Patent Damages Question

PatentlyO235Patent damages question: Lets say a patent has a broad independent claim and a narrower dependent claim. Should the damages calculation be any different for the following three cases where: (1) the broad claim is found to be infringed & valid; (2) the narrow claim is found to be infringed & valid; or (3) both claims are found to be valid & infringed?  Further, what if the claims were found in two separate patents? Finally, what additional information would be helpful in answering this question?

Patent Trolls by the Numbers

by Assistant Professor Colleen Chien, Santa Clara University Law School, colleenchien@gmail.com, @colleen_chien (Download PDF of this at SSRN)

Following President’s Obama remarks and reintroduction of the SHIELD Act, today the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet is holding hearings on litigation abuse by patent trolls (aka patent assertion entities or PAEs). Companies J.C. Penney, SAS, Cisco, Johnson & Johnson, & Adobe, are testifying. Part of the discussion may focus on patent troll metrics, on which I have previously reported. These statistics draw heavily upon proprietary research as well as my own analyses, so, in the interest of full disclosure, below are the numbers and what I know about them.  Some say that the time has come to act, not to further study the PAE phenomenon but I believe in both – that to craft interventions that are both narrowly tailored and actually will work requires a deep understanding and careful analysis.

(It bears mentioning as well that much also can be learned from related experiences  — indeed, litigation abuse is nothing new and in fact the Judiciary committee that is hosting today’s hearing held a hearing on litigation abuse in non-patent contexts yesterday. In the patent troll context, many interventions, like fee-shifting, improving patent quality control, special defenses, and maintenance fee tweaking have been suggested/tried before – in the recent past (early 2000s) as well as in the late 1800s, against both farming and railroad patent trolls and related contexts. FWIW, in my paper on the topic,  I discuss other fixes like court leadership, industry organizations, collective action, and bolstering protection of users based on what has worked in these settings.)

1. PAEs brought 62% of 2012 patent litigations

According to RPX Corporation PAEs initiated 62% of all patent litigation, or 2,921 of 4,701 suits in 2012. RPX is a publicly-traded company that provides solutions to troll threats for its member companies and has great data, principally maintained by Seth Besse.

        PAE Suits (2005-2012)

Credit: © RPX Corporation 2013

Data checks on RPX numbers:

  1. Patent Freedom reports 2,923 NPE lawsuits in 2012, as compared to RPX's 2,921 PAE lawsuits, using a slightly different definition.
  2. I compared about 1,000 of RPX's codings with my own, and reported the result in Appendix C of this paper: "The share of disagreements between the databases was 7%, with the net number of trolls varying by 4%."
  3. Robin Feldman, Sara Jeruss, and Joshua Walker found that about 40% of 2011 suits were brought by patent monetizers in their study for the GAO. See comparison at page 17.

Comparison to 2011: The share of suits brought by PAEs in 2012 grew from 2011. However, the AIA's misjonder rules, which curbed the troll tactic of naming multiple unrelated defendants in a single suit which had artificially deflated troll suit numbers, are responsible. Thus, the increase in the number of troll suits, post-AIA, is most likely an artifact of the AIA.

2. In 2012, PAEs Sued More Non-Tech Companies than Tech Companies

Though the PAE share may surprise some, patented technologies like software are the building blocks of modern commerce. "Low-tech" industries like funeral homes, advertising agencies, and retailers like JC Penny which is testifying today are all taking steps to protect themselves from troll demands. Though historically a "tech" problem, in 2012 PAEs sued more non-tech companies than tech companies, according to the analysis below by Patent Freedom, which provides market intelligence on patent trolls. Retailers are hit the hardest by non-tech PAE suits, followed by automotive like Ford, which has also testified against trolls, financial services, and consumer products. So expect a broadening of the coalition to deal with trolls especially as many in these sectors are likely being sued over their use rather than making of technology.

3. Individual Inventor v. Corporate PAE suits

Not all trolls are created alike. Individuals get injunctions, corporate trolls don't. (See my paper with Mark Lemley, at FIG 3.) The SHIELD act would force corporate losing trolls to pay, but not individuals. "Non-practicing entities" can also include universities and startups, which is why I created the term PAE to apply to businesses that assert patents as their primary business model – universities and startups don't, they are focused on commercializing or transferring technology. (As Justice Kennedy put it in his eBay concurrence, trolls are firms that "use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.")

Based on data provided by RPX, 94% of 2012 suits brought by entities that don't practice were brought by corporate PAEs. Individual inventors were another 5% and the remaining 1% universities, based on data provided by RPX. However, PWC's excellent litigation report reports much higher "individual NPE" proportion – of 51% but for the 1995-2011 period and likely using a different methodology (the PWC university share is a bit higher). Because the SHIELD act turns on the individual vs. corporate distinction, it would be good to reconcile these numbers. 

The Distribution of 2012 NPE Suits by NPE Type (based on RPX data)

4. PAE defendants comprised 59% of all patent lit defendants

According to RPX Corporation, defendants to PAE suits represented 59% of 2012 patent litigation defendants, or 4,125 out of 6,934. (Patent Freedom counted 3,859 NPE defendants to RPX's 4,125).

    PAE Defendants (2005-2012)

Credit: © RPX Corporation 2013

Comparison to 2011: As the graph above shows, the absolute number of defendants named in PAE suits in 2011 shrank about 25% in 2012. However, that the relative share of troll defendants only declined by 4% (from 63% to 59%), supports that this trend reflects a general decline in new patent cases brought by practicing and non-practicing entities, rather than a fundamental shift away from the courts by PAEs.

The Success of the Misjoinder Rules

While the share of PAE defendants has not gone down significantly, I do believe, based on unreported analyses that I have performed, that trolls have changed their litigation tactics in at least one respect – they are less likely, because of the misjoinder rules, to name small defendants in lawsuits where they cannot be joined with other parties. In this way, the joinder rules can be said to be having their intended impact of making life harder for trolls. The small companies that actually are sued, however, are arguably worse off because they have fewer joint defense options. And even if they are not sued, many small defendants are receiving letters (see below).

5. 55% of Unique PAE defendants makes $10M or less

Based on my analysis of RPX's database, 55% of unique PAE defendants make $10M or less in revenue, and 66% make less than $100M a year. (previously I have erroneously reported the 55% number as associated with defendants making "less than $10M", it should be "$10M or less." Apologies for the error!). While small defendants have historically received less attention as troll targets, the patent woes of podcasters and small businesses that use scanners, not to mention bakeries (I love bread) have gotten recent attention.

Notes:

Because small companies are sued fewer times than large companies – e.g. Apple gets dozens of PAE demands whereas a small company may only get a handful – the number of total demands is more heavily skewed towards large companies than the unique defendant count. However, I believe 55% to be a conservative estimate because I calculated it based on actual revenue estimates in the RPX database provided by Dun & Bradstreet and commercial providers, and excluded from both the nominator and denominator companies for whom no revenue is reported. If, on the other hand, we assume that companies without coded revenue likely have limited revenue – an assumption other scholars have made– the share would grow. Longer discussion of methodological issues and approaches to filling in missing data here. Also of note, because of the success of the joinder rules in discouraging suits against individual small cos., the 55% number has likely declined in recent months.

6.At the ITC in 2012, PAE complainants brought about 35% of patent complaints and about half of patent respondents.

337 Patent Investigations & Respondents

2011

2012

New Patent Investigations

69

40

PAE Share

23%

30%

New Patent Defendants

226

184

PAE Share

43%

48%

My research assistants worked with me to code the complainants in these cases, using data provided by the ITC. As with district court defendant counts, total ITC investigations and defendants (called "respondents") declined in 2012 from 2011, by about 40% and 20%, respectively. However, the PAE share of investigations and respondents actually increased from 2011 to 2012, from 43% to 48%.

