by Dennis Crouch

Intellectual property rights in the U.S. have long been a mix of state common law rights and federal statutory rights.  Patents and copyrights were established in the Constitution and enacted by the First Congress in 1790.  Those rights were fairly quickly established as exclusively federal, meaning that there is effectively no patents or copyrights offered by individual states.  Trademarks and trade secrets followed a different path – developing under state common law before later later gaining federal protections; with trade secrets moving federal most recently via the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) of 2016.  Unlike patent and copyright, trademarks and trade secrets continue to be concurrent and overlapping, meaning that state rights continue to exist and be enforceable alongside the federal right.  It is common for litigation to assert both.  With trademark law, the federal right has been around since 1870 and today occupies most of the space.  Because the federal trade secrecy right is so new (and no registration is available), it is still unclear whether we’ll see the same result.

The straggler here is the right of publicity, often termed Name Image & Likeness or NIL rights.  Although publicity rights initially emerged as a privacy interest, I find that students are quick to see its kinship to trademark law and unfair competition.  While typical privacy rights focus on personal interests and one’s peace of mind, the right of publicity is more economic and commercial in nature.  The basic idea here is that a person’s reputation is an asset — commercial goodwill.  And, that person’s brand is their name, image, and likeness.

The growth of the internet and influencer culture has raised the awareness and importance of publicity rights as the a key transferable with endorsement deals and celebrity advertising.  In the background, we also have the emergence of deep fake AI tools that allow digital impersonation of celebrities at a level never experienced (as exemplified by my AI created version of Swift above).

In a recent hearing on AI IP issues before the US Senate IP subcommittee, Adobe proposed creating a new federal right of publicity called the Federal Anti-Impersonation Right (FAIR). This would establish a minimum level of protection against the unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name, image, likeness, or other identifying aspects of their persona. Adobe argued this is needed to protect artists and creators from having their style or likeness copied by AI tools and used by others for commercial gain.  A national right of publicity could provide more consistent protections similar to those created for trademarks and trade secrets. It could also facilitate enforcement across state lines and could eventually serve as the basis for international treaties in this increasingly global space where persona rights are often exploited online and across multiple platforms.

Adobe’s proposal is largely in theory, and the terms have not yet been drawn-up. Obviously, key policy questions remain:

• Should protections apply only to famous personalities or to anyone whose NIL is used for commercial gain?
• How should we balance free speech, parody, and fair use concerns?
• To what extent should online platforms be shielded from liability?
• Should rights vest only for commercial exploitation or is there a privacy interest to protect?

The origins of publicity rights stem from privacy protections rather than commerce. This conceptual difference from trademark law is important, and I would suggest that any federal right should consider personal dignity and reputational interests, not just economic harms from impersonation.

What do you think? Are you ready for a national right of publicity?

by Dennis Crouch

In re Float’N’Grill LLC, 2022-1438 (Fed. Cir. 2023)

Just in time for my early August floating trip down in the Ozarks, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the USPTO’s rejections of Float’N’Grill’s proposed reissue claims.  The problem: the reissue claims omit an “essential element” of the original invention in violation of 35 U.S.C. 251. The case here is quite similar to the maligned essential elements test of Gentry Gallery, but relies upon the reissue statute rather than the written description requirement of Section 112(a).

Float’N’Grill’s US 9,771,132 covers a floating grill. In patent lingo, we call this a “floating apparatus with grill supports” to allow grilling while floating in water. The disclosed embodiment uses magnets to removably secure the grill to the grill supports, and the original claims required a plurality of magnets.  After the patent issued, the patentee recognized that the magnet limitation was unduly narrow.  The broadening reissue was filed within the two-year 112(d) deadline and replaced the magnet limitation with one requiring the portions to be “removably securable.”

This is a Shark Tank innovation that got investment (video below). Before getting an investor, these guys filed a low quality initial patent application that had unduly narrow claims that were exploited by knock-off versions and really just disclosed a single embodiment.  They got a notice of allowance within a year and paid the issue fee without a continuation.   In its decision, the Federal Circuit rejected their reissue patent claims on what is clearly a technicality and one that is extremely biased toward those who spend more on patent prosecution.  Patent holders with more money would drafted a more “lawyerly” initial patent application that included wiggle room boilerplate statements and additional prophetic embodiments; and would have kept a continuation application alive.  Either of those strategies would have saved the broader claims.

The Original Patent Requirement: Section 251 requires that the reissue claims be directed to “the invention disclosed in the original patent.”  And here, the problem, according to the PTO and Federal Circuit, is that the magnets was essential to the invention as originally disclosed.

The key precedent on point is U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals, Corp., 315 U.S. 668 (1942). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a  set of reissue claims on similar grounds.  The original specification highlighted the inclusion of water to improve the efficiency of a reaction. Later, in the reissue, the patentee removed the water requirement.  In its analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that water was “a necessary step” in the invented process “essential in the original patent.”  As such, the claim omitting water was improperly added in the reissue.

In US Industrial Chemicals, the court also remarked that the original patent requirement goes beyond the ordinary limits of Section 112.  The test is not passed simply by showing that the proposed invention “might have been claimed in the original patent because it was suggested or indicated in the specification.”

The Federal Circuit reaffirmed these principles in Forum US, Inc. v. Flow Valve, LLC, 926 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  In that case, the original patent document disclosed several different machining implements, each having multiple arbors. The patent  also described advantages of the multiple-arbor arrangement.  In the reissue though the patentee attempted to remove the multiple-arbor requirement in favor of a  more generic support. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit concluded the proposed claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the original patent requirement.  The court noted that the patent document failed to suggest anywhere “that arbors are an optional feature of the invention.”  See also Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac Pharma Inc., 771 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

by Dennis Crouch

Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., No. 2022-1308, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2023).

