Tag Archives: Claim Construction

Case Questions Fundamental Questions of Patentability Requirements of Nucleic Acid Molecules

In re Fisher: EST Patentability Redux

By Donald Zuhn, Ph.D. (Patently-O Guest Author).

On Tuesday, May 3, 2005, the Federal Circuit will hear In re Fisher, in which the Court will address the utility requirement for the first time since the Patent Office set forth revised Utility Examination Guidelines in January 2001.  Specifically, in Fisher, the issue of patentable utility is being raised with respect to nucleic acid molecules.  In commenting on the possible importance of this case, Harold Wegner has described Fisher as having "the potential of being either the single most important pharmaceutical patent case in recent years – or a yawn."  Amicus briefs filed by recognized biotech and pharmaceutical companies such as Affymetrix, Eli Lilly, and Genentech in support of the Board’s decision in Ex parte Fisher suggest that it may be the former as opposed to the latter.

The particular controversy presented in Fisher can be traced back as far as 1991, when a group of NIH investigators led by J. Craig Venter sought to protect thousands of DNA sequences corresponding to portions of expressed genes.  Venter called these gene fragments expressed sequence tags, or ESTs.  Venter’s group sought to protect not only the ESTs themselves, but also the full-length sequences from which the ESTs were derived and the protein products encoded by the full-length sequences, without first determining the biological function of the encoded protein products.  In several applications filed on its ESTs, the NIH asserted a number of utilities, including the design of oligonucleotides for use in chromosomal analysis, PCR amplification, and recovering the corresponding full-length gene.  After receiving a second rejection on its initial filing, the NIH abruptly abandoned its attempts to protect the ESTs, and withdrew all of its pending EST applications from consideration.

While the withdrawal of these applications temporarily quieted the debate surrounding EST patentability, the Patent Office again stoked the fires of controversy in 1995, when it published new Utility Examination Guidelines.  The new Guidelines removed some of the obstacles to EST patenting by only requiring that an applicant assert a utility that was "specific" and "credible."  The new Guidelines had thus omitted the requirement that the assertion of utility also be "substantial," as set forth by the Supreme Court in 1966 in Brenner v. Manson.  In 1997, the Patent Office further declared that since ESTs were acknowledged to have utility apart from the full-length sequences from which they were derived, an applicant would no longer be prevented from securing protection for an EST by the failure to specify the function of the full-length sequence from which that EST was derived.

The Patent Office reversed course again in 2001 when it published revised Utility Examination Guidelines, reinstating the Brenner substantial utility prong.  The revised Guidelines now required that an applicant assert a specific and substantial utility for the claimed invention that would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art.  The Patent Office also issued Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, which provided Examples indicating how the revised Guidelines were to be applied to thirteen different types of biochemical subject matter, including ESTs, as well as definitions of the three utility prongs.  In particular, the Training Materials defined "specific utility" as utility that is specific to the subject matter claimed, as contrasted with a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention; "substantial utility" as utility having a "real world" use; and "credible utility" as utility that is believable to a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the totality of evidence and reasoning provided.

In the appeal to be heard Tuesday, appellants Dane Fisher and Raghunath Lalgudi (employees of Monsanto Co., the real party in interest) seek to reverse the Board’s decision affirming the final rejection of a claim directed to five ESTs isolated from maize leaf tissue.  The five ESTs constitute only a small portion of the 4,013 sequences that appellants originally claimed and an even smaller portion of the 32,236 sequences that appellants disclosed in their application.  Appellants also asserted a number of utilities for the claimed ESTs in their application, including the use of the ESTs to identify polymorphisms (i.e., alternate forms, or alleles, of the claimed sequences), to design oligonucleotide probes or primers for use in isolating DNA sequences from other plants and organisms, and to measure mRNA expression levels in plant cells using microarray technology.

