by Dennis Crouch

My prior post on DuPont v. Synvina focused on the obviousness of a claimed range in the context of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings.  The decision also raises a question of standing — whether the patent challenger DuPont had standing to appeal the IPR decision favoring the patentee Synvina.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Synvina C.V. (Fed. Cir. 2018)

The patent act provides a couple of limits on who may file a petition to institute an IPR. The petitioner must be “a person” and may not be either the patent owner nor a person (or privy) who was sued for infringing the patent more than 1-year before the petition filing date.* Notably absent – the IPR statute does not require the petitioner to have any reason for challenging the patent or any actual dispute with the patentee.

Courts are different – a lawsuit cannot be filed by just any person.  Rather, the plaintiff must have “standing” — a an actual case or controversy that the lawsuit can resolve.  Standing is required at every stage of court litigation. This creates a bit of a difficulty for IPR proceedings: Although no standing is required for a patent challenger to pursue an IPR proceeding — standing is required once the case goes to the Federal Circuit on appeal.  In this situation, the patentee always has standing — their patent is under risk of being cancelled.  However, the patent challenger needs to show that it has an actual stake in the outcome of the decision — even though the Patent Act appears to provide a right-of appeal to any “party dissatisfied” with the IPR outcome.

In a 2016 decision in Spokeo, the Supreme Court explained that standing requires that a plaintiff must have:

(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  When a harm has already occurred, the injury-in-fact is easy to find. However, in pre-injury declaratory situations — the injury requirement may be met by a potential injury “of sufficient immediacy and realty.” ABB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  In Consumer Watchdog, however, the Federal Circuit noted in dicta that the immediacy requirement “may be relaxed” in situations like this “where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a litigant, such as the right to appeal an administrative decision.”  Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Here, DuPont – the patent challenger – has (apparently) never been accused of infringing the Synvina patent; does not believe that it presently infringes the patent; and is not paying any royalties based upon the patent’s validity.  However, the Federal Circuit identified a controversy based upon the fact that DuPont’s factory has the capability of infringing:

Such a controversy exists here because DuPont currently operates a plant capable of infringing the ’921
patent.

I’ll note here that the court appears to have written this as a broad statement that could apply in many untold situations, including declaratory judgment actions.  However, later courts may cabin-in the holding to the specific facts of this case.

If you remember my prior post, the patent at issue covers a method of making a “green” plastic-precursor known as FDME from plant sugars (fructose).  In reaching its decision, the court walked through several bits of evidence that all come together to show that the DuPont plant has the capability use the claimed invention in its factory:

According to DuPont’s declarations, the process conducted at its plant uses the same reactants to generate the same products using the same solvent and same catalysts as the ’921 patent. Likewise, the temperature and PO2 ranges used at the plant overlap with those claimed in the ’921 patent. At the very least, this indicates that DuPont “is engaged or will likely engage in an activity that would give rise to a possible infringement suit.”  Quoting JTEKT

In its decision, the Federal Circuit also noted two additional facts that it saw as supporting standing:

1. At the Board Synvina argued that DuPont had copied elements of Synvina’s invention and put them in a DuPont application (the board found this not compelling).
2. Synvina has refused to grant DuPont a covenant not to sue.

Together, these “further confirm that DuPont’s risk of liability is not conjectural or hypothetical.”

With the standing requirement met, the Federal Circuit was able to hear DuPont’s argument and agreed that the claims are obvious.

Burden Shifting at the PTAB and the Obviousness of Ranges

Although the USPTO is not yet requiring Continuing Legal Education hours, there is still lots to learn about the twists and turns of our patent system.  I will be speaking at a few upcoming CLE-events this fall:

• September 27-29, 2018: I’ll be the Keynote speaker at the 2018 Annual Fall Institute on Intellectual Property Law in Galveston, Texas.
• October 11, 2018: I will be speaking at the BAMSL St. Louis Inventor-of-the-Year award ceremony.
• October 25-27: I’m closing the Plenary Session of the AIPLA Annual Meeting in Washington DC with a discussion of Intellectual Property Law Ethics.
• November 2, 2018: I’m joining folks in Chicago at the JMLS 62^nd ANNUAL
  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW CONFERENCE. (If you miss early-bird registration, get a 10% discount with code “patentlyo“).
• January 2-6, 2019: I’ll be returning to Snowmass Colorado to speak at the IP track of the National CLE Conference (“Ski CLE“).

I hope to see you there! Dennis Crouch

by Dennis Crouch

Each summer, the Supreme Court takes a recess and patent cases begin to pile-up in the high-court’s docket. Only a handful of intellectual property petitions are granted certiorari each year, but almost all of the petitions raise interesting and important issues of law and policy.

The following is a comprehensive list of Patent cases pending before the Supreme Court.  I have excluded a small handful that have (in my estimation) no shot at certiorari and also fail to raise interesting patent law issues.

Petitions Granted:

1. Prior Art – On Sale Bar: Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., No. 17-1229. This case questions whether 102(a) prior art under the AIA is limited to publicly available prior art. Particularly, does a pre-filing sale of the invention count as “on sale” prior art where the sale was a private sale that did not publicly disclose the invention? Merits briefing should be complete in October with oral arguments likely held in November 2018.

Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Pending:

1. Inequitable Conduct: Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus N.V., No. 17-1616. The question presented is “Whether a patent right can be fully extinguished based on misconduct committed by the patentee’s counsel during federal district court litigation to enforce the patent right.”
2. Validity – Indefiniteness: American Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., No. 17-1497 (Can a patent’s definiteness be proven based wholly upon post-filing evidence?)
3. Damages – Enhanced Damages: Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., et al. v. Arctic Cat Inc., No. 17-1645 (Can treble damages for “willful infringement” be based upon a “should have known” standard?)
4. Validity – Obviousness: Nichia Corporation, et al. v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd., et al., No. 17-1707 (Treating obviousness as a question of fact vs law).
5. Validity – Obviousness: B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc., No. 17-1252 (Process of obviousness analysis — is there first a prima facie obviousness analysis followed by consideration of objective indicia of non-obviousness?)
6. Procedure – Standing for AIA Trials: Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, No. 17-1594 (Whether the government is a “person” who can petition to institute a CBM;  Does a 1498(a) action count as an infringement action?)
7. Procedure – Standing of AIA Trials: RPX Corporation v. ChanBond LLC, No. 17-1686 (What is required for a petitioner to have standing to appeal an AIA Trial final decision?)
8. Procedure – Impact of Factual Stipulation: Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., et al., No. 18-21 (may the court “ignore a factual stipulation”).
9. Procedure – Federal Court Patent Jurisdiction: Alexsam, Inc. v. Wildcard Systems, Inc., et al., No. 17-1483 (Does a breach-of-patent-license lawsuit arise under the Federal Patent laws?)
10. Procedure – Joinder of Co-Owner: Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. HTC Corporation, et al., No. 18-77 (When we have co-owners of a patent, can one co-owner use Fed. R. Civ. Pro. R. 19 to force joinder of the other co-owner in an infringement lawsuit?)
11. Procedure – Timing of New Trial Motion: Promega Corporation v. Life Technologies Corporation, et al., No. 17-1669.
12. Inventor Rights: Leitner-Wise v. LWRC International, LLC, et al., No. 18-52.  Leitner-Wise (the inventor) assigned his patent rights as part of a royalty agreement that have not been by the subsequent assignee.  May he now sue the assignee for infringement?
13. Patent Eligibility: Integrated Technological Systems, Inc. v. First Internet Bank of Indiana, No. 17-1590 (“Does 35 U.S.C. § 282 allow for challenges to a patent’s validity based on patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101?”)
14. AIA Trials and Appeals: Stambler v. Mastercard International Inc., No. 17-1140 (Can Congress revoke a patent owner’s right to have the validity of his patent determined by a jury trial before an Article III forum after his patent issues; and (2) whether Federal Circuit Rule 36 contravenes 35 U.S.C. § 144.).
15. Infringement — Ensnarement as a Defense: Jang v. Boston Scientific Corporation, et al., No. 17-1332 (“Whether the Federal Circuit’s “ensnarement” defense to infringement [under the doctrine of equivalents] violates patent holders’ Seventh Amendment jury-trial rights.”)
16. Prior Art – Effective Date of Prior Art: Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Illumina Inc, No. 18-****.  (“If a patent discloses but does not claim an invention, does that disclosure qualify as prior art as of the date of the application in which it was first made, such that no one else may patent the same invention based on a later-filed application?”)

The University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Information Law recently announced its essay competition: “Science Fiction and Information Law.”

Authors in both ‘genres’ dedicate a considerable share of their time speculating about how [new] technologies may evolve. Most importantly, science fiction authors, as well as information law scholars, ponder what the implications will be for society, markets and the values that we cherish and seek to protect. . . .

We welcome essays that reflect on our possible data-driven future, where data has been firmly established as an economic asset and new, data-driven smart technologies can change the way we live, work, love, think and vote. How will AI change politics, democracy or the future of the media? What will life be like with robot judges and digital professors? What is the future of transportation in the wake of drones, the autonomous car and perfect matching of transportation needs? Is there a life beyond the ubiquity of social media: Is there bound to be an anti-thesis and if so, what will the synthesis look like? What will happen when social media corporations start fully-fledged co-operation with the police? Or unleash the power of public engagement to solve or prevent crime by themselves? How would crime respond to all this? What could be the true implications of the ‘data economy’ and if we really can pay our bills with our data? How will future information law look like in the age of AI?

The essays will be read and judged — the top five will receive awards, published in the Internet Policy Review, and the authors invited to Amsterdam for a public symposium.

Rules:

• 8000-15000 words in English.
• Authors might already be sci-fi authors, but might come from any realm.
• Essay emailed to Prof. Helberger n.helberger@uva.nl by December 15, 2018.

Excerpt: July 4,1776

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

USPTO Director Andrei Iancu gave the keynote address at the April 11, 2018 Patent Policy Conference hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The following is an excerpt:

… Dr. Eli Harari … risked everything: his career, his finances, and his family. That first company actually did not work out well, but a few years later, Harari risked it all again and co-founded a new company, which he ultimately called SanDisk. At SanDisk, Harari built upon his EEPROM technology, added critically important new inventions, and perfected flash memory data storage. And he obtained patents, including on how to turn memory chips into reliable systems. Harari’s flash technology came to be used almost universally in devices like digital cameras and cell phones. In 2016, Western Digital acquired SanDisk for $19 billion. But think about it: Without patents, how could someone like Dr. Harari risk everything, put aside his secure career at an established company, and strike it on his own?

As Dr. Harari told me: “The only asset you have is your idea.  If you have no way to protect your idea, you are at the mercy of the next bad guy.  The U.S. patent system is genius, really the bedrock foundation of capitalism.” Harari’s sentiment was echoed by President Ronald Reagan, who said in 1982: “Throughout our Nation’s history, the patent system has played a critically important role in stimulating technological advances.”

How true that is.

Yet today, our patent system is at a crossroads. For more than just a few years, our system has been pushed and pulled, poked and prodded. The cumulative result is a system in which the patent grant is less reliable today than it should be. This onslaught has come from all directions: There has been major reform legislation, and proposed legislation. There have been massive changes brought about by major court cases. And the USPTO itself has taken a variety of actions in an effort to implement these changes. Plus, importantly, the rhetoric surrounding the patent system has focused relentlessly on certain faults in, or abuses of, the system—instead of the incredible benefits the system brings to our nation. …

Still, we are at an inflection point with respect to the patent system. As a nation, we cannot continue down the same path if we want to maintain our global economic leadership. And we will not continue down the same path. This administration has a mission to create sustained economic growth, and innovation and IP protection are key goals in support of that mission.  So, how do we reverse the trend? The good news is that reclaiming our patent leadership status is within reach.

