Texas Patent Attorney Shot and Killed.

PatentlyOImage036In a bundle of sad news, it appears that late last week, patent attorney Jackie Duke of Houston shot and killed patent agent Michael Hartmann before killing himself.  Hartmann was an in-house counsel at Cooper Cameron and head of the patents department.  Duke also worked as a consultant for the Cameron patent department. The shooting occurred at Cooper Cameron headquarters in Texas.

Our thoughts and prayers go out to their families, friends, and co-workers.

 

PTO Moves Forward with Nanotechnology Classification

On May 4, 2005, the Patent Office held a Nanotechnology Customer Partnership Meeting as a forum for two-way-feedback on the PTO’s nanotechnology initiatives.  Blaise Moullet attended the meeting and provided background for the following summary:

Searching: A new cross-reference classification (977) will likely include search areas for (i) nanostructures; (ii) computer software for nanostructure modeling; (iii) manufacturing, treatment, or detection of nanostructures; and (iv) specific uses of nanostructures. The new classification system is intended to both ease examination and inform applicants and the public of the ‘state of the art.’

Global: The PTO has provided their proposed schedule to the EPO and JPO and is hoping that it will be adopted by each agency.

Concerns were raised that the PTO does not have specific plans for providing a core group of examiners with expertise in nanotechnology.  There are no definitive plans to form a nanotechnology art unit.

Links:

Rapper Ludacris Provides Ordinary Meaning of Terms

PatentlyOImage035Insurance litigator John Mejia sent in news of Google’s News patent application that ranks news items based on source quality.  (Patently-O is still ranking fairly well in Google’s news listing.)  In his reporting on the topic, Ron Coleman provided the improvement of basing the quality of the source on its political affiliation. Ron also talked about the inherent boring nature of the great patent law blogs.  A non-boring court opinion was recently released in the Seventh Circuit case of US v. Murphy (04–2032).  Although Murphy is a criminal case, it provides some interesting comments regarding the meaning of terms.  Quoting from Footnote 1:

The trial transcript quotes Ms. Hayden as saying Murphy called her a snitch bitch “hoe.” A “hoe,” of course, is a tool used for weeding and gardening. We think the court reporter, unfamiliar with rap music (perhaps thankfully so), misunderstood Hayden’s response. We have taken the liberty of changing “hoe” to “ho,” a staple of rap music vernacular as, for example, when Ludacris raps “You doin’ ho activities with ho tendencies.”

In the future, if the courts needs definitions of other terms that are yet to arrive in Webster’s, they might turn to the Urban Dictionary.

File Attachment: US v. Murphy.pdf (25 KB)

Another Topic Interior Design: We have a very close family friend who is also a talented designer.  Her problem is that she is located in Manhattan, Kansas — a rising senior in the Kansas State University (KSU) interior design department — and is having some trouble finding a summer opportunity.  Any ideas or opportunities? (Shoot me an e-mail and I’ll send you her resume: crouch@mbhb.com). I’ll vouch for her character and fitness (She wrote a song and sang it in my wedding when she was a middle school student).  

Claim Term of “Conventional Computer” Limited to Computers Available as of Patent’s Effective Filing Date

Patentlyoimage034 PC Connector Solutions v. SmartDisk (Fed. Cir. 2005).

PC Connector sued SmartDisk for infringement of its patent directed to the connection of peripherals to a computer via a coupler inserted into the disk drive.  The claims include limitations such as “an input/output port normally connectable to a conventional computer input/output port.”

SmartDisk argued that its flash memory cards could not infringe the patent because, like other terms in the claims, the terms “normally” and “conventional” must be interpreted as referring to technology that existed at the time of the invention.  The district court agreed, finding that there could be no literal infringement because flash memories were not in normally connectable at the time the patent was filed in 1988.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that a claim’s “meaning must be interpreted as of its effective filing date.”  As such, the appellate panel held that SmartDisk did not infringe because “even a casual observer, [the flash memories] cannot be connected to a vintage 1988 computer I/O port that uses a multi-pin connector, there can be no literal infringement.”

Prosecution Tip: Do not use the modifiers such as “normally,” “traditional,” or “conventional” in your claims. Such limitations do not allow you to overcome any prior art but do severely limit the scope of the claims.

Patent Marking: Statute Requires Good Faith Belief that Mark is Properly Applied

PatentlyOImage033Clontech Laboratories v. Invitrogen Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Clontech sued Invitrogen for falsely marking its biologic products. Under 35 U.S.C. Section 292, falsely marking a product with a patent number or even the word “patent” or “patent pending” is an offense if done with the intent of (i) counterfeiting the mark of a patentee or (ii) deceiving the public. The fine is capped at $500 per offense. At the district court, Invitrogen was found liable for false marking.

On appeal, the CAFC panel noted that this case raises “virtually an issue of first impression.”  After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the panel reversed-in-part, finding clear error in the trial court’s finding that certain test results had put Invitrogen on notice of the falsity of its marks relating to reverse transcriptase.

Regarding its cDNA library products, Invitrogen argued that Section 292 “does not require a good faith belief that the marked article falls within the subject matter” of the claims. The CAFC disagreed with that argument, finding that from a policy perspective, marking should be reliable to permit free and fair competition and commerce. Thus, the appellate panel affirmed the district court ruling that the cDNA library products were falsely marked.

 

Eight tips for avoiding unpatentability rejections in Business Method Cases

One of the most interesting presentations at the May 4, 2005 business method partnership meeting was by Bob Weinhardt who is a Business Practice Specialist at the PTO.  Mr. Weinhardt managed the “second pair of eyes” review of allowed applications in the Business Methods art and provided a checklist of common problems that were uncovered in those reviews. Although in my view, some of the PTO’s policies do not conform with the law, Mr. Weinhardt’s comments are quite useful if you want the PTO to allow your cases. I have compiled the presentation into these following eight tips:

1) Specifically call-out a practical application of any claimed algorithms (relate it to the real-world).

2) In method claims, explicitly relate the method to a machine (such as a computer) in the body of the claim.

3) Data per se is not patentable.

4) Non-functional data (as opposed to computer code) stored on a device (such as a computer disk) is not patentable.

5) A claimed computer program per se will be rejected unless it is tangibly embodied on a computer readable medium.

6) For signal claims — the signal must firmly related to a machine or computer readable medium.

7) Don’t try to get a patent on an invention that merely uses the Internet or a computer to do what was previously done by hand.

8) Think about your claims in terms of the broadest reasonable meaning.  The PTO would rather not implicitly import limitations into the claims.

Updated Business Method Patent Statistics

On May 4, 2005, Technology Center Director John Love and his able group of e-commerce patent examiners hosted a well attended partnership meeting to discuss current and upcoming issues in the field.  The meeting is an annual event and provides an excellent opportunity to meet with the leadership on a more informal basis. I want to publicly thank the Director Love, Joe Thomas, and the entire crew for being so helpful and forthright.

In the meetings, Director Love always provides some helpful statistics. Perhaps the most telling number from the most resent event is the 11% allowance rate for FY2004 in class 705.  [Calculated as (allowed)/(allowed + abandoned)].  Although this issue was not raised at the meeting, it is clear from the numbers presented at the meeting that the backlog in the class continues to grow.  By using Director Love’s numbers on allowance, percent allowed, and new filings, I created the following table to demonstrate the continued growth in the backlog of business method cases:

Fiscal Year

Number Allowed

Percent Allowed

Disposed (Abandoned or allowed)

New Filings

Cumulative Backlog

2001

433

45%

        962

      8,700

       7,738

2002

492

26%

      1,892

      6,700

      12,546

2003

495

16%

      3,093

      6,000

      15,453

2004

283

11%

      2,572

      6,300

      19,181

Conclusion: Over the past four years, the backlog has increased dramatically.

Second Pair of Eyes: The business method group instituted a ‘second review’ of business method cases as a quality control measure.  Although still termed “second pair of eyes,” the meaning of the term has changed.  The reality is that the second review is now simply a meeting between the examiner, the primary examiner, and the SPE at which the examiner explains his reasons for allowance.  This process will hopefully payoff by helping to reduce the backlog.  Perhaps partly due to this new procedure, allowed cases for FY2005 in Class 705 are projected to shoot over 700.

Links:

 

Blade Wars: Gillette Wins Latest Round in Multi-Blade Razor Patent Litigation

PatentlyOImage032

Gillette’s patent disclosing a three-blade razor also covers a four-blade version.

Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Co. (Fed. Cir. 2005).

By Baltazar Gomez

Gillette owns U.S. Patent No. 6,212,777 for wet-shave safety razors with multiple blades. Gillette sued Energizer in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging Energizer’s QUATTRO®, a four-bladed wet-shave safety razor, infringed claims of the patent. The district court denied Gillette’s motion for a preliminary injunction because it found that the claims covered only a three-bladed razor. On appeal, CAFC vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceeding.

The ’777 patent claims a disposable safety razor with a group of blades, each blade placed in a particular geometric position relative to the other blades. Claim 1 describes a progressive blade exposure as follows:

A safety razor blade unit comprising a guard, a cap, and a group of first, second, and third blades with parallel sharpened edges located between the guard and cap… (emphasis added).

In determining the meaning and the scope of claim 1, the CAFC attempted to place the claim language in its proper technological and temporal context. The Court reasoned that the inventors’ statutorily-required written description in the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and the prosecution history, is the primary source of the meaning of disputed claim language.

Using this standard, CAFC determined that the language “comprising . . . a group of first, second, and third blades” can encompass the four-bladed Energizer razors. To begin, CAFC noted that the claim uses “open” claim terms “comprising” and “group of” in addition to other language to encompass subject matter beyond a razor with only three blades. Moreover, although the specification focused on blade units with three blades, the patent also disclosed a plurality of blades showing that the ‘777 patent covers razors with more than three blades. The CAFC further explained that it may be that a four-bladed razor may be less preferred embodiment, but noted that a patentee typically claims broadly enough to cover less preferred embodiments as well as more preferred embodiments, precisely to block competitors from marketing less than optimal versions of the claimed invention.

Further, CAFC also noted that the specification provided further support for interpreting claim 1 to encompass razors with more than three blades. The first sentence of the written description teaches that the invention relates to razors having a plurality of blades. Moreover, the prosecution of patents related to the ’777 patent also supports reading claim 1 as an open claim. Gillette endorsed an open interpretation of “comprising” when it argued to the European Patent Office (EPO) that a virtually identical claim in Gillette’s European counterpart to the ’777 patent would not exclude an arrangement with four or more blades. Accordingly, the CAFC concluded that the district court erred in limiting the claims of the ’777 patent to encompass razors with three blades because no statement in the ‘777 patent excludes a four-bladed razor.

In dissent, Judge Archer argued that claim 1 should not be construed as permitting a group with more than three blades simply because claim 1 contains the open transition term “comprising” in its preamble.   Judge Archer concluded that a three-bladed razor is not merely a preferred embodiment of the invention, but is the invention itself, and that the inventors did not regard a blade unit with four blades arranged in the described geometry as their invention.

Note: Dr. Baltazar Gomez is a scientific advisor at MBHB in Chicago. Dr. Gomez obtained his PhD in biochemistry from the University of Texas and researched retrovirology as a PostDoc at Cornell University.

Case Questions Fundamental Questions of Patentability Requirements of Nucleic Acid Molecules

In re Fisher: EST Patentability Redux

By Donald Zuhn, Ph.D. (Patently-O Guest Author).

On Tuesday, May 3, 2005, the Federal Circuit will hear In re Fisher, in which the Court will address the utility requirement for the first time since the Patent Office set forth revised Utility Examination Guidelines in January 2001.  Specifically, in Fisher, the issue of patentable utility is being raised with respect to nucleic acid molecules.  In commenting on the possible importance of this case, Harold Wegner has described Fisher as having "the potential of being either the single most important pharmaceutical patent case in recent years – or a yawn."  Amicus briefs filed by recognized biotech and pharmaceutical companies such as Affymetrix, Eli Lilly, and Genentech in support of the Board’s decision in Ex parte Fisher suggest that it may be the former as opposed to the latter.

The particular controversy presented in Fisher can be traced back as far as 1991, when a group of NIH investigators led by J. Craig Venter sought to protect thousands of DNA sequences corresponding to portions of expressed genes.  Venter called these gene fragments expressed sequence tags, or ESTs.  Venter’s group sought to protect not only the ESTs themselves, but also the full-length sequences from which the ESTs were derived and the protein products encoded by the full-length sequences, without first determining the biological function of the encoded protein products.  In several applications filed on its ESTs, the NIH asserted a number of utilities, including the design of oligonucleotides for use in chromosomal analysis, PCR amplification, and recovering the corresponding full-length gene.  After receiving a second rejection on its initial filing, the NIH abruptly abandoned its attempts to protect the ESTs, and withdrew all of its pending EST applications from consideration.

While the withdrawal of these applications temporarily quieted the debate surrounding EST patentability, the Patent Office again stoked the fires of controversy in 1995, when it published new Utility Examination Guidelines.  The new Guidelines removed some of the obstacles to EST patenting by only requiring that an applicant assert a utility that was "specific" and "credible."  The new Guidelines had thus omitted the requirement that the assertion of utility also be "substantial," as set forth by the Supreme Court in 1966 in Brenner v. Manson.  In 1997, the Patent Office further declared that since ESTs were acknowledged to have utility apart from the full-length sequences from which they were derived, an applicant would no longer be prevented from securing protection for an EST by the failure to specify the function of the full-length sequence from which that EST was derived.

The Patent Office reversed course again in 2001 when it published revised Utility Examination Guidelines, reinstating the Brenner substantial utility prong.  The revised Guidelines now required that an applicant assert a specific and substantial utility for the claimed invention that would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art.  The Patent Office also issued Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, which provided Examples indicating how the revised Guidelines were to be applied to thirteen different types of biochemical subject matter, including ESTs, as well as definitions of the three utility prongs.  In particular, the Training Materials defined "specific utility" as utility that is specific to the subject matter claimed, as contrasted with a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention; "substantial utility" as utility having a "real world" use; and "credible utility" as utility that is believable to a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the totality of evidence and reasoning provided.

In the appeal to be heard Tuesday, appellants Dane Fisher and Raghunath Lalgudi (employees of Monsanto Co., the real party in interest) seek to reverse the Board’s decision affirming the final rejection of a claim directed to five ESTs isolated from maize leaf tissue.  The five ESTs constitute only a small portion of the 4,013 sequences that appellants originally claimed and an even smaller portion of the 32,236 sequences that appellants disclosed in their application.  Appellants also asserted a number of utilities for the claimed ESTs in their application, including the use of the ESTs to identify polymorphisms (i.e., alternate forms, or alleles, of the claimed sequences), to design oligonucleotide probes or primers for use in isolating DNA sequences from other plants and organisms, and to measure mRNA expression levels in plant cells using microarray technology.

The Board, in Ex parte Fisher, analyzed Brenner and subsequent CCPA and CAFC decisions in In re Kirk, In re Ziegler, In re Jolles, Cross v. Iizuka, and In re Brana, and determined that "[r]ather than setting a de minimis standard, Section 101 requires a utility that is ‘substantial’," or in the words of the Brenner court, "one that provides a specific benefit in currently available form."  The Board then examined appellants’ asserted utilities and determined that none of the claimed ESTs provided a specific benefit in its currently available form.  In particular, with regard to appellants assertion that the claimed ESTs could be used to measure mRNA expression levels in plant cells using microarray technology, the Board declared that "the asserted utility of the claimed nucleic acid – as one component of an assay for monitoring gene expression – does not satisfy the utility requirement of Section 101."

In briefing the issues before the Federal Circuit, appellants argue that the Board erred in concluding that an EST is "subject to a heightened standard of utility . . . that hinges upon some undefined ‘spectrum’ of knowledge about the function of the gene that corresponds to the EST."  Appellants also contend that the Board erred in concluding that the claimed ESTs lack patentable utility "despite the undisputed existence of eight scientifically useful applications for the claimed ESTs and a commercially successful industry built upon the sale and licensing of ESTs corresponding to genes of unknown function, just like those at issue here."  In arguing against the Patent Office’s application of a "heightened standard" of utility in this case, appellants note that the Patent Office has set forth "three substantially different constructions of the utility standard over the last decade alone," and that the Board has adopted a test "so ambiguous and impracticable that even the PTO cannot articulate with any reasonable certainty when the claimed ESTs – or any other EST – might be entitled to patent protection."  Appellants also contend that the Patent Office has applied the wrong test in determining whether there is an assertion of specific utility, since "the specific utility prong only requires the existence of an identifiable benefit for the claimed invention; it does not require a benefit that is unique to the claimed invention."

The Patent Office, on the other hand, denies that appellants’ ESTs have been subjected to a heightened standard, arguing instead that appellants merely failed to assert a specific and substantial utility for the claimed ESTs that would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art. In its brief, the Patent Office often focuses on appellants’ failure to satisfy the specific utility prong, arguing, for example, that appellants’ asserted utilities "would apply not only to the over 32,000 ESTs Fisher discloses, and to the over 600,000 ESTs disclosed in Monsanto’s [six] related appeals, but also to any ESTs derived from any organism." In particular, the Patent Office counters appellants’ argument that because each EST only specifically binds to its complement, the specific sequence of each EST makes its use as a probe or primer specific, by stating that "there is no specific reason for using the EST to bind its complement," and therefore, "[t]o the extent that more sequence data could be acquired by using the ESTs as probes, that result would likely be true for any scrap of DNA derived from nature." Finally, in responding to appellants’ assertion that ESTs have a real world value as part of a multi-billion dollar industry, the Patent Office contends that "batches of ESTs of unknown significance are sold for the purpose of finding targets worthy of further development, not because the individual ESTs have any specific currently available benefit."

NOTE: This post was written by patent attorney Donald Zuhn, PhD. Don is a true expert in cutting edge biotech patent law and practices both prosecution and litigation at MBHB LLP in Chicago. (zuhn@mbhb.com). His article "DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility Requirement," published in the summer 2001 issue of the John Marshall Law Review, contains a more thorough discussion of the history of the utility requirement, particularly with respect to the patentability of DNA sequences.

Hynix Fails to Beat Rambus on Collateral Estoppel Issue

Rambus Hynix Semiconductor v. Rambus (N.D. Cal. 2005).

In an earlier lawsuit against Infineon, a court dismissed Rambus’s patent claims in a bench statement that "I have concluded that [Infineon] has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, a spoilation that warrants dismissal of [the patent infringement case] as the only appropriate sanction after having considered the alternatives."  However, the case settled before the judge issued a written opinion.

Now, Hynix argues that Rambus should be collaterally estopped from re-asserting the spoilage issue.  The N.D. Cal. disagreed with Hynix, finding that the elements for a finding of collateral estoppel were not met.

In the 9th Circuit, a party asserting collateral estoppel must show four elements:

  1. Full and fair opportunity to litigate in the previous action;
  2. Issue was actually litigated in that action;
  3. Issue was lost in a final judgment; and
  4. The person against whom collateral estoppel is asserted in the present action is in privity with the party from the previous action.

Using these elements, the court found (i) that the issue of spoilage (unclean hands) is particular to each litigation and thus had not been litigated in the Infineon case; and (ii) that the Infineon court’s statements from the bench did not constitute a "final judgment" because they were not "sufficiently firm."

While there is no question that Judge Payne was sufficiently settled in his decision that he was willing to dismiss Rambus’s patent claims at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on spoliation, he never issued a reasoned opinion, either written or oral, explaining his ruling. Before Judge Payne could issue such a ruling, Infineon and Rambus settled the action between them, stipulating to a dismissal with prejudice.

Seemingly to protect against the CAFC’s veto power, the opinion noted that even if all the elements of collateral estoppel were met, the court would use its discretion to deny the motion because such offensive uses of collateral estoppel are disfavored.

Hynix’s motion to dismiss Rambus’s patent claims for unclean hands on the basis of collateral estoppel is denied.

France: Right To Privacy Includes DVD Copying For Personal Use

Monsieur Stephane P v. Universal Pictures Video France (Court d’Appeal de Paris 2005).

PatentlyOImage031In a move to protect privacy rights, a French Appellate Court has ordered DVD vendors to stop selling copies of the film “Mulholland Drive.”  The court found that copy prevention software on the DVD violated privacy rights of DVD purchasers because it precluded them from transferring the film onto a VHS tape for personal use.

Assistance — Does anyone have an English translation of the case? (crouch@mbhb.com).

Links:

 

PATENT REFORM: Preventing Inequitable Results Under Knorr-Bremse Willfulness

This post is part of our continuing series discussing a US House of Representatives working draft of patent legislation, by Marcus Thymian, Jennifer Swartz, and Dennis Crouch.

In the landmark decision of Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., an en banc panel of Federal Circuit judges recently held that no adverse inference is to be drawn from the absence of an opinion of counsel in willfulness determinations.  This ruling overruled the Court’s earlier precedent in Quantum and was a dramatic change.  The proposed legislation attempts to balance this swing in jurisprudence by adding a section on willfulness that incorporates the Knorr-Bremse holding while carving out broad exceptions.  

The proposed changes repeat the Knorr-Bremse holding that “[t]he absence of an opinion of counsel shall not create an inference that the infringement was willful.”  Further, the legislation makes mere knowledge of a patent or its contents insufficient for a finding of willfulness against the defendant.

The legislation diverges from Knorr-Bremse by listing “other factors” that may be considered in increasing damages against an infringer.  Included as one such factor is intentional copying by a defendant who has specific knowledge he is infringing patented subject matter.  However, unlike Knorr-Bremse, the defendant must rebut proof of specific knowledge by proffering evidence of an “informed good faith belief” that the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable (i.e. an opinion).  Thus, while no adverse inference of willfulness will be drawn in the absence of an opinion under the proposed changes, the defendant will still have the onus to provide an opinion in cases in which the plaintiff proves the defendant’s specific knowledge of infringement.

Finally, the legislation also proposes adding to the statute for increased damages the “factor” of prior litigation between the parties for substantially similar infringement.  Thus, in a later action between parties for colorably similar infringing conduct, willfulness may be based on the knowledge the infringer has maintained since the earlier litigation.< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

Antitrust: FTC confronts decision that liberally allows patent settlements

PatentlyOImage030Schering-Plough v. FTC (11th Cir. 2005) (on petition for en banc review).

In a March 8 decision, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals set aside an FTC order that barred Schering-Plough from settling an infringement suit with generic makers over the patented blood pressure drug K-Dur.  The FTC had concluded that the settlement was an “unreasonable restraint of trade.”  The 11th Circuit disagreed, finding that because the suit involved patented products, neither a per se nor a rule of reason analysis would be appropriate.

By their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition. The anticompetitive effect is already present. “What is required here is an analysis of the extent to which antitrust liability might undermine the encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent to which the patent laws prevent antitrust liability for such exclusionary effects.” Therefore, in line with Valley Drug, we think the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.

Applying their rule to the facts, the Court concluded that payment from a patent holder to a generic competitor cannot be the sole basis of a violation of antitrust law. Accordingly, the court SET ASIDE the decision of the Federal Trade Commission and VACATED its cease and desist order.

Petition en banc: Now, the FTC has filed a petition for rehearing of the case en banc. In the petition, the Commission raises three primary contentions:

  • Not every patent infringement litigation settlement should be shielded from antitrust scrutiny, so long as entry of the allegedly infringing product is not precluded at any time subsequent to expiration of the patent;
  • That the decision subverts the goals of Hatch-Waxman; and
  • That the decision used an improper standard review of critical disputed facts.

If this petition for rehearing fails, the Government is expected to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Links:

2005 USPTO Partnership Meetings Scheduled for May 4, 2005

On Wednesday May 4, the Patent Office is holding a couple of “Customer Partnership Meetings.”  These meetings are designed to provide insight into how the patent office handles patent applications and tend to give some informal insight into peculiarities of particular technology areas. They are also free of charge.

1) Nanotechnology

The PTO has a newly formed Nanotechnology art unit class.  The Wednesday discussion will provide a look at how the new art unit is collecting and searching the prior art.  In addition, an industry panel will give feedback to the PTO and participants.  There will also be time for an open floor discussion.  Although the deadline for signing up for the conference has passed,

there is still some room for those interested.  Contact Jill.Warden@uspto.gov.

2) Business Methods

Because of a popular believe that business method patents are of lower quality, the PTO has instituted a number of initiatives to improve quality in the art unit.  The PTO is focusing on speeding up a process that currently involves long delays.  John Love, director of art unit handling business method patents as well as other members of the unit will be available to discuss these issues.  This conference may be full — however Joseph.Thomas@uspto.gov may be able to fit you in.

Note: I’m planning to be at the business methods conference.  I look forward to meeting you there.

How should a future patent attorney choose a law school?

AcademicEggHeadThe new USNews law school rankings have been released.  Everyone knows that the rankings are worthless, but we follow them anyway.  Engineers and scientists usually do pretty well on the LSAT and often end up with the following law school options:  

  • Attend a highly-ranked law school;
  • Attend a lower-ranked law school with a renowned intellectual property program; or
  • Attend a lower-ranked law school as a night student and continue making money during the day.

The name of the law school matters most when you are looking for your first job out of law school.  Many people advise students to attend the highest ranked school where they can gain admittance.  Others would advise you to go to the school that offers the best financial package.  Not many advocate part-time solution — because it is such a hard road to work full-time then attend school four nights a week.  However, some of the most skillful attorneys that I know went through school that way.

What is your advice for hopeful pre-law students? Please leave a comment:

PATENT REFORM: Quick highlights from the Senate hearings.

The Senate Intellectual Property subcommittee held hearings on Monday, April 25, 2005 to discuss patent reform.  Some highlights:

  • Jon Dudas, Director of the Patent Office believes in the goal of “educating the world on the importance of patents.”  I believe that a major part of this should be to restore the mystique of the American inventor/entrepreneur.
  • On behalf of the AIPLA, Michael Kirk shot down BSA proposals to limit the availability of injunctive relief and the size of damage awards.  Kirk also mentioned that Congress should consider repealing 35 U.S.C. 271(f).
  • David Simon from Intel promoted changes to the notion of when an injunction should be granted.  In his viewpoint, there should be “a return equitable principles to determine whether an injunction should be granted.”

Patent Claim Construction: Whereby Clause Limits Claim Scope

PatentlyOImage029Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

By Eric Moran

In Hoffer, the patentee (appearing pro se) appealed a summary judgment holding that defendants Microsoft, IBM, and Ariba did not infringe claim 21 of U.S. Patent No. 5,799,151 (the ‘151 patent) and that claim 22 of the ‘151 patent was invalid for indefiniteness.  The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment on invalidity and affirmed the judgment of noninfringement.  In affirming the judgment of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit affirmed the construction of a “whereby” clause, which “generally states the result of a patented process” and generally does not limit claims.  Here, however, as discussed below, the Federal Circuit held that when a “whereby” clause “states a condition that is material to patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention.”

The ‘151 patent involves methods and systems that allow remote users of computer terminals to obtain economic data from an index, and interactively post and receive messages concerning economic topics.  Claim 21 of the ‘151 patent in Hoffer included the phrase:

whereby a trade network supports users at said plurality of [remote user terminals] who are each guided by said [integrated application program interface] to select an economic activity, to identify that index topic that corresponds to said activity, to enter that topic board dedicated to said topic, and who are collectively able to concurrently engage in interactive data messaging on said topic boards.< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

The accused method allows real-time posting of messages, but not interactive data messaging in which users can communicate with each other.

The patentee argued that under Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a “whereby” clause cannot limit method claims when the “whereby” clause simply states the intended result of a method step.  In particular, the patentee contended that the “whereby” clause in claim 21 did not state the mechanics of the claimed method, but only stated an overall objective, and, moreover, his invention does not require interactive messaging.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that, based at least on the “Summary of the Invention” section of the patent and statements in the prosecution history, interactive messaging “is more than the intended result of a process step; it is part of the process itself. . . . [It is] an integral part of the invention.”  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the “whereby” clause stated a condition that was material to patentability, and claim 21 was limited to interactive messaging and did not extend to real-time posting of messages.

Judge Newman, in a panel that also included Judges Bryson and Dyk, authored a concurrence in which she disagreed with the panel’s failure to decide each of the appealed claim construction issues. 

Eric Moran (moran@mbhb.com) is an attorney at the intellectual property law firm of McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP in Chicago. His practice runs the gamut of intellectual property issues and includes patent, trademark, and domain name disputes.

Notes:

 

Full Panel Denies Rehearing in Fosamax Patent Case

Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (Fed. Cir. 2005) (on petition for rehearing).

Merck & Co. owns the patent on the best-selling drug Fosamax.  Teva, a generic manufacturer lost an infringement case at the district court after the court found the patent valid and infringed.  In January 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court — vacating the lower court’s finding of validity and infringement. 

Merck, with the amicus support of PhRMA, subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en banc.  The CAFC has denied that the request, thus maintaining the panel decision. 

DISSENT: In a two-page dissent, Judge Lourie, supported by Chief Judge Michel and Judge Newman, argued that the panel decision erroneously concluded that commercial success was not probative to obviousness in this case and by linking commercial success with the failure of others.

Commercial success is a fact question, and, once it is established, as found here by the trial court, the only other question is whether the success is attributable to the claimed invention (“nexus”), rather than to other factors such as market power, advertising, demand for all products of a given type, a rising economy that “lifts all boats,” etc. It is not negatived by any inability of others to test various formulations because of the existence of another patent. Success is success. The panel’s rule is especially unsound in the context of an improvement patent, as here, because it holds in effect that commercial success for an improvement is irrelevant when a prior patent dominates the basic invention.

Commercial success is also independent of any “failure of others,” as that is another, separate secondary consideration.

Respectfully, the full court should have reheard the appeal to eliminate the confusion in the law that the panel opinion creates.

Interestingly, Judge Rader dissented in the three-judge panel opinion, but now agrees with the majority that the case should not be reheard.

The case will be remanded to the district court on April 28, 2005.

A REUTERS article indicates that Merck & Co. plans to petition the Supreme Court to hear an appeal from the CAFC decision.

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Microsoft ordered not to release patented TCP software

PatentlyOImage028Alacritech v. Microsoft (N.D. Cal. 2005) (04–C-03284)

In an April 12 decision, Judge Jeffrey White of the Northern District of California granted Plaintiff Alacritech’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Microsoft — thus preventing Microsoft from releasing its TCP Chimney or Longhorn software. Alacritech’s patent covers a software method of establishing a TCP connection with reduced processor load and accelerating digital communication. 

In the thirteen page decision, Judge White determined that the patent was likely to be found valid and infringed and that the balance of hardships weighed in favor of the plaintiff, Alacritech.  Factors considered include:

  • A finding of likelihood of success on the merits leads to a presumption of irreparable harm in patent cases;
  • Because Alacritech is a small start-up, it would not be able to withstand infringing competition from Microsoft; and
  • Microsoft has not yet released the TCP Chimney software

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Patent Applicant’s Claim Takings Claim Barred by Res Judicata

PatentlyOImage027Hornback v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Back in 1986, Mr. Alton Hornback applied for a patent on a error slope sensor for a missile.  The invention was found to be patentable but was withheld from issuance because of a secrecy order under 35 USC 181. The secrecy order was renewed annually until 1999, and the patent finally issued in June of 2000.

Hornback requested compensation for the delay in issuance, arguing that it was a taking.  Because Hornback had argued the takings issue in a previous case, the CAFC found that his claim was now barred by res judicata.

Hornback argued that the present case raised new issues because the military had de-classified then reclassified the technology in the interim.  The CAFC rejected that argument, however, finding that the classification action internal to the military did not alter his rights — “because only the Commissioner of Patents may rescind a secrecy order.”

In addition, the Appellate Panel agreed that the Court of Federal Claims “does not have subject matter jurisdiction of an adverse ruling of the PTO director.” 

28 U.S.C. §1361 vests “original jurisdiction” for the issuance of mandamus orders in the district courts, authorizing the district court to hear any action “to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”

Dismissal affirmed.

Aside: In 1996, Hornback made another precedent when the CFC held that a pro se patent applicant without legal training is not held to the same standard as trained counsel.

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