The Board, in Ex parte Fisher, analyzed Brenner and subsequent CCPA and CAFC decisions in In re Kirk, In re Ziegler, In re Jolles, Cross v. Iizuka, and In re Brana, and determined that "[r]ather than setting a de minimis standard, Section 101 requires a utility that is ‘substantial’," or in the words of the Brenner court, "one that provides a specific benefit in currently available form."  The Board then examined appellants’ asserted utilities and determined that none of the claimed ESTs provided a specific benefit in its currently available form.  In particular, with regard to appellants assertion that the claimed ESTs could be used to measure mRNA expression levels in plant cells using microarray technology, the Board declared that "the asserted utility of the claimed nucleic acid – as one component of an assay for monitoring gene expression – does not satisfy the utility requirement of Section 101."

In briefing the issues before the Federal Circuit, appellants argue that the Board erred in concluding that an EST is "subject to a heightened standard of utility . . . that hinges upon some undefined ‘spectrum’ of knowledge about the function of the gene that corresponds to the EST."  Appellants also contend that the Board erred in concluding that the claimed ESTs lack patentable utility "despite the undisputed existence of eight scientifically useful applications for the claimed ESTs and a commercially successful industry built upon the sale and licensing of ESTs corresponding to genes of unknown function, just like those at issue here."  In arguing against the Patent Office’s application of a "heightened standard" of utility in this case, appellants note that the Patent Office has set forth "three substantially different constructions of the utility standard over the last decade alone," and that the Board has adopted a test "so ambiguous and impracticable that even the PTO cannot articulate with any reasonable certainty when the claimed ESTs – or any other EST – might be entitled to patent protection."  Appellants also contend that the Patent Office has applied the wrong test in determining whether there is an assertion of specific utility, since "the specific utility prong only requires the existence of an identifiable benefit for the claimed invention; it does not require a benefit that is unique to the claimed invention."

The Patent Office, on the other hand, denies that appellants’ ESTs have been subjected to a heightened standard, arguing instead that appellants merely failed to assert a specific and substantial utility for the claimed ESTs that would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art. In its brief, the Patent Office often focuses on appellants’ failure to satisfy the specific utility prong, arguing, for example, that appellants’ asserted utilities "would apply not only to the over 32,000 ESTs Fisher discloses, and to the over 600,000 ESTs disclosed in Monsanto’s [six] related appeals, but also to any ESTs derived from any organism." In particular, the Patent Office counters appellants’ argument that because each EST only specifically binds to its complement, the specific sequence of each EST makes its use as a probe or primer specific, by stating that "there is no specific reason for using the EST to bind its complement," and therefore, "[t]o the extent that more sequence data could be acquired by using the ESTs as probes, that result would likely be true for any scrap of DNA derived from nature." Finally, in responding to appellants’ assertion that ESTs have a real world value as part of a multi-billion dollar industry, the Patent Office contends that "batches of ESTs of unknown significance are sold for the purpose of finding targets worthy of further development, not because the individual ESTs have any specific currently available benefit."

NOTE: This post was written by patent attorney Donald Zuhn, PhD. Don is a true expert in cutting edge biotech patent law and practices both prosecution and litigation at MBHB LLP in Chicago. (zuhn@mbhb.com). His article "DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility Requirement," published in the summer 2001 issue of the John Marshall Law Review, contains a more thorough discussion of the history of the utility requirement, particularly with respect to the patentability of DNA sequences.

Patent Claim Construction: Whereby Clause Limits Claim Scope

PatentlyOImage029Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

By Eric Moran

In Hoffer, the patentee (appearing pro se) appealed a summary judgment holding that defendants Microsoft, IBM, and Ariba did not infringe claim 21 of U.S. Patent No. 5,799,151 (the ‘151 patent) and that claim 22 of the ‘151 patent was invalid for indefiniteness.  The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment on invalidity and affirmed the judgment of noninfringement.  In affirming the judgment of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit affirmed the construction of a “whereby” clause, which “generally states the result of a patented process” and generally does not limit claims.  Here, however, as discussed below, the Federal Circuit held that when a “whereby” clause “states a condition that is material to patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention.”