For today, let me focus on two principal points:

(1) Creating a new pro-innovation, pro-IP dialogue, and
(2) Increasing the reliability of the patent grant.

First, we must change the dialogue surrounding patents. … [A] successful system must be defined by its goals, aspirations, and successes. Obviously, errors in the system should be corrected. And no abuse should be tolerated. Errors and abuse should be identified and swiftly eliminated. However, the focus for discussion, and the focus for IP policy, must be on the positive.  We must create a new narrative that defines the patent system by the brilliance of inventors, the excitement of invention, and the incredible benefits they bring to society. And it is these benefits that must drive our patent policies. …

But, how exactly do we translate this into a better patent system? Here’s a start: when we write, interpret, and administer patent laws, we must consistently ask ourselves: Are we helping these inventors? Whether it’s an individual tinkering in her garage, or a team at a large corporation, or a laboratory on a university campus—we must ask ourselves: are we helping them? Are we incentivizing innovation?

And that brings me to my second principal point for today: increasing the reliability of the patent grant. Because that is key to incentivizing innovation. Without reliable patents, inventors like Dr. Eli Harari are less likely to risk it all in order to bring their new concepts to the market. As I said at my Senate confirmation hearing: “When patent owners and the public have confidence in the patent grant, inventors are encouraged to invent, investments are made, companies grow, jobs are created, science and technology advance.” … [The Chamber] report identifies two principal reasons for the increased uncertainty (or lower reliability) of our patents:

(1) Patentability Standards, or more specifically, patent subject matter eligibility pursuant to 35 USC Section 101; and
(2) Opposition procedures, namely, the post-grant procedures, such as IPR, that were established by the America Invents Act.

Let me address each of these in turn.

First, our current law surrounding patentable subject matter has created a more unpredictable patent landscape that is hurting innovation and, consequently, investment and job creation. Recent cases from the Supreme Court – Mayo, Myriad, and Alice – have inserted standards into our interpretation of the statute that are difficult to follow. Lower courts applying these cases are struggling to issue consistent results. Patent lawyers trying to advise their clients are, in turn, struggling to predict the outcome with respect to certain patents. And examiners at the USPTO must spend increased amounts of time addressing this challenging issue. The current standards are difficult for all: stakeholders, courts, examiners, practitioners, and investors alike. System-wide, a significant amount of time is being spent trying to figure out where the lines should be drawn, and what’s in and what’s out. And multiple people looking at the same patent claims often have trouble agreeing on, and predicting, the outcome. Something must be done. To be sure, we must and will apply Supreme Court law faithfully. This does not mean, however, that more cannot be done to increase clarity and predictability. Of course, given our statutory mandate, there is only so much that the USPTO can do. But within that mandate, we will do everything we can. Currently, we’re actively looking for ways to simplify the eligibility determination for our examiners through forward-looking guidance. Through our administration of the patent laws, which we are charged to execute, the USPTO can lead, not just react to every new case the courts issue.

Second, your report also mentions our “patent opposition procedures” as a reason for the increased uncertainty of our patents. This refers primarily to our Inter Partes Review, or the IPR system. This was a creation of the America Invents Act, and since its introduction five and a half years ago, we have now conducted more than 8,000 such proceedings. It’s been a very popular proceeding. Opinions on this new system diverge widely. Yet each opinion is passionately held by its supporters. Pointing to the high invalidation rates in IPR proceedings, some hate the new system with vigor, arguing that it’s an unfair process that tilts too much in favor of the petitioner. Others love the system, and think it’s the best tool we have to correct errors, eliminate “bad patents,” and improve patent quality. Who is right? Well, both arguments have legitimate elements. But I encourage people to reduce the hyperbole and look at the process with fresh eyes, in order to understand its true benefits and true challenges. This is what we are now doing at the USPTO.  Indeed, it’s one of our highest priorities. We need to carefully balance rights-holder’s and rights challenger’s interests. On the one hand, for example, this proceeding can come years after issuance, when the patent owners and the public may both have relied on those rights and made investments accordingly. On the other hand, we do want to execute the statutory mandate and help maintain the quality of patent rights. And – assuming the Supreme Court does not declare it unconstitutional – we do want the IPR system to effectively address invalid claims, but at the same time, we don’t want to throw out the baby with the bathwater. The filters need to be appropriately set.  And so, among various other things, we are now examining: how and when we institute proceedings, the standards we employ during the proceedings, and  how we conduct the overall proceedings.The goal, with whatever action we take, is to increase predictability of appropriately-scoped claims….

We have a remarkable patent system, born from our Constitution and steeped in our history. It is a crown jewel; a gold standard. We have a unique opportunity to ensure it meets its full Constitutional mandate to promote innovation and grow our economy.

I look forward to working with all of you in support of that great endeavor. Thank you again for the invitation to participate in this important discussion.

(Today’s guest post is by  Professor Jorge L. Contreras of the University of Utah College of Law.  Professor Contreras is known for his excellent work on remedies, particularly in the SEP and FRAND context.  I’m especially excited about today’s guest post, as it dovetails nicely into a one-week course on Remedies in Patent Law at Iowa Law in early January, taught by another leading expert on remedies law, Prof. Tom Cotter of Minnesota. – Jason) 

On December 21, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California released its long-awaited Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in TCL Communications v. Ericsson (SACV 14-341 JVS(DFMx) and CV 15-2370 JVS (DFMx)).  In a lengthy and carefully crafted decision, Judge James Selna sets forth some important new points regarding the calculation of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) royalties for standards-essential patents (SEPs).  Among other things, the decision offers a strong endorsement of “top down” methodologies for the calculation of SEP royalties, and makes significant use of the non-discrimination (ND) prong of the FRAND commitment in arriving at a FRAND royalty rate.  Equally importantly, the case establishes that, for non-discrimination purposes, even low end vendors like TCL will be considered “similarly situated” to high end vendors like Apple, giving them the benefit of the rates that high end vendors can negotiate with SEP holders for far more expensive consumer products.

