Tag Archives: USPTO Director

Two-Step Printed Matter Doctrine: (1) Is it Printed Matter?; (2) Do we give it patentable weight?

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By Dennis Crouch

The printed matter doctrine probably arises less than it should as its contours are likely integral to an understanding of the patentability of software related inventions.  Like the abstract idea test the doctrine barring the patentability of certain “printed matter” is nonstatutory and judicially created.

In the recent DeStefano case, the Federal Circuit vacated a PTAB anticipation decision that was based upon the printed matter doctrine — holding that the Board erred in its understanding of the test.

Distefano claims a user-directed method of designing an electronic document.[1] The PTAB found that all of the elements of the claim were anticipated by a prior art reference except for the claimed requirement of “selecting a first element from a database including web assets authored by third party authors and web assets provided to the user interface from outside the user interface by the user.”  Rather than finding that element in the prior art, the Board ruled that it should be given no patentable weight under the printed matter doctrine.

The printed matter doctrine has a long history and generally stands for the principle that no patentable weight should be given to the content of information recorded in a substrate.[2]  leading case in the area continues to be 1931 Russell decision.[3] In Russell, the CCPA ruled that a “mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute any new and useful art.”

The Federal Circuit has ruled on several printed matter cases — holding that the content labels providing dosage instructions, instructions for performing tests, and numbers printed on a wristband were all printed matter.[4] on the other side, the Federal Circuit ruled in Lowry that data structures themselves should not be considered printed matter if they include “information regarding physical interrelationships within a memory.”[5]

To be clear, the question of whether or not a claim element is printed matter represents just the first step in the process. Once an element is determined to be printed matter the court must take the next step of determining whether or not it should be given patentable weight.  Regarding the second step, the court writes here that the “common thread amongst all of these cases is that printed matter must be matter claimed for what it communicates.”  Thus, information content can be given patentable weight if it “has a functional or structural relation to the substrate.”

Coming back to DiStefano’s case, the appellate panel here ruled that the claimed “selecting a first element” step failed the threshold question and was not itself a claim directed toward printed matter. The court writes:

Although the selected web assets can and likely do communicate some information, the content of the information is not claimed. And where the information came from, its “origin,” is not part of the informational content at all. Nothing in the claim calls for origin identification to be inserted into the content of the web asset.

Thus the case was vacated and remanded back to the patent office for another go-round.  I’ll note here that this is the second time the Federal Circuit has reached a decision in this case. In its 2014 unpublished decision the Federal Circuit also rejected the board’s attempt at an anticipation rejection-that time finding that the rejection was an “new ground of rejection” that required a remand.[6]

The claim itself appears fairly simple and straightforward, and one that is, in my guesstimate, likely directed to an idea already known.[7] Of course, so far the patent office has been unable to find the right references and unfortunately had to really stretch the law in this one.

On remand, it will be interesting to see whether the patent office follows its usual procedure of allowing a case after a successful appeal by the applicant, or will a new search and new rejection be submitted?

My understanding is that Mr. DiStefano continues to own the patent via his Patent Trust LLC.  Patents in his portfolio include US Patent Numbers 6,331,400, 6,771,291, 7,353,199, 7,996,259, 8,335,713, 8,412,570, 8,417,567, 8,423,399, 8,442,860, 8,589,222, 8,650,076, 8,768,760, 8,781,890 and 8,996,398.[8]

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[1] US patent Application No. 10/868,312, claim number 24.

[2] See 1 Chisum on Patents section 1.02.

[3] In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (CCPA 1931)(indexing the names in directories and dictionaries).

[4] AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2004); and In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

[5] In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

[6] In re DiStefano, 562 F. App’x 984, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

[7] The text of the claim is as follows:

A method of designing, by a user in a user interface having first and second display regions each capable of displaying a plurality of element, an electronic document, comprising:

selecting a first element from a database including web assets authored by third party authors and web assets provided to the user interface or outside the user interface by the user;

displaying the first element in the second display region;

interactively displaying the electronic document in the first display region;

modifying the first element displayed in the second display region upon receiving a first command to modify the first element in the second display region; and

displaying the modified first element in the first display region, wherein the modified first element forms at least part of the electronic document.

[8] Thomas L DeStefano III, LinkedIn biography available at https://www.linkedin.com/in/thomas-l-distefano-iii-a538811.

Patentlyo Bits and Bytes by Anthony McCain

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Get a Job doing Patent Law

Trade Secret Law

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The Senate Judiciary Committee moved forward with hearings on the Defend Trade Secret Act (DTSA) that would, inter alia, create a Federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.  The intent would not be to preempt state laws but instead to provide an additional layer of protection for trade secret owners. That said, the new law could be used to overcome limits and defenses available in some states (such as California).  Although still objectionable to some, the current bill is a toned-down version of the parallel bill from last term.  The current approach also has bipartisan support from leaders of the Judiciary Committee (Senators Grassley and Leahy).

Statements and Written Testimony from the Hearing:

Of those testifying, only Prof Sandeen called for a slowdown in the legislative approach.

 

THE MYTH OF THE TRADE SECRET TROLL

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Why We Need a Federal Civil Claim for Trade Secret Misappropriation

Guest Post by James Pooley, former Deputy Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization.  Pooley makes his full argument in a forthcoming George Mason Law Review article available here.

Trade secret theft has been a federal crime since 1996, covered by the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”). But civil misappropriation claims remain limited to state court filings under common law or local variants of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). Calls for federal jurisdiction have grown with the increasing importance of information as a business asset and with the emergence of technology that makes theft of these assets almost infinitely easier. Recent examples involving international actors have galvanized the business community to request a straightforward solution: amend the EEA to provide a federal option for private claims.

Several bills were introduced in the 113th Congress to accomplish this, and to authorize provisional remedies for seizure of relevant property to prevent secret technology from being transferred out of the jurisdiction. The 2014 legislation was not acted on before Congress adjourned.  A revised version is pending now, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”), reflected in identical House (H.R.3326) and Senate (S.1890) bills.

The approach of the DTSA is fairly simple: use existing language of the EEA where appropriate, such as the definition of a trade secret, and where other language is required to define the civil aspects, such as misappropriation and damages, use language taken from the UTSA. Indeed, the only meaningful departure from the UTSA is to add a section allowing ex parte seizures of the misappropriated property. But even that portion draws from established provisions of the Lanham Act, tightened up considerably from the 2014 bills in order to discourage abuse.