The ‘151 patent involves methods and systems that allow remote users of computer terminals to obtain economic data from an index, and interactively post and receive messages concerning economic topics.  Claim 21 of the ‘151 patent in Hoffer included the phrase:

whereby a trade network supports users at said plurality of [remote user terminals] who are each guided by said [integrated application program interface] to select an economic activity, to identify that index topic that corresponds to said activity, to enter that topic board dedicated to said topic, and who are collectively able to concurrently engage in interactive data messaging on said topic boards.< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

The accused method allows real-time posting of messages, but not interactive data messaging in which users can communicate with each other.

The patentee argued that under Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a “whereby” clause cannot limit method claims when the “whereby” clause simply states the intended result of a method step.  In particular, the patentee contended that the “whereby” clause in claim 21 did not state the mechanics of the claimed method, but only stated an overall objective, and, moreover, his invention does not require interactive messaging.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that, based at least on the “Summary of the Invention” section of the patent and statements in the prosecution history, interactive messaging “is more than the intended result of a process step; it is part of the process itself. . . . [It is] an integral part of the invention.”  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the “whereby” clause stated a condition that was material to patentability, and claim 21 was limited to interactive messaging and did not extend to real-time posting of messages.

Judge Newman, in a panel that also included Judges Bryson and Dyk, authored a concurrence in which she disagreed with the panel’s failure to decide each of the appealed claim construction issues. 

Eric Moran (moran@mbhb.com) is an attorney at the intellectual property law firm of McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP in Chicago. His practice runs the gamut of intellectual property issues and includes patent, trademark, and domain name disputes.

Notes:

 

It is proper to limit the scope of the claims according to the specification

PatentlyOImage022Rhodia Chimie v. PPG Industries Inc., (Fed. Cir. 2005)

By Baltazar Gomez, Ph.D.

Rhodia is an international chemical company and the assignee of U.S. Pat. No. 6,013,234 (“the ‘234 patent”). The patent discloses and claims certain essentially spheroidal precipitated silica particulates. Rhodia markets “Micropearl” which is a silica particulate covered by the patent. PPG also makes three silica products, namely, Hi-Sil SC60M, SC72 and SC72C. Rhodia alleges that these products infringe claim 1 of the ‘234 patent.

The district court granted summary judgment for noninfringement in favor of PPG. On appeal, Rhodia argued that the district court erred in interpreting claim 1. The CAFC, however, affirmed the district court’s construction.

Claim 1 of the ‘234 patent partly reads as follows: Dry, dust-free and non-dusting, solid and homogeneous atomized precipitated silica particulates essentially spheroidal in geometrical configuration… (emphasis added)

In addition, the specification included examples tested both for flowability and dusting properties. Flowablity tests were performed by a pour test which compared the flowability of Micropearl with the prior art. The dusting tests were measured by the German DIN 53 583 standard (the “DIN test”).

During the district court’s claim construction hearing, PPG asserted that the phrase “dust-free and non-dusting” should be interpreted literally to mean “no dust cloud whatsoever.” Conversely, Rhodia argued that such a meaning was improper in view of the results of the pour test that showed production of some dust. Accordingly, Rhodia advocated construing “dust-free and non-dusting” to mean “very low dust.”

The district court was concerned, however, that Rhodia’s proposed definition of the phrase was relative and that such a definition would not meet the statutory requirement that the claims particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. Thus, to resolve the perceived ambiguity of the phrase, the district court adopted a construction based upon the only meaningful guidance provided in the patent, namely the DIN test.

On appeal, Rhodia argued that the DIN test was not the only means by which to assess the amount of dust produced by the invention. Rhodia asserted that the pour test could also be used to determine the level of dustiness, and therefore, it is inappropriate for the district court to limit the phrase “dust-free and non-dusting” to the DIN test. Further, Rhodia cited statements made during prosecution of the ‘234 patent explaining that the pour test could be used to show the non-dusting and free-flowing properties of the ‘234 patent.

