalid while more aesthetically attractive patented designs were more likely to found valid. This trend away from aesthetics as a factor in invalidity is mirrored in both the doctrine and the data.

c. Policy implications

There may be policy advantages to dropping the requirement for aesthetics, chief among which may be improved consistency in making decisions about design patent validity. Judgments about attractiveness are inherently subjective, depending as they do on the personal aesthetic sensibilities of the judges who determine design patent validity. Relying, instead, on a more objective test of ornamentality, such as lack of functionality, is likely to lead to improved consistency in validity determinations, not only in court and at the USPTO, but also among design patent owners considering infringement litigation and defendants attempting to avoid such actions.

A second salutary implication for policy involves the harmonization of U.S. design patent law with standards of intellectual property law prevailing internationally. The weakening of the aesthetics requirement in its design patent law has moved the United States towards the design protection laws that predominate in most other jurisdictions, such as the European Union and Canada. Access to a similar test of design patent (or design registration) validity across jurisdictions may afford design patent owners advantages of efficiency, since determinations of validity in one jurisdiction would be more likely to hold true in others.

Conclusions

Coinciding approximately with the inception of the CAFC, design patent doctrine appears to have begun to shift away from an aesthetic interpretation of the statutory ornamentality requirement. In particular, the measured attractiveness of patented designs finally found invalid by courts has increased substantially over the last three decades. Both legal doctrine and experimental results agree that beauty appears to have faded as a requirement for design patent validity.

Andrew Torrance is a Professor at the University of Kansas School of Law, a Visiting Scholar at MIT Sloan School of Management, and a Research Fellow at the Gruter Institute.

Two recent 101 Cases at the PTAB

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By Dennis Crouch

Ex parte Thomsen (PTAB 2012) (App S.N. 11/314,709)

SAP’s patent claims are directed to a “method to determine statistics for a field of a database table.” In the appeal, the claim in question has three particular steps:

  • determining that the field of the table is associated with a field of a check table;
  • determining a relationship between a number of distinct values of the field in the table and a number of distinct values of the field in the check table; and
  • determining the number of distinct values of the field in the table based on the relationship and on the number of distinct values of the field in the check table.

In its recent decision, the PTAB affirmed the examiner rejection of this claim on statutory subject matter grounds. The panel wrote:

Considering the language of independent claim 1 as a whole, we agree with the Examiner that the process of claim 1 does not meet Bilski‘s “machine or transformation test” and could be performed within the human mind or by a human writing on a piece of paper. The claim recites a number of steps that are not tied to a particular machine — the claim does not recite any machine performing the functions of the steps, e.g., a processor. Nor do these steps transform data into a different state — the claim simply recites: (1) “determining that the field of the table is associated with a field of a check table;” (2) “determining a relationship between a number of distinct values of the field in the table and a number of distinct values of the field in the check table;” and (3) “determining the number of distinct values of the field in the table based on the relationship and on the number of distinct values of the field in the check table. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).

Here, to the extent any transformation takes place, the transformation is of one type of data into another type of data — (a) determining an association, (b) determining a relationship, and (c) determining a number. This is not a “transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing constituting patent-eligible subject matter.” In re Bilski, at 962; see id. at 963-64 (discussing patent-eligible data transformations). More importantly, the claim is entirely devoid of any mention of a “machine.” While Appellant urges that “[t]he claimed database tables, fields and values necessarily involve the use of a computer or machine” in actuality the “determining” steps could be accomplished within one’s mind or utilizing a pen and paper.

Our reviewing court guides that “a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373. Because we conclude that the scope of claim 1’s method steps covers functions that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, we conclude that unpatentable abstract mental processes fall within the subject matter of claim 1.

In the past year, the BPAI has similarly cited CyberSource in several dozen cases.

=====

Ex parte Battles (PTAB 2012) (App. S.N. 10/859,029)

HP’s patent application is directed to a “computer-readable medium that stores a program that, when executed by a digital camera causes the camera to perform” various functions associated with a histogram of light information from a photo-sensor on the camera.

The PTAB has affirmed the examiner’s Section 101 rejection – finding that the claim unduly includes patentable subject matter because the computer-readable medium might be a signal.

Appellant contends that the “computer readable medium,” as recited in claim 21, is drawn to statutory subject matter because the computer readable medium is further recited to store programs, and that transitory, propagating signals cannot store programs. We agree with the Examiner that the “computer readable medium,” as recited in claim 21 and as construed in light of the disclosure is drawn to non-statutory subject matter.