Data checks:

  1. Last summer, the ITC published a report called "Facts and Trends" that tracks NPEs. It reported a combined NPE share of 19% of investigations, and 41% of defendants in 2011, versus my PAE shares of 23% and 43%, respectively (see above). The ITC report also notes that ITC numbers tend to vary greatly from year to year, given their relatively small numbers of investigations, which I tend to agree with.
  2. Covington & Burling's Robert Fram and Ashley Miller, in an excellent unpublished paper The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity Litigation at the ITC: The State of the Law and Litigation Strategy (Jan. 5, 2011), tracked the percentage of companies relying on their licensing activities to show a domestic industry from 13% in 2000-2006 to 35% in the first 8 months of 2010). Based on an extension of their database they shared with me, the rate in 2011 (through Oct. 1) was 41%.

Legislative reform?: Members of the ITC bar and ex-ITC officials remain deeply skeptical of the efforts to reform the ITC legislatively that tech companies are pushing for. Last summer, I argued that the ITC's decision-making was evolving, and recommended revisiting its record in six months to a year. However, the fewer cases and exclusion orders that the ALJs have issued since then have meant a slower evolution of the ITC's law, despite more attention from government agencies and others.

While we wait, I still find it puzzling that entities like Acacia, Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan, Beacon Navigation GmbH of Switzerland, and Intellectual Ventures would put up the considerable funds it takes to bring an ITC case when the ITC can't award the licensing revenues they seek, but only an exclusion order. The best I can tell is that this trend reflects a deeper dissatisfaction of patentholders with the consequences of eBay, rather than a desire to stop unfair importation, particularly since PAEs name domestic defendants more often than foreign ones (see Appendix A).

7. Some High Impact PAE Patents Fit the "Buy and Sue" Pattern

SHIELD has put more emphasis on the provenance of patents, with Joff Wild at IAM estimating that SHIELD might only cover one in four NPEs based on Patent Freedom Data. I really respect Joff's blog and magazine, and recommend it to anyone who is serious about understanding the monetizer perspective (though the magazine is expensive). However, I have a different view of the numbers, that because patent impact is heavily skewed, what matters are high impact patents– that is to say, if just Lodsys and Geotag were discouraged from bringing their suits, many people would have been happy. Through our analysis of "high impact" patents I asked Patent Freedom to put together for another analysis, we found that the nine out of ten were purchased before assertion, rather than owner-asserted.

10 High-Impact PAE Patent Campaigns: 9 out of litigated patents were bought, not owner-asserted

.

Also, I understand that the Patent Freedom folks have a different view of their own data than IAM so if you are interested follow them on Twitter:@PatentFreedom.

8. PAEs are Less Successful than Practicing Entities in Litigation

PWC's excellent annual litigation report is chock full of statistics about patent litigation and in particular, with respect to NPEs, that: they look to juries more (but the differences are declining), a higher median damage award and a lower than practicing company success rate (34% practicing co v.23% NPE ) that is declining (Chart 5B).

John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Josh Walker's paper documents that the "most litigated" (8x or more) NPE patents lose more than 90% of the time in court. Data provided by RPX found that such repeat litigants dominate PAE cases – 61% of defendants named in 2011-2012 were sued by a PAE who had brought the case 8+ times (see page 33).

9. Public PAEs

My research assistant and I have been working on profiling public company PAEs – those which derive a majority or significant revenue from asserting patents. Depending on how you slice it, we have found about 16 of them (ACTG, ASUR, DEMO: OTC, NSSI, OPTI, RMBS, VHC, WIN:TO, VRNG, PANL, DSS: NYSE Amex , WDDD: OTC, BB,PCO, PRKR, UPIP); a number of the stocks are very volatile and live and die by litigation outcomes – invest with caution.

10. What We Need to Understand Better: Demands , Users, the Differential Impact of Interventions

Litigations are only a tiny part of the story. While good data on patent demand letters is lacking, here are a few data points:

  • In my survey of startups, among companies that had received threats (N=79), in some cases many threats, less than a third had been sued. This survey is being redistributed to a larger and more representative sample which should yield better estimates when it is concluded.
  • In its RICO complaint against Innovatio, Cisco reported that over 8,000 letters had been sent, even though there were only 26 named defendants, a ratio of 276:1.

We also need to understand how many of these suits are user based ones – in my survey (N=79), 40% of respondents said the demand was based on a technology they were using, not making. Such suits seem hard to justify as anything but nuisance-based.

Some will say that the time has come to act, not to further study the PAE phenomenon but in order to craft interventions that are both narrowly tailored and actually will work requires careful analysis and learning from the past as many interventions like fee-shifting, patent quality control, and maintenance fee tweaking have been suggested/tried before, in related and different contexts — some of them even to trolls of the late 1800s, as detailed in my paper, which also suggests: bolstering protection of and staying cases against users, industry organizations, and collective action.)

11. What Really Counts

What really matters is not PAE litigation itself but the impact it has on businesses, innovation, and the economy, and in particular how these impacts are distributed and also the justice or injustice of the claims – that is why there is so much heat on the PAE issue –because people who are sued feel that had no ability to anticipate or avoid it. My research has documented the positive impacts of a liquid IP market, and that startups are selling to trolls and benefiting from that monetization. However, it also documents a significant emotional toll: people said demands have "invoked rage over the waste of time," made a target "very very angry," "ruined family friends" and caused "stress" and "ill-will generation [sic]": "it was agonizing to hand over all the money we had earned from a product we had invented and created ourselves to a firm that invents nothing and creates nothing. Our founder has since lost his house, car [sic] all his assets." As the numbers of impacted companies and industries continues to grow, don't be surprised if the ranks of those who support curbing most egregious litigation abuses – the practices of going after end-users, rather than manufacturers and extracting from small companies nuisance-based rather than value-based settlements – continues to swell as well.

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Notes:

  • With thanks to my research assistants Aashish Karkhanis, Nicole Shanahan, Teri Karobonik, John Neal, and Coryn Millslagle and to RPX Corp., Patent Freedom, Gazelle Technologies, Robert Fram and Ashley Miller.
  • High impact patents discussed above include 7,222,078 (Lodsys), 7,346,472 (Bluespike), 5,937,402 (DataTern), 6,101,502 (Datatern), 5,930,474 (Geotag), 6,150,947 (Ogma), 5,223,844 (PJC Logistics), 6,185,590 (Project Paperless), 7,054,949 (Single Touch) 8,015,307 (Single Touch).

Design Patents in the Modern World Conference

Stanford Law School is hosting what looks to be an excellent event on April 5, 2013 that focuses on design patents. The event is free, but you should register here.

Long neglected in practice and academic scholarship, design patents have exploded in importance as a result both of recent changes in the law and high-profile cases like Apple v. Samsung. Drawing on the experience of lawyers, in-house counsel and academics, our conference will explore both practical and policy ramifications of these developments.

Speakers include: Sarah Burstein (University of Oklahoma); Christopher Carani (McAndrews); Dennis Crouch (University of Missouri); Alan Morgan Datri (WIPO); Brian Hanlon (USPTO); Laura Heymann (William & Mary Law School); James Juo (Fulwider Patton); Robert Katz (Banner & Witcoff); Mark Lemley (Stanford); Jaime Lemons (Nike); Katie Maksym (Nike); Michael Meehan (Google); Mark McKenna (Notre Dame Law School); Tom Moga (Shook Hardy & Bacon); John Pratt (Kilpatrick Townsend); Michael Risch (Villanova Law School); Perry Saidman (Saidman Design Law); and Matt Schruers (CCIA).