In affirming the district court’s construing of “dust-free and non-dusting”, CAFC noted that although the pour test may also provide evidence of dustiness, the results of the pour tests presented in the ‘234 patent were only identified as evidence of the products’ flowability.  The CAFC further noted that there is no language in either the claims or the written description that taught the application of the pour test to determine the level of dustiness.  Finally, CAFC stated that Rhodia’s statements made during prosecution cannot serve to fill such a gap.  Thus, the CAFC concluded that the district court did not erred in limiting the scope of the claims by defining the phrase “dust-free and non-dusting” to the only disclosure in the patent.

Note: Dr. Baltazar Gomez is a scientific advisor at McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP in Chicago. Dr. Gomez obtained his PhD in biochemistry from the University of Texas and researched retrovirology as a PostDoc at Cornell University.

File Attachment: Chimie v. PPG.pdf (98 KB)

CAFC: District Court Failed to Construe Terms in Sufficient Detail for Appellate Review

Java Accelerator

Nazomi Communications v. ARM Holdings (Fed. Cir. 2005)

In a dispute over a patented “Java hardware accelerator” for translating Java bytecode into native instructions for a CPU, the district court construed the claim term “instruction” and found that ARM’s accused device did not infringe.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court had not been detailed enough in its claim construction ruling:

This court’s review of a district court’s claim construction, albeit without deference, nonetheless is not an independent analysis in the first instance. Moreover, in order to perform such a review, this court must be furnished "sufficient findings and reasoning to permit meaningful appellate scrutiny." Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This requirement for sufficient reasoning applies with equal force to issues of law, such as claim construction, and issues of fact, such as infringement. Id.

This opinion was written by Judge Rader and the panel members include Chief Judge Michel and Judge Proust.  Harold Wegner has noted, and I tend to agree, that this opinion appears to be written as a foreshadow of where Rader would take the Phillips decision — a decision that not expected until late this summer.

Links:

CAFC: Claims should be interpreted according to the specification and the pertinent art

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Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc. v. Masimo Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005)

by Baltazar Gomez

Appellant Nellcor owns U.S. Patent No. 4,934,372 (“the ‘372 patent”), which covers a pulse oximeter and method for using signals from red and infrared light, and processing the signals to measure blood oxygen saturation noninvasively. Appellee Masimo also makes pulse oximeters of the same type as Nellcor.

Nellcor filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the Central District of California alleging that Masimo products infringed the ‘372 patent. The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. On appeal, CAFC vacated and remanded for further proceeding because the district court erred in interpreting the claims.

Claim 1 of the ‘372 patent covers a method for detecting, digitizing, and processing the signals, separating much of the aperiodic noise from the signal, and calculating the oxygen saturation from the processed signal. Claim 1 describes the processing and separating step as follows:

processing the time-measure collectively to determine a composite waveform having a relative maximum and minimum amplitude corresponding to a composite periodic waveform of the periodic information in the time-measure so that the aperiodic information present in the time-measure is attenuated and filtered from the composite; (emphasis added)

The district court construed the phrase “attenuated and filtered” to mean “reduced and removed,” and concluded that Masimo did not infringe the ‘372 patent.

On appeal, Nellcor argued that the district court erred by construing “filtered” to mean removal rather than simply reduction. In determining the meaning of the phrase “attenuated and filtered,” CAFC examined the meaning the patentee used in the specification of the ‘372 patent. The ‘372 patent describes the relative reduction of the impact of the aperiodic noise by the small relative weight assigned to it that results in it being “quickly and effectively attenuated, and thus filtered out.” The ‘372 patent further describes that the claimed phrase “attenuated and filtered from the composite” is used to refer to “effective removal” of data, rather than the absolute removal of unwanted data. Further, CAFC also looked at the meaning of “filter” in the IEEE standard dictionary which defines “filter” as separation of data, signals, or material in accordance with specified criteria and elimination of certain portions of a signal. The CAFC agreed that the definition from the IEEE dictionary was consistent with the meaning given in the specification of the ‘372 patent. Thus, the CAFC concluded that the district court misinterpreted the claims of the ‘372 patent because the phrase “attenuated and filtered from the composite” means “reduced in comparison to the desired information.”