Background

The case involves the sale of cellular handsets by TCL, a Chinese firm reported to be the seventh largest global manufacturer of mobile phones.  Ericsson is one of the largest holders of patents essential to the implementation of the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards published by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) (standards-essential patents or SEPs).  Under ETSI’s policies, ETSI participants are required to grant licenses under their SEPs to implementers of ETSI standards on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND).

In 2007, TCL obtained a 7-year license under Ericsson’s patents covering ETSI’s 2G standards.  In 2011, the parties began to negotiate a license under Ericsson’s 3G SEPs, and in 2013, these negotiations expanded to include Ericsson’s 4G SEPs. Over the next several years, the parties were unable to reach agreement on the terms of this license, and during the course of negotiations, Ericsson sued TCL for infringement of its SEPs in six non-U.S. jurisdictions.  In March 2014, prior to the expiration of TCL’s 2G license, TCL filed an action in the Central District of California seeking a judicial declaration that Ericsson breached its obligation to offer TCL a license on FRAND terms.  TCL agreed to abide by the court’s determination of FRAND terms for a worldwide license under Ericsson’s 2G, 3G and 4G SEPs (slip op. at p.9).  Partially based on this assurance, in June 2015 the court entered an “anti-suit injunction” against Ericsson, prohibiting it from pursuing further infringement litigation against TCL until the resolution of the FRAND issues (I discuss TCL’s anti-suit injunction here). The court ruled that the nature of TCL’s claims was equitable (p.8), making it suitable for judicial (rather than jury) determination, and a 10-day bench trial was held in early 2017.  The court’s decision was rendered in November 2017, and a public version was released in December 2017 in which certain competitive information was redacted.

FRAND Royalties

Numerous U.S. cases have made clear that a FRAND royalty must be “premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology … [so that] the royalty award is based on the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the product, not any value added by the standardization of that technology” (p. 108, quoting Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1232-33 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).  Unlike the recent UK decision in Unwired Planet v. Huawei ([2017] EWHC 711 (Pat), 5 Apr. 2017] (which I discuss here and here), which held that there is but a single FRAND rate applicable to any given set of parties and SEPs ((¶804(4)), Judge Selna in TCL v. Ericsson holds that there is no single FRAND rate (p. 109).

Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Royalty Calculations

There are two general schools of thought regarding the calculation of SEP royalties subject to FRAND commitments: bottom-up and top-down.  “Bottom-up” approaches attempt to assess the value of asserted SEPs in isolation, using comparable license agreements and other methodologies, but without significant reference to other patents covering the same standard (I critique bottom-up methodologies here and here).  In contrast, top-down approaches first determine the aggregate royalty that should be paid for all SEPs covering a particular standard, and then allocate an appropriate portion of the total to the asserted SEPs (I discuss top-down royalty calculations at length here, as do Norman Siebrasse and Tom Cotter in this recent chapter).

Top-down approaches were used by the UK court in in Unwired Planet and by the Japanese IP High Court in Apple Japan v. Samsung (2014) (both discussed here).  And in November 2017, the European Commission emphasized in its Communication on SEPs that “an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology” (p. 7). However, with the exception of In re. Innovatio IP Ventures (N.D. Ill. 2013), most U.S. courts making FRAND royalty determinations have used bottom-up methodologies heavily dependent on an analysis of comparable licenses (e.g., Microsoft v. Motorola (9^th Cir. 2014), Ericsson v. D-Link (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

In TCL v. Ericsson, Judge Selna largely adopts the top-down methodology proposed by TCL (see below). He notes that the “appeal of a top down approach is that it prevents royalty stacking”, which occurs when individual SEP holders each demand a royalty that, when combined, can be excessive (p.15).

However, the court also notes that top-down methods cannot assess whether the licensor complied with the non-discrimination prong of the FRAND commitment.  Accordingly, Judge Selna undertakes a separate non-discrimination analysis based principally on the review of comparable licenses (discussed below).  He then combines the top-down and comparables approaches to determine the appropriate FRAND royalty rate.

The Aggregate Rate

A top-down royalty calculation methodology has two steps:  determining the aggregate SEP royalty applicable to a standard, then allocating an appropriate portion of the total to the asserted SEPs.  As I have discussed before, the UK and Japanese courts that applied top-down methodologies in FRAND cases based their aggregate rates on public statements made by SEP holders and other market participants.  Judge Selna also adopts this approach, citing various public statements and press releases by Ericsson that support an aggregate royalty of 5% on the 2G and 3G standards and a rate between 6% and 10% on the 4G standard (pp.19-26). While the court acknowledges that this method “is not perfect” (p.25), one of its merits is its dependence on statements made by Ericsson itself to induce the market to adopt standards covered by its own SEPs (p.25) (for a discussion of “market reliance” on FRAND commitments, see this paper).

Allocation of Ericsson’s Proportional Share

Once an aggregate royalty rate for all SEPs covering a standard has been determined, the appropriate portion must be allocated to the SEPs asserted in the case.  In TCL v. Ericsson, this determination involved two contentious steps: determining the total number of SEPs covering each standard (the denominator), then determining Ericsson’s share of those SEPs (the numerator).  The percentage of SEPs held by the SEP holder is the quotient of the numerator divided by the denominator.

Essentiality. It is well known in the literature that many patents declared by their owners as “essential” to a particular standard are, upon closer inspection, not really essential at all (up to 80% in some cases).  This is the problem of “over-declaration”, and it occurs because there is no verification by any third party of the essentiality of patents declared by their owners to be SEPs. As a result, courts considering total royalties attributable to SEPs covering a standard must also consider how many patents are actually essential to the standard.