Trinity Info Media sued Covalent for infringing two patents covering a process of connecting users based on polling question answers – US Patent Nos. 9,087,321 and 10,936,685. The patents describe a system where users answer polling questions and the system uses those answers to find a “likelihood of match” between users. Connections are suggested for high-likelihood matches. The system uses conventional computer components like processors, memory, servers, etc. The ‘685 patent adds limitations about performing operations on a handheld device, displaying results via swiping, and using a mobile app.

The district court granted Covalent’s motion to dismiss, finding the asserted claims ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed after analyzing the claims under the two-step Alice/Mayo framework:

Step 1 – Determine if the claims are directed to a patent ineligible concept like an abstract idea.

• The court found the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “matching based on questioning”, which involves collecting user information, analyzing it, and displaying results.
• This is a mental process that could be performed by humans without a computer. Using generic technical components does not change the character of the claims.

Step 2 – Determine if the claims recite an inventive concept, i.e. something significantly more than the abstract idea.

• The court found the claims do not contain an inventive concept. The additional elements like processors, servers, mobile devices, etc. are generic and conventional.
• They are used in a conventional way to apply the abstract idea, which is insufficient to qualify as significantly more.
• The alleged advance of real-time matching based on polling does not make the claims patent eligible. That merely reflects use of generic computers to speed up the process.

At oral arguments, the patentee’s attorney (Gregory Hillyer) argued that a better framing of the invention was the requiring of a “unique identifier to the answer so that that answer can find its place in a new and novel array of match servers, rather than a single match server that would have to later be searched.”  Unfortunately for the patentee these features were not actually required by the claims. Judge Cunningham pressed the patentee to identify specific non-conclusory allegations in the complaint about inventiveness. The patentee had difficulty citing anything substantial.

The patentee (Trinity) provided a number of arguments, but the court rejected each one in turn:

• Trinity argued the claims recite specific improvements to computer capabilities, like using “multiple match servers” and a “match aggregator.” However, the court found these were simply generic computer components used in a conventional way to implement the abstract idea.
• Trinity argued the claims recite a technical solution to a problem, like allowing “rapid real-time matching.” But the court found this merely uses computers to make the process faster, which is not enough for patent eligibility.
• Trinity argued humans cannot perform mental matching as fast as the claimed system. However, the court noted the claims do not require the alleged improvements in speed or capability. Rather, the focus of the claims themselves was on the abstract idea.
• Trinity argued the claims recite unconventional features like using a handheld device and swiping to review matches. However, the court found these limitations just apply the abstract idea using generic technology, and are not an inventive concept.  These were generic components by the time of the invention.
• Trinity relied on allegations that some limitations were not in the prior art. However, the court discounted these conclusory statements, noting that an abstract idea remains abstract even if some computer limitations are novel.

In the end, the appellate panel affirmed the lower court’s obviousness finding.

= = =

Patent eligibility can sometimes involve underlying factual questions, but that this was not one of those cases. The quoted Berkheimer to explain that ‘not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.’  Here, the court also concluded that claim construction and discovery were not necessary precursors for the 101 analysis since the patentee failed to identify any proposed claim constructions or specific facts that would affect the 101 analysis.

by Dennis Crouch

The key benefit of the first-to-file patent regime, introduced by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), is the clarity that it provides. The filing date is an understandable, immutable, and reasonable priority claim marker. This is in contrast to the invention “date”, which requires evidence of the inventor’s mental state as shown by corroboratory evidence; spread across time from conception to invention completion accomplished at reduction to practice. Pre-AIA invention priority contests were decided through a process known as Interference Proceedings—mini trials before the Board (then known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences or BPAI).

The transition from first-to-invent to first-to-file has involved a number of quirks, the latest is found in SNIPR Technologies Ltd. v. Rockefeller University, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2023). The case focuses on situations where one party has a Pre-AIA filing date and the other was Post-AIA.

Both parties claim patent rights to certain methods of using CRISPR tools to edit bacterial genes for the purpose of creating antibiotic resistance. The idea then is that those “good” bacteria will not be impacted by the use of antibiotics to kill “bad” bacteria growing in the same pot.

After SNIPR’s patents issued, Rockefeller amended its pending claims to match those of the SNIPR patents for the purpose of prompting an interference.  The PTO took the bait, declared an interference, and invalidated the SNIPR patents.  On appeal though, the Federal Circuit has reversed — holding that the SNIPR patents are post-AIA patens and therefore should not have been subjected to an interference proceeding.

Rockefeller’s application claims priority to a provisional application filed on February 7, 2013 (before the March 2013 AIA date). The SNIPR patents claim priority back to a May 2016 filing. In interference lingo, Rockefeller is the “senior party” because of its earlier filing date and SNIPR was unable to provide an earlier date of conception.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded this whole process was wrong and no longer permitted. In particular, the PTAB erred in subjecting SNIPR’s AIA patents to an interference proceeding. Only pre-AIA patents, not pure post-AIA patents like SNIPR’s, can be subjected to such a proceeding. The court reached this conclusion based upon its analysis of the text, purpose, and history of the AIA, concluding that first-to-file patents are exclusively governed by the new priority provisions found in the AIA and therefore cannot be subject to an interference. Under the AIA, we no longer question which party is the first inventor, but rather only ask if there is some prior art that renders the claimed invention obvious or anticipated.

