USPTO Discontinues Accelerated Examination Program for Utility Applications (Design Patent Rocket Docket is also Suspended)

by Dennis Crouch

The USPTO is discontinuing its Accelerated Examination program on July 10, 2025.  The program has received fewer than 100 petitions in recent years, compared with 10,000+ Track One prioritized examination requests.  The USPTO anticipates further raising the annual limit on Track One requests in 2025.  The USPTO also recently terminated the Climate Change Mitigation Pilot Program on January 28, 2025. See Discontinuation of the Accelerated Examination Program for Utility Applications, 90 Fed. Reg. 24324 (June 10, 2025).

The Accelerated Examination program allowed applicants to advance their applications out of turn by filing a petition to make special along with a pre-examination search and examination support document.  The program was designed to provide expedited examination for applicants willing to invest significant effort in preparing detailed examination support materials, including prior art searches and claim charts mapping the prior art to each pending claim.  However, the program’s popularity plummeted following the introduction of Track One prioritized examination in 2011.  Unlike Accelerated Examination, Track One requires only payment of a fee—currently $4,200 for large entities—without the burden of preparing examination support documents or conducting pre-examination searches. (more…)

Prosecution Laches from Woodbridge to Sonos: A 170-Year Continuation?

By Dennis Crouch,

I did a double-take earlier this week as I read the 1923 Supreme Court case of Woodbridge v. U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 44 S.Ct. 45. Although the case was decided after WWI, the facts center on a cannon projectile patent originally filed in 1852 – well before the U.S. Civil War.  The 70 year saga involved the inventor’s prolonged quest for a patent (and later for compensation). The Supreme Court’s ultimate decision, delivered by the former U.S. President and Chief Justice Taft, planted the seeds for what we now call prosecution laches – the equitable doctrine barring patents obtained after unreasonable, prejudicial delay in prosecution.


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Cert Petition Preview: Federal Circuit’s Broad Reading of TrafFix in CeramTec

by Dennis Crouch

CeramTec GmbH v. CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC, (formerly known as C5 Medical Werks, LLC)

CeramTec GmbH has requested a 30-day extension to file a petition for certiorari in its dispute with CoorsTek Bioceramics LLC over pink ceramic hip implants, setting up what could be a significant Supreme Court review of the intersection between expired utility patents and trademark protection. The case presents a fairly clean vehicle for resolving a circuit split over the proper interpretation of TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).

In TrafFix, the Court held that when features are claimed in an (expired) utility patent, this constitutes "strong evidence" that those claimed features are functional and thus ineligible for trademark protection. In CeramTec, the Federal Circuit took this holding a step further -- holding that a feature (pink coloration) that could result from practicing an expired patent was presumptively functional, regardless of whether the patent actually teaches advantages for that specific feature.


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SCOTUS: Pairing RADesign’s Discovery Rule with Jem’s Laches Defense

by Dennis Crouch

The Supreme Court has rescheduled its consideration of the copyright statute of limitations petition in RADesign v. Michael Grecco (No. 24-768), moving the conference from May 29, 2025, to June 5, 2025. This delay appears strategic, as the Court has simultaneously distributed for the same June 5 conference another intellectual property limitations case: Jem Accessories, Inc. v. Harman International Industries, Inc. (No. 24-1011), which presents questions about laches in trademark law.  Both of these cases are sparked by prior statute of limitations cases - particularly the two laches cases of Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014) (copyright) and SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. 328 (2017) (patent) alongside the 2024 SOL case of Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. ___ (2024).

The pairing of these cases suggests the Court may be considering extending its trans-doctrinal approach to limitations and laches doctrines across intellectual property law. Both petitions raise basic questions about when rights holders must act to preserve their claims, though they approach the issue from different statutory frameworks.