More Info: http://www.law.stanford.edu/event/2013/04/05/design-patents-in-the-modern-world-conference

The following day (April 6, 2013), Stanford is also hosting an academic conference on design patents with additional speakers, including Paul Goldstein, Rebecca Tushnet, Pam Samuelson, David Abrams, Jason Du Mont, Andew Torrance, Sarah Wasserman Rajec, Graeme Dinwoodie, Sunder Madhavi, Peter Lee, Ryan Vocca, Gerard Magloicca, Rob Merges, and Colleen Chien. The second day is purely academic and will have some pie-in-the-sky, but is also free and open to practitioners.

See you there!

Revisiting Inequitable Conduct at the Supreme Court

By Dennis Crouch

The US Supreme Court has decided a number of patent cases that raise questions of unenforceability. Perhaps most notable among these are:

  • Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933);
  • Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); and
  • Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).

This trio of cases explains that inequitable conduct fits within the scope of the traditional equitable doctrine of unclean hands.

Keystone involved a patentee paying another party to lie about its prior use of a patented invention where that use might have been a prior public use. Similarly, in Hazel-Atlas, the patentee wrote an article and had it published under the name of a well-known expert (with the expert's consent). After seeing how the article lauded the invention (and without knowing the connection), the PTO was willing to issue the patent. Precision involved perjury in the course of an interference proceeding. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that that the unclean hands doctrine could be used to render the patent unenforceable.

For many years, the doctrine of unclean hands (and, as we call it now inequitable conduct) was a powerful in-court tool for accused infringers to challenge patent enforcement. Almost since the Federal Circuit beginning, Federal Circuit judges have been on a crusade to limit the doctrine. The court's most recent pronouncement found in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) continues this trajectory and strongly limits the scope of inequitable conduct allegations.

In Therasense, the Federal Circuit offers two pathways for proving inequitable conduct in the patent prosecution process. The first and primary pathway clear and convincing proof of (1) intentional misconduct and (2) that the misconduct is a but-for cause of the patent issuing. As shorthand, we speak of (1) intentionality and (2) materiality. The Therasense majority, also offered a second pathway for proving inequitable conduct based upon "egregious affirmative acts of misconduct." According to the court, the mere non-disclosure or omission of required information will always fit within the primary pathway while intentional affirmative misstatements that go beyond attorney argument could fit within the second pathway if sufficiently egregious. In reading the trio of Supreme Court cases, the Federal Circuit found that Keyston, Hazel-Atlas, and Precision all fit the definition of egregious misconduct.

Writing in dissent Judge O'Malley criticized the majority opinion as unduly rigid in its formulation of the unclean hands doctrine.

[B]oth the majority and [other] dissenting opinions eschew flexibility in favor of rigidity. Both opinions suggest tests for materiality to apply in all cases. Their respective materiality inquiries are black or white, while equity requires judicial consideration of shades of gray.

The majority defines materiality under a but-for test, with an exception for intentionally false affidavits filed with the PTO. The dissent, on the other hand, defines materiality according to Rule [37 C.F.R. 1.56]. Both tests fail to provide district courts with flexibility to find inequitable conduct in an extraordinary case where the conduct in question would not be defined as such under either test. This result is contrary to the very nature of equity and centuries of Supreme Court precedent. I cannot, accordingly, lend support to either of the immutable tests proposed by my colleagues.

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Sony Computer v. 1st Media LLC (on petition for writ of certiorari 2013)

In a recently filed petition for writ of certiorari, Sony and Viacom have asked the Supreme Court return the law to the flexible tests of its old precedent. Raising the following question:

Did the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit err in restricting district courts' equitable discretion in evaluating patent unenforceability, contrary to this Court's precedent in Keystone Driller, Hazel-Atlas, and Precision Instrument, by applying a rigid test that (a) forecloses district courts from considering the entire circumstantial record; and (b) precludes district courts from granting equitable remedies where a patent applicant has violated the PTO's duty of candor.

The Federal Circuit intended that the second pathway for egregious misconduct add sufficient flexibility to fit within the Supreme Court's doctrine. Sony responds that the limited carve-out "is flawed because it creates a rigid threshold [of an egregious affirmative act of misconduct] as a prerequisite to the equitable discretion called for by this Court's precedent. The flexibility embodied in this Court's precedent should apply in all cases, not just those involving affirmative egregious misconduct."

Read Sony's Petition:  Download 1st Media Certiorari Petition

Doctrinal Precedence Among the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Patent Act, and the Sherman Act

Guest post by Professor Brett M. Frischmann (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law)

On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a case concerning reverse payment settlements of patent litigation.  The court granted cert on the following issue:

Whether reverse-payment agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying patent litigation was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as the court below held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful (as the Third Circuit has held).

In this brief post, I suggest a way to decide the issue in a manner that resolves the apparent tensions between the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Patent Act, and the Sherman Act. To my knowledge, the argument I make does not appear explicitly in the briefs, although Scott Hemphill made a related argument in his 2006 NYU Law Review article, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem.

Hatch-Waxman should be given substantial priority in the analytical framework that courts employ when resolving antitrust claims about reverse payment settlements of patent litigation. Here is why. Both antitrust law and patent law are general-purpose, industry-agnostic legal regimes. Antitrust law regulates competition generally. It aims to sustain competition and constrain anticompetitive practices, and it does so with very general legal prescriptions that courts must apply in a wide range of different contexts. Patent law aims to encourage innovation by giving inventors the right to exclude others from a patented invention. Patent law also consists of very general legal prescriptions that the PTO and courts must apply in a wide range of different contexts. In both antitrust and patent, sector-specific, industry-specific, or even context-specific rules do arise over time in the courts or agencies. But the statutory law enacted by Congress is general-purpose.

Hatch-Waxman is special-purpose and industry-specific, and it also happens to be last-in-time. Congress enacted Hatch-Waxman to accomplish specific ends through specific means. Of course, Hatch-Waxman is a complex regulatory regime, and there are various tradeoffs reflected in the law that may have been necessary to get it passed. But Hatch-Waxman primarily aimed to induce competition in drug markets when such competition is feasible, and one of the central means for accomplishing this end is litigation over patent validity.1 Thus, Hatch-Waxman envisioned two particular types of competition—first, competition in courts between owners of drug patents and generic drug companies, and second, competition in drug markets between brand firms and generics. Reverse payment settlements stifle both types of competition.

What do I mean when I say that Hatch-Waxman should be given substantial priority in the analytical framework that courts employ when resolving antitrust claims about reverse payment settlements of patent litigation? The antitrust-patent interface has been the source of substantial consternation—how do we resolve tensions that might arise among competing legal principles and values? Regardless of how one comes out on how to resolve or understand the interface, it is largely irrelevant to this particular set of issues. Hatch-Waxman replaces general patent law in this context. As a result, it supplies the relevant principles and values, and it significantly narrows the range of relevant arguments that a court should entertain in an antitrust suit. Simply put, broad claims about principles and values derived from patent law should not carry much, if any, weight. For example, claims about the impact of reverse payment settlements, or their prohibition, on patent law's "incentives to innovate" are red herrings. Similarly, arguments about weak vs. strong patents are also red herrings because there is nothing in Hatch-Waxman itself that draws a distinction between weak and strong. (It is worth noting that even for "really strong" patents, litigation over patent validity also provides the public with greater certainty about the validity of those patents.) Finally, claims about the general judicial economy of encouraging settlement are also irrelevant because Hatch-Waxman directly employs litigation as a means to facilitate competition.