The result then is that SNIPR’s patents have not been cancelled, and the PTO will also need to issue the Rockefeller patent. Some folks see this as a major metaphysical risk—that the existence of two patents covering the same invention could lead to the singularity. While having double patents is probably not the best outcome, industry will work through this possibility of blocking rights as it has many times in the past. The Federal Circuit considered this issue and noted that the Rockefeller filings could be raised in a variety of other ways—such as an AIA-trial proceeding, a process to challenge the validity of a patent—to challenge the SNIPR patents. Although there is a theoretical scenario where a pre-AIA application would not qualify as post-AIA prior art, that scenario is highly unlikely and remote. While a remote risk exists, the Court ultimately found it did not justify overriding Congress’ intent in the AIA statute to rid the system of interference proceedings and focus on filing date.

Guest post by Marlene Koffi, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Toronto and NBER Faculty Research Fellow. This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. The first blog in the series is here and resources from the first conference of the initiative are available here.

Diversity and inclusion in science and commercialization are integral to innovation, societal and economic growth. While progress has been made in increasing representation and inclusivity in STEM, there are complex factors at play that hinder a comprehensive understanding of the barriers faced by underrepresented groups in these fields. Today, I will focus on a challenging point later in the invention process: commercializing a scientific discovery. In a research study with Matt Marx, we characterize the gender dynamics of scientific commercialization in the full canon of scientific inquiry.

One of the highlights of our study is to show that, as a society, we have made lots of progress regarding gender balance in the early steps of the scientific production process. Analyzing 70 million scientific articles, we observe meaningful growth in female participation in scientific production. In 1980, barely one in five published papers included a female author. By 2020, that figure exceeded 50%. This increase represents a significant cultural shift in the scientific community. Diversity in science has been shown to stimulate innovation and promote higher recognition within the academic community. This is a win not just for the women involved but for the whole of society.

However, these gains for women early in scientific production hide potential pitfalls later. Namely, the key takeaway of our study is that a significant gender gap remains for commercializing scientific discoveries. Given that we find the gender gap in commercialization is the largest among discoveries that are more highly cited and with higher commercial potential, we title our study and refer to these uncommercialized discoveries as “Cassatts in the Attic” after the renowned female painter and printmaker Mary Cassatt.

What are the underlying reasons behind this gap? For instance, it could be that the investors financing early commercialization efforts are biased against women or that women have limited social networks to help move their scientific discovery to the next stage. While we explored several potential explanations, we found limited evidence that these supply-side factors alone could explain the gap. Instead, our findings indicate that the gender gap predominantly emerges in commercialization efforts conducted in collaboration with existing firms, pointing towards a potential bias from the firm side.

Now, let us consider the relevance of these findings to society.

At its core, the underrepresentation of women in the commercialization of scientific discoveries represents an enormous loss of potential. Women are leading innovative research projects, producing highly cited scientific papers, and making substantial contributions to the research community. Yet, their discoveries are often left “in the attic,” uncommercialized and underutilized, suggesting a possible waste of human and intellectual resources. These “Cassatts in the Attic,” represents missed opportunities to enhance societal welfare and economic prosperity.

This research also shows that the gender gap in commercialization is not just a women’s issue; it is an issue that affects all of us. In fact, it might stifle innovation, limit economic growth, and prevent society from fully benefiting from the contributions of half its population. So, it is essential to remember to promote inclusivity and diversity in all stages of the invention process and extend our efforts beyond the early stages of recruiting and training new STEM talent. We also must help those diverse voices in the critical process of commercializing scientific discoveries. This collective effort should involve all stakeholders, including government, firms, investors, universities, and scientists themselves.

Brilliant minds surround us from all types of backgrounds (gender, race, socio-demographic,…), possibly holding valuable insights that have the potential to shape our world. However, it is our responsibility to ensure that these ideas are not confined and hidden away but brought into the light where they can truly make a difference.

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Guest Post by Jordan Duenckel.  Jordan is a third-year law student at the University of Missouri, head of our IP student association, and a registered patent agent.  He has an extensive background in chemistry and food science.

Medytox, Inc. has appealed a decision made by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board regarding a post-grant review proceeding under the new Pilot Program. Medytox’s motion to amend the claim language, which aimed to substitute claims 19–27 of U.S. Patent No. 10,143,728 (‘728 patent), was denied by the Board for lack of enablement. Additionally, Medytox questions the Board’s Pilot Program regarding motion to amend practice and procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. In Medytox v. Galderma, 2022-1165, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. Jun. 27, 2023), Judge Reyna (joined by Judges Dyk and Stark) affirmed the Board’s determinations involving claim construction, enablement, arbitrary and capricious behavior under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The ’728 patent is directed to the use of an animal-protein-free botulinum toxin composition that exhibits a longer-lasting effect in the patient compared to an animal protein-containing botulinum toxin composition. ’728 Patent, col. 2 ll. 57–62. Used to treat glabellar wrinkle lines and possibly chronic migraines, this botulinum toxin is claimed to have a greater length of efficacy than BOTOX®. While a deadly foodborne pathogen that can be present in canned food, modified botulinum toxin can be used as a cosmetic treatment in reducing wrinkling as well as other aesthetic applications.