Optional Portions.   An initial question addressed by the court is whether patents covering optional portions of a standard should be considered “essential” to the standard.  After analyzing the specific language of the ETSI policy, the court concludes that patents covering optional portions of an ETSI standard should not count as SEPs (p.27).

Essentiality Sampling.  Instead of analyzing the essentiality of each patent declared essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G standards, TCL’s experts sampled one-third of the patents covering each standard for each of the fifteen largest patent holders.  Thus, of 7,106 declared patent families covering user equipment, TCL analyzed the essentiality of approximately 2,600 patent families.  After various forms of cross-checking, it determined that a total of 413 patent families were essential to the 2G standard, 1,076 to 3G and 1,673 to 4G (pp.28-29).  Interestingly, it appears that TCL’s experts charged approximately $100 per patent for this analysis (p.30), which is significantly lower than the $10,000 per patent that is generally acknowledged as the cost of essentiality analyses for patent pools (some figures are collected here). One of the reasons for the low cost of TCL’s analysis was that TCL’s experts reviewed only the claims of the examined patents, not the full specifications.  Given that a review of patent specifications could have resulted in additional patents being found non-essential (p.31), the court adjusts the totals downward to arrive at 365 SEPs covering 2G, 953 covering 3G and 1,481 covering 4G (p.32).

Ericsson’s Share.  To compute Ericsson’s share of SEPs covering the relevant standards (the numerator), the parties’ experts determined which of the SEPs already identified would be owned by Ericsson during the term of a 5-year (60-month) license (p. 37).  Under the holding of Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964), which prohibits post-expiration patent royalties, the court eliminates from Ericsson’s total any patents that expired prior to the date of closing arguments (May 18, 2017) (p.36). Interestingly, the court did not require the elimination of expired SEPs from the total number of SEPs (the denominator).  It explained that “[b]ecause the total aggregate royalty represents the value of all expired and unexpired inventions in the standard, … removing an expired SEP from the denominator treats the invention as no longer having value.  The invention however still has value, that value has merely been transferred to the public domain.  To remove expired patents from the denominator (without decreasing the total aggregate royalty) would result in transferring the value from expired inventions to the remaining patents in the standard instead of the public.” (p.36).

Interestingly, while the parties agreed that Ericsson held 12 2G SEPs, they disagreed with respect to the number of 3G and 4G SEPs SEPs held by Ericsson (TCL finding 19.65 3G SEPs and 69.88 4G SEPs, and Ericsson finding 24.65 3G SEPs and 111.51 4G SEPs) (p. 37).  In any event, even using Ericsson’s estimate of approximately 150 SEPs, this is a relatively modest share of the 3,162 patent families essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G standards.

Relative Strength.  TCL argued that Ericsson’s proportionate share should be adjusted based on the relative importance of Ericsson’s SEPs compared to other SEPs covering the standards at issue (pp. 38-40) (this concept was introduced by Judge Robart in Microsoft v. Motorola, in which the court evaluated both the importance of the asserted patents to the standard and the importance of the standard to the overall product).  Though Judge Selna did not accept TCL’s methodology for gauging the importance of Ericsson’s SEPs, it did concede that “Ericsson’s patent portfolio is certainly not as strong or essential as it has claimed” (p. 43).

Geographical Variance

The court recognized that Ericsson’s patent strength was greatest in the U.S. and therefor determined that a discount rate should be applied to Ericsson’s FRAND royalty outside of the U.S.  It reasoned that “a global patent rate that does not account for differences in national patent strength provides the SEP owner a royalty based on features that are unpatented in many jurisdictions” (p. 44). For the sake of simplicity, the court divided the world into three regions: U.S., Europe and Rest of World (ROW) and established precise discounts for non-U.S. regions for each standard (e.g., for ROW, Ericsson’s 2G value share is 54.9% of the U.S. value)  (p. 45). This approach is significantly more fine-grained than that taken by the UK court in Unwired Planet, which divided the world into just two categories: Major Markets (U.S., Japan, Korea, India and several European countries) and all other countries, including China.  The FRAND rate for non-Major Market countries was simply 50% of the Major Market rate.

Violation of “Fair and Reasonable” Prong of FRAND

Even though the court does not accept each of TCL’s methodological steps in its top-down royalty analysis, the court finds, on the basis of those portions of the analysis that it accepts, that Ericsson’s offers to TCL are not “fair and reasonable” under its ETSI FRAND commitment.

Non-Discrimination

The court next analyzes whether Ericsson’s offers to TCL complied with the non-discrimination prong of its FRAND commitment.

Similarly Situated. As noted above, a FRAND license must be non-discriminatory.  This means that the licensor must not discriminate against similarly-situated licensees (p. 54). In TCL v. Ericsson, the court undertakes the most detailed analysis to-date to identify which firms are similarly situated with the potential licensee.  First, it concludes that the basis for comparison must be “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market” [for telecommunications products] (p. 56).  The court expressly excludes from this group “local kings” – firms that sell most of their products in a single country (e.g., India’s Karbonn and China’s Coolpad) (p. 59).  The firms that the court finds to be similarly situated to TCL are Apple, Samsung, Huawei, LG, HTC and ZTE (p. 58). Ericsson argued that Apple and Samsung are not similar to TCL given their greater market shares and brand recognition, but the court rejects that argument, reasoning that “the prohibition on discrimination would mean very little if the largest, most profitable firms could always be a category unto themselves simply because they were the largest and most profitable firms” (p. 61).

 The court found Ericsson’s licenses to Apple and Huawei to be suitable benchmarks for comparison to its offers to TCL (p. 91).  This conclusion is critical, because it establishes that low end vendors like TCL will be compared with high end vendors like Apple as to FRAND rates, giving low end vendors the benefit of favorable rate packages that high end vendors have been able to negotiate with respect to far more expensive products.