The DTSA has received virtually unanimous support from industry, and also enjoys unusually bipartisan political sponsorship, with 65 cosponsors in the House (45 Republican and 20 Democrat) and ten in the Senate (six Republican and four Democrat). The only organized opposition has come from a group of law professors who published an “open letter” in 2014 criticizing the previous draft legislation, and who have recently released another letter describing their concerns. Mainly, they argue that we don’t need federal legislation because state laws are uniform enough; that the seizure provisions are too broad; and that the DTSA would limit labor mobility by approving the so-called “inevitable disclosure doctrine.”

As I will explain below, on each of these points the professors are wrong, misled by incorrect assumptions or unjustified speculation. Indeed, in a recent journal article two of them have predicted that the legislation would unleash a never-seen-before class of commercial predator, the “trade secret troll,” who they claim would “roam free in a confused and unsettled environment, threatening or initiating lawsuits for the sole purpose of exacting settlement payments, just like patent trolls.”

This apocalyptic scenario is not only fanciful; it is absurd. While patents are exclusive rights that operate against the world, trade secrets provide no exclusivity and depend on a confidential relationship. The image of a “trade secret troll” may help draw attention to a political argument, but it is a myth, and deserves no serious consideration.

The reality of this legislation is simple and compelling. Giving trade secret owners the option to sue in federal court would fill a critical gap in effective enforcement of private rights against cross-border misappropriation that in the digital age has become too stealthy and quick to be dealt with predictably in state courts. The bills would accomplish this by effecting only very modest changes, relying heavily on existing laws and rules. The seizure provisions in particular are so narrowly drawn that only the most clearly aggrieved plaintiffs would risk invoking the procedure. Having no pre-emptive effect, the federal law would leave in place all relevant state laws and policies, including those relating to mobility of labor.

U.S. trade secret law emerged in the nineteenth century to accommodate the shift from agrarian and cottage production to larger-scale industry, in which the secrets of production would have to be shared with workers or with business partners. Court decisions sought to enforce the confidence placed in those who were given access to valuable information about machines, recipes and processes. At the core of every case was a confidential relationship. Protecting this trust, the courts explained, was a simple matter of enforcing morality in the marketplace.

The common law origins of trade secrets – in contrast to the federal patent statute – meant that the majority of cases were heard in state court. Even when a federal court took diversity or supplemental jurisdiction over a trade secret dispute, it applied the law of the state in which it sat. And at first there was little variation, with most states looking to the Restatement of Torts § 757 as a guide. But as industrial development continued through the middle of the twentieth century, legal foundations shifted, and the reporters of the Second Restatement dropped the subject completely.

Meanwhile, a school of thought had developed among commentators that trade secret law should be abolished altogether because it was inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, federal patent law. This argument was famously rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Two important public interests, the Court explained, were served by trade secret law: the “maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention.” Without guaranteed secrecy, businesses would be left to expensive self-help security measures that would disadvantage smaller competitors and discourage dissemination of information through sharing. And as a practical matter, there was no conflict between the two systems because they operate so differently: patent law is strong, providing an exclusive right “against the world;” while trade secret rights are “far weaker,” because they do not protect against reverse engineering or independent development.

With the Second Restatement’s decision not to treat the issue, some were concerned that trade secret law would become too fractured and inconsistent for companies which had been increasingly doing business across state lines. Therefore, in 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued the first of two versions of the UTSA, proposing harmonized rules on establishing and enforcing trade secret rights. Measured by adoption rates, the UTSA has been a great success, with 47 of the 50 states so far embracing it (New York is the leading holdout). However, measured by its objective of uniformity, the law has been a disappointment. Unlike the UCC, the UTSA has frequently been enacted with customized features.

A few examples will help illustrate the scope of the problem. California dropped the language requiring that a trade secret be not “readily ascertainable,” with the result that the defendant is required to specially plead that circumstance as an affirmative defense. Illinois also eliminated the “readily ascertainable” language, and it prohibits royalty injunction orders, sets a different limitations period and allows permanent injunctions. Idaho requires that computer programs carry a “copyright or other proprietary or confidential marking” to qualify for protection.  Georgia limits protection of customer lists to physical embodiments, in effect allowing employees to appropriate such information in (human) memory. South Carolina’s version of the UTSA requires a court hearing an injunction request to consider “average rate of business growth” in determining a head start period, and prescribes very particular rules for discovery of trade secret information, even for local discovery in aid of an action pending in another jurisdiction.

When Congress considered the EEA in 1996, there was some discussion of adding a civil right of action, but this was deemed impractical in view of the need for swift legislative action. In the years since its enactment, the EEA has had a mixed record of success. As reported by one veteran prosecutor, the average of about eight prosecutions per year is a “languid pace” that probably has done little to create a deterrent effect. In part this may be due to a reluctance of victims to bring cases to the prosecutor, either because of a loss of control or Fifth Amendment effects on civil claims, or it may be due to a lack of resources or interest within the various offices of the U.S. Attorneys, who have discretion whether to accept qualifying cases.

Calls for a federal trade secret law with a private right of action had already begun before the EEA was passed. After it became law, a number of scholars noted the anomaly and suggested that, because the national economy had become primarily knowledge-based, and because even with the UTSA state law was far from uniform, a federal civil law should be enacted. More recent commentary, while continuing to emphasize the drawbacks of variations in state law, also has pointed out the economic advantages of federalization, particularly for small businesses, which rely more heavily on secrecy than on patenting, as well as the procedural advantages for trade secret owners, including national service of process.

The highly-publicized cyberattacks of recent years have exposed not only the precarious security of personal financial and health information, but also the vulnerability of American corporate secrets. Thirty years ago information security consisted mainly of guarding the photocopier and watching who went in and out the front door. Now, with the Internet connected to millions of smartphones, and with electronic storage devices the size of a coin, information assets (which account for over 80% of the value of U.S. public companies) can be moved quickly and silently across state and international borders. In that context, existing procedures at the state level seem impossibly quaint. If a case in Illinois requires testimony of a witness in California, the plaintiff has to petition its home court to authorize a deposition, and then file an action in California based on the Illinois order, to secure the required subpoena. During the weeks or months of this process, the witness could easily have left the country, with the secrets in her pocket.