Antitrust scrutiny of reverse payment settlements of patent litigation need not get bogged down in discussions of patent law or judicial economy. Congress has spoken clearly and specifically and chosen to use patent litigation as a means to induce competition. Reverse payment settlements of patent litigation are precisely the sort of agreements that antitrust law directly regulates, usually through a rule that says such agreements are per se unlawful. An agreement not to compete in the forum specified by Hatch-Waxman is no different than competitors expressly agreeing not to compete in any other market; it looks like various types of cases where per se illegality is generally accepted as a legitimate rule (e.g., bid rigging, market division).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court could reasonably declare reverse payment settlements of Hatch-Waxman-based patent litigation per se unlawful. Alternatively, the Court could declare the settlements in question presumptively unlawful and then put the burden on the defendants to rebut the presumption.

Reverse payment settlements stifle both types of relevant competition noted above. Competition of the first type (competition in courts between owners of drug patents and generic drug companies) is always stifled. The same might be said about competition of the second type (competition in drug markets between brand firms and generics), although some argue that settlements sometimes may increase competition of the second type where a patent would be found valid (if actually litigated) because the settlement allows the generic company to enter the market earlier than otherwise would be the case. Presumably, the Court should choose between per se illegality and presumptive illegality based on its evaluation of this argument.

If the Court takes this latter route, the types of evidence and arguments relevant to rebutting the presumption should be limited substantially by Hatch-Waxman. As noted above, Hatch-Waxman specifies the types of relevant competition and if given the priority it deserves, it would preclude various generic arguments from being made.

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FN1: As Scott Hemphill put it, "the Hatch-Waxman Act is a deliberate effort to promote consumer access through litigated challenges." See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1553 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925919. He goes on: "Since litigation is the instrument by which the regulatory arrangement accomplishes its ends, it is difficult to argue that an end-run on the instrument is consistent with the scheme." Much of the argument I am making derives from ideas in Scott's article and conversations we have had over the years.

Does the Shift in IP Ownership Predict a Political Shift in the IP Debate

By Dennis Crouch

One reason for the US strong pro-intellectual-property position is based on US national interests. US IP rights have historically been held primarily by US entities. In that scenario, US IP enforcement was primarily a transfer of wealth between US entities. That setup allows for strong political support for IP rights so long as the rights offer additional benefits (such as incentive to innovate and market products).

A major change in this political environment is the new reality that most new US IP rights are of foreign origin and held by foreign entities. In that context the US national interest in IP enforcement is at least marginally reduced because a larger portion of IP enforcement actions will involve a transfer of wealth from US entities to foreign entities.

The chart below shows the percent of US utility patents issued each year that are of foreign origin. The general trend is that a smaller and smaller percentage of US patent rights are owned by US entities.

For more consideration of this issue see the following new report: /media/docs/2013/03/foreignownrep-paper.pdf

H.R.845 — Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013 (Introduced in House – IH)

By Dennis Crouch

The text of the proposed SHIELD ACT legislation adds one new section, 35 U.S.C. § 285A as follows:

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Sec. 285A. Recovery of litigation costs

(a) In General- In an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent–

(1) a party asserting invalidity or noninfringement may move for judgment that the adverse party does not meet at least one of the conditions described in subsection (d);

(2) not later than 90 days after a party has moved for the judgment described in paragraph (1), the adverse party shall be provided an opportunity to prove such party meets at least one of the conditions described in subsection (d);

(3) as soon as practicable after the adverse party has been provided an opportunity to respond under paragraph (2), but not later than 120 days after a party has moved for the judgment described in paragraph (1), the court shall make a determination whether the adverse party meets at least one of the conditions described in subsection (d); and

(4) notwithstanding section 285, the Court shall award the recovery of full costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the United States, upon the entry of a final judgment if the court determines that the adverse party did not meet at least one of the conditions described in subsection (d), unless the court finds that exceptional circumstances make an award unjust.

(b) Bond Required- Any party that fails to meet a condition under subsection (a)(3) shall be required to post a bond in an amount determined by the court to cover the recovery of full costs described in subsection (a)(4).

(c) Timing and Effect of Pending Motion- With respect to any motion made pursuant to subsection (a)(1) the following applies:

(1) In the case of a motion that is filed before the moving party’s initial disclosure are due–

(A) the court shall limit any discovery to discovery that is necessary for the disposition of the motion; and

(B) the court may delay issuing any scheduling order until after ruling on the motion.

(2) In the case of a motion that is filed after the moving party’s initial disclosures are due the court may delay ruling on the motion until after the entry of final judgment.

(3) In the case of a motion that is filed after the entry of final judgment, any such motion must be combined with a motion for fees to the prevailing party.

(d) Condition Defined- For purposes of this section, a `condition’ means, with respect to the party alleging infringement, any of the following:

(1) ORIGINAL INVENTOR- Such party is the inventor, a joint inventor, or in the case of a patent filed by and awarded to an assignee of the original inventor or joint inventor, the original assignee of the patent.

(2) EXPLOITATION OF THE PATENT- Such party can provide documentation to the court of substantial investment made by such party in the exploitation of the patent through production or sale of an item covered by the patent.

(3) UNIVERSITY OR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ORGANIZATION- Such party is–

(A) an institution of higher education (as that term is defined in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001); or

(B) a technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate the commercialization of technology developed by one or more institutions of higher education.

Guest Editorial: Throwing Trolls Off The Bridge

Guest Editorial by Peter Schechter (Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP)

CCF03082013_00000Some years ago, a few patent lawyers realized that the cost of U.S. patent litigation had become so expensive that most companies sued for infringement would probably pay something just to make it go away, regardless of the merits. This realization forms the fundamental underpinning of most U.S. patent litigation today. If most of the plaintiffs were shining examples of Horatio Alger stories, no one would be too upset about this state of affairs. But they are not – far from it. Most patent infringement plaintiffs today are Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs), or "patent trolls." Rates of success on the merits for NPEs, in those few cases that actually get determined on the merits, are very low, ranging from less than 10% to about 25%, according to different studies. Many people view NPE cases as being generally meritless, generally speaking, regardless of the accuracy of that view in any specific case. On February 14, 2013, even President Obama voiced his displeasure with patent trolls, saying they "are essentially trying to leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort some money out of them."

Recently, Congress has at least been trying to fix what many feel is this most broken aspect of the U.S. patent system. Last year, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) and Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) introduced the bipartisan H.R. 6245 –"Saving High-tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act" — a bill intended to curb the flourishing patent troll business model by shifting the patent litigation system away from the "American model" (everyone pays their way, win or lose) to a "loser pays" system, at least in some types of infringement cases. H.R. 6245 was applauded by some and decried by others; among its faults were the limitations on the types of cases to which it applied, and its lack of "teeth" for implementing the "loser pays" fee-shifting provision. The bill died with the end of the 112th Congress.

Reps. DeFazio and Chaffetz last week reintroduced a "new and improved" version (H.R. 845) of the SHIELD Act (now "of 2013"). Now the bill bites – hard — on NPEs. Gone are the industry-specific limitations. New for 2013 is the most significant provision of the bill: the requirement that the NPE (as defined in the bill) must post a bond early in the case to cover the recovery of the "full costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including reasonable attorney's fees …." This provision does more than implement fee-shifting in NPE patent litigation; it strikes at the heart of the patent troll's business model, and may cut out that heart completely.