Vacated and remanded to evaluate whether Masimo infringes based on the new claim construction

Note: Dr. Baltazar Gomez is a scientific advisor at McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP in Chicago. Dr. Gomez obtained his PhD in biochemistry from the University of Texas and researched retrovirology as a PostDoc at Cornell University.

Links:

CAFC: No Disclaimer of Claim Scope When Patentee Makes Contradictory Statements.

PatentlyOImage005Outlast Technologies v. Frisby Technologies (Fed. Cir. 2005)(Nonprecedential).

Most of you arrived at this post looking for information on patents on Frisbee discs and disc golf.  Unfortunately this is not a Frisbee case.  

However, it does involve temperature-resistant, phase changing materials that resist temperature change by changing between their solid and liquid state. (Remember latent heat from physics 101).

After claim construction, the district court awarded summary judgment of noninfringement to the defendant Frisby.  Specifically, the court found that the patentee had, during prosecution, clearly disclaimed certain ‘impregnated materials’ from the claim scope.  On Rule 54(b) certified appeal, Outlast argued for an alternative claim construction.

The Appellate Panel found that the district court had erred by finding disclaimer.  The rule, of course, is that a disclaimer must be unequivocal and unambiguous.  In this case, the patentee made one statement that is easily read as a disclaimer, but also made another statement that tends to contradict a disclaimer. 

The Panel found that such contradictory statements are ambiguous of the patentee’s desire to disclaim the subject matter, and thus cannot serve as such a disclaimer.

These seemingly contradictory statements do not unequivocally or unambiguously disclaim articles in which the microcapsules are impregnated within the interstices of the substrate. On the contrary, such contradictory statements are indicative of ambiguity.

The court remanded for a determination of infringement under its newly constructed claim construction using an ordinary meaning approach.

March 2005 Report on New Academic Research

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Each month I post a note discussing new research from the academic side of patent law.  This March edition includes three great articles that relate to either legislative changes (prior use statute, post grant opposition) or upcoming court decisions (Phillips claim construction case).  Feel free to e-mail suggestions for April’s edition.

  1. Tom Fairhall and Paul Churilla, Prior Use of Trade Secrets and the Intersection with Patent Law, 14 Fed. Cir. Bar J. 455.  Fairhall and Churilla present a timely article on prior use rights that notes how the current prior use statute (35 USC 273) does not provide the scope necessary to truly protect a prior user’s expectations or investments.  The article is quite timely because FTC proposals to expand the statutory prior use rights is gaining some teeth in the patent community and on the Hill.
  2. Mark Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, available at SSRN.  Professor Lemley’s article is also timely — he discusses at what particular point in time should the meaning of claim terms be fixed.  This is important because the ordinary meaning of terms in the English language change over time.  The major temporal candidates are (i) at the time of the invention (currently used for novelty and nonobviousness); (ii) at the time the application was filed (currently used for enablement or written description); (iii) a the time the patent issues (currently used for means-plus-function claim construction); and (iv) at the time of the infringement (at least some times used to determine infringement).  Lemley agrees that each candidate has a sound legal foundation.  However, he argues that the best approach moving forward is to fix the meaning at the time the patent application is first filed.
  3. Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents Survive in the Market, available at SSRN. The professors provide a game theory model to show how would-be invalid patents can survive and be valuable in the marketplace.  Essentially, the transaction costs make it difficult to mount an effective challenge to improperly granted patents.  Their work will serve as the theoretical basis any proposed post-grant opposition procedures.  Specifically, the authors “conclude that a low-cost, post-grant opposition process based primarily on written submissions within a limited estoppel effect . . . will serve as an effective instrument for improving the quality of patents that are issued and enforced.”