In other words, the time-critical nature of interstate and international misappropriation of valuable digitized data requires an immediate and sophisticated response mechanism, and neither state law nor the EEA criminal framework provides a satisfactory solution. Federal courts, however, can provide the necessary resource. First, they will be operating under a single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation and a transparent set of procedural rules, offering predictability and ease of use. Second, they will provide nationwide service of process and a unified approach to discovery, enabling quick action by trade secret owners even when confronted with actors in multiple jurisdictions. Third, as a result of their extensive experience with complex cross-border litigation involving intellectual property, they will be able to resolve ex parte matters fairly and jurisdictional issues quickly and efficiently. Fourth, their generally more predictable discovery procedures will serve the legitimate needs of trade secret plaintiffs, who typically must develop most of the facts to prove their case through defendants and third parties.

In this context, the objections raised by the law professors are not convincing. First, it is not fair to describe existing state law as “coherent,” “robust and uniform,” so that U.S. businesses already enjoy “a high level of predictability.” The rhetoric does not obscure the reality of a patchwork of differing standards and rules – in some ways more divergent than before enactment of the UTSA – that necessarily creates friction and inefficiency for companies with interstate operations.

Second, while admitting that the current language on ex parte seizure is “more limited in scope” than the 2014 legislation (for example, only property “necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret” can be seized), the professors think this tightening is not enough and that the provision “may still result in significant harm.” No evidence is provided, but only speculation that mere invocation of the procedure might cause small businesses to “capitulate,” and that the “chilling effect on innovation and job growth . . . could be profound.” Again, the reality could hardly be more different. The DTSA is loaded with limitations making seizure very difficult to achieve, and with liabilities making it prohibitively expensive to be wrong in asking for it. In the unusual case where the plaintiff has no substantial basis for the claim, the defendant will simply file an opposition, the seizure will be dissolved, and the plaintiff will pay for the harm. Surely the benefits of the DTSA are worth that occasional risk.

Third, the professors assert that new language, added to the DTSA to ensure that mobility of labor is respected, embraces the so-called “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which they view as the equivalent of a judge-made noncompetition agreement. In fact, that “doctrine” is nothing more than a method of analysis under the common-sense UTSA provision allowing injunctions against “threatened misappropriation.” This method has been applied thoughtfully in a majority of jurisdictions, resulting in a wide range of conditional remedies, and has only rarely been applied in a way that stops anyone from taking a new job.

The DTSA is sorely needed to fill a gap in remedies available to U.S. businesses that now operate in an information-based, globalized economy. This is one of those instances where federal structures are required to address a critical set of interstate and international problems. The DTSA has been carefully constructed to deter and punish abuse. Using well-established definitions and norms, it provides a choice to file a familiar claim in an effective forum. And there is absolutely no danger that enacting this statute will generate some new form of “troll” behavior to this point unknown in trade secret law.

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James Pooley was most recently Deputy Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, where he was responsible for managing the international patent system. For 37 years before that he was a trial lawyer in California, handling primarily trade secret and patent disputes. He taught trade law and litigation as an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Santa Clara University. He is the author of the treatise “Trade Secrets” (Law Journal Press, updated 2014) and a co-author of the Patent Case Management Judicial Guide (Federal Judicial Center 2009, 2015). His most recent business book is Secrets: Managing Information Assets in the Age of Cyberespionage (Verus Press 2015).  Mr. Pooley currently serves as Chairman of the Board of the National Inventors Hall of Fame.

Director Michelle Lee: Moving toward Patent Clarity

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The following is a post from Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO Michelle K. Lee and was published on the PTO Director’s blog. 

Patent quality is central to fulfilling a core mission of the USPTO, which as stated in the Constitution, is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” It is critically important that the USPTO issue patents that are both correct and clear. Historically, our primary focus has been on correctness, but the evolving patent landscape has challenged us to increase our focus on clarity.

 Patents of the highest quality can help to stimulate and promote efficient licensing, research and development, and future innovation without resorting to needless high-cost court proceedings. Through correctness and clarity, such patents better enable potential users of patented technologies to make informed decisions on how to avoid infringement, whether to seek a license, and/or when to settle or litigate a patent dispute. Patent owners also benefit from having clear notice on the boundaries of their patent rights. After and after successfully reducing the backlog of unexamined patent applications, our agency is redoubling its focus on quality. 

 We asked for your help on how we can best improve quality—and you responded. Since announcing the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative earlier this year, we received over 1,200 comments and extensive feedback during our first-ever Patent Quality Summit and roadshows, as well as invaluable direct feedback from our examining corps. This feedback has been tremendously helpful in shaping the direction of our efforts. And with this background, I’m pleased to highlight some of our initial programs under the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative. 

 First, we are preparing to launch a Clarity of the Record Pilot, under which examiners will include as part of the prosecution record definitions of key terms, important claim constructions, and more detailed reasons for the allowance and rejection of claims. Based on the information we learn from this pilot, we plan to develop best examiner and applicant practices for enhancing the clarity of the record.

 We also will be launching a new wave of Clarity of the Record Training in the coming months emphasizing the benefits and importance of making the record clear and how to achieve greater clarity. Recently, we provided examiners with training on functional claiming and putting statements in the record when the examiner invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f), which interprets claims under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard and secures a complete and enabled disclosure for a claimed invention. Training for the upcoming year includes an assessment of a fully described invention under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) and best practices for explaining indefiniteness rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112(b).

 Second, we are Transforming Our Review Data Capture Process to ensure that reviews of an examiner’s work product by someone in the USPTO will follow the same process and access the same facets of examination. Historically, we have had many different types of quality reviews including supervisory patent examiner reviews of junior examiners and quality assurance team reviews of randomly selected examiner work product. Sometimes the factors reviewed by each differed, and the degree to which the review results were recorded. With only a portion of these review results recorded and different criteria captured in those recordings, the data gathered was not as complete, useful, or voluminous as it could have been. As a result, the USPTO has been able to identify statistically significant trends only on a corps-wide basis, but not at the technology center, art unit, or examiner levels. We are working to unify the review process for all reviewers and systematically record the same and all review results through an online form, called the “master review form,” which we intend to share with the public. 

 What are the implications of this new process and new form? This new process will give us the ability to collect and analyze a much greater volume of data from reviews that we were already doing, but that were not previously captured in a centralized, unified way. As we roll out this new review process the amount of data we collect will significantly increase anywhere from three to five times. This will allow us to use big data analytic techniques to identify more detailed trends across the agency based upon statistically significant data including at the technology center, art unit, and even examiner levels. Also, this new process will give us better insight into not just whether the law was applied correctly, but whether the reasons for an examiner’s actions were spelled out in the record clearly and whether there is an omission of a certain type of rejection. For example, for an obvious rejection we are considering not only whether a proper obvious rejection was made, but whether the elements identified in the prior art were mapped onto the claims, whether there are statements in the record explaining the rejection, and whether those statements are clear.