To understand the importance and effect of the bond provision, one must first understand the NPE business model. Many, and probably most, NPEs today are "special purpose vehicles" created for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning and suing on patents. In many instances, these limited liability companies are owned by the patent litigators doing the suing. These plaintiffs have few or no assets other than the patents themselves, the out-of-pocket expenses of litigation being fronted by the lawyers, and the lawyer's fees being entirely contingent upon settlement payments. In other words, NPEs are designed to be, and typically are, judgment-proof. For this crucial reason, the traditional fee-shifting mechanism in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. Sec. 285, is not an effective deterrent to truly unwarranted patent infringement allegations. Only in rare situations are the litigation attorneys held jointly and severally liable for Sec. 285 attorney's fees awards. While Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., always exists to deter the very worst offenses, Rule 11 awards against signing attorneys are even rarer in patent infringement cases than Sec. 285 awards.

As a result, NPEs are often analogized to gamblers playing with house money – they can win, but cannot lose. The bond requirement of the SHIELD Act of 2013 recognizes and addresses this economic reality, because virtually every type of judicial bond available from a surety, bank, insurance company, or other bond provider is fully 100% collateralized. In practical terms, this fact may well throw the trolls off the bridge.

Bail bonds and appeal (supersedeas) bonds are two examples of judicial bonds. Both the party seeking the bond and the company giving the bond know the exact amount of the potential liability that the bond must cover. In some cases, the amount of a supersedeas bond is set by statute, and may include a required amount to cover interest.

The bond required by the SHIELD Act is different – no one knows, at the beginning of a patent case, what the "full costs to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including reasonable attorney's fees," might ultimately be. Qualcomm, the prevailing defendant in a patent case, was recently awarded more than $12.4 million in attorney's fees alone; "full costs" would presumably be substantially more. Prevailing defendant Takeda Chemical was awarded $16.8 million in attorney's fees in 2008. Dozens of attorney's fees awards have exceeding $1 million, and in almost all of those cases, the prevailing defendants had to establish that the cases were "exceptional" under Sec. 285.

"Losing NPE pays full costs including reasonable attorney's fees" would become the default standard for NPEs under the SHIELD Act; no "exceptionality" is required. Given the NPEs' current strategy of filing numerous substantially simultaneous separate suits (as a result of the anti-joinder provisions of the America Invents Act), critical questions arise. Would an NPE be required to post a "full costs" bond in each, separate suit? If not, the law would be pointless. How would the "full costs" amount of the required bonds be determined at the beginning of each, separate suit, when different defendants will employ different defense strategies, and incur different "full costs"? Will the bond amount be the subject of legal opinions of counsel, or of expert opinions? What banks, sureties, or insurance companies would offer to provide SHIELD Act bonds to NPEs? Assuming that some financial institutions would, in fact, offer to provide SHIELD Act bonds, what amount and type of collateral would be required and, more importantly, how would typically asset-free, judgment-proof NPEs provide that collateral?

Given the historical reluctance of insurers to offer patent infringement insurance of any kind at all, the 100% collateral requirement is virtually a sure thing. It also seems reasonable to assume that only a very tiny fraction of currently operating NPEs will be able to raise sufficient capital to provide 100% collateral for more than a very small number of SHIELD Act bonds at any given time – should they even decide to take that risk, knowing full well their low probabilities of success on the merits. If the SHIELD Act of 2013 becomes law as written in H.R. 845, the business model of patent infringement litigation as currently practiced by most NPEs would likely become economically unfeasible, and the era of NPE patent litigation as it currently exists would likely come to an end.

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The views expressed in this article are the author's alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP or anyone else.

DC Note: Artwork is by my daughter Robin. 

Gunn v. Minton: Moving Forward with Patent Attorney Malpractice Litigation

By Dennis Crouch

Sanders v. Flanders (Fed. Cir. 2013)

Scott Hemingway sent me a note regarding his case of Sanders v. Flanders. The legal malpractice action pits the inventor (Mr. Sanders) against his former patent attorney (Mr. Flanders). The Federal Court in W.D. Tex. sided with the patent attorney Flanders and awarded FRCP R. 50 Judgment as a Matter of Law – writing “Eric M. Sanders shall TAKE NOTHING on his claims against Defendant Harold H. Flanders.”

In presenting his case, Sanders had not offered any expert testimony to show that the patent attorney’s failures actually caused harm. In his motion, patent attorney Flanders argued that expert testimony is required in a case and the district court Judge Yeakel agreed.

In this case, Flanders had filed six different patent applications (over a almost a decade) that each lacked full payment to the USPTO. The district court found that Flanders never paid the full fee or notified Sanders of the missing parts prior to abandonment of the applications. Of course, breach of the standard of care is not sufficient to create malpractice liability. Rather, harm must also be shown. Thus, for instance, if the patents would have never issued or if nobody would have cared about the patents then no harm. And, the plaintiff has the burden of proving harm.

Sanders appealed to the Federal Circuit, but in a recent order the court has forwarded the appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based upon the recent Supreme Court case of Gunn v. Minton.

Why the 5th Circuit?: The original jurisdiction of the Federal district court was based on both (1) patent law arising under jurisdiction and (2) complete diversity of the parties. In Gunn, the Court rejected the notion that malpractice cases such as this arise under the patent laws. Following Gunn, the remaining justification for federal court jurisdiction is only diversity. And the, diversity cases are appealed to the regional circuit court of appeals (here the 5th Circuit) rather than to the Federal Circuit.

Now, the 5th Circuit will need to decide (applying Texas and 5th Circuit law) whether expert testimony drawing the link is required.

Design Patents on Images Shown on a Computer

By Dennis Crouch

In a recent post, Tracy-Gene Durkin outlined some issues associated with GUI-based design patents. These design patents essentially cover computer images that are shown on a screen, such as a computer display or smartphone. I have written before that this type of patent is somewhat problematic because of its likelihood to impinge on free speech protections. I created the chart below of the number of these type of patents issued each year since 2005. In the PTO’s design patent classification system, these all fall within classes D14 / 485 – 495. The forecast for 2013 is also included.

Who is getting these icon design patents?: Microsoft. The software company has obtained 44% of the GUI-based design patents issued since 2005. Samsung & Apple are both big players in this market with around 5% each. Only 1% of the icon design patents are unassigned at issuance. This contrasts with the 22% of all design patents that are unassigned at issuance.

Pepsi holds over 40 icon design patents that appear to simply be advertisement drawings such as the “DEW” design patent shown below. U.S. Patent No. D.618,251.

 

Limited Equitable Estoppel for 4 ½ Year Delay in License Pursuits

By Dennis Crouch

Radio Systems Corp. v. Lalor (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore (majority author), Reyna, & Newman (in partial dissent)).

In a split decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that the judicial doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to block a patentee from alleging patent infringement following a five-year delay in pursuing charges. Writing in partial dissent, Judge Newman argued that estoppel should additionally apply to family members of the patent in question.

In the 1992 en banc decision of Aukerman v. Chaides Constr., the Federal Circuit identified three elements of the equitable estoppel doctrine applicable here:

  1. Misleading Silence: The patentee, through misleading conduct (or silence), leads the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer;
  2. Reliance: The alleged infringer relies on that conduct; and
  3. Prejudice: The alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.

As background, the patentee (Bumper Boy) sent a demand letter to Innotek back in 2005. The letter indicated that Innotek's "UltraSmart" dog collar infringed Bumper Boy's U.S. Patent No. 6,830,014. Innotek quickly responded with a letter claiming that the patent was invalid. Following that, there was no communication between the parties for 4 ½ years. In fact, Bumper Boy never again communicated with Innotek because that company was acquired by Radio Systems. Radio Systems continued to develop the UltraSmart and other dog collar product lines. Meanwhile, Bumper Boy filed a continuation application and obtained a second patent in 2007 (U.S. Patent No. 7,267,082) with a somewhat more focused claim scope. In 2009, Bumper Boy sent a demand letter to Radio Systems alleging infringement of both the old '014 patent and the new '082 patent.