In the originally filed disclosure, Appellant discloses, “a ‘computer readable medium’ can be any means that can store, communicate, propagate, or transport the data … [and it] can be, for example, but not limited to … infrared… or propagation medium now known or later developed.” Per the originally filed disclosure, the claimed “computer readable medium” can be a transitory, propagating signal and transitory, propagating signals are ineligible. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Nuijten continues to be regularly cited by the PTAB – with almost 500 citations in the past five years.

Making Software Patents Transparent and Understandable: Begin by Determining Whether Software is Patentable

Patent,

By Dennis Crouch

One major problem with software patents is their forced lack of transparency. The USPTO has granted hundreds of thousands of patents that should rightfully be termed “software patents,” but almost none of those patents include a claim directed to “software.” Rather, the innovative software is being hidden by innuendo and obfuscation because of the perceived ban on patenting software per se.

I contend that if we are going to allow software patents, we should do so openly and honestly. In that world, patent claims would be able to match the words of the computer scientist inventors and might simply be written as “Software comprising …” or “A computer program comprising …” We are not in that world.

In the 1960’s the USPTO began pushing against the patenting of bare computer software. Its 1968 guidelines formalized the USPTO’s position against computer programs as unpatentable mental steps under 35 U.S.C. § 101. That approach was largely vindicated by the Supreme Court cases of Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) and Parker v. Flook (1978). However, the combination of Diamond v. Diehr (1981); new leadership at the USPTO; and the formation of the Federal Circuit all rejuvenated the patenting of computer software. Many still hold to the idea that software per se cannot be patented because the software is not a machine or apparatus and because the software only becomes a non-abstract patentable process once implemented on a particular device. In Bilski v. Kappos (2010), the court rejected categorical exclusions of business method patents (and thus presumably software patents). At the same time, however Bilski and the subsequent case of Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) serve to revive the pre-Federal-Circuit case law and create further direct tension with software patents.

The result from this long history is that we still have software patents but they are hidden under the surface. They are harder to find, harder to examine, harder to understand, and thus much more problematic than they need to be. After fifty years of controversy; meandering administrative practice; and inconsistent Supreme Court decision making, it is time for the courts to take a stand and deliver the law in a way that is clear and precise. Finally answer the question: Is software patentable?

Federal Circuit To Announce Whether Software is Patentable?: En Banc Rehearing on Section 101 Issues

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By Dennis Crouch

CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp, App. No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc order)

The Federal Circuit has refocused its attention on the question of patentable subject matter and has ordered an en banc rehearing of CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2012). In its initial panel opinion, the Federal Circuit held that, when considered as a whole, the claimed data processing invention was patent eligible. Judge Linn wrote the majority opinion suggesting that a court should only reach Section 101 issues when subject matter ineligibility is “manifestly evident”. Judge Prost wrote in dissent and argued that the majority improperly ignored the Supreme Court’s most recent statements on the topic found in Prometheus. The patentable subject matter question in CLS Bank is virtually indistinguishable from the parallel issue in Bancorp v. Sun Life. In that case, however, the Federal Circuit ruled the invention ineligible.

In its en banc order, the court reformulated the questions presented as follows:

a. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?

b. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

The Federal Circuit has asked for the USPTO to file a brief as amicus curiae. Further amicus briefs may be filed without consent of the parties or leave of the court but must otherwise follow Federal Circuit’s Rule 29.

More Reading:

The Removal of Section 102(f)’s Inventorship Requirement; the Narrowness of Derivation Proceedings; and the Rise of 101’s Invention Requirement

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By Dennis Crouch (October 5, 2012)

In a prior Patently-O essay, I wrote that the removal of the inventorship requirement of Section 102(f) opens the door to patenting obvious variants of inventions created by someone else. In that essay, I mentioned the newly designed derivation proceedings, but opined that they would not be much use in this situation. I wrote that "it appears to me that those actions (even if timely filed by the originator) would be unsuccessful because derivation proceedings are limited to cases where the derived claims are "substantially the same" as the originator's innovation. The substantially the same limitation is much narrower in scope as compared with the potential wide variety of obvious variants." 102(f) Essay.