 The end result will be the (1) ability to provide more targeted and relevant training to our examiners with much greater precision, (2) increased consistency in work product across the entire examination corps, and (3) greater transparency in how the USPTO evaluates examiners’ work product. You can read more about these and our many other initiatives, such as our Automated Pre-examination Search pilot and Post Grant Outcomes, which incorporates insight from our Patent Trial and Appeal Board and other proceedings back into the examination process on our new Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative page on our website.

 Finally, let me close by emphasizing that our Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative is not a “one-and-done” effort. Coming from the private sector, I know that any company that produces a truly top quality product has focused on quality for years, if not decades. The USPTO is committed to no less. The programs presented here are just a start. My goal in establishing a brand new department within the USPTO was to focus exclusively on patent quality and the newly created executive level position of Deputy Commissioner for Patent Quality will ensure enhanced quality now, and into the future. With your input we intend to identify additional ways we can enhance patent quality as defined by our patent quality pillars of excellence in work products, excellence in measuring patent quality, and excellence in customer service.

 To that end, we will continue our stakeholder outreach and feedback collection efforts in various ways, such as our monthly Patent Quality Chat webinars. The next Patent Quality Chat webinar on November 10 will focus on the programs presented in this blog and our other quality initiatives. I encourage you to join in regularly to our Patent Quality Chats and visit the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative page on our website for more information.  The website provides recordings of previous Quality Chats as well as upcoming topics for discussion. We are eager to hear from you about our Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, so please continue to provide your feedback to WorldClassPatentQuality@uspto.gov(link sends e-mail).  Thank you for collaborating with us on this exciting and important initiative!

 

PTO Rules: File Sharing and Correcting Foreign Priority Claims

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By Dennis Crouch

NOTE: See final paragraph for Nov. 5 pending rule change for correcting foreign priority claims.

The USPTO has published a new Final Rule notice titled: Changes To Facilitate Applicant’s Authorization of Access to Unpublished U.S. Patent Applications by Foreign Intellectual Property Offices. This is a follow-up to the proposed rules from 2014. As its name suggests, the proposal would allow the USPTO to share otherwise secret information regarding pending-unpublished US applications with foreign patent offices, such as the EPO. A major caveat here though is that the sharing of information requires applicant authorization. The change is part of the general major shift toward worksharing and international procedural harmonization. The following comes from the notice:

[The USPTO] is revising its rules of practice to include a specific provision by which an applicant can authorize the Office … all or part of the file contents of an unpublished U.S. patent application in order to satisfy a requirement for information imposed on a counterpart application filed with the foreign IP office. … The final rule changes consolidate the specific provisions of the regulations by which applicants give the Office authority to provide a foreign IP office with access to an application in order to satisfy a requirement for information of the foreign IP office. The Office is also revising the rules of practice to indicate there is no fee for providing a foreign IP office with an electronic copy of an application-as-filed or an electronic copy of file contents pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Additionally, along with changes to the application data sheet (ADS) form [to facilitate authorization], the final rule changes simplify the process for how applicants provide the Office with the required authorization, thereby reducing the resources applicants must expend to comply with these foreign IP office requirements, and enhance the quality of patent examination.

The change has a November 30, 2015 effective date.

In this process, the PTO is setting up a major roadblock to more complete worksharing by only sharing documents when authorized by applicants. One comment to the proposed rules focused on this issue:

Comment 4: One comment asserted that the proposed rule change is based upon the assumption that a specific authority is required from an applicant in order to send out pre-publication information to a foreign IP office where applicant has filed an application and that the Office should reconsider this assumption. The comment further asserted that once an applicant files an application in a foreign IP office, applicant inherently agrees to the rules and requirements of that foreign IP office. Accordingly, the comment suggests that the Office does not need a separate authorization to either send a priority document or pre-publication information to that foreign IP office. Therefore, the comment requested that the Office reconsider the need for any authorization for access in this circumstance. The comment stated that if the Office adopts this position, then the entire authorization section from the ADS can be removed and a filing of an application in a foreign IP office by an applicant can serve as authorization for access to send priority documents and/or pre-publication information to that foreign IP office(s).

Response: After due consideration of the comment, the Office has decided to not adopt the position expressed in the comment. The written authority requirement is in accord with 35 U.S.C. 122(a), and consistent with current Office policy, practice, and procedure regarding access. Therefore, the Office is retaining the requirement for written authority from an applicant for access to the file contents of an unpublished application.

Here, the statute properly quoted by the Patent office does require that these non-published “applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of an Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Director.”

The USPTO has also announced “Change in Practice Regarding Correction of Foreign Priority Claims.” The changes – becoming effective on November 5, 2015, will make it more difficult to correct errors in foreign priority claims. Starting this week, a correction of a foreign priority claim made outside of the one-year deadline will require a petition to accept an unintentionally delayed benefit claim.

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) … provides that the filing date of an earlier foreign patent application may now be the effective prior art date for subject matter disclosed in a U.S. patent or a U.S. patent application publication. Therefore, U.S. patent application publications should reflect accurate foreign priority information to minimize the burden on examiners and members of the public in assessing the effective prior art date for subject matter disclosed in such U.S. patent application publications. The USPTO will thus now require that any correction of the identification of the foreign application (by application number, country (or intellectual property authority), and filing date) in a foreign priority claim after the time period for filing a priority or benefit claim be via a petition to accept an unintentionally delayed priority claim, and once the petition is granted in a pending application, will now publish a corrected patent application publication reflecting the accurate foreign priority claim information.

So, if you have a correction to make regarding foreign priority, it is probably best to get it done in the next two days. In general, the “unintentional” standard is fairly easy to overcome, but does require sworn statements that may later open-the-door to charges of inequitable conduct if it turns out that the error was known for some time. I’ll also note here that the parallel correction of US priority already requires the petition.

IPO Executive Director: Mark Lauroesch

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Mark LauroeschI wanted to take a moment to welcome Mark Lauroesch as the new Executive Director of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) following the retirement of longtime director Herb Wamsley.  Lauroesch was previously in house counsel with Corning for 20 years, including 10 years as VP and General IP Counsel.  Congratulations on the new role! 