Radio Systems then filed a declaratory judgment action and the district court awarded summary judgment for Radio Systems. The summary judgment ruling held the patentee equitably estopped from pursuing an infringement action against the UltraSmart products based on either the old or the new patent.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed-in-part – affirming that the patentee is estopped from suing the successor-in-interest (Radio Systems) on the old patent (subject of the 2005 letter exchange) but denying to extend the estoppel to the new family-member patent that was not mentioned in the letter and that had not issued at the time.

Judge Moore's language suggests that equitable estoppel could never apply to pending patent applications. She writes "quite simply, the '082 patent claims could not have been asserted against Innotek or Radio Systems until those claims issued." However, that interpretation of the decision is likely unduly expansive – especially since a patentee can collect back-damages for pre-issuance infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). Thus, for instance, a patentee who sends a pre-issuance 154(d) notice of infringement and then waits to sue for four years following the issuance may well (in my estimation) fall within the realm of equitable estoppel. Of course, these are hypothetical facts that do not apply in the Radio Systems case. A second potential factor in the decision here is that the patentee added new matter to the second patent, but the majority appears to have disregarded that fact as immaterial since the asserted claims do not rely on new matter.

Judge Newman has previously provided an expansive view of equitable estoppel in her majority opinion in the case of Aspex Eyewear v. Clariti Eyewear (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Judge Rader dissenting). In the present caes, Judge Newman penned a quite short opinion that argued that the estoppel should be extended to the continuation application, although her analysis does not directly confront the majority's reasoning. 

A second pressure point in the decision involves the corporate restructuring from Innotek to Radio Systems. The Federal Circuit has previously held that equitable estoppel can be claimed by successors-in-interest where privity has been established. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988). At some point, there may be a need to explore the privity element, but here that was not a real problem since Radio Systems (1) wholly owns Innotek, (2) is headed by the same individual as Innotek, (3) incorporated Innotek designs and products in its own product lines; and (4) exerts substantial control over Innotek. In my view, privity alone should be insufficient to transfer equitable estoppel rights to the new entity if the estoppel has not yet vested and if the patentee has no reasonable knowledge of the shift.

This decision provides some food-for-thought to patentees. On the one hand it places more pressure of having enforcement-through-litigation as a genuine and timely option during any license negotiations. On the other hand, the case also offers a roadmap for avoiding equitable estoppel problems with the use of continuation applications.

Patent versus Portfolio: The conceptual problem with this decision is one that we'll be struggling to deal with for years – and that is the distinctions between a single patent claim, a single patent, a family of patents, and a portfolio of loosely related patents. The law still largely focuses on single patent claims while business leaders are increasingly focused on a portfolio analysis. Equitable estoppel is largely related to reasonable reliance by business leaders and in that context it makes sense to apply the estoppel principles to a portfolio rather than single claims or single patents.

= = = = =

In addition to the estoppel decision, the lower court also found that the claims were not infringed by other Radio Systems products. In the appeal, the Radio Systems offered as an alternative ground for affirmance that the asserted patents were invalid. However, the Federal Circuit refused to hear that contention on technical grounds since the contention was raised in an opposition brief rather than as a cross-appeal. An invalidity holding is generally broader than a holding of equitable estoppel or non-infringement since those holdings are limited to the products or parties involved in the case. Invalidity on the other hand will apply to all future Radio Systems products as well as other would-be infringers and even current licensees. That change-in-scope creates a problem for Radio systems because of the ordinary rule that an appellee cannot request expansion of the lower court holding. Rather, a party unsatisfied with the scope of a lower court ruling must become an appellant by filing an appeal or cross-appeal.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a]bsent a cross appeal, an appellee . . . may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary." El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). We have held that a judgment of invalidity is broader than a judgment of noninfringement. "[A] determination of infringement applies only to a specific accused product or process, whereas invalidity operates as a complete defense to infringement for any product, forever." Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, invalidity cannot be an alternative ground for affirming a judgment of noninfringment absent a cross-appeal.

While we acknowledge the inefficiency that may result from requiring cross-appeals in situations where the scope of a judgment would be enlarged, we are cabined by our jurisdiction and may not reach issues that are not properly before us. On remand, Radio Systems may pursue its invalidity defense in further proceedings, and, should there be additional rulings on invalidity by the district court, Radio Systems may pursue a proper appeal at that time. Because Radio Systems did not properly file a cross-appeal on the invalidity issue in this appeal, Bumper Boy's motion to strike Radio System' alternative grounds for affirmance is granted.

Just to be clear, it doesn't appear that Radio Systems failure to file a cross-appeal was a technical error. Rather, the company could not file an appeal arguing invalidity because the district court had not reached that issue yet.

Limited Equitable Estoppel for 4 ½ Year Delay in License Pursuits

By Dennis Crouch

Radio Systems Corp. v. Lalor (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore (majority author), Reyna, & Newman (in partial dissent)).

In a split decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that the judicial doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to block a patentee from alleging patent infringement following a five-year delay in pursuing charges. Writing in partial dissent, Judge Newman argued that estoppel should additionally apply to family members of the patent in question.

In the 1992 en banc decision of Aukerman v. Chaides Constr., the Federal Circuit identified three elements of the equitable estoppel doctrine applicable here:

  1. Misleading Silence: The patentee, through misleading conduct (or silence), leads the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer;
  2. Reliance: The alleged infringer relies on that conduct; and
  3. Prejudice: The alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.

As background, the patentee (Bumper Boy) sent a demand letter to Innotek back in 2005. The letter indicated that Innotek's "UltraSmart" dog collar infringed Bumper Boy's U.S. Patent No. 6,830,014. Innotek quickly responded with a letter claiming that the patent was invalid. Following that, there was no communication between the parties for 4 ½ years. In fact, Bumper Boy never again communicated with Innotek because that company was acquired by Radio Systems. Radio Systems continued to develop the UltraSmart and other dog collar product lines. Meanwhile, Bumper Boy filed a continuation application and obtained a second patent in 2007 (U.S. Patent No. 7,267,082) with a somewhat more focused claim scope. In 2009, Bumper Boy sent a demand letter to Radio Systems alleging infringement of both the old '014 patent and the new '082 patent.

Radio Systems then filed a declaratory judgment action and the district court awarded summary judgment for Radio Systems. The summary judgment ruling held the patentee equitably estopped from pursuing an infringement action against the UltraSmart products based on either the old or the new patent.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed-in-part – affirming that the patentee is estopped from suing the successor-in-interest (Radio Systems) on the old patent (subject of the 2005 letter exchange) but denying to extend the estoppel to the new family-member patent that was not mentioned in the letter and that had not issued at the time.

Judge Moore's language suggests that equitable estoppel could never apply to pending patent applications. She writes "quite simply, the '082 patent claims could not have been asserted against Innotek or Radio Systems until those claims issued." However, that interpretation of the decision is likely unduly expansive – especially since a patentee can collect back-damages for pre-issuance infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). Thus, for instance, a patentee who sends a pre-issuance 154(d) notice of infringement and then waits to sue for four years following the issuance may well (in my estimation) fall within the realm of equitable estoppel. Of course, these are hypothetical facts that do not apply in the Radio Systems case. A second potential factor in the decision here is that the patentee added new matter to the second patent, but the majority appears to have disregarded that fact as immaterial since the asserted claims do not rely on new matter.