I received a response to that essay from Professor Sarnoff who reports that he and Chico Gholz have a soon-to-be-published article in IP Today addressing the PTO's new rules for triggering derivation proceedings. The punch line of their article is that the legal scope of derivation proceeding is even narrower than I suggested—thus allowing for a third party to patent quite minor variations of ideas obtained from someone else. (I encourage you to read the article once it is published.)

The America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) entirely rewrote the section 135 of the patent act. That provision previously detailed the interference process and now focuses exclusively on derivation proceedings as they will apply to patent applications filed on or after March 16, 2013. New section 135(a) limits derivation proceedings to instances where an alleged wrongdoer files an earlier patent application "claiming" the original inventor's (but late filer's) "claimed invention." In their article, Gholz and Sarnoff correctly argue that there is not much room for variation here. Under the statute, the derived invention (as claimed) must be for the same subject matter as the original invention (as claimed), even if their language differs. This further confirms what I see as the problematic naming of "derivation proceedings." In my mind, the meaning of the word derivation suggests some amount of modification. While a derivation depends upon having an original source, the final results are ordinarily a modification of that source. With Gholz-Sarnoff, we learn that this ordinary meaning does not fit to the Derivation Proceedings as defined by the AIA. A better term for the AIA defined action might be "False Inventorship Claim Proceeding."

Gholz and Sarnoff recognize that the PTO took a different view when it codified the rules at 37 C.F.R. §42.405(a)(2). That provision broadly authorizes derivation proceedings when the petitioner's claims are "substantially the same" as the alleged deriver's claims, with "substantially the same" defined in 37 CFR 42.401 as "patentably indistinct." Gholz and Sarnoff argue that the PTO is wrong in this interpretation and that the Federal Circuit will eventually overrule the PTO's misapplication of the law.

Further, as noted by Sarnoff in his Patently-O article and as reiterated in the new Gholz-Sarnoff article in response to the views of Armitage, the original inventor may not have conceived of the obvious variant and thus may not be able to provide the required oath in regard to the obvious-variant claim so as to trigger the derivation proceeding.

In our prior e-mail communications (repeated here with permission), Sarnoff has also explored other ways to block patenting of the obvious variants. He writes:

  1. A person who conceives of an obvious variant is normally treated as an inventor of an invention (just of an obvious one), so lack of inventorship under Section 101 may not be a successful approach to invalidating the claim made by the deriver, although the deriver will likely be entitled at least to joint-inventor status; and
  2. Current inventorship law may not necessarily treat the originator of the underlying invention as a joint-inventor of the obvious variant of which the originator did not conceive, even if the originator added a significant contribution to conception by the deriver, and thus it may not always be possible to correct inventorship to permit the originator to obtain joint inventor status and joint ownership of the obvious variant.
  3. However, the courts have sometimes extended unpatentability to obvious variants even when the statute does not clearly provide for it, as they did in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (extending Section 102(b) to claims that were obvious in light of statutory bar art). [Note, this explains Professor Sarnoff's prior equivocation that I discussed here. DC.]

The bottom line here that I began with my recent essay and continue with this additional discussion revealed by Gholz and Sarnoff is that the elimination of section 102(f) and the narrow scope of derivation proceedings have created a potential problem by offering a roadmap for bad behavior. The law now apparently sanctions the patenting of minor variations of innovations created by someone else. This raises several levels of concern. Most directly, we are concerned about (1) how the obvious variant patent negatively impacts the idea originator and (2) how the obvious patent burdens the public who must either license or avoid infringement.

The current law basically places the burden on the idea originator to protect his or her rights by (1) keeping the idea secret and then relying on contract and trade secret law to protect that secrecy; (2) quickly filing for patent rights; or (3) quickly going public with the idea in a way that creates prior art. Any of these overlapping choices can be sufficient to block or invalidate an obvious variant patent. I am also not overly concerned that this approach unduly shifts a burden to the idea originator. My problem with that approach – as suggested by Anon – is that the idea originator might not be proactive enough to take the actions necessary to protect the public's interest in not being burdened by patents covering obvious innovations.

New Pressure on Section 101: This whole scenario then puts tremendous pressure on courts (including the Supreme Court) to expand the powerful (but ungainly) tool of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and use that fundamental statute to block these derived variant patents that are not otherwise prohibited by statute. The Supreme Court is unlikely to stand for the patenting of obvious variants of ideas derived from another. And, the most straightforward way for the court to act is with the return of something akin to the invention requirement that was thought to have been eliminated by the 1952 Patent Act. That action would likely add steel to the link between newness and subject matter eligibility in a way that many of us see as problematic. (Perhaps under the framework of "inventive contribution.") The better approach is a statutory change that shifts rights with fewer ripple effects.