Competitive Harm.  Ericsson argued that in order for an instance of discrimination to violate Ericsson’s FRAND commitment, it must have the effect of “impairing the development of standards” (p. 91).  A similar systemic approach was taken in Unwired Planet, in which the UK court held that a violation of FRAND would not arise unless discriminatory treatment of licensees would “distort competition” (¶501). Judge Selna in TCL v. Ericsson takes a different view, holding instead that  discrimination in violation of a FRAND commitment can be found so long as an individual firm is harmed.  He expressly rejects the application of an antitrust-based standard, which requires harm to competition rather than harm to a competitor, to the analysis of a FRAND commitment (p. 91).

Comparison to Ericsson’s Offers. Though the options offered by Ericsson were complex and involved both lump sum payments and royalty floors within certain ranges (making them difficult to compare to other licenses), the court estimated that under one option, Ericsson’s offer to TCL translated to a running royalty on handsets of approximately 1% for 2G, 3G and 4G, and under another option 0.8% – 1.0% for 2G, 1.2% for 3G and 1.5% for 4G with a $2.00 per unit floor and a $4.50 per unit cap (p. 90).  The royalty floor proposed by Ericsson was apparently intended to address TCL’s low selling price for handsets, so that Ericsson would receive an assured royalty stream no matter how cheaply TCL priced its handsets.  Slightly different royalty schedules were proposed for external modems (p.90).

Discrimination.  Based on this analysis, the court holds that Ericsson’s offers to TCL “are radically divergent from the rates which Ericsson agreed to accept from licensees similarly situated to TCL” and that Ericsson’s offers to TCL were therefore discriminatory and noncompliant with its FRAND obligations (p. 94). In particular, the court holds that Ericsson’s proposed “floor” on royalties payable by TCL was discriminatory (p. 113).  This being said, the court also finds that Ericsson negotiated in good faith and that its conduct during the negotiations did not violate its FRAND obligations (p. 3).

Having concluded that Ericsson’s offers to TCL were not FRAND, the court proceeds to determine a FRAND rate for TCL’s desired license. It does so using a combination of the top-down rates derived above, as well as the comparable licenses reviewed in its non-discrimination analysis.  Below is a table containing the court’s final determination of FRAND rates for the different standards and geographic regions at issue (p. 104):

Royalty Base and SSPPU?  It is notable that the court’s decision in TCL v. Ericsson does not discuss the often contentious issue of the appropriate royalty “base” for TCL’s products – the figure against which the percentage royalty is applied.  As explained in cases such as Ericsson v. D-Link, parties often disagree whether the SEP holder’s royalty should be applied against a component (e.g., a chip) embodying the standardized technology or against an end user product such as a smart phone.  If the percentage royalty rate is not adjusted, the choice of the royalty base could result in radically different payments to the SEP holder. This concern has led to debates over the appropriateness of using constructs such as the “smallest salable patent practicing unit” (SSPPU) as the royalty base.  I understand that this debate was largely avoided in this case because TCL conceded that the royalty would be charged against the selling price of its handset units.

Holding and Conclusions

On the basis of these findings, the court prescribes that the parties enter into a 5-year license agreement reflecting the FRAND rates described above (p. 115).  In addition, TCL must pay Ericsson approximately $16.5 million for past unlicensed sales.

While the outcome of this case will likely make it easier for firms such as TCL to compete in the U.S. and other major markets, it also establishes several important guideposts for future FRAND license negotiations. First, the case establishes that, for non-discrimination purposes, even low end vendors like TCL will be considered “similarly situated” to high end vendors like Apple, giving them the benefit of the rates that high end vendors negotiate with SEP holders for much more expensive products.  Equally importantly, it highlights the growing predominance of top-down royalty calculation methodologies for FRAND licenses.

University of Maryland Biotech Institute v. Presens Precision Sensing (Fed. Cir. 2017)

In a non-precedential decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the USPTO handling of the inter partes reexamination of Maryland’s U.S. patent No. 6,673,532. The examiner rejected claims 1, 3– 6, 9–11, 13–16, 19, and 20 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  That determination was affirmed by the PTAB and now by the Federal Circuit.

Note, the inter partes reexamination was filed in 2011 and at that time Maryland did not challenge the process on Eleventh Amendment Immunity grounds.  However, the same patent was challenged in an Inter Partes Review (IPR) in 2016 and the PTAB recently dismissed the petition on sovereign immunity grounds. [IPR2016-00208 28 – Termination – Dismissed After Institution].  In the appeal, Maryland did not raise the issue.

Here, the patent covers growing cells in a cultivation vessel that includes various LEDs and light sensors.   This process can be used to make several non-invasive observations, including oxygen level, optic density, pH, etc.

The prior art rejection combined two references.  One of which taught what was claimed – certain sensors within the cultivation vessels themselves – and the other reference disclosing the sensors “located in individual flow-through units outside the cultivation vessel.”  The second reference was needed though to complete the obviousness analysis.

On appeal, the patentee argued that combining the references was not proper because of the two different vessel configurations.   The Federal circuit rejected that approach – holding that PHOSITA is “not an automaton . . . limited to physically combining references.”  While a court may ask whether “substantial reconstruction and redesign” would be necessary to combine the references.  However, as KSR demands, “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”

Obviousness affirmed

= = = = =

As an aside, patent law may do well to move-on from the automaton language.  Nobody knows what an automaton really is — does someone have one they can show me? How does an automaton compare with contemporary AI?

The University College of London (UCL) Institute of Brand and Innovation Law and George Washington University’s Faculty of Law are holding their 3rd Conference on Patents in Telecoms and the Internet of Things, November 9-10 2017 in Washington D.C.  Join Professor Sir Robin Jacob (the Sir Hugh Laddie Chair of Intellectual Property at UCL Laws), Professor Marty Adelman, Dave Kappos, Judge Kathleen O’Malley, and many more.