Phil Johnson (J&J) remains president of the IPO Board of Directors with Carl Horton  (GE) as VP and Kevin Rhodes (3M) as treasurer.

Will the Federal Circuit Recognize the U.S.–Foreign Tradeoff in Friday’s Lexmark Argument?

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Guest post by Daniel Hemel, Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Assistant Professor at Stanford Law School.

On Friday, the en banc Federal Circuit will hear argument in Lexmark v. Impression Products, the printer cartridge resale case that will determine the fate of two key patent exhaustion precedents, including the current Jazz Photo rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S. patent rights. Despite extensive briefing (including over thirty amicus briefs), we argue in a new Essay that the key distributive tradeoffs between U.S. and foreign interests remain ignored (or misunderstood).

Both sides in Lexmark argue that their proposed rule would be more efficient. Those advocating broader exhaustion rules (including Google, Costco, EFF, and a group of IP professors) argue that the current regime is complex and uncertain. Those favoring the status quo (including PhRMA, BIO, and IPO) point to the aggregate welfare gains from geographic price discrimination. While it is possible to construct models to support both views, we argue that the efficiency question cannot be answered without first making a choice about whose welfare is aggregated.

As explained in more detail in our Essay, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, the U.S. rule on international patent exhaustion implicates at least two tradeoffs between U.S. and foreign interests:

First, there is a tradeoff between U.S. and foreign consumers. A U.S. rule of international exhaustion would cause prices of patented products in low-income countries to increase and prices of those same products in the United States to fall. It is thus surprising to see groups focused on global access to medicines such as Public Citizen advocating for this change; we are not aware of any study suggesting that a U.S. rule of international exhaustion would decrease prices in the developing world. As counterintuitive as it may be for developing countries and global access-to-medicines proponents to take the side of pharmaceutical companies, we think that their interests are in fact aligned on this issue. Developing-world consumers and pharmaceutical companies would both be better off if the Federal Circuit sticks with its Jazz Photo rule.

Second, a U.S. rule of international patent exhaustion would make it more difficult for foreign countries to allocate access to patented goods using non-market mechanisms. Some national governments subsidize their citizens’ consumption of patented products; examples range from the UK National Health Service’s provision of pharmaceuticals to Uruguay’s one-laptop-per-child program. As we explain in our Essay, such subsidies could end up being transferred to U.S. consumers via arbitrage if the Federal Circuit overrules Jazz Photo. At the very least, the decision to overrule Jazz Photo would make it more difficult for foreign governments to subsidize access to patented goods.

We argue that one cannot answer the policy question at the heart of Lexmark without taking a position on these distributive questions. If one assigns zero value to the interests of foreigners, then the United States might well be better off if it adopted a rule of international patent exhaustion. (While international patent exhaustion would also reduce profits for U.S. patent holders, a majority of U.S. patents are issued to foreigners; if one adopts a purely nationalistic approach, the interests of most patent holders wouldn’t count in the welfare analysis.) If one assigns a high value to the interests outside the United States, particularly those in developing countries, then one should almost certainly come down against a U.S. rule of international exhaustion. (If one assigns equal weight to the interests of all individuals regardless of nationality, then the question is somewhat closer.) How much the Federal Circuit should care about foreign consumers is a question that defies easy answer, but we hope that our Essay at least brings these tradeoffs into clearer focus. We also offer some tentative suggestions as to how U.S. courts might approach questions of global distributive justice.

35 U.S. Code § 314 – Institution of inter partes review

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(a)Threshold.—

The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.

(b)Timing.—The Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review under this chapter pursuant to a petition filed under section 311 within 3 months after—

(1) receiving a preliminary response to the petition under section 313; or

(2) if no such preliminary response is filed, the last date on which such response may be filed.

(c)Notice.—

The Director shall notify the petitioner and patent owner, in writing, of the Director’s determination under subsection (a), and shall make such notice available to the public as soon as is practicable. Such notice shall include the date on which the review shall commence.

(d)No Appeal.—

The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.

Patentlyo Bits and Bytes by Anthony McCain

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Guest Post: Why the (Previously) Improving Economy Likely (Also) Reduced Patent Litigation Rates

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Guest Post by Ted Sichelman, Professor of Law and Director of the Technology Entrepreneurship and Intellectual Property Clinic and Center for Intellectual Property Law & Markets at the University of San Diego School of Law, and Shawn Miller, Lecturer in Law and Teaching Fellow in Law, Science & Technology at Stanford Law School

As Patently-O has described in detail (e.g., here and here), patent litigation rates have been in flux over the last several years. First, in 2010, rates nominally went up because of false marking suits. Then, in 2011, following passage of the America Invents Act (AIA), patent litigation rates appeared to increase (and the media made much ado over this). Yet, the only thing that changed immediately after the AIA was how we counted patent litigation numbers because of new joinder rules. Indeed, the AIA’s joinder rules actually lowered total defendant counts a bit. Next came inter partes review (IPR) and covered business method (CBM) review, which appear to have substantially decreased litigation rates in 2013 and 2014. Then came Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank and its progeny, which some have claimed decreased litigation rates throughout 2014. And now rates seem to be back up in 2015—why, nobody is sure.

To further understand the drivers of patent litigation, Alan Marco (Chief Economist at the USPTO) and the two of us recently conducted the first rigorous study of the effects of the economy as a whole (the “macroeconomy”) on patent litigation rates over the period 1970-2009 (we stopped at 2009 to avoid the counting mess I just described). The study will be published this month in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (a draft is available here).

As background, we examined changes in the rates of total litigation, litigation per issued patent, and litigation per in-force patent. To do so, we used a new USPTO dataset that provides the most accurate numbers on total in-force patents by year gathered to date. Figure 1 below shows the number of in-force patents between 1971 and 2009 (the vertical bars represent periods of recession).

Figure 1

Figure 1. U.S. In-Force Patents (1971-2009) [from USPTO data].

Indeed, although many have noted that the litigation rates per issued patent have been fairly stable, Figure 2 below shows that the litigation rates per in-force patent have risen quite dramatically since the early- to mid-1990s (at least from 1970s rates—Ron Katznelson has argued that rates per in-force patent in the 1920s to the mid-1930s are fairly comparable to the recent rates, at least through the 2000s).

Figure 2

Figure 2. U.S. Patent Litigation Per In-Force Patent (1971-2009)

(Total Patent Litigation in Gold (with annual filings on left y-axis) and Litigation Per In-Force Patent in Blue (with annual values on right y-axis)).