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Maintaining a Speedy and Robust IPR Process Should Be a Major Focus of John Squires’ Patent Quality Efforts

Guest Post by Shawn Miller, Professor of Practice, University of San Diego School of Law; CodeX Fellow, Stanford Law School; Creator, Stanford NPE Litigation Database

Just a week ago, I began dusting off the half-written paper drafts of two empirical research projects that have mostly sat on my shelf the past year while teaching an overload to aid my colleagues on sabbatical. Brushing up on current events at the USPTO, it is clear that neither patent policy stakeholders nor the second Trump administration waited around for this law professor’s summer break. We have seen several months of the very active Acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart’s reshaping of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB’s”) process of reviewing Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) petitions, particularly in ways that tend to favor patent owners. Additionally, within the past two weeks we have had the Judiciary Committee Hearing of John Squires, the President’s nominee to serve as his permanent USPTO Director.

It seems likely that Squires will be confirmed soon and begin to act on the priorities he outlined at his hearing, two of which just so happen to overlap the topics of the two projects I am scrambling to complete this summer: patent quality and IPR reform. With my slow writing pace and the clear indications that the “reform” the administration has in mind would actually tend to harm patent quality when and where it matters, I asked—and Professor Crouch graciously agreed—to publish this guest post.

To start, what is patent quality? Put simply, it is the likelihood that a granted patent meets all of the statutory requirements for protection. In other words, low quality patents are likely invalid. Different stakeholders naturally emphasize different aspects of patent quality; for instance patent owners might prioritize breadth sufficient to cover potential infringing products or claim sets robust enough to survive validity challenges. In my own research, I have focused on novelty and non-obviousness because granted patents lacking these traits are usually devoid of innovation, and promoting new technology is the primary objective for granting inventors exclusive rights in the first place. I qualify patent quality with “likelihood” because it makes sense to think of inventors’ rights as probabilistic and contingent on unknown or misunderstood information (e.g., prior art) that supports or casts doubt on the validity of the claimed matter down the road when a granted patent is tested during enforcement. (more…)

Injury vs. Discovery: The Goldilocks Problem and Copyright’s Statute of Limitations

by Dennis Crouch & Tim Knight

The Supreme Court will hold its conference on May 29, 2025, to decide whether to grant certiorari in RADesign, Inc. v. Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (No. 24-768), a case that could fundamentally reshape how copyright’s three-year statute of limitations operates. The petition, which has attracted significant attention from copyright scholars and practitioners, presents a deceptively simple question with profound implications: whether a copyright infringement claim “accrues” when the infringement occurs (the “injury rule”) or when the copyright holder discovers or reasonably should have discovered the infringement (the “discovery rule”).  Although the circuit courts all appear to agree that some form of a discovery rule should persist, we believe the deeper question is the rule’s form.  We believe in this case that the district court offered the better approach by permitting the discovery rule, but only after taking a contextual approach requiring reasonable diligence that considers the copyright holder’s circumstances while maintaining meaningful protections against fraudulent concealment.

Michael Grecco, a professional photographer, took photographs of model Amber Rose in 2017, wearing shoes designed by Ruthie Davis. Grecco alleges that Davis’s company, RADesign, reposted some of these photos on its website and social media platforms without authorization.  Although the photos were posted in 2017. Grecco claims he did not discover this infringement until February 2021 and filed suit in October 2021, four years after the alleged infringement began but less than one year after his claimed discovery.

The copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), requires any lawsuit be filed “within three years after the claim accrued,” and RADesign moved to dismiss the case as time-barred since it was filed four years after the infringing acts. The district court agreed, although it did consider whether to extend the statute of limitations based upon the copyright holder’s delay in discovering the infringement.  Applying a “reasonable diligence” standard, the court concluded that someone in Grecco’s position—specifically, a sophisticated copyright holder with extensive enforcement experience—should have discovered the infringement within the three-year limitations period.  This sophistication includes the filing of 100+ copyright infringement actions. Grecco’s own complaint touted his extensive history of actively policing infringements and litigation, making late discovery implausible under those specific circumstances.