Galderma S.A. submitted a petition for post-grant review of claims 1–10 of the ‘728 patent. Following the PTAB granting review, Medytox filed a motion to amend that sought to cancel claims 1–10 and introduce claims 11–18 instead. Medytox also requested the Board to provide Preliminary Guidance based on the Pilot Program, which relates to the practice and procedures for motions to amend. The Pilot Program allows a patent owner to receive Preliminary Guidance from the Board regarding its motion or to file a revised motion to amend. The Preliminary Guidance is an initial nonbinding discussion about whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements. Read more about the Pilot Program here, 84 Fed. Reg. 9,497.

Galderma S.A. objects to the new claims claiming that they introduce new matter that is not disclosed in the specification. The new claim language claims that the responder rate at sixteen weeks is a range between 50% and 100%. The responder rate, in the context of the ’728 patent, is the proportion of patients who responded favorably to the animal protein-free botulinum composition expressed as a percentage. Galderma asserts that the original specification only discloses a responder rate up to 62% so anything above that is a range that is not fully enabled. The preliminary guidance was issued by the Board and stated that Medytox did not show a reasonable likelihood that the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 326(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a) were met to file a motion to amend. Significantly, the Board also gave its “preliminary view” that Medytox’s proposed responder-rate limitation did not add new matter. In order to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements, Medytox filed a revised motion to amend which was denied due to the introduction of new matter.

The responder rate substitute claim language was determined to have a scope of 50% to 100% based on the claim construction. Medytox relies on multiple clinical trials in their specification to show the actual responder rate that they attained. However, the highest rate achieved was 62% leaving a significant portion of the range unenabled with no clear direction on how to enable the rest of the claims. Relying on the Wands factors to conclude that the full scope of the claim was not enabled without undue experimentation.

Judge Reyna also references the recent Amgen v. Sanofi to require that the full scope of the claims must be enabled. Not enabling such a large range of the scope of the claims makes the lack of enablement seem more clear-cut in light of Amgen. While a different factual background from Amgen, not providing clear instructions to enable 76% of the claimed range is a more clear example of not enabling the full scope than the monoclonal antibodies of Amgen.

Medytox also challenges that the Board’s revision of its claim construction of the responder rate limitation made between its Preliminary Guidance and final written decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because it was arbitrary and capricious and deprived it of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Medytox specifically asserts that the Board reversed its decision based on a nearly identical record rending the reversal arbitrary and capricious. The USPTO Director intervened to explain that the Board’s Preliminary Guidance was “initial, preliminary, and nonbinding.”

Likewise, the significant extrinsic evidence that warranted the reversal of the determination was developed after the Preliminary Guidance was issued. The claim construction regarding the responder rate limitation, expert testimony, briefing regarding written description, and subsequent oral argument on the limitation were all developed after the Preliminary Guidance. Based on the totality of the record, the reversal of the claim construction was not arbitrary and capricious. The guidance program is meant to be an effort to provide some direction to the patent owner and not be a binding decision. At oral arguments, the Board expressed multiple concerns about the responder rate limitation and Medytox did not adequately remedy the issue. As such, the Board had plenty of evidence to base their reversal.

Guest post by Paul R. Gugliuzza & Joshua L. Sohn

One of the oddest things about the Federal Circuit is that, in the court’s view, it’s powerless to decide many issues of federal law that arise in the appeals presented to it.

Sure, on matters of patent law, what the Federal Circuit says binds district courts, the Patent Office, and future panels of the Federal Circuit itself. Ditto for nonpatent matters the Federal Circuit considers “unique” to patent disputes.

But, on pretty much every other issue in a Federal Circuit patent appeal—whether it be transfer of venue, the permissible scope of discovery, co-pending antitrust or copyright claims, or anything else—the Federal Circuit asserts no “law-saying” power. Instead, the Federal Circuit—and district courts in cases that will be appealed to the Federal Circuit—apply the precedent of the regional circuit from which the case arose.

Recent Federal Circuit venue disputes spotlight the need for a better approach to questions of nonpatent law in patent cases.

As readers of this blog surely know, the Federal Circuit decides venue questions all the time, usually through petitions for writs of mandamus by defendants seeking to escape the Eastern or Western Districts of Texas. As a nonpatent issue, however, a court deciding a transfer-of-venue fight in a patent case must apply regional circuit law.

Yet, at the regional circuits, transfer disputes are vanishingly rare: the Federal Circuit in a single year decides as many transfer cases as the regional circuits decide in a decade. Moreover, the regional circuit cases that do exist usually involve fact patterns wildly dissimilar from patent litigation, making that precedent unhelpful in the patent context.

The paucity of relevant binding precedent has led both district judges and Federal Circuit judges to essentially guess about what “what the law is.” Judge Albright, for instance, has complained about having to choose between what he characterized as “traditional Fifth Circuit transfer law” or “the Federal Circuit’s”—erroneous, in his view—“interpretations of Fifth Circuit transfer law.”

And, in one of the Federal Circuit’s most high-profile venue mandamus grants, In re Apple, Judge Moore castigated the majority on the ground that “[n]either [the Federal Circuit] nor the Fifth Circuit has held that an accused infringer’s general presence in a district is irrelevant” to the transfer analysis. Well, of course the Fifth Circuit has never held that! With the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, how could it?

Transfer isn’t the only area where we see the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule leaving judges and litigants in the dark. In a forthcoming article, we provide examples from areas as varied as copyright, antitrust, and attorney-client privilege.

And we propose a simple solution: much like federal courts certify unsettled questions of state law to state supreme courts, the Federal Circuit should certify unsettled questions of nonpatent law to the regional circuits.