We then performed numerous time-series regressions against important macroeconomic variables like GDP, R & D spending, interest rates, and related factors, controlling for in-force patents and other key variables. Our major findings (over the last 20-25 years) are as follows:

  • In economic upswings (i.e., increasing productivity, low interest rates, low economy-wide financial risk), patent litigation rates generally fall.
  • In recessions, whether rates rise or fall depends on the availability of credit.
    • When credit is freely available in a downturn, overall patent litigation rates generally rise.
    • However, when credit is scarce (like in the most recent recession), overall patent litigation rates generally fall.

We explain the first finding on a “substitution” theory—namely, when selling products and services is highly profitable, companies and investors are less concerned about earning revenue from patent litigation. We speculate that our second finding is driven by the increasing reliance by plaintiffs on external funding. Indeed, the availability of credit has only played a significant role in patent litigation rates since roughly the mid-1990s, when licensing-driven litigation began to rise—first by practicing entities such as IBM and Texas Instruments and, later, by non-practicing entities (NPEs).

Over the last five years, the mean U.S. real GDP growth rate has been about 2-3% per year. Ignoring other factors, and assuming our model applies on a going forward basis since 2009, this increase in productivity has very roughly amounted to a 6-9% decrease in annual patent litigation counts over the same period. In general, it is likely that a sizeable portion of the decrease in patent litigation rates over the last several years has been not merely due to the rise of IPRs and CBMs, and the issuance of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, but also to the economy as a whole. So the next time the economy worsens, if credit remains relatively available, all other factors equal, it is likely that patent litigation rates will rise significantly—not by a huge amount, but enough to notice. Whether the current increase in patent litigation is somehow related to a declining macroeconomy, only time will tell.

Please note that the views expressed herein solely express our personal views and do not express the views of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.

 

Hughes on Obviousness: The Problem Motivates the Solution

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by Dennis Crouch

Dome Patent v. Michelle Lee in her capacity as Director of the USPTO (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Patent No 4,306,042 issued in 1981 and expired in 1998, but is still being litigated.  The patent covers a method of making oxygen-permeable material used for contact lenses. Back in December 1997, the patent owner (Dome) sued a set of defendants for infringement.  That lawsuit has been stayed since 1999 pending resolution of an ex parte reexamination requested by one of the defendants. In a 2006 final ruling, the USPTO confirmed patentability of claims 2-4, but cancelled claim 1 as obvious.  Dome then filed a civil action in DC challenging the PTO ruling. That case – filed in 2007 – concluded in July 2014 with the district court’s de novo determination that claim 1 was obvious over a combination of three prior art patents.  On appeal here, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that ruling – finding that “district court did not commit reversible error in its determination that the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill during the relevant time period.”  Judge Hughes penned the opinion that was joined by the two other panel members, Judges Reyna and Schall.

In typical close cases, each of the major elements of a claimed invention are found in a collection of prior art — leaving the question of whether the combination as claimed would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.   An important intermediary factual question is whether there is any evidence showing why a skilled artisan might or might not be inclined to combine the references.   In the Supreme Court’s KSR decision, the Supreme Court indicated that the motivation question involves an ‘expansive and flexible’ analysis and can consider the common sense of the skilled artisan.  Citing KSR, Judge Hughes writes:

If all elements of a claim are found in the prior art, as is the case here, the factfinder must further consider the factual questions of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine those references, and whether in making that combination, a person of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success.

Evidence of a motivation to combine prior art references may flow from “the nature of the problem to be solved.”  Here, the district court found that the motivation came from the prior art evidence indicating a search for high oxygen permeability in contact-lens materials. That finding was then affirmed on appeal: “This understanding would have motivated a person of ordinary skill to combine the Tris monomer disclosed in Gaylord with the Tris-type cross-linking agent disclosed in Tanaka to increase the oxygen permeability of a contact lens.”  There was also some amount of teaching away (the non-Tris prior art outlined the problems of using Tris), but the appellate court affirmed the obviousness finding.

It was important for the appeal here that the ‘motivation’ found by the district court was seen as an issue of fact — a subset of some unnamed Graham factor — rather than a question of law.  Thus, although the appellate court may have disagreed with some aspects of the original decision, the district court’s findings were not “clearly erroneous.”

 

Review of Civil Action: As I mentioned above, the case began as a reexamination and, after losing, the patentee filed a civil action in district court who reviewed the case de novo.  Under i4i, a court patent may only invalidate a patent after being presented with clear and convincing evidence proving that result. See also 35 U.S.C. 282(a) (“In General. – A patent shall be presumed valid.”).  On the other hand, the USPTO operating in reexamination mode only requires a preponderance of the evidence to render the claims null and void.  These competing standards came to a head in the civil action challenging the reexamination finding.  On appeal here, the Federal Circuit affirmed that in this situation only a preponderance is necessary. 

“‘[A reexamination] is in essence a suit to set aside the final decision of the board.’ Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

[I]f the Patent Office decides after an ex parte reexamination that a preponderance of the evidence establishes the claimed subject matter is not patentable, § 145 authorizes the district court to review whether that final decision is correct. The § 145 action in such a case does not concern the different question of whether, as part of a defense to an infringement action, clear and convincing evidence establishes that an issued and asserted patent should be held invalid.

Somewhat oddly, the court ruled that Section 282 does not apply here because that section only relates to defenses in patent infringement litigation. “The § 145 action before the district court did not involve a defense to a charge of infringement of an issued patent. Section 282 therefore does not apply in this instance.

Guest Post by Profs. Lefstin & Menell on Sequenom v. Ariosa

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In a parallel post, Dennis summarized the numerous amicus briefs filed in support of Sequenom’s petition for rehearing en banc.  Below, professors Jeffrey Lefstin (Hastings) and Peter Menell (Berkeley) discuss the core issues raised in their amicus brief.

Don’t Throw Out Fetal-Diagnostic Innovation with the Bathwater:
Why Ariosa v. Sequenom Is an Ideal Vehicle for Constructing a Sound Patent-Eligibility Framework

By Jeffrey A. Lefstin and Peter S. Menell
Over the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated patentable subject-matter limitations, issuing four significant decisions after nearly three decades of dormancy.  These decisions reflect justifiable concerns about the patenting of abstract business methods and laws of nature. Just as importantly, they reveal internal inconsistencies and confusion about the scope of patentable subject matter and tension with the centuries-old fabric of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. As Justice Breyer remarked at the oral argument in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014), the Mayo (2012) decision did no more than “sketch an outer shell of the content” of the patent-eligibility test, leaving much of the substance to be developed by the patent bar in conjunction with the Federal Circuit.