On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the discovery rule uniformly determines when copyright claims accrue, irrespective of a plaintiff’s sophistication or enforcement history. According to the panel, there is no special diligence standard for sophisticated plaintiffs; instead, the discovery rule must be applied objectively, uniformly, and without presumptions. Since the complaint itself did not conclusively show that Grecco should have discovered the infringement earlier, the Second Circuit reinstated the suit.  One takeaway from the Second Circuit decision is that it creates the anomalous result where undercapitalized first-time participants with no legal experience or monitoring capabilities are asked to conduct the same level of monitoring as the  largest, most sophisticated copyright holder with vast monitoring resources.  We think this is wrong.  To be clear, we are not necessarily arguing for two different standards, but rather an approach that places the reasonableness within the factual context – what would have been reasonable for the copyright holder to do in the given situation.

Further, the objective standard adopted by the Second Circuit is not in the spirit of the discovery rule. The core of the discovery rule is based on a known or should have known standard. While there may be a debate on the requisite level of monitoring diligence by the copyright holder, the Second Circuit essentially eliminates this standard. Rather, the appellate court’s opinion more effectively reduces the discovery rule to merely a knowledge standard.

RADesign’s pending Supreme Court petition challenges the Second Circuit’s interpretation and presents the following question: Does a copyright infringement claim accrue when the infringement occurs (injury rule) or when the infringement is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered (discovery rule)? The petition is set for conference on May 29, 2025, with extensive briefing and amici participation already completed. This includes an excellent amicus brief from Prof. Tyler Ochoa.  Although the circuit courts appear to be continuing to maintain a discovery rule in copyright cases, Justice Gorsuch’s 2024 dissent in Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy argued strongly against the discovery rule as inconsistent with the statutory text and traditional limitations principles. (more…)

An IDS is Now the Best Defense Against IPRs: Ecto World v. RAI

by Dennis Crouch

In a significant development for PTAB practice, Acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart has issued a precedential decision that conclusively establishes IDS-cited art as grounds for discretionary denial while creating a narrow exception for "mega-IDSs." Ecto World, LLC v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc, IPR2024-01280_paper_13_20250519. The case places a burden on petitioners to demonstrate examiner error in situations where the ground for the IPR petition relies upon art that had been formally considered by the examiner during original prosecution.

This decision comes amid Stewart's broader transformation of PTAB practice since early 2025, characterized by the rescission of prior guidance limiting discretionary denials, the introduction of bifurcated review processes separating discretionary decisions from merits analysis, and the Director's personal involvement in discretionary determinations. The cumulative effect signals a decisive shift toward a more patent-owner friendly posture at the USPTO, with IPR institution rates reportedly dropping significantly over the past two months.


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Transformative Changes: Copyright Leadership Dismissed as AI Report Questions Industry Practices

by Dennis Crouch

The copyright world experienced a major shift in May 2025 with the abrupt dismissal of Dr. Carla Hayden (Librarian of Congress), followed by the release of a landmark U.S. Copyright Office report on AI training that concluded many current industry practices likely do not qualify as fair use, and culminating in the firing of Shira Perlmutter (Register of Copyrights) just after the report's publication.  This drama  is not a resolution of the legal question, but rather seems to intensify and further politicize the debates over whether AI developers must seek permission and pay for the copyrighted works they use to train their systems.  As the report's opening paragraphs explain: "The stakes are high, and the consequences are often described in existential terms."

The report released last week in "pre-publication" form, titled "Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 3: Generative AI Training," is the latest installment in the Copyright Office's attempt at comprehensive examination of AI's intersection with copyright law. AI training often requires uploading of entire copyrighted works into the systems, and so is easily categorized as prima facie copyright infringement -- absent a license or fair use excuse.  The 100+ page report offers a nuanced analysis, but ultimately suggests that in many situations the use will not be fair use.

The quick release of this report appears to have circumvented folks in leadership outside of the Office. Although it has not formal legal weight, courts are likely to consider its reasoning as persuasive authority as they decide the dozens of AI training copyright cases currently pending.