At this point, you hopefully have lots of questions: Wouldn’t we need Congress to pass a statute to make this happen? What about Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement? Wouldn’t certifying questions just add more cost and delay? And wouldn’t it be easier to simply change the choice-of-law rule?

To see how we respond, download the article!

—–

Paul R. Gugliuzza is Professor of Law at Temple University Beasley School of Law.

Joshua L. Sohn is a Trial Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice and former law clerk to Judge Jerome Farris, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Stanford University.

The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and should not be taken to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

by Dennis Crouch

Design patents continue to rise in importance, but the underlying law full of eccentricities.  The crux of the issue lies in the manner patent law decisions are typically written. Most of precedential patent decisions are penned with a strong focus on utility patent doctrine, yet, surprisingly, the same patent doctrines of novelty, obviousness, definiteness, enablement, and written description are also applicable in the realm of design patents.

The Federal Circuit has decided to reevaluate this dichotomous situation specifically in relation to the question of obviousness. The case under scrutiny is LKQ Corp. v. GM Global Tech, 21-2348 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The court has set forth six key questions for the parties to consider:

A. Does KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), overrule or abrogate In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (CCPA 1982), and Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100 (Fed. Cir. 1996)?

B. Assuming that KSR neither overrules nor abrogates Rosen and Durling, does KSR nonetheless apply to design patents and suggest the court should eliminate or modify the Rosen-Durling test? In particular, please address whether KSR’s statements faulting “a rigid rule that limits the obviousness in-quiry,” 550 U.S. at 419, and adopting “an ex-pansive and flexible approach,” id. at 415, should cause us to eliminate or modify: (a) Durling’s requirement that “[b]efore one can begin to combine prior art designs . . . one must find a single reference, ‘a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design,’” 101 F.3dat 103 (quoting Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391); and/or (b) Durling’s require-ment that secondary references “may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are ‘so related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental fea-tures in one would suggest the application of those features to the other,’” id. at 103 (quot-ing In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal alterations omitted).

C. If the court were to eliminate or modify the Rosen-Durling test, what should the test be for evaluating design patent obviousness challenges?

D. Has any precedent from this court already taken steps to clarify the Rosen-Durling test? If so, please identify whether those cases resolve any relevant issues.

E. Given the length of time in which the Rosen-Durling test has been applied, would eliminat-ing or modifying the design patent obviousness test cause uncertainty in an otherwise settled area of law?

F. To the extent not addressed in the responses to the questions above, what differences, if any, between design patents and utility patents are relevant to the obviousness inquiry, and what role should these differences play in the test for obviousness of design patents?

En Banc Order.

The case itself involves design patents covering GM parts, such as front fenders.  See D797,625.  The existence of the design patent means that repair parts must come from authorized manufacturers and channels.  For years, auto insurance companies and others have argued that this improperly raises costs.

The original appellate decision was non-precedential and supported the PTAB IPR decision that the patent challenger failed to demonstrate obviousness. The court relied on the tests delineated in Rosen & Durling, putting a spotlight on a primary reference that ought to be “basically the same” as the claimed design. Notably, this is a substantially different approach than the one employed in utility patent obviousness doctrine.

The original panel was composed of Judges Lourie, Clevenger, and Stark. Though the panel released a per curium opinion, separate opinions were also issued by Judges Lourie and Stark. Judge Lourie expressed his conclusion that it is totally acceptable for the design patent obviousness test to be different from that in utility patents. “Obviousness of an ornamental design thus requires different considerations from those of a utility invention.”  Judge Stark disagreed with the majority opinion on a procedural grounds (forfeiture of certain arguments).

Barry Irwin teamed up with Profs Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna for the en banc petition. Joseph Herriges and John Dragseth from Fish & Richardson represent GM.

The court specifically invited the US Gov’t to file an amicus brief and also welcomed additional briefs of amicus curiae — noting that they “may be filed without consent and leave of the court.”  If you support LKQ (making it easier to invalidate design patents), amicus briefs will be due in late August.  If you support GM, briefs will be due in late September.

(Guest Post by Kevin Ahlstrom, Associate General Counsel, Patents, Meta. This post is part of a series by the Diversity Pilots Initiative, which advances inclusive innovation through rigorous research. The first blog in the series is here and resources from the first conference of the initiative are available here. – Jason)

Guided invention sessions not only increase idea submission rates but also transform individuals’ perception of themselves as inventors. By creating a supportive environment and equipping participants with the necessary tools, these sessions pave the way for gender equality in patenting.

Women submit ideas for patenting at a lower rate than men

In 2021, I noticed that most of the ideas I received for patenting came from men. At Meta, employees are encouraged to submit patent ideas through an inventor portal. Women submitted less than 10% of the ideas I received, despite making up more than 30% of the technical and design roles in the organizations I supported. I was chatting with a research scientist about this, and I asked her why she didn’t submit more of her ideas for patenting. She said, “I tend to minimize my contributions compared to others on my team. I sometimes think that the big patentable ideas are for people above my paygrade.”

Another female UI designer said, “We are all often working on things with many other people, and so it can feel presumptuous to claim ‘ownership’ over an idea. Vying for credit can bring up yucky shame feelings in me when I have been trained by our culture to make people happy, to support others, to help.”

I realized there were stark differences between the way that I, a male patent attorney, and many of my female coworkers view the invention process and related work. There are likely many causes for this engagement gap:

• differences in social expectations between men and women;
• fewer historical female inventor role models;
• women may be implicitly penalized for claiming ownership and credit;
• women often take on the unpaid labor of home and childcare responsibilities, leaving less time or energy for patent activities.