Sarnoff's perspective is that Section 101 should have an active and engaged role in the patent eligibility doctrine. In his recent article on the post-1952 invention requirement, Sarnoff writes (with apologies to Dr. Strangelove): "[T]o those who believe in using private property to motivate creative advance, using eligibility determinations to restrict access to the patent system is the bomb that threatens our future viability. For the reasons discussed [in the article], I believe we need to learn to stop worrying and to love that bomb." Joshua Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 Hasting Law Journal 53 (2011).

Notes:

  • In addition to raising this interesting topic, I should (and do) also thank Gholz and Sarnoff for their editorial suggestions on this essay.

With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information.

Patent, , ,

By Dennis Crouch

Before the America Invents Act (AIA), the Patent Act included a specific prohibition on patenting something the purported inventor did not actually invent. According to the statute, “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless … 102(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (pre-AIA). When that provision was eliminated, Congress was assured by various parties that the inventorship requirement was sufficiently protected by the U.S. Constitutional reference to “inventors” and by the “[w]hoever invents or discovers” preamble of 35 U.S.C. § 101. This position is exemplified by Joseph Matal in his recent article on the creation of the AIA.

Some may think that, because § 102(f) has been repealed, there is no longer any legal requirement that a patent for an invention be obtained by the inventor. Not so. Both the Constitution and § 101 still specify that a patent may only be obtained by the person who engages in the act of inventing. Indeed, even commentary on the 1952 Patent Act noted, with respect to § 102(f), that “[t]his paragraph is perhaps unnecessary since under § 101 it is ‘Whoever invents …’ who may obtain a patent and later sections provide that the inventor must apply for the patent and execute an oath of inventorship.”

Joseph D. Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012).

To be clear, even under this duplicative construct we should recognize that Section 102(f) does have the important effect of eliminating 102(f)/103 prior art defined by the 1997 OddzOn Prods decision. The 102(f)/103 scenario is probably best termed a “derived knowledge” situation that occurs when an applicant learns of an invention created by someone else and then comes-up with an obvious variant of that invention. Under pre-AIA law, the resulting patent would properly be invalidated on 102(f)/103 obviousness grounds even if the prior-invention had never been made public or the subject of a sale. By removing 102(f), the AIA also removes the prospect of 102(f)/103 prior art. In his AIA article, Robert Armitage writes “subsection [102(f)] had become, as far as the courts were concerned, a prior art provision for assessing obviousness.” Understanding the America Invents Act its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2012). Armitage explains why the change is particularly fitting as part of the move-towards transparency embodied by the AIA first-to-file rules.

Moreover, putting a “prior art” provision of pre-AIA § 102(f) ilk into the new law would have undone the transparency/objectivity reforms that its elimination by the AIA worked to perfect. Congress simply rejected the notion that every individual named as an inventor on a patent application should be queried to determine what secret or private information the inventor was already aware of, from the work of someone else, at the time the invention was made by that individual. Congress rejected the notion that the inventor’s private knowledge learned from others should then be provided to patent examiners to determine whether the inventor’s claimed invention could be nonetheless regarded as “obvious” (perhaps in combination with other prior art).

Armitage at 98. Armitage and Matal were both instrumental in the development and passage of the AIA. Their well written articles explain the choices made in the AIA legislation and attempt to explain their visions for how ambiguities should be interpreted. Professor Sarnoff agrees with Armitage here that the AIA removes knowledge that a putative inventor obtained from another is no longer prior art. In his Patently-O Patent Law Journal Article, Sarnoff wrote:

By eliminating existing § 102(f), the new act removes the substantive prior art basis that used to prevent patents on derived inventions that are the same as or obvious in light of the derived knowledge. Because § 102(f) was treated as prior art for obviousness, it provided substantive grounds for denying or invalidating patents on obvious variants of a derived invention (e.g., applications or improvements of, or additions to or modifications of, a derived invention) as well as to the derived invention itself.

Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 Patently-O Patent Law Journal 12.