Update: Todd Blanche and Paul Perkins have been tapped by President Trump to be acting Librarian of Congress and Copyright Registrar, respectively.  Todd Blanche, recently appointed as Deputy Attorney General at DOJ has spent the past two decades litigating fraud and corruption issues, either as a prosecutor or for the defense.  Most recently, Blanche was defense attorney during a 2024 New York criminal trial, which resulted in Trump’s conviction on 34 felony counts.  Perkins has been with DOJ since 2016, and is an Associate Deputy Attorney General. Perkins spouse, Hilary Perkins was tapped earlier this year to be chief counsel for the Food and Drug Administration. However, Senator Josh Hawley forced her removal with arguments that she was pro-abortion. 


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Color Mark Denial on Dark Green Medical Gloves

by Dennis Crouch

Although the Supreme Court permits color itself to serve as a trademark, the cases have generally not been strongly supportive. The Federal Circuit's recent decision on green medical examination gloves fits this standard like a ... glove. In re PT Medisafe Technologies (Fed. Cir. April 29, 2025). The decision particularly focuses on color mark genericness, holding that the dark green color for chloroprene medical examination gloves was "so common in the industry that it cannot identify a single source."


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Soto v. US: Will the Court Require Congress to Say the “Magic Words?”

By Dennis Crouch

Although most of our fare is IP related, I have also been keeping an eye on other Federal Circuit cases.  On April 28, 2025, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in  one of those, Soto v. US, a case could significantly impact thousands of combat-disabled veterans seeking retroactive benefits. The Court will decide whether veterans can receive full retroactive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) payments or are instead limited to six years of backpay under the federal Barring Act.

Background: Marine veteran Simon Soto served in Mortuary Affairs during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he retrieved fallen service members, often under combat conditions. This obviously stressful assignment led to severe PTSD, resulting in his medical retirement in 2006. In December 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs rated him 100% disabled due to combat-related PTSD, which qualified him for CRSC under a 2008 program expansion that opened benefits to all medically retired veterans with combat-related disabilities.

However, Soto did not apply for these benefits until 2016, approximately eight years after becoming eligible. While the Navy approved his claim, it only provided retroactive payments dating back six years (to December 2010), citing the six year statute of limitations found in the "Barring Act." 31 U.S.C. § 3702.  Soto argues that the CRSC statute itself (10 U.S.C. § 1413a) contains its own settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act's time limitation.  The Barring Act provides "authority to settle claims" against the U.S. Government, and particularly identifies a settlement process with the six-year statute of limitations to be used "except as provided [by] another law."  The question then is whether the CRSC statute does, in fact, provide, alternative settlement authority.  The basic problem is that the CRSC statute does not expressly state that it is providing "settlement" authority and it contains no statute of limitations.  On this second point, Soto suggests that the absence of a SOL is a feature

As I wrote last November, the Federal Circuit split 2-1 in reversing the district court's ruling in favor of Soto. Judge Todd Hughes, writing for the majority, applied a formalist approach requiring specific statutory language. Hughes concluded that nothing in the CRSC statute expressly supersedes the Barring Act, looking for "magic words" such as specific authorization to "settle" claims or an alternative limitations period.  Judge Jimmie Reyna dissented, advocating for a more functional analysis that would benefit the disabled veterans. Reyna argued that the majority's test was unnecessarily rigid, pointing out that over a century ago, the Supreme Court defined "settle" in this context to simply mean making an administrative determination of the amount of money due on a claim. In his view, the CRSC process unquestionably meets that definition. This divide between Hughes and Reyna reflects a broader philosophical tension I've observed across multiple cases, with Hughes typically adopting a text-focused formalist approach and Reyna favoring a more purposive or justice-oriented analysis that considers practical impacts.