Two of the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility decisions (Bilski and Alice) involve non-technological business methods.  Mayo glosses over several key issues, including how to reconcile prior discordant decisions (Flook and Diehr), and whether the requirement of “inventive concept” demands an unconventional application, or merely more than the generic instruction to “apply the law.” And Myriad departs from Mayo in a critical respect in that it authorizes patentability for a conventional transformation of a natural compound.

Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s panel decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom elides the critical questions.  In view of Congress’s reluctance to weigh in on the scope of patentable subject matter and the Supreme Court’s signals to the patent bar and the Federal Circuit to bring coherence to these rough outlines, Ariosa v. Sequenom marks a critical juncture in the development of a modern patent-eligibility framework.  Failure to vet these issues risks undermining the patent system’s role in promoting biomedical research.  Beyond Supreme Court review, which is never guaranteed (consider the havoc wreaked by the Court’s passing on State Street Bank), or corrective legislation (which is even more speculative), en banc review by the Federal Circuit presents the last clear chance to avert potentially dire consequences.

Our amicus brief urges the Federal Circuit to grant en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom to ventilate the critical issues left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility decisions.  Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patent-eligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an “inventive concept”: non-preemptive application; and non-generic application – that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it.  While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, we believe that the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates unconventional or inventive application.

Our brief further shows that the Ariosa panel decision conflicts with several strands of prior Supreme Court decisions.  The panel decision jeopardizes valuable innovation in diagnostic research and other biomedical fields as unintended fallout of the Supreme Court’s justifiable desire to discard vague and non-technological business method patents.  The primary responsibility for developing patent-eligibility doctrine now rests with the Federal Circuit and this case presents an ideal vehicle for explicating sensible jurisprudential boundaries.

Jeffrey A. Lefstin is Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings College of Law.  Peter S. Menell is Koret Professor of Law and a Director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law.  Their amicus brief in support of en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom is available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652452

Working through Old Patent Applications

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The decision in Hyatt v. Lee (Fed. Cir. 2015) included a citation to a June 2013 letter submitted by then Acting Director Terry Rea to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The letter was submitted in a response to a Senate request for information regarding still pending patent applications filed pre-GATT.

Rea reported that 482 applications are still pending that were filed prior to June 8, 1995. That cutoff is important because those applications – if ever issued as patents – will be entitled to 17-year patent terms following the issue date.  Applications filed since that date are given 20-year terms that begin counting at the application filing date.

The letter goes on to list the serial number, inventor, assignee, priority date, and other information for each of the 482 applications.

Leading the pack is Gilbert Hyatt with 399 applications pending. Runner-Up is Personalized Media Communications (John Harvey) company with 38 applications pending.  The remaining ancient-application-owners are all smaller players with only one or two pending (as of 2013). These include UCB Pharma; Boeing; US Dept of HHS; Sanofi-Aventis; and US Smokeless Tobacco Company, as examples.

Although the letter does not so indicate, it is apparent to me that the data does not include applications kept from issuing due to secrecy orders.  On example is recently issued U.S. Patent No. 9,057,604 that was filed as an application in 1989 but did not issue till 2015 because of a secrecy order by the U.S. Government.  Since Rea’s letter, 30 of Harvey’s patents have issued. See link.

 

Federal Circuit Gives PTO “OK” to Treat Hyatt as a Special Case

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Gilbert Hyatt v. Michelle Lee (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Hyatt is a highly successful patentee with more than 75 issued patents and hundreds of millions of dollars in licensing revenue. He also has over 400 patent applications pending before the USPTO that were all filed more than 20-years ago. Hyatt’s applications represent 80% of the applications still-pending that were originally filed prior to the June 1995 patent term transition. Because these old patent applications were filed under the old regime, if they ever issue they will be given a 17-year patent term extending from the issue date (barring a terminal disclaimer or prosecution laches finding). Many of these applications claim priority to much earlier filed applications – some claiming priority back in to the 1970s and most having a complex set of continuation and continuation-in-part applications.

According to the USPTO, these 400 pending applications have – on average – 300 claims each – resulting in about 120,000 pending claims – roughly the equivalent of 6,000 ordinary-sized applications.

I expect that many of Hyatt’s patent claims would cover chip and display technology that is now ubiquitous. If valid and enforceable then we’re talking billions of dollars in licensing fees. If the USPTO has anything to do about it, that result is not coming anytime soon.

Over the years, the USPTO has developed a number of special procedures for Hyatt applications. In 2013, the USPTO began issuing requirements that Hyatt limit each patent family to <600 claims absent a showing of necessity and also identify the earliest priority date for each chosen claim (along with links to the supporting disclosure).

The USPTO also indicated that it would publicize the family linkage of Hyatt’s (otherwise secret) applications. In particular, the disclosure would occur by placing the requirements in the file histories of all of Hyatt’s pending applications, some of which are public. Apparently, this requirements document includes a number of examples of how Hyatt applications overlap claim scope – relying upon specific claim texts of Hyatt’s otherwise secret applications.

In response, Hyatt filed a complaint in the E.D. Virginia asking the district court to enjoin the USPTO from disclosing information in violation of 35 U.S.C. 122(a) (“applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of an Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Director”). However, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and – in the alternative – held that the extraordinary nature of Hyatt’s situation created “special circumstances” that allowed for the publication.

Although the statute provides the PTO with seeming authority to determining when to disclose the confidential information (“special circumstances as determined by the director”), the Federal Circuit on appeal here found that the PTO’s power is both “narrow and reviewable.” In particular the appellate panel found that the PTO must “determine that special circumstances exist” and those special circumstances must be sufficient and particular enough to “justify the specific content to be disclosed.” However, because of the seeming discretionary nature of the statute, the Federal Circuit determined that it should review the PTO’s determination of these factors with deference and only overturn the PTO’s decision upon finding of an abuse of discretion.

In determining that the PTO had then acted within these requirements, the panel first held that the requirements were proper – given Hyatt’s unique and special status among patent applicants. The court also found that the disclosure of confidential claim scope proper.