Judge Newman has previously provided an expansive view of equitable estoppel in her majority opinion in the case of Aspex Eyewear v. Clariti Eyewear (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Judge Rader dissenting). In the present caes, Judge Newman penned a quite short opinion that argued that the estoppel should be extended to the continuation application, although her analysis does not directly confront the majority's reasoning. 

A second pressure point in the decision involves the corporate restructuring from Innotek to Radio Systems. The Federal Circuit has previously held that equitable estoppel can be claimed by successors-in-interest where privity has been established. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988). At some point, there may be a need to explore the privity element, but here that was not a real problem since Radio Systems (1) wholly owns Innotek, (2) is headed by the same individual as Innotek, (3) incorporated Innotek designs and products in its own product lines; and (4) exerts substantial control over Innotek. In my view, privity alone should be insufficient to transfer equitable estoppel rights to the new entity if the estoppel has not yet vested and if the patentee has no reasonable knowledge of the shift.

This decision provides some food-for-thought to patentees. On the one hand it places more pressure of having enforcement-through-litigation as a genuine and timely option during any license negotiations. On the other hand, the case also offers a roadmap for avoiding equitable estoppel problems with the use of continuation applications.

Patent versus Portfolio: The conceptual problem with this decision is one that we'll be struggling to deal with for years – and that is the distinctions between a single patent claim, a single patent, a family of patents, and a portfolio of loosely related patents. The law still largely focuses on single patent claims while business leaders are increasingly focused on a portfolio analysis. Equitable estoppel is largely related to reasonable reliance by business leaders and in that context it makes sense to apply the estoppel principles to a portfolio rather than single claims or single patents.

= = = = =

In addition to the estoppel decision, the lower court also found that the claims were not infringed by other Radio Systems products. In the appeal, the Radio Systems offered as an alternative ground for affirmance that the asserted patents were invalid. However, the Federal Circuit refused to hear that contention on technical grounds since the contention was raised in an opposition brief rather than as a cross-appeal. An invalidity holding is generally broader than a holding of equitable estoppel or non-infringement since those holdings are limited to the products or parties involved in the case. Invalidity on the other hand will apply to all future Radio Systems products as well as other would-be infringers and even current licensees. That change-in-scope creates a problem for Radio systems because of the ordinary rule that an appellee cannot request expansion of the lower court holding. Rather, a party unsatisfied with the scope of a lower court ruling must become an appellant by filing an appeal or cross-appeal.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a]bsent a cross appeal, an appellee . . . may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary." El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). We have held that a judgment of invalidity is broader than a judgment of noninfringement. "[A] determination of infringement applies only to a specific accused product or process, whereas invalidity operates as a complete defense to infringement for any product, forever." Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, invalidity cannot be an alternative ground for affirming a judgment of noninfringment absent a cross-appeal.

While we acknowledge the inefficiency that may result from requiring cross-appeals in situations where the scope of a judgment would be enlarged, we are cabined by our jurisdiction and may not reach issues that are not properly before us. On remand, Radio Systems may pursue its invalidity defense in further proceedings, and, should there be additional rulings on invalidity by the district court, Radio Systems may pursue a proper appeal at that time. Because Radio Systems did not properly file a cross-appeal on the invalidity issue in this appeal, Bumper Boy's motion to strike Radio System' alternative grounds for affirmance is granted.

Just to be clear, it doesn't appear that Radio Systems failure to file a cross-appeal was a technical error. Rather, the company could not file an appeal arguing invalidity because the district court had not reached that issue yet.

Limited Equitable Estoppel for 4 ½ Year Delay in License Pursuits

By Dennis Crouch

Radio Systems Corp. v. Lalor (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore (majority author), Reyna, & Newman (in partial dissent)).

In a split decision, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that the judicial doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to block a patentee from alleging patent infringement following a five-year delay in pursuing charges. Writing in partial dissent, Judge Newman argued that estoppel should additionally apply to family members of the patent in question.

In the 1992 en banc decision of Aukerman v. Chaides Constr., the Federal Circuit identified three elements of the equitable estoppel doctrine applicable here:

  1. Misleading Silence: The patentee, through misleading conduct (or silence), leads the alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer;
  2. Reliance: The alleged infringer relies on that conduct; and
  3. Prejudice: The alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.

As background, the patentee (Bumper Boy) sent a demand letter to Innotek back in 2005. The letter indicated that Innotek's "UltraSmart" dog collar infringed Bumper Boy's U.S. Patent No. 6,830,014. Innotek quickly responded with a letter claiming that the patent was invalid. Following that, there was no communication between the parties for 4 ½ years. In fact, Bumper Boy never again communicated with Innotek because that company was acquired by Radio Systems. Radio Systems continued to develop the UltraSmart and other dog collar product lines. Meanwhile, Bumper Boy filed a continuation application and obtained a second patent in 2007 (U.S. Patent No. 7,267,082) with a somewhat more focused claim scope. In 2009, Bumper Boy sent a demand letter to Radio Systems alleging infringement of both the old '014 patent and the new '082 patent.

Radio Systems then filed a declaratory judgment action and the district court awarded summary judgment for Radio Systems. The summary judgment ruling held the patentee equitably estopped from pursuing an infringement action against the UltraSmart products based on either the old or the new patent.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed-in-part – affirming that the patentee is estopped from suing the successor-in-interest (Radio Systems) on the old patent (subject of the 2005 letter exchange) but denying to extend the estoppel to the new family-member patent that was not mentioned in the letter and that had not issued at the time.

Judge Moore's language suggests that equitable estoppel could never apply to pending patent applications. She writes "quite simply, the '082 patent claims could not have been asserted against Innotek or Radio Systems until those claims issued." However, that interpretation of the decision is likely unduly expansive – especially since a patentee can collect back-damages for pre-issuance infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). Thus, for instance, a patentee who sends a pre-issuance 154(d) notice of infringement and then waits to sue for four years following the issuance may well (in my estimation) fall within the realm of equitable estoppel. Of course, these are hypothetical facts that do not apply in the Radio Systems case. A second potential factor in the decision here is that the patentee added new matter to the second patent, but the majority appears to have disregarded that fact as immaterial since the asserted claims do not rely on new matter.

Judge Newman has previously provided an expansive view of equitable estoppel in her majority opinion in the case of Aspex Eyewear v. Clariti Eyewear (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Judge Rader dissenting). In the present caes, Judge Newman penned a quite short opinion that argued that the estoppel should be extended to the continuation application, although her analysis does not directly confront the majority's reasoning. 

A second pressure point in the decision involves the corporate restructuring from Innotek to Radio Systems. The Federal Circuit has previously held that equitable estoppel can be claimed by successors-in-interest where privity has been established. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988). At some point, there may be a need to explore the privity element, but here that was not a real problem since Radio Systems (1) wholly owns Innotek, (2) is headed by the same individual as Innotek, (3) incorporated Innotek designs and products in its own product lines; and (4) exerts substantial control over Innotek. In my view, privity alone should be insufficient to transfer equitable estoppel rights to the new entity if the estoppel has not yet vested and if the patentee has no reasonable knowledge of the shift.

This decision provides some food-for-thought to patentees. On the one hand it places more pressure of having enforcement-through-litigation as a genuine and timely option during any license negotiations. On the other hand, the case also offers a roadmap for avoiding equitable estoppel problems with the use of continuation applications.