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Seymour’s Shadow: Reviving the Supreme Court’s Standard for Prior Art Enablement

by Dennis Crouch

Pending Supreme Court petition in Converter Manufacturing v. Tekni-Plex (No. 24-866), focuses on the question of who bears the burden of proving whether prior art references enable the claimed invention, and what standard should apply. As far as I can discern, the Federal Circuit's basic approach stems from ex parte patent appeals and has three key elements:

  1. In order to be anticipating, the prior art must enable the claimed invention; and
  2. The party challenging the patent claim has the ultimate burden of proving enablement; BUT
  3. The "proof" is made so much easier by a quite strong presumption that prior art patents and printed publications are enabling.

The court's approach effectively shifts the burden to the patentee to prove non-enablement.  But, it is clear from all the old patent cases that the patent challenger has the burden, not the patentee (particularly once the patent issues). The key case on point here is Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870) along with subsequent Supreme Court precedent in the late 1800s.


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PHOSITA is no Ordinary Person

by Dennis Crouch

In this post, I use the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Sage Products, LLC v. Stewart, Appeal No. 23-1603 (Fed. Cir. April 15, 2025) to delve into the increasingly fictional construct at the center of patent law: the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art (PHOSITA).  In our stories, PHOSITA is typically the antagonist, attempting to undermine our hero, the inventor. PHOSITA didn't invent, but now says that he would have done so if only he were a real boy.  And, the ever-expanding knowledge base imputed to PHOSITA helps justify that claim--while naturally raising concerns about the system's fairness, predictability, and effectiveness.

In this case involving sterilized chlorhexidine products, the court imputed detailed knowledge of British regulatory standards to a U.S.-based innovator—another example of how "ordinary skill" has become anything but ordinary. This decision continues a troubling evolution in which courts attribute unrealistic knowledge and capabilities to the hypothetical PHOSITA, creating an ever-widening gap between this legal fiction and the actual capabilities of real-world mechanics and artisans.


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Judge Shopping vs. Judge Dodging: Federal Circuit Denies SAP’s Transfer Request

by Dennis Crouch

In a precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit has denied SAP's mandamus petition seeking to transfer its patent infringement case from the Marshall Division to the Sherman Division within the Eastern District of Texas -- and also change judges. In re SAP America, Inc., No. 2025-118 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2025).   Although SAP made good arguments in the case, they just were not good enough to overcome the particularly high burdens for transfer and mandamus.

Although it has failed, the bold petition is a continuation of the successful extra-legal campaign that turned Judge Albright's Waco courtroom back into a ghost town. On the legal side, the decision highlights the high bar for obtaining mandamus relief in disputes over convenient venue, particularly for intra-district transfers under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).  The case is also notable as the first Federal Circuit appeal brought by Kathi Vidal since leaving her role as USPTO director and rejoining her old 1,000 attorney firm Winston & Strawn. Matthew Berkowitz (Reichman Jorgensen) and his team successfully defended against the mandamus petition, which the court decided without oral arguments. (I also hope that neither of them are too upset by their ChatGPT image remakes)


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Diamond Art Club Challenges USPTO’s Mass Termination of Chinese-Origin Applications in Federal Court

by Dennis crouch

In October 2024, the USPTO terminated proceedings in approximately 3,100 patent applications due to the fraudulent use of a U.S. practitioner’s signature. The bulk of the applications are Chinese origin filed through Dr. Yu "Mark" Wang, who operated a patent services firm called Wayne and King LLC (W&K). According to USPTO findings, Wang, who was not a registered patent practitioner, used the electronic signature of registered patent agent without her knowledge or consent. Most recently, one of the impacted patentees - Diamond Art Club LLC - filed a lawsuit challenging the the termination based upon "arbitrary and capricious" action by the agency.  In particular, the patent applicant argues that it is being unfairly punished as the victim: "If the misconduct described by the Defendants did in fact occur, Plaintiff was the victim of the misconduct." [DAC Complaint]


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Statutory Text vs. Precedent: Analyzing the AIA’s On-Sale Bar for Secret Processes in Celanese v. ITC

by Dennis Crouch

The pending cert petition in Celanese v. ITC asks whether the sale of products made using a secret process triggers the on-sale bar post-AIA.  In my view, the case sets up a fundamental tension between a straight reading of the statutory text and longstanding precedent.  My bet is on the precedent.

Although Congress has repeatedly tinkered with U.S. patent law over the past several decades, the America Invents Act of 2011 was clearly the most dramatic rewriting of  the law since 1952. The fundamental change to Section 102 was the transition from first-to-invent to first-to-file.   In addition, the law was amended throughout to focus on the "claimed invention" rather than simply the "invention."  This second change is important for the Celanese case.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)  now reads:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.

The AIA also added a definition of the new term, defining "claimed invention" as "the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent." 35 U.S.C. § 100(j).  This heightened specificity was largely downplayed as a clarification that courts were already following. In particular, for anticipation situations courts were already asking whether the asserted prior art disclosed the invention as claimed.

But, one key divergence from this practice involves ...


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Secretary of Commerce Clears House at USPTO Advisory Committees

by Dennis Crouch

In an unprecedented move, the Secretary of Commerce is terminating all current appointments to the Patent Public Advisory Committee (PPAC) and Trademark Public Advisory Committee (TPAC), effectively removing the entire membership of both committees.  New members will apparently be appointed shortly, with the USPTO planning to proceed with previously scheduled public committee meetings in May 2025.  The statute requires that "any vacancy on an Advisory Committee shall be filled within 90 days after it occurs."

Although my memory is sometimes faulty, I believe that this is the first time in the committees' 25 year history that an incoming presidential administration has dismissed all members.  The dismissed PPAC includes Loletta Darde, Earl Bright, Henry Hadad, Lateef Mtima, Marvin J. Slepian, Olivia Tsai, Maria Anderson, Idris McKelvey, and Jennifer Yokoyama.  The last three of these were appointed in January 2025 -- making them immediately suspect to the new administration seeking to make dramatic departures from approaches taken by President Biden's administration.  In general, this group was all put in place under President Biden and  would have likely been a contentious group to deal with -- potentially authoring negative reports and asking difficult questions.

The new committees will be more friendly to the new administration, but my hope is that they will still be able to provide independent guidance and counsel to the USPTO Director. The effectiveness of these advisory committees has always depended on their ability to bring diverse perspectives and constructive criticism to USPTO operations, rather than simply rubber-stamping agency decisions. While political alignment with the administration may facilitate communication, the value here is really derived from member expertise, connection to practice, and willingness to challenge assumptions when necessary.


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President Trump Formally Nominates John Squires as USPTO Director

by Dennis Crouch

President Trump has formally nominated John A. Squires to serve as Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The White House announced the nomination on Tuesday, and the Senate received it on Monday, March 10, referring it to the Committee on the Judiciary. The nomination confirms reporting by Dani Kass at Law360 from mid-February that identified Squires as the likely pick.

Squires currently serves as a partner at Dilworth Paxson LLP and brings substantial intellectual property experience to the role, including a nine-year tenure as Chief IP Counsel at Goldman Sachs (2000-2009). He has particularly focused on emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, blockchain, fintech, and cybersecurity.  In addition though, Squires holds chemistry degree from Bucknell. According to reports, Squires beat out several other candidates for the role, including acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart; Intel's intellectual property policy leader Vishal Amin (who served as IP czar during Trump's first administration); former chief counsel for the Senate subcommittee on IP under Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) Brad Watts; and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP partner Bill Atkins.


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Federal Circuit offers Another Important Expansion of the Domestic Industry Requirement for USITC Jurisdiction

by Dennis Crouch

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC or ITC) operates as an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency the mission of safeguarding US domestic industries from injury caused by foreign imports.  This is a protectionist agency. In the patent context, the ITC exercises its authority under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits the importation of articles that infringe valid U.S. patents. Unlike district courts, the ITC cannot award monetary damages but instead provides exclusion orders that block infringing imports at the border and cease-and-desist orders that prevent domestic sales of previously imported infringing products.  These orders are then enforced by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a branch of Homeland Security.  The ITC is attractive to patent holders because of its relatively expeditious "target date" of 16-18 months from institution to final determination (compared to multi-year district court proceedings), its experienced Administrative Law Judges who frequently handle patent matters, the difficulty respondents face in staying ITC investigations during parallel PTAB trial proceedings, and, as mentioned above, the availability of injunctive relief (via exclusion order) despite eBay.

