The UCANN vs. Pure Hemp patent case has come to a close with the Federal Circuit affirming the district court's decision to deny attorney fees to Pure Hemp. The original infringement lawsuit was filed in 2018, with UCANN suing Pure Hemp for infringing US Patent No. 9,730,911, covering various high concentration cannabis and CBD extract formulations. During the litigation, UCANN filed for bankruptcy, causing the case to be stayed, and eventually, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the infringement claims with prejudice. However, the stipulated dismissal did not include any discussion of attorney fees -- leading to the current appeal.
Following the dismissal, Pure Hemp moved for attorney fees and sanctions, arguing that UCANN's counsel committed inequitable conduct during patent prosecution and that UCANN's litigation counsel had a conflict of interest. The district court sided with UCANN and denied attorney fees, stating (1) that Pure Hemp was not the prevailing party and (2) that Pure Hemp did not prove that the case was exceptional. The Federal Circuit has now affirmed the decision, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the case unexceptional. Although district court the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, the error was harmless.
The district court sided with the defendant Sage, dismissing the complaint for lack of eligibility. In a short opinion, the Federal Circuit has largely affirmed, but made an important caveat -- that the district court held only that claims 1 and 31-33 are invalid.
[W]e agree that the operative complaint asserted infringement of only claims 1 and 31–33 of each asserted patent, and because Sage did not file any counterclaim of its own (instead, it simply moved to dismiss Hantz’s complaint), we conclude that the ineligibility judgment should apply to only claims 1 and 31–33 of the asserted patents. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment insofar as it held any claim other than claims 1 and 31–33 of each asserted patent ineligible and affirm in all other respects.
Slip Op. Despite the limit here, claim preclusion will prevent Hantz from reasserting any of the remaining claims against Sage. Non-mutual collateral estoppel should also apply here to to prevent Hantz from asserting any of the claims against a third party -- unless the claims are meaningfully distinct on eligibility grounds from those already adjudged to be invalid. Normally, collateral estoppel only applies to issues actually litigated, but in the patent context, the Federal Circuit has ruled that it may also apply to non-litigated claims when the differences do not "materially alter the question of invalidity." Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013); MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Asking “whether the remaining claims present materially different issues that alter the question of patentability”).
The Federal Circuit regularly affirms PTAB judgments without issuing any explanatory opinion to justify the result. Although not found in the Rules of Appellate procedure, the court has created its own local rule allowing itself to "enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion." In a 2017 paper, I argued that these no-opinion affirmances violated both the spirit and letter of 35 U.S.C. 144, which requires the court to issue a "mandate and opinion" in cases appealed from the USPTO. Since that time, the Federal Circuit has continued its practice, issuing hundreds of no-opinion judgments. Throughout this time, dozens of losing parties have petitioned for en banc rehearing with the Federal Circuit or certiorari to the Supreme Court. Up to now, both courts have remained silent and have refused to address the issue.
A new pending petition raises the issue once again. Virentem Ventures v. Google (Supreme Court 2023). Virentem sued Google for patent infringement, and Google responded with a set of Inter Partes Review (IPR) petitions. The PTAB eventually sided with Google and invalidated the claims of all seven challenged patents. Virentem appealed; but the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB's judgement without opinion under its local Rule 36.
The new petition to the Supreme Court asks four related questions:
Does the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 to affirm without opinion PTAB invalidity determinations that are challenged based on pure questions of law violate a patentee’s due process rights through arbitrary or disparately applied results?
Did the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 to affirm without opinion PTAB invalidity determinations of Virentem’s patents violate its due process rights?
Did the PTAB’s adoption, and Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance, of broad constructions of Time Scale Modification and other claim terms over Virentem’s explicit narrowing definitions, violate the Federal Circuit’s own law and precedents on claim construction in such circumstances?
Does the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 to affirm without opinion decisions from the PTAB violate the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 144 that the Federal Circuit “shall issue to the Director its mandate and opinion”?
The Virentem patents relate to time-scale modification -- the speeding-up or slowing-down of media. You may remember Alvin, Simon, and Theodore -- the Chipmunks. That unintelligible high pitch arguably is not really time-scale modification because it is such a failure. Rather, TSM modern impliedly requires maintaining pitch and intelligibility. In this case though, the PTAB broadly interpreted the term to include any system that speeds-up or slows-down media. With that broad interpretation, the tribunal then was able to find prior art rendering the claims obvious. Virentem argued that its patents would be seen as valid under the narrower construction. The PTAB's response: If you wanted that limitation in the claim, you should have added it to the claim.