Register: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/patents-in-telecoms-2017/

The following is a guest post from Ana Santos Rutschman, the Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and IP at DePaul.  I invited Prof Santos Rutschman to write about her work on Vaccine Preparedness and IP. Her new article titled IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases is forthcoming in UCLA Law Review. – DC.

In September 2017, the development of the US Army’s Zika vaccine—once a leading candidate in the Zika vaccine race—came to a halt after almost all federal funding for Zika R&D was cut short. This happened less than a year from the end of the global public health emergency. Funding will now resume only if the Zika epidemic re-emerges.

That R&D on diseases like Zika is not attractive to pharmaceutical companies is a well-known phenomenon. It usually takes a major public health crisis to shake up the playing field. With Ebola, for instance, funding for R&D increased 258% in 2015. The Zika outbreak had the same effect, and so will future outbreaks of similar diseases.

But funding spikes triggered by outbreaks are short-lived. They fuel an accelerated R&D race, with multiple pharmaceutical companies and research institutions jumping in. As soon as the fear factor begins to decline, so does the support for R&D. The looming possibility of another outbreak guarantees that some drug development will still occur, but only at a residual level.

The relationship between outbreaks and R&D funding has long been a feature of our vaccine development cycles—from diphtheria and polio in the 1920s and 1950s to Ebola and Zika more recently. But Zika is teaching us something new about the role of IP in the development of vaccines through outbreak-spiked funding: we need to look at IP well beyond the realm of patents operating as incentives to prospective R&D players. Transfers of IP rights between R&D entities, if poorly designed, can hinder the development and the availability of new vaccines (and of drugs in general).

We are seeing the consequences of such a bad licensing deal right now. The Army’s Zika vaccine was once considered a top candidate in the Zika vaccine race. Its initial development was supported during the early stages of the outbreak by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), an office under the umbrella of the Department of Health and Human Services. In 2016, the Army brought in a private-sector company, Sanofi, to help with the clinical development of the vaccine. Shortly thereafter BARDA awarded the company $43.2 million for phase II clinical trials. Then, in late 2016, the Army announced that it intended to license the vaccine to Sanofi on an exclusive basis.

Two provisional patents covered the Army’s vaccine—one encompassing methods of production, and another encompassing methods of preparation. Having been developed through government funding, the vaccine is subject to §207-§209 of the Patent Act, which regulate the transfer of federally owned inventions. §207 allows an agency to grant both exclusive and non-exclusive licenses. §209, however, establishes that an agency can only grant an exclusive license if exclusivity is “a reasonable and necessary incentive” to bring the innovation to the public. The fact that Sanofi had already received a substantial amount of government money to develop the vaccine makes it doubtful that exclusivity was needed in this case.

Even more troubling was the fact that, when prompted to disclose the main terms of the license, the Army indicated that no pricing provisions had been agreed upon with Sanofi. Exclusive licenses, per §209, must “promote the invention’s utilization by the public.” The lack of an affordable pricing clause, or of tiered pricing categories, seems to be at odds with this goal. Sanofi, incidentally, has a record of drug overcharging, having recently paid $19.8 million to resolve claims brought by the Department of Veterans Affairs with regard to two different contracts.

Now that federal funding for Zika R&D is over, the problems posed by the existence of a sole licensee become more acute. Even with last year’s $43.2 million boost in federal funding, Sanofi has chosen to stop all work on the vaccine. Meanwhile, several competitors across the globe keep developing other candidates. But the damage is done. All the outbreak-induced R&D at the Army is put to simmer and won’t likely be rekindled until there is a new outbreak (at which point, for all we know, the Zika virus might have mutated and the Army’s vaccine technology rendered ineffective). All the money poured into this project—including the portion of federal funding that subsidized Sanofi’s R&D—will yield no vaccine to help prevent the next outbreak.

Over the past few years, I have been studying IP inefficiencies in the context of outbreaks and outbreak-spiked vaccine R&D. The case of the Zika vaccine is not unique, but rather emblematic of the current lack of IP preparedness to support the development of drugs for outbreak diseases. Much in the same way that health systems struggle to cope with outbreaks, our IP regime works poorly when it comes to making the most out of the R&D funding brought about by an outbreak. As a consequence, we will miss out on vaccines and life-saving drugs before other public health crises arise.

Now that we are seemingly in an inter-outbreak period, it would be timely to address these problems. Here are a few simple solutions to the licensing problem: we can create a limited list of diseases that are ineligible for §207 exclusivity (with neglected tropical diseases coming immediately to mind); we should amend the disclosure requirements in §209 and have agencies disclose all terms of proposed licenses involving federally funded vaccines; and we should make the incorporation of pricing provisions mandatory in §209 exclusive licenses (at least for outbreak-related technologies).

Oil States v. Greene’s Energy (Supreme Court 2017)

Briefing continues in the Oil States constitutional challenge to the IPR System.  Amicus briefs supporting either the petitioner or neither party were due August 31 with at least 31 filings –  Respondents’ brief (both Greene’s Energy and USPTO) will be due October 23 with supporting amicus shortly thereafter.