Sarnoff absolutely agrees with Armitage that the law will no longer prevent an applicant who derived an invention from obtaining a patent on an obvious variant of that invention. I.e., the USPTO has no tools to prevent a third party from patenting obvious variants of information obtained from another. Now, the AIA does provide for a third party to initiate a derivation proceeding or a civil action for derivation. However, it appears to me that those actions (even if timely filed by the originator) would be unsuccessful because derivation proceedings are limited to cases where the derived claims are “substantially the same” as the originator’s innovation. The substantially the same limitation is much narrower in scope as compared with the potential wide variety of obvious variants. Sarnoff largely agrees with my analysis here, but in a more equivocal manner.

The new derivation procedure and civil action also may be inadequate to prevent the deriving applicant from obtaining the patent on an obvious variant even when the originator does file a derivation petition, when the original inventor learns about the obvious variant from the deriver (and had not earlier conceived of the obvious variant). And in litigation defending against the deriver’s patent on an obvious variant, an unrelated third party may be unable to challenge the deriver’s patent for obviousness (although it may be able to challenge it for improper inventorship, but only if the elimination of § 102(f) has not undermined the substantive basis for such invalidation.

Sarnoff (emphasis added).

Unlike Armitage & Matal, Mark Stadnyk is a total Washington DC outsider. His company MadStad designs and sells after-market motorcycle parts (mainly windshields and accessories). MadStad and Stadnyk filed suit in 2012 challenging the AIA as an unconstitutional modification of the US patent laws and asking the federal court to render the law null and void. One of the argument MadStad presents is that the statutory elimination of 102(f) is problematic because it runs contrary to the IP enabling clause of the US Constitution. The US Constitution empowers Congress to develop a patent system that grants rights to “inventors.” And, according to MadStad, the new AIA creates a system where (1) non-inventors can apply for patent and (2) rights wrongly granted to non-inventors cannot be challenged in court by negatively affected third-parties.

In its response to MadStad, the USPTO recently presented its idea regarding inventorship. The USPTO rejects MadStad’s argument and instead follows Matal’s “duplicative” theory. (Matal is now an assistant solicitor at the USPTO.)

The USPTO writes:

The AIA does not sanction the award of patents to anyone but inventors. Retained verbatim—unaltered by the AIA—section 101 continues to restrict the grant of patents to inventors. Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added); see AIA, passim (no changes to § 101). By retaining section 101, the AIA still requires as a condition of patentability that the named inventor actually invent the claimed subject matter.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs remarkably allege that the AIA eliminates the inventorship requirement and thus will allow an individual who is not an inventor to obtain a patent. The basis of their claim is that the AIA deletes section 102(f), which provides that a person will not be entitled to a patent if he “did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Plaintiffs accordingly allege that, without section 102(f), “being an inventor is no longer a condition of patentability” nor “a requirement of patent validity under Section 282 of the Patent Act,” which establishes the defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. Plaintiffs’ allegations are legally incorrect. Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have concluded that §101—which the AIA retains—is a condition for patentability and can be used as a defense in an action involving patent infringement and validity.

Thus, according to the USPTO, the AIA’s deletion of the redundant requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) is irrelevant, as section 101 will continue to require that a patent only be awarded to an inventor.

Moving forward, the question is what work do the US Constitution and Section 101 actually do on the inventorship front? The link between patents and their inventors is strong and deeply rooted. As such, it is unlikely (in my view) that MadStat is correct in its argument that Section 102(f) was the only provision guaranteeing continuation of that link. An important question, however, is what to do about the inventorship requirement of the IP empowering clause. Are the limits of that clause implicitly embedded into the conditions and requirements of patentability or, instead, do we use those limits to invalidate legislation that fails to conform to the constitutional restrictions.

Prior to the 1952 patent act, lack-of-inventorship was a condition for patentability under the precursor to our Section 101 and was explicitly listed as a defense that a defendant charged with infringement could plead under the precursor to our Section 282. Thus, “the defendant may plead … That [the patentee] was not the original and first inventor or discovered of any material and substantial part of the thing patented.” See RS § 4920 (Patent Act of 1870).

There are real ongoing questions that stem from the elimination of section 102(f): Is Armitage correct in his assessment of the law that a third party can now patent an obvious variation of an idea secretly learned from the true inventor? Is the USPTO correct that a patent can be challenged for improper inventorship as a violation of 35 U.S.C. 101?

Notes: