The new petition for certiorari filed by Liquidia raises some interesting questions about the ongoing race between inter partes review proceedings and district court litigation. Liquidia Techs v. United Therapeutics Corp., 23-804 (US), on petition for writ of certiorari from United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
UTC won its infringement suit against Liquidia with a holding that its patent covering treprostinil administration by inhalation were valid and infringed. (US10716793). While the appeal was pending, the PTAB sided against the patentee and found the claims unpatentable as obvious. In the appeal, however, the Federal Circuit refused to give credence to the PTAB decision - finding that litigation was still "pending" and "non-final." The claims had not actually been cancelled yet - since the Director only issues the certificate confirming unpatentability after any appeal. Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that IPR decisions do not have issue-preclusive (collateral estoppel) effect until the decision is affirmed on appeal, or the parties waive their right to appeal. Citing XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Liquidia's petition argues that the PTAB's final-written decision should be given preclusive effect in parallel litigation even if an appeal is pending, just like would be done for a district court opinion.
In a non-precedential 2023 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) refusing to register “Everybody vs Racism” as a trademark for apparel, tote bags, and services promoting racial justice advocacy. The court found substantial evidence supported the TTAB's conclusion that the slogan fails to function as a source identifier for the applicant GO & Associates’ goods and services. Although the outcome here supports the informational matter doctrine barring registration, the court is clear that political slogans and other informational matter can be protected as trademarks so long as the applicant shows that they actually function as a trademark.
The Schedule A litigation phenomenon continues apace in the Northern District of Illinois, a court that has become, in the words of Judge Seeger, “an assembly line for TROs.” But Schedule A litigation is not confined to Chicago. It has spread, perhaps most notably to the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York.
One recent decision out of New York merits closer attention. In this case, as in most Schedule A cases, the plaintiff was able to obtain an ex parte TRO that included an order instructing Amazon to freeze the defendants’ seller accounts. The order also required the plaintiff to post a bond of $20,000 “for the payment of any damages any person may be entitled to recover as a result of an improper or wrongful restraint ordered.”
The plaintiff sued 163 defendants, alleging that each was liable for infringing a utility patent directed towards “a rectangular-shaped buckle-and-belt mechanism” for “an outdoor exercise product.”
At the TRO stage, the plaintiff’s “infringement evidence chart” consisted of a series of screenshots (many of them low-resolution screenshots) of the accused products. Here’s an example of all of the evidence submitted in that chart with respect to one of the defendants:
As per usual in a Schedule A case, the defendants did not find out about the case until after their accounts were frozen. When the plaintiff moved to extend the TRO, multiple defendants appeared to object. Judge Rochon refused to extend the TRO and the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case.
Two of the defendants, Hyponix and NinjaSafe, moved for bond damages, sanctions, and fees. They argued that the plaintiff had filed to conduct a sufficient pre-suit investigation and had committed various acts of litigation misconduct. They further argued that they each suffered damages from being wrongfully enjoined.
Judge Rochon granted the defendants’ motions for bond damages but denied their motions for sanctions and fees. She agreed that the moving defendants had been wrongfully enjoined because “Hyponix has pointed to at least four elements of claim 1 of the ’673 patent that are not present in its product” and “Ninja Safe has also shown that its products may not infringe claim 1 and has raised questions of invalidity.” Accordingly, Judge Rochon granted each moving defendant bond damages, though less than they asked for: $3,682.28 for Hyponix and $14,641.51 for NinjaSafe.
But she refused to grant sanctions or fees, despite being “troubled by Plaintiff’s conduct in this case.” In particular, Judge Rochon noted the “‘clear discrepancies’ between the protected elements of the ’673 Patent and the products of many of the parties against which Plaintiff secured a TRO.” She also noted other instances of “possible misconduct,” including:
“Plaintiff represented that most of the 163 parties were difficult to find and contact. In practice, however, contact information for many of the parties was readily available. . . . Plaintiff does not indicate that it tried with any diligence to locate these parties before seeking a TRO.”
“The pace and prevalence of Plaintiff’s dismissals suggest to the Court that Plaintiff used Rule 41 as part of a broader strategy to freeze the accounts of its competitors, then withdraw its claim against any party that happened to object.”
“Plaintiff failed to provide Hyponix with documents necessary for its defense. . . . . Plaintiff claims, falsely, that Hyponix did not request these documents.”
(Emphasis added.) Despite all of this, Judge Rochon refused to sanction the plaintiff:
Despite these concerns, the Court does not lightly award sanctions and will not do so in this case. Plaintiff holds a valid patent for its Hanging Exercise Product, its claim was colorable against at least some of the parties, and it dismissed its lawsuit voluntarily at a very early stage in the litigation (presumably in light of the issues raised by the Court at the order to show cause hearing), before any of the defendants responded to the Amended Complaint. Defendants here were made whole for their losses under the bond. Although a close question, the Court exercises its discretion to deny Defendants’ request for sanctions under its inherent powers and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. . . . To the extent that Plaintiff and its counsel engage in similar misconduct in the future, however, the Court will not hesitate to impose sanctions.
As Professor Eric Goldman noted in this blog post, “it would not be lightly awarding sanction when a plaintiff has committed so many violations.” Two additional points stand out as well.
First, the fact that some of the infringement claims might be colorable does not change the fact that the plaintiff brought numerous claims that were not—including the claims brought against the moving defendants. If the plaintiff had sued Hyponix and NinjaSafe separately, would that have changed the court’s analysis? If so, why should the fact of mass joinder insulate the plaintiff from sanctions? Especially in light of the fact that it’s far from clear that any—let alone all—of the defendants were properly joined, as they sell different products and do not seem to be actually connected in any way. See 35 U.S.C. § 299. In any case, the fact remains that this plaintiff brought many claims that were not colorable and used the machinery of the federal judiciary to wrongfully enjoin competitors. That is what should matter in the sanctions calculus, not the fact that some of the other claims (against apparently unrelated defendants) might have potentially had merit.
Second, it is true that the plaintiff dismissed the case at what would be, in a regular case, “a very early stage in the litigation.” But in a Schedule A case, the TRO seems to be the whole game. The plaintiff gets a TRO with an asset freeze, then starts making settlement demands. At that point, the defendants generally either settle or default. It appears that these cases aren’t meant to proceed any further. And as the defendants’ submissions show, significant damage can be done in these cases, even in a short period of time. (One also wonders how much money the plaintiff may have been able to extract in settlements before dismissing the case.)
In the end, the decision to sanction and to award fees is left to the discretion of the judge. And while it is encouraging to see Judge Rochon recognize the damage caused by acts that have become common in Schedule A cases (e.g., using FRCP 41 to dismiss defendants who fight back), it is discouraging to see a result that will only serve to further disincentivize Schedule A defendants from fighting back.
Once a judge grants a TRO with an asset freeze, the deck is heavily stacked against the Schedule A defendants. Defendants have strong incentives to settle, even when the cases against them lack merit. In many cases, it’s just too expensive to fight back, especially when your assets have been frozen.
If judges were willing to sanction plaintiffs—or at least shift fees—when Schedule A defendants were wrongfully restrained, that would do a lot to help level the playing field and incentivize the plaintiffs to bring better claims.
Without fee shifting or sanctions, the cost of bringing a nonmeritorious claim in a Schedule A case is virtually zero, while the harms to defendants who are wrongfully restrained—even for a short time—can be devastating. As Judge Hunt has noted, “the extraordinary remedy of freezing all [the defendants’] assets without notice” can “potentially ruin[] a legitimate business.”
Plus, as Casey Hewitt noted on Mastodon, Schedule A “defendants have no choice but to litigate, have no option to meet and confer and avoid a lawsuit . . . They did not ignore demand letters or refuse to negotiate or discuss alleged infringement.” But once they find out that their assets have been frozen, they have to “hire expensive IP litigators or they will lose their businesses.” In these circumstances, it seems like fee shifting for wrongfully enjoined Schedule A defendants should be the norm, not the exception.
Yes, it’s true that a presumption in favor of fee shifting would be a departure from normal federal court practice. But courts routinely use their discretion to grant procedural departures to Schedule A plaintiffs—e.g., email service, ex parte asset freezes, mass joinder upon conclusory (and in many cases, dubious) allegations. Perhaps it is time for judges to start using their discretion to make routine departures for Schedule A defendants, too.
Additional observations:
This case is a good example of why patent litigation is a poor fit for the Schedule A litigation model. I’ve written here before about how design patent infringement is ill-suited to ex parte adjudication; so too is utility patent adjudication. If judges are going to keep allowing the Schedule A model in patent cases (and they don’t have to do so, in these cases or in any others), they should consider making it a regular practice to special masters to help analyze the infringement evidence at the TRO stage. And they should, at a minimum, require an individualized claim chart for each and every defendant.
It is far from clear that Judge Rochon actually had the power to freeze these defendants’ assets in the first place. As Judge Kendall noted in a recent order, 35 U.S.C. § 284 “does not provide for the equitable relief of accounting and profits,” which is seems to be the standard basis for asset freezes in other types of IP cases. Furthermore, as Judge Seeger has noted, “Schedule A plaintiffs typically don’t request and receive equitable monetary relief” at the end of their cases, even when equitable relief is available. Other judges might be well-advised to start questioning whether they should use their discretion to keep granting these types of asset freezes, even in cases where a remedy of equitable disgorgement is actually available.
The Federal Circuit has remanded the Xencor appeal -- allowing USPTO leadership an opportunity to re-focus on the written description requirement for both Jepson claims and means-plus-function claims in the antibody art. I have several prior posts about the case:
Vanda Pharmaceuticals recently filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review a May 2023 decision by the Federal Circuit that invalidated claims from four Vanda patents covering methods of treating Non-24-Hour Sleep-Wake Disorder ("Non-24") using the drug tasimelteon (Hetlioz). Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 23-768 (Supreme Court). The district court held that all the asserted claims were invalid as obvious, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed this decision. Vanda.cert.petition
The Federal Circuit has denied Cellect's en banc petition on the interplay between obviousness-type-double-patenting and patent-term-adjustment. The situation here is creating some strategic challenges for patentees with large patent families.
In Roku, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit has affirmed determinations by the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) favoring the patent holder Universal Electronics, Inc. (“Universal”). The most interesting part of the case for me is the assignment issue - whether the patents had been properly assigned at the appropriate time. This can become in cases like this because Universal has created a large patent portfolio that all claim back to original priority documents from more than a decade ago. While most of patents are attributable to both joint-inventors, some are only attributable to one or the other. Here, though the Federal Circuit supported the simple approach of a "hereby assigns" transfer of rights that includes future continuations. The decision is lacking though because the court does not ground its decision in any particular contract or property tradition.
The Federal Circuit recently affirmed a ruling by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in an inter partes review (IPR) filed by ZTE and joined by LG, finding claims of CyWee Group’s U.S. Patent No. 8,441,438 unpatentable as obvious. CyWee Group v. ZTE, No. 21-1855 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 18, 2024). The ’438 patent claims 3D motion-tracking technology for handheld devices like smartphones. The appeal included both IPR procedural issues and substantive patent law issues. In siding with the PTAB, the Federal Circuit rejected CyWee’s argument that the Board should not have allowed LG to oppose CyWee's motion to amend its claims. The court also affirmed the Board’s finding that the proposed amended claims would have been obvious over the prior art.
I believe that today was the first time that I've seen the Federal Circuit issue a no-opinion affirmance in a case that included three amicus briefs along with briefs from three parties. The case, New Vision Gaming v. LNW Gaming, 20-1400 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
Martin Luther King Jr. received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, and I re-read his speech today -- especially the portion contrasting development of science and technology against development of the human spirit. The past 60 years have continued to reveal astonishing discoveries and invention. Yet King’s words and warnings continue to resonate because we have continued to neglect our internal realm.
Every man lives in two realms, the internal and the external. The internal is that realm of spiritual ends expressed in art, literature, morals, and religion. The external is that complex of devices, techniques, mechanisms, and instrumentalities by means of which we live.
King. In his speech, King did not decry advances in technology, but argued that the level of attention paid to material advances should be matched by attention to moral and spiritual humanism.
Modern man has brought the whole world to an awe-inspiring threshold of the future. He has reached new and astonishing peaks of scientific success. He has produced machines that think, and instruments that peer into the unfathomable ranges of interstellar space. He has built gigantic bridges to span the seas and gargantuan buildings to kiss the skies. His airplanes and spaceships have dwarfed distance, placed time in chains, and carved highways through the stratosphere. This is a dazzling picture of modern man’s scientific and technological progress.
Yet, in spite of these spectacular strides in science and technology, and still unlimited ones to come, something basic is missing. There is a sort of poverty of the spirit which stands in glaring contrast to our scientific and technological abundance. The richer we have become materially, the poorer we have become morally and spiritually. We have learned to fly the air like birds and swim the sea like fish, but we have not learned the simple art of living together as brothers.
The Leading pro-IP Senators, Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE) recently introduced a bill focusing on patents stemming from research paid-for by federal grants. The proposed legislation, titled the “Improving Efficiency to Increase Competition Act,” would require a government study on reporting requirements related to the landmark Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
This article analyzes some of the latest developments in the ongoing legal battle between medical device company Masimo and tech giant Apple regarding Apple's adjudged infringement of Masimo's pulse oximetry patents in its Apple Watch. The basic question is whether Masimo's pulse-oximetry patents will be strong enough to stop the Apple juggernaut.