Regardless of the cause, it was clear that I could not rely solely on our inventor portal to capture women-generated innovation.

As my team and I searched for solutions, I initially wanted to hold training sessions for women on how to submit and advocate for their ideas. That’s what the men did – they submitted frequently and argued with me frequently; consequently, I approved more of their ideas for patenting. But why should we train women to act more like men? It didn’t make sense to ask women to change their behavior to fit inside a system that wasn’t designed for them. Instead of more training, we needed a change in our system to meet innovators where they were.

The Patent Team at Meta has been working on this issue for years. Together, we have made large strides in creating a patent program that is equitable and accessible to everyone. We’ve surveyed employees to better understand their needs, we’ve revamped our inventor portal to be more inclusive, we’ve held conferences and forums to spotlight diverse inventors and encourage other companies to improve, and much more.

Our Pilot: how to double women’s idea submission rate with guided invention sessions

A main component of our efforts has been implementing guided invention sessions for underrepresented inventors. Before I explain how to run one, I just want to say that guided invention sessions work. During the months in which we initially implemented these sessions, I saw the invention submission rate from women more than double: among orgs I support, ideas coming from women rose from less than 10% to 22%. Not quite the 30% needed for gender parity, but this is significant progress.

Here’s how it works. We model the guided invention sessions after the 6-3-5 Brainwriting Method, which is a proven way to come up with lots of ideas in an hour or less. Here’s a quick breakdown of the process:

• 5-7 participants gather to ideate around a single problem. The problem can be anything, but ideally should encourage patentable ideas that align with company goals.
• The sessions consist of two meetings, each lasting one hour. At the first meeting, participants brainstorm using the 6-3-5 method. This can be done in-person on sheets of paper or virtually using a remote collaboration tool like Google Sheets, Slides, or Figma.
• The first meeting is broken up into multiple 5-8 minute segments where participants use the collaboration tool to write solutions to the problem.
• At the end of each 5-8 minute segment, papers are passed and a new segment begins. Each participant can either write down new ideas or build on the existing ones from previous segments.
• At the end of this first 60-minute meeting, the group will have generated 40-60 solutions to the problem.

Between the first and second meeting, a patent attorney reviews the ideas and selects the most patentable ideas for further discussion. At the second meeting, the group discusses 2-4 of the selected ideas to build on. I encourage as much detail as possible in this meeting, so that by the end we have enough detail to begin drafting one or more patent applications.

In terms of cadence, we have found that doing guided invention sessions once per half produces strong patents, gives inventors something to look forward to, and avoids putting too much burden on patent counsel.

Conclusion: help people become confident and comfortable with patents

In my opinion, the most remarkable result of these sessions has been the inventor transformation. Session participants realize what it takes to generate a patentable idea, and after participating in the process, they are much more likely to become repeat inventors. After attending her first guided inventor session, the research scientist who thought patents were above her paygrade has since submitted 16 ideas for patenting and has 6 patent applications to her name.

Another participant said, “I didn’t know I was an inventor until I attended this workshop.”

Just to drive the point home: guided invention sessions immediately boost the idea rate coming from underrepresented inventors. Participants find the sessions fulfilling and leave confident and excited to patent their innovations.

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Three main takeaways:

1. A variety of societal expectations and gender norms has resulted in a significant disparity in patent idea submissions between men and women.
2. Guided invention sessions have proven to be a game-changer in boosting idea submissions from underrepresented inventors. By providing a structured and inclusive platform for brainstorming, these sessions empower women and other underrepresented inventor groups to participate confidently in the patenting process.
3. Guided invention sessions not only increase idea submission rates but also transform individuals’ perception of themselves as inventors. By creating a supportive environment and equipping participants with the necessary tools, these sessions pave the way for gender equality in patenting.

by Dennis Crouch

Though there have been some improvements, initial office actions regularly require a fair amount clean-up and fine-tuning. This process often includes rectifying typographical errors and clarifying loose claim language. It’s also common for the examiner to misconstrue aspects of the invention.  However, by the time the final rejection stage is reached, these issues are usually addressed, and the lines of difference are more clearly drawn.  So, for my study here, I decided to look solely at final office actions and ask the question of what percentage of these involve eligibility rejections.

The chart above reports the percentage of final office actions that include an eligibility rejection.  The uppermost (orange dashed) line on the chart represents applications examined by the eCommerce art units (specifically the 3620s, 3680s, and 3690s). Notably, in 2023 more than 90% of the final rejections for the 3690s (finance, banking, insurance) included an eligibility rejection.  The middle (grey) line in the chart pertains to non-financial data processing inventions (2120s). The main focus of 2120s examination has now shifted predominantly to issues related to AI  simulation and modeling. The third and last (double blue) line in the chart represents all applications. This totals line illustrates that around 9% of all final rejections include an eligibility focus. This is an increase from the 2% rate in 2012.  Notably, about half of the USPTO art units have an eligibility rejection rate of around 0%.

One issue with my study here approach is the time factor. The majority of cases that receive a final rejection are at least three years removed from their effective filing date, and so more recent filings might be doing a better job.  This study was conducted based on a sample size of 100,000 final rejections and is limited only to publicly available files.

The second major new Senate patent bill focuses on reconstructing AIA trials — particularly by reducing availability and power of inter partes review and post grant proceedings.  The bipartisan Promoting and Respecting Economically Vital American Innovation Leadership (PREVAIL) Act was introduced by Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.),Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), and Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii).