• Petitioner Merits Brief [Brief][Discussion of Brief]
• Amicus in Support of Petitioner
  • Alliacense (N.Heller) [Brief][Discussion of Brief]
  • Grass Root Inventors (R.Greenspoon) [Brief]
  • 27 Law Professors (Mossoff) [Brief]
  • CATO Institute [Brief]
  • Affected Patent Owners [Brief]
  • Eagle Forum [Brief]
  • Unisone Strategic IP [Brief]
  • Security People [Brief]
  • Abbvie [Brief]
  • BIO and AUTM [Brief]
  • Blackwell [Brief]
  • Karshtedt [Brief]
  • Evolutionary Intelligence [Brief]
  • Gary Lauder [Brief]
  • IEEE-USA [Brief]
  • InterDigital [Brief]
  • Liquid Power [Brief]
  • Pacific Legal and Private Property Interest Groups [Brief]
  • PhRMA [Brief]
  • Prof. Ely [Brief]
  • UNM [Brief]

• Amicus in Support of Neither Party
  • Gomez-Arostegui [Brief][Discussion of Brief]
  • Association of Amicus Cousel [Brief]
  • NYU Civil Jury Project [Brief] (Important Brief by Chemerinsky)
  • IPO [Brief] (Patents are private rights)
  • Shire Pharma [Brief]  (IPRs harm the biotech industry)
  • 3M [Brief] (ending IPRs won’t harm the patent system)
  • AIPLA [Brief] (IPR system is OK; although property, patents are public rights for the Article III analysis)
  • BPLA (Boston) [Brief] (IPRs serve an important goal) 
  • PTAB Assn [Brief] (IPR “Benefits all parties”)
  • IPLAC (Chicago) [Brief] (Patents issued after AIA might be treated differently than those issued before-hand) 
• Petitions-stage Briefs
  • 16-712-petition
  • 16-712-respondents-BIO
  • 16-712-Reply-Brief-for-Petitioner
  • 16-712-Government-BIO
  • 16-712-Reply-to-Federal-Respondent

I have not reviewed all of these these briefs, yet, but have a few notes above.  As expected, the vast majority of these top-side briefs support the petitioner. I have highlighted above the few briefs, including that by AIPLA, that support keeping the current system.

by Dennis Crouch

Nidec Motor v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor (Fed. Cir. 2017)

Serial Filings: Important statement here from the Court against allowing a PTAB IPR patent challenger to continue to file additional IPR petitions after the 1-year deadline of 315(b) via the joinder process of 315(c); and also against stacking of PTAB Board to achieve particular results on rehearing.  The court’s statement though is entirely dicta – it actually affirmed the PTAB decision here where these actions occurred. 

On appeal in this case is the PTAB’s cancellation of the claims of Nidec’s Patent No. 7,626,349.  The patent covers an HVAC with an improved motor controller that uses sinus-wave powering (rather than square-waves) for reduced noise.

In September 2013, Nidec sued Broad Ocean for infringement and Broad Ocean followed with an IPR petition in July 2014 (within the one-year deadline).  The Board (acting on behalf of the PTO Director) partially instituted the IPR – but denied on the grounds relating to a Japanese Publication since Broad Ocean had attested to the translation accuracy.  In February 2015 (a month after the original petition decision), Broad Ocean filed a second petition – this one including the required affidavit.

The PTAB originally denied the new petition – holding that it was filed after the 1-year statutory deadline following the lawsuit initiation. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  That original panel decision was split, with Judges Wood and Boucher in the majority, and Tartal in dissent.  Tartal argued that the late-filing should be allowed to be joined (under § 315(c)) to the original IPR proceeding in a way that avoided the 1-year filing deadline.    Statutes at issue:

315 (b)Patent Owner’s Action.— An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner … is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).

315 (c) Joinder.— If the Director institutes an [IPR], the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director … determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.

On the rehearing, the PTAB Chief (acting on behalf of the PTO Director) shuffled the Board seemingly to change the result – adding two additional judges – Medley and Arbes – with the result that the dissenting opinion became the majority who offered an interesting explanation of the statute.  Section 315(c) textually appears to focus on joinder of additional people.  However, the text actually allows for “joinder of any person” – and according to the majority that should be interpreted to allow the “same person” to join himself to his prior filing (and in the process bring-along additional claims).

§ 315(c) permits the joinder of any person who properly files a petition under § 311, including a petitioner who is already a party to the earlier instituted [IPR]. We also conclude that § 315(c) encompasses both party joinder and issue joinder, and, as such, permits joinder of issues, including new grounds of unpatentability, presented in the petition that accompanies the request for joinder.

After joinder, the Board went on to find the challenged claims obvious (based upon challenges instituted in the original petition) and anticipated (based upon challenges in the second petition)

Unfortunately for the appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that it “need not resolve” the joinder issue because the obviousness finding were proper and were based upon the original petition.

Because there is no dispute that Broad Ocean timely filed the First Petition (containing the obviousness ground), the issues on appeal relating only to the Board’s joinder determination as to anticipation ultimately do not affect the outcome of this case

The court opinion affirming obviousness was written per curiam. An important concurring opinion was filed by Judge Dyk and joined by Judge Wallach suggesting that the PTAB’s joinder decision is wrong and that stacking of panels is problematic.  The opinion’s designation as concurring appears to be an implicit recognition that the additional opinion is dicta.

They write:

[W]e write separately to express our concerns as to the [PTO] position on joinder and expanded panels since those issues are likely to recur. Although we do not decide the issues here, we have serious questions as to the Board’s (and the Director’s) interpretation of the relevant statutes and current practices. . . .

The issue in this case is whether the time bar provision allows a time-barred petitioner to add new issues, rather than simply belatedly joining a proceeding as a new party, to an otherwise timely proceeding. Section 315(c) does not explicitly allow this practice. We think it unlikely that Congress intended that petitioners could employ the joinder provision to circumvent the time bar by adding time-barred issues to an otherwise timely proceeding, whether the petitioner seeking to add new issues is the same party that brought the timely proceeding, as in this case, or the petitioner is a new party. . . .

Second, we are also concerned about the PTO’s practice of expanding administrative panels to decide requests for rehearing in order to “secure and maintain uniformity of the Board’s decisions.” . . .

[Although t]he Director represents that the PTO “is not directing individual judges to decide cases in a certain way”[,] we question whether the practice of expanding panels where the PTO is dissatisfied with a panel’s earlier decision is the appropriate mechanism of achieving the desired uniformity.

Part of the reason why this is all dicta is that the PTO Director’s decision whether or not to initiate proceedings is – by statute – not appealable.