Patent versus Portfolio: The conceptual problem with this decision is one that we'll be struggling to deal with for years – and that is the distinctions between a single patent claim, a single patent, a family of patents, and a portfolio of loosely related patents. The law still largely focuses on single patent claims while business leaders are increasingly focused on a portfolio analysis. Equitable estoppel is largely related to reasonable reliance by business leaders and in that context it makes sense to apply the estoppel principles to a portfolio rather than single claims or single patents.

= = = = =

In addition to the estoppel decision, the lower court also found that the claims were not infringed by other Radio Systems products. In the appeal, the Radio Systems offered as an alternative ground for affirmance that the asserted patents were invalid. However, the Federal Circuit refused to hear that contention on technical grounds since the contention was raised in an opposition brief rather than as a cross-appeal. An invalidity holding is generally broader than a holding of equitable estoppel or non-infringement since those holdings are limited to the products or parties involved in the case. Invalidity on the other hand will apply to all future Radio Systems products as well as other would-be infringers and even current licensees. That change-in-scope creates a problem for Radio systems because of the ordinary rule that an appellee cannot request expansion of the lower court holding. Rather, a party unsatisfied with the scope of a lower court ruling must become an appellant by filing an appeal or cross-appeal.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a]bsent a cross appeal, an appellee . . . may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary." El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). We have held that a judgment of invalidity is broader than a judgment of noninfringement. "[A] determination of infringement applies only to a specific accused product or process, whereas invalidity operates as a complete defense to infringement for any product, forever." Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, invalidity cannot be an alternative ground for affirming a judgment of noninfringment absent a cross-appeal.

While we acknowledge the inefficiency that may result from requiring cross-appeals in situations where the scope of a judgment would be enlarged, we are cabined by our jurisdiction and may not reach issues that are not properly before us. On remand, Radio Systems may pursue its invalidity defense in further proceedings, and, should there be additional rulings on invalidity by the district court, Radio Systems may pursue a proper appeal at that time. Because Radio Systems did not properly file a cross-appeal on the invalidity issue in this appeal, Bumper Boy's motion to strike Radio System' alternative grounds for affirmance is granted.

Just to be clear, it doesn't appear that Radio Systems failure to file a cross-appeal was a technical error. Rather, the company could not file an appeal arguing invalidity because the district court had not reached that issue yet.

Guest Post: What is Next in Design Patents for On-Screen Icons?

By Tracy-Gene G. Durkin

The recent Apple v. Samsung litigation has consumed the media since August when a California Jury awarded Apple more than $1 billion for infringement. Of the three design patents involved in that judgment, one was for a graphical user interface (GUI). This landmark case is the first time that a U.S. court has considered infringement of a GUI design patent and may be just the tip of the iceberg beginning to emerge within the design patent landscape.

How the Law Developed

Design law relating to GUI protection has developed at a slow rate since 1996, when the USPTO first created guidelines for the examination of GUI designs. The legal basis for design patents derives from the Patent Statute, 35 U.S.C. Section 171 which provides that whoever invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an “article of manufacture” may obtain a patent for it. Section 171 also refers to the design for an article as including ornamental designs of all kinds, such as surface ornamentation. The question then is how is GUI considered to be an article of manufacture under U.S. law?

The Manual of Patent Examination Procedure Section 1502 discusses what constitutes the ornamental appearance of a design, which includes the shape and configuration, indicia, contrasting color or materials, and graphic representations on an article of manufacture. Any ornamentation applied to an article is considered to be surface treatment. Surface treatment itself is not protectable with a design patent, but rather through copyright. However, when that surface treatment is applied to an article of manufacture it is protectable through a design patent.

The case of Ex parte Strijland 26 USPQ2d 1259 (BPAI 1992) established the protection of GUI using a design patent. This case was taken up at the USPTO Board of Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) over an icon. The examiner rejected the design as being unpatentable on the basis that it was not an ornamental design to be applied to an article of manufacture, but rather was mere surface ornamentation. The applicant then tried to add information to the application to include and describe the computer display on which the claimed icon could be displayed. The Examiner rejected the additional information as new matter. The BPAI affirmed the Examiner, but in doing so, created a road map of how to apply for a patentable GUI by suggesting that had the information that was added to the application after it was filed been provided at the time of filing the application, it would have made the design patentable because it provided an article of manufacture (the display) on which the GUI was presented as surface ornamentation.

In 1996, the USPTO created guidelines for the protection of GUIs based on the decision in Ex Parte Strijland. GUIs are now statutory subject matter, provided that the GUI design or surface ornamentation is shown with some portion of a display or other article of manufacture. Although there have been no reported USPTO BPAI decisions involving the patentability of GUI designs since the Strijland case of 1992, nor any reported infringement cases related to GUI’s (excluding Apple v. Samsung), there have apparently been GUI cases appealed to the BPAI. Those decisions have unfortunately not been published.

Requirements to patent a GUI design

The requirements to patent a GUI design in the United States are the same as for any other kind of design patent application. The design must be novel, not obvious, and not functional. The claimed design may be presented as a line drawing or a digital image. Color and grayscale are allowed to be presented in the same GUI application, but line drawings and digital images are not. Animated designs are also patentable in the United States, and must show a minimum of two views of the animation. More images may lead to a greater chance of patentability, although it may also lead to patent with a narrower scope.

Any attempt to add language about the article of manufacture in the title or the drawing figures after an application has been filed will be met with a new matter rejection during patent examination at the USPTO. Examiners search prior patented GUI designs as well as GUI utility patents in making their patentability analysis, resulting in a very complex and comprehensive search. While design patent applications are rarely rejected, the most common references used in a GUI design rejection are utility patents. Non-patent literature is also commonly used.

What’s Next for GUI Design Patents

The number of patent lawsuits involving GUI is increasing rapidly in the United States. According to the New York Times, over the last two decades the number of patent lawsuits filed yearly in U.S. district courts has tripled (3,260 were filed in 2010). According to a study done by Stanford University, $20 billion was spent on patent litigation and purchasing patents in the smartphone industry in the last two years. We also know from information provided recently by David Gerk from the USPTO’s Office of Policy and External Affairs at an Inn of Court meeting that the number of GUI design patent applications is currently growing at the fastest rate of any other area. As digital displays become common place on more and more consumer products, there is little doubt that the subject matter of the increased patent filings is extending well beyond the smart phone.

About the Author:
Tracy-Gene G. Durkin
is a director and leader of the Mechanical Patent and Trademark Practice Group at intellectual property specialty law firm Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox. Tracy is a recognized design patent expert and represents some of the most forward thinking companies in the area of product design and product packaging design. Contact Tracy via email at tdurkin@skgf.com.

 

 

2013 Sequester at the USPTO

by Dennis Crouch

If the 2013 Sequester holds through the end of FY2013, it looks like the USPTO will be forced to cut about $148 million from its FY2013 budget of $2.951 billion. [White House Report on Sequestration]. This amount represents 5% of the agency’s annual budget.

However, the USPTO’s fee collections for FY2013 have fallen somewhat under the budgeted amount.  Under USPTO budget rules, the executive agency can only spend what it brings in through fees with a maximum cap set by the budget.  If this trend continues through the major fee shake-up of March 16, 2013, then we should not see any direct serious direct impact due to an ongoing sequester.

The Federal Circuit will be expected to cut about $2 million from its $30 million budget.  Chief Judge Rader previously indicated the Court’s intention to continue to provide the highest quality opinions in the same timely manner.  Still, the cuts have to come from somewhere. The judges may take a voluntary pay cut and hourly employees could receive reduced hours.

Update: An official at the Department of Commerce has confirmed that the USPTO is subject to sequestration but that the agency is already operating below the sequester’s funding level.