1. Limiting Standing: Parties could only file IPR petitions if they would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal Court.
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence: Invalidating a patent before the PTAB would require proving unpatentability of a previously issued claim by clear and convincing evidence.  This is a substantially higher standard than the current requirement of preponderance of the evidence.
3. Separating Institution from Trial: Judges who participate in the institution will would be forbidden from then serving on the trial team.  The idea here is to avoid holdover bias against the patent that may have been established during the institution stage.
4. Drop Invalidity Defenses: If an IPR is established, the petitioner must drop any invalidity defenses from pending litigation that could have been raised in an IPR.
5. No Interference: Although the Director still has power of Director Review, the law would forbid the Director from interfering or influencing PTAB IPR decision-making.

The press release also notes the following provisions:

• Require standing for PTAB challengers and limit repeated petitions challenging the same patent;
• Harmonize PTAB claim construction and burden of proof with federal district court;
• End duplicative patent challenges by requiring a party to choose between making its validity challenges before the PTAB or in district court; and
• Increase transparency by prohibiting the USPTO director from influencing PTAB panel decisions.

IPRs would remain valuable if this bill became law, but their scope would be substantially limited.

Read the bill here.

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Broadcom v. Netflix revolves around the construction of the claim term “drive server” found in Broadcom’s U.S. Patent No. 6,341,375.  The decision reaffirms the significance of preferred embodiments in claim construction and their potential to shape the validity of patent claims.

The basic question in the case is whether a “drive server” requires computing capabilities, or is storage capacity enough.  Although the plain language of “server” suggests computing capacity, the court agreed with the PTAB that the intrinsic evidence, including the claim language and the specification, supported the broader interpretation.  In the IPR, Broadcom was seeking the narrower construction in order to avoid prior art.  Under the broader construction, the claims were found invalid as obvious.

The important part of the case serves as a reminder of the power of “preferred embodiment” language within the patent specification.  In this case, Qualcomm had included a preferred embodiment of a DVD drive server, also known as a disk library, that contained a number of DVD drives and associated disks.  Broadcom admitted that its proposed construction would exclude this preferred embodiment if the disk library contained no additional computer.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit quoted Vitrionics in its conclusion that: Claim constructions that exclude a preferred embodiment are “rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”  Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (opinion by Judge Michel). In this case, that evidentiary support was lacking.  Invalidity affirmed.

Since Vitrionics, the Federal Circuit has placed additional weight upon intrinsic evidence — something that seemingly should give the recited principle even more power.

by Dennis Crouch

This week, the Supreme Court is considering the re-filed certiorari petition of Franz Wakefield, dba CoolTVNetwork.com v. Blackboard, Inc., No. 22-819.  The petition’s basis stems from the debate over Judge Newman’s competency.  The appellate case was decided by a panel that included Judge Newman, and the petitioner relies heavily upon the public documents circulated in the ongoing disability hearing. Including the repeated statements suggesting that Judge Newman lacks competence and “may suffer from impairment of cognitive abilities (i.e., attention, focus, confusion and memory).”  The petition notes that Judge Newman’s colleagues acted unanimously  to remove her from being assigned new cases.  Wakefield is pursuing his case pro se and so it lacks some fine points, but the thrust of the claims here are quite clear.

Read the petition here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-819/268013/20230531141520726_20230531-141242-95759941-00000772.pdf

On the 22nd of June, the court will also consider petitions in two additional IP cases that both focus on IPR procedure grounded in statutory interpretation:

• Apple Inc. v. CalTech, No. 22-203: Scope of estoppel following IPR. After losing an IPR, when can defendant later raise similar issues in district court?
• Nike v. Adidas, No. 22-927: Can the PTAB raise its own patentability objections to substitute claims that are different from those raised by the patent challenger?

As always, the odds are on denial, and we’ll know something by early July.

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit’s special investigation committee recently released an order in focusing on next steps in its ongoing investigation into the conduct and capacity of Judge Newman.  Although the investigation generally centers on disability and misconduct in her role as judge — the most recent order narrows the focus to the question of whether Judge Newman’s refusal to submit to medical testing constitutes misconduct that could potentially lead to her removal from the bench. The committee’s next steps will be to hold a closed-door hearing on July 13 solely on this issue.  The committee appears to be tacitly admitting that its allegations of general misconduct are insufficient alone and that it cannot prove disability without a medical evaluation.  Still, the committee is moving forward methodically and the order indicates that the refusal-to-cooperate is one area that it could fairly efficiently review and reach a conclusion sufficient to make a final recommendation to the Judicial Council, despite Judge Newman’s lack of cooperation.

Confidentiality: The court’s decision to refuse Judge Newman’s request for a public hearing is another important aspect of this case. This decision raises questions about transparency and the public’s right to know about proceedings that could potentially impact the composition of the judiciary. The order explains the committee’s reasoning:

• The court begins with a strong presumption that all proceedings that form part of the Committee’s investigation should be confidential, as mandated by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 and the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings.
• Confidentiality facilitates the investigative process and is almost universally accepted.
• Opening the argument to the public carries a grave risk of inadvertent disclosure of both witnesses’ identities and confidential details of witness statements, which could impair the investigative process.
• The court believes that a public hearing may include references to materials that have not been made public, and that discussion may disclose information that would identify witnesses or confidential details of witness statements.
• The court believes that a better approach to permitting some public transparency would be to consider releasing a redacted transcript after the argument has been completed.
• The court argues that the cases defining a right of access to trials are of limited usefulness in the context of the fundamentally different procedures of judicial disciplinary boards, which do not have a long history of openness.