In light of the nature of Mr. Hyatt’s applications, longstanding PTO rules justify the issuance of the Requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) provides that, in a patent application, “[m]ore than one claim may be presented provided they differ substantially from each other and are not unduly multiplied” The PTO issued the Requirements to ensure that Mr. Hyatt’s applications complied with § 1.75(b). Given the extraordinary number and duplicative nature of Mr. Hyatt’s various pending applications, all drawn from the same 12 specifications, it was reasonable for the PTO to be concerned that the claims did not “differ substantially from each other,” and that some claims were “unduly multiplied.” § 1.75(b). In fact, in the Requirements the PTO demonstrates that across these applications, Mr. Hyatt has in numerous cases filed identical or nearly identical claims. This sort of redundant, repetitive claiming is inconsistent with § 1.75(b).

These special circumstances, which justify issuing the Requirements, also justify the disclosure of the confidential information contained in them. . . .

We hold that the Director did not abuse her discretion when she found that the “special circumstances” exception justified the otherwise-prohibited disclosure of the Requirements

It is fairly amazing to look at the effort going-in on both sides in Hyatt’s patent applications. One that is public and available in PAIR Application No. 05/849,812 that claims priority back to 1970 through a series of 20 continuations-in-part.

New Rules on PTAB Trials

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Earlier this year, the USPTO released a set of ‘quick fixes‘ to AIA trial procedures before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and also promised second package of rule changes. That second package has now been detailed in the USPTO’s Proposed Rule Changes now found in the Federal Register. The proposed rules focus on a number of practical changes to PTAB Trial Procedures:

  • Testimonial Evidence (Such as Expert Declarations) in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (to be considered but viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner when determining whether to institute an inter partes review proceeding)
  • Claim construction standards for patents about to expire (use actual construction for patents that “will expire” before final judgment rather than broadest-reasonable-interpretation)
  • Rule-11 Requirement associated with all papers filed with the PTAB – giving the USPTO “a more robust means with which to police misconduct.”

In her blog-post on the topic, USPTO Director Michelle Lee indicated that the USPTO will also “amend its Office Patent Trial Practice Guide to reflect developments in practice before the Office concerning how the Office handles additional discovery, live testimony, and confidential information.”

As part of the process, Director Lee also offers a “where we stand” set of statistics for the past three years of AIA filings:

  • 3,655 petitions, of which 3,277 are IPRs, 368 are CBMs, and 10 are PGRs.
  • 63% focus on patents from electrical/computer technology centers (TCs) and only 9% in the the bio/pharma TC.
  • Review Institution: Trials have been instituted on 1,389 of 3,277 IPR petitions, 185 of 368 CBM petitions, and 2 of 10 PGR petitions.
  • Trial results: 12% of total claims available to be challenged (4,496 of 38,462), were determined by the PTAB to be unpatentable in a final written decision. Other claims were either not challenged, resolved by settlement, cancelled, or upheld as patentable. Of the first IPRs to reach a conclusion, 25% of claims actually challenged (4,496 of 17,675) were found to be unpatentable.

According to Director Lee, the number of petitions is “around three times more” than what were originally expected by Director Kappos.

These statistics fit with those discussed by Richard Bone in his recent post.

Comments on the proposed rules go to trialrules2015@uspto.gov and discussions will be held at the upcoming roadshows: August 24, 2015 in Santa Clara, August 26, 2015 in Dallas, and August 28, 2015 at USPTO HQ.

Patent Grant Rate by Technology Area

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TechAreas

The chart above shows the USPTO patent grant rate across a variety of major technology areas. I apologize for the tightness of the lines, but there are several overall trends that are easy to discern.  In particular, the general trend reported last week – a drop in grant rate followed by a rise once Director Kappos took charge – is present in each of the major technology areas. In general, you will also see less variance between the technology areas in later years. It is unclear at this point if that coming-together is due more to USPTO practices or to applicant practices or some other unknown factor.

The major outlier in the group is electronic commerce patent applications.  Those applications continue to be granted at a rate of < 10%

Regarding the sources: The data primarily comes from the USPTO Chief Economist Alan Marco and his team [LINK].  For each year in the chart, I calculated the percentage of patent applications that were issued as patents (relative to the number disposed-of as either abandoned or issued).  Thus, a figure of 70% grant rate would indicate that, of the respective patents that were fully disposed-of during the given time period, 70% issued as patents and 30% were abandoned.  If an application is still pending at the end of the time period then it is not counted.  Likewise, the applicant’s filing of a continuation application before abandonment/issuance has no impact on the grant rate for the given year.  The technology categories here are linked to the NBER technology areas except for eCommerce that I coded (Class 705 and 701/467, corresponding to Art Units in the 3620’s, 3680’s, and 3690’s).  Of importance, the data here goes only through disposals made in September 2014.

 

 

Commissioner of Patents: Drew Hirshfeld

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Drew Hirshfeld has now taken-on the role as Commissioner of Patents at the USPTO after being appointed by Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker.  Hirshfeld is filling the office left by Peggy Focarino’s recent retirement.  Earlier this year I suggested that Hirshfeld was a likely appointee.

Commissioner Hirshfeld has been with the USPTO for more than 20-years.  He originally joined as an examiner but moved up through the ranks by proving himself to be smart, reliable, and reasonable.  Hirshfeld was David Kappos Chief of Staff and has been the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy under Director Lee. Prior to that, he served as a group director for TC2100.

Congratulations on an excellent appointment.

 

Seeking the AntiCommons

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Interesting historical look at patent-pools and ‘transaction entrepreneurs’ by USC law professor Jonathan Barnet leads him to the conclusion that the “anti-commons” concerns in the patent context don’t hold weight in practice.

IP scholars and policymakers often maintain that [anti-commons] effects are endemic in IP-governed markets and therefore tend to endorse the view that IP rights should be reduced to mitigate those effects. The descriptive component of that proposition cannot be reconciled with the clear weight of contemporary and historical evidence—covering more than a century’s worth of experience—that AC effects are repeatedly mitigated through independent market action by affected constituencies or transactional entrepreneurs. This is true both in concentrated markets, in which repeat-players have incentives and capacities to converge on a knowledge-sharing arrangement, and dispersed markets, in which intermediaries commonly enter to supply transactional solutions that ameliorate AC frictions. Remarkably, recent historical research shows that this proposition holds true even in “easy” cases that have long been assumed to provide clear illustrations of AC effects. Recognizing the shortcomings of the AC thesis as a descriptive proposition rebuts normative intuitions that intensive levels of IP acquisition and enforcement trap markets in a transaction-cost web that depresses innovation. This sophisticated view of AC effects as a potential but rarely realized outcome provides the basis for a more nuanced appreciation of the role of IP rights in creative and technology markets.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2633695