One measure Congress took to ensure the ensures stays on-mission is through the "domestic industry" requirement.  Before the ITC can block infringing imports, the patent holder must to show the existence of a domestic industry "relating to the articles protected by the patent." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2). This requirement has two components: the "economic prong" and the "technical prong" that we'll dig into later.

When is Transnational Activity Sufficiently Domestic: The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Lashify highlights an ongoing situation with regard to domestic industry.  Lashify, Inc. v. ITC, No. 23-1245 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2025).  Lashify designs its fake eyelash products in the U.S., but manufactures them abroad, and the question is when domestic non-manufacturing activity is enough to satisfy the domestic industry requirement.


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Federal Circuit Upholds ITC Import Ban: Key Rulings on Storage Defense and Domestic Industry Requirements

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit has affirmed a US International Trade Commission (ITC) determination that Wuhan Healthgen violated Section 337 through importation of clinical-grade recombinant human serum albumin (rHSA) products that infringe Ventria Bioscience’s U.S. Patent No. 10,618,951. Wuhan Healthgen Biotechnology Corp. v. International Trade Commission, No. 2023-1389 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2025).

The patentee in the case – Ventria / ExpressTec – is a small biotech company  operating out of Junction City Kansas.  Their asserted patent is directed to a cell culture media containing rHSA produced via plants genetically modified to include the human genes. The albumin is basically a protein food for growing human cells in artificial laboratory environments.  Traditionally, the albumin came from animal sources, such as blood serum, but the plant process has some easy to identify benefits.  A key feature of the patented invention is monomer purity. Ideally, the albumin will be in monomer form as opposed to forming dimers or other aggregated groups, and Ventria’s patent particularly requires “less than 2% aggregated albumin.”

Wuhan Healthgen has been competing in the market by supplying its own version of the product exported from its Chinese production facilities and Ventria took action – in the ITC seeking a trade exclusion order of the infringing product.  The ITC largely sided with the patentee.  In this post, I focus on the domestic industry requirement and particularly how it applies to small innovative US companies. (more…)

Attorney Fees in Copyright Cases, Part II

by Dennis Crouch

WC Realty recently filed a petition for certiorari that builds upon and expands the issues presented in the Property Matters case that I wrote about recently.  Both cases focus on whether a voluntary dismissal of a copyright infringement action under Rule 41(a)(1) bars "prevailing party" status under §505 of the Copyright Act.  Under Section 505, "the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party."   This is almost identical to the Patent Act's fee shifting provision except that patent law limits discretion to "exceptional cases."  35 U.S.C. 285.

The petition presents two distinct but related questions about how voluntary dismissals should be handled under §505 of the Copyright Act. The first question addresses the fundamental threshold issue: whether a defendant can even qualify as a "prevailing party" after a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses under Rule 41(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has created a categorical bar, holding that defendants cannot be prevailing parties without court-ordered dismissal, even when the dismissal is "with prejudice" and precludes refiling. The second question examines how voluntary dismissals should be weighed when courts exercise their discretion to award fees under §505.

Voluntary Dismissals and Attorney Fees

The case arose when Affordable Aerial Photography (AAP) sued WC Realty for copyright infringement over real estate photographs. After WC Realty incurred substantial defense costs, AAP voluntarily dismissed its claims "with prejudice" under Rule 41(a)(1). The district court denied WC Realty's request for attorney's fees, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that WC Realty could not be a "prevailing party" because there was no "judicial action rejecting or rebuffing" AAP's claims.


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