Read the Order.

by Dennis Crouch

This essay focuses on proposed Advancing America’s Interests Act (H.R.3535) which aims to limit NPE access to the ITC by refining the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement and by adding a stronger public interest consideration prior to issuance of an exclusion order. 

The International Trade Commission (ITC) is a branch of the U.S. government focused on protecting domestic industry against undue foreign competition.  The ITC’s power extends in to several areas, but primarily by enforcing the laws of (1) intellectual property rights; (2) anti-dumping; and (3) countervailing duties.

1. Intellectual Property Rights: Section 337 investigations constitute a significant portion of ITC’s enforcement activities. These investigations patent, trademark, or copyright violations caused by trade importation into the US. The ITC has the power to issue an exclusion order — much like an injunction — to bar infringing products from entering the US.
2. Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties: The ITC can impose anti-dumping duties on foreign manufacturers selling goods in the U.S. at less than fair value. The ITC can also impose countervailing duties to counter effects of foreign subsidies on products imported into the U.S.

Because the ITCs key role is protecting US industry, the agency can only act if there is a domestic industry to be protected.   In recent years, the ITC and Federal Circuit have expanded the scope of what counts for ITC domestic industry.  For instance, US investments in licensing of IP have been increasingly recognized as a major factor in establishing the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement.  And, patent holders have been able to rely upon uses of their technology licensees as evidence of a domestic industry.  Likewise, R&D may also satisfy the requirements. Changes like these have broadened the scope of the domestic industry requirement, making ITC action accessible to industries and companies that may not have traditional manufacturing facilities or significant capital investments in the United States. — i.e., non practicing entities.

H.R.3535 – Advancing America’s Interests Act (AAIA).  This proposed legislation aims to amend Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to counteract some of these expansions by narrowing the definition of domestic industry.  This is the third time that Rep Schweikert has introduced the legislation. And, the basic thrust is that non-practicing patent holders would have real difficulty in bringing Section 337 complaints.

Key features of the proposed amendments include:

1. Licensing Activities: The Bill seeks to refine the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement by requiring that complainants demonstrate their licensing activities have led to the development of a product. This change is intended to prevent Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), which often license their patents under threat of patent infringement suits, from establishing a domestic industry. This adjustment is designed to still permit entities who license patents as part of a technology transfer leading to new products, to assert their intellectual property rights at the ITC.
2. Unwilling Licensees: The Bill proposes changes regarding the use of “unwilling” licensees to establish a domestic industry. Currently, a third-party licensee can be subpoenaed for confidential information, regardless of their desire to participate in the investigation. The proposed Act stipulates that the patent owner can only rely on the licensee’s activities to establish a domestic industry if the licensee joins the complaint under oath.
3. Public Interest and Exclusion Orders: The Act introduces a significant shift in how the ITC considers exclusion orders. It requires the ITC to affirmatively determine that any exclusion serves the public interest. This change effectively removes the current presumption in favor of exclusionary relief — making ITC action more akin to the eBay analysis in district court..
4. Expedited Fact Finding: The Act would codify the ITC’s existing “100-day early disposition program,” directing the ITC to consider at the beginning of an investigation whether there are potentially dispositive issues appropriate for an early Initial Determination by the presiding administrative law judge.

ITC action became much more popular in the wake of eBay and the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief in district court. The proposal here would shift that dynamic once again and would represent a significant shift — coupled with the limits on NPE filings.  If passed, this legislation would reshape the ITC’s approach and its effectiveness for many patent holders.

by Dennis Crouch

The USPTO began establishing satellite offices a decade ago to expand beyond the traditional Alexandria (Washington DC) headquarters.  We now have offices in Detroit, Dallas, Denver, and San Jose. Last year, Congress voted to further expand the decentralization by at least one more. The Unleashing American Innovators Act of 2022 (UAIA) mandates creation of a Southeast Regional Office (SERO).  The USPTO is now seeking comments on where the office should be located — and the methodology it should use in selecting a location.  [Fed Reg].

The statute requires that it be located in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, or Arkansas.  I would automatically rule-out Virginia and North Carolina as too close to the PTO HQ; and also rule-out Arkansas as too close to the Dallas Office.  In my mind, I quickly narrowed things down to four potential cities: Atlanta, Jacksonville, Miami, and Nashville.

In my comments to the PTO, I will be including the results of this poll: LinkedIn Poll.  Voting is open for a few more days.  Atlanta is currently in the lead.

The core objective here is to is to deliver better services to citizens and inventors in the region; be more responsive to their needs; and drive positive changes in these regions.  Simultaneously, the Community Outreach Office aims to provide a platform for dialogue, bridging the gap between citizens and the government. The statute sets out five particular considerations:

1. Strengthen connections between the Office and patent filers through enhanced outreach to a broad spectrum of innovators including underrepresented, rural, low-income, and student populations.
2. Improve retention of diverse patent examiners and judges, taking into account economic, geographic, and demographic factors.
3. Enhance the recruitment process to attract more high-quality patent examiners.
4. Reduce the backlog of pending patent applications.
5. Elevate the standards of patent examination to ensure greater accuracy and quality.

In addition to the new Southeast Regional Office, the PTO has also been tasked with opening a “Northern New England Community Outreach Office (NNECOO)” and the PTO is seeking comments on its location as well.  The USPTO will be also be conducting a study to identify whether more regional offices would benefit US innovation.