Tag Archives: Enablement

Challenging PTO Decisions in District Court: Federal Circuit Affirms Exclusion of Enablement Evidence that “Should Have” Been Raised During Prosecution

Patent, Patent Cases 2009, , , , , ,

Hyatt v. Doll (Fed. Cir. 2009) 07-1066.pdf

Gil Hyatt is a prolific inventor who has spent much of his time over the past thirty years challenging the bounds of USPTO practice. This August 11, 2009 opinion marks the seventeenth Federal Circuit decision focusing on Hyatt’s patent rights in addition to the 2003 Supreme Court decision Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt.

This Case: During prosecution, the examiner rejected each of Hyatt’s 117 computer memory architecture claims based on anticipation, obviousness, enablement, double patenting, and written description. Hyatt appealed (pro se) to the BPAI who reversed the bulk of the rejections, but affirming only the written description and enablement rejections associated with 79 claims. Hyatt then took his case to Federal Court by filing a civil action in DC District Court grounded in 35 U.S.C. 145.

At the district court, Hyatt submitted a new declaration offering additional evidence of enablement and written description. However, the district court excluded that inventor-declaration from evidence based on Hyatt’s “negligence” in failing to previously submit the information to the PTO.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the exclusion of evidence – holding that the district court may properly exclude evidence that Hyatt should have produced to the PTO. (Chief Judge Michel as author joined by Judge Dyk)

Hyatt was obligated to respond to the examiner’s written description rejection by In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1996), by explaining where in the specification support for each of these limitations could be found. . . . The Board noted, “It is far easier for appellant to describe where the limitation he wrote is disclosed than for the Office to prove that the limitation is not disclosed.” . . . Hyatt, however, refused to cooperate, even though he necessarily possessed the information the examiner sought by the time he filed his application.   

On these facts, the district court’s exclusion of Hyatt’s new evidence must be affirmed. . . . [I]t is clear from the record that Hyatt willfully refused to provide evidence in his possession in response to a valid action by the examiner. Such a refusal to provide evidence which one possessed was grounds in Barrett to exclude the withheld evidence. Similarly, we hold that in light of Hyatt’s willful non-cooperation here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Hyatt declaration.

Judge Moore penned a vigorous dissent in support of the patent applicant’s right to a full civil action including the right to submit additional evidence when challenging a PTO decision.

The majority takes away this patent applicant’s fundamental right to a “civil action to obtain [a] patent” as granted by Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 145. Today the majority decides that a patent applicant may not introduce the inventor’s declaration in a § 145 proceeding before the district court because the inventor had an “affirmative duty” or “obligation” to disclose this evidence to the PTO. His failure to fulfill his affirmative duty, by not disclosing evidence he could have disclosed to the PTO, results in such evidence being excluded from the district court § 145 proceeding. The district court made no fact findings indicating willful withholding or intentional suppression; in fact, the district court did not even conclude that Mr. Hyatt’s conduct amounted to gross negligence, but rather excluded the evidence under a negligence “could have” standard. Nor did the PTO even argue, at any stage of these proceedings, that Mr. Hyatt’s conduct in this case was willful or intentional. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the applicant “owed,” the PTO all evidence he possesses that is responsive to a rejection and that failure to fulfill this newly created “affirmative duty” amounts to willful withholding as a matter of law. There are only two possible ways to interpret the majority’s willful withholding determination. Either the majority is engaging in appellate fact finding or it is determining that breach of its newly created affirmative duty is willful withholding as a matter of law.

. . .

Congress granted patent applicants the right to a civil action in the district court distinct from their right of appeal. It is our obligation to protect the distinction Congress codified in § 145, not to reweigh the virtues of that decision. The § 145 proceeding is a civil action and ought to be governed by the same Federal Rules of Evidence that govern other civil actions. Patent cases do not need, nor should they have, special rules of evidence.

. . .

The statute itself distinguishes the appeal that may be brought pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141 because a § 145 action is not an appeal; it is a “civil action.” The statute obligates the district court to adjudicate the facts in this civil action. Because the statute affords no limitations on the type of evidence that ought to be admissible in a civil action brought under § 145, the standard Federal Rules of Evidence that govern all civil actions ought to govern. The legislative histories of § 145 and its predecessor statute, section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, repeatedly and without contradiction indicate that the intent of Congress was to permit a patent applicant to bring a new suit built upon a new record. . . . Congress intended that the district court in a § 145 action have everything that a court would have in an infringement suit. Under this standard, Congress certainly intended for an inventor, such as Mr. Hyatt, to be permitted to introduce his own declaration in a § 145 action.

. . .

The majority holds that by failing to offer his testimony to the PTO, Hyatt has failed to satisfy “an affirmative and specific duty.” Maj. Op. at 2. In this way, this new affirmative duty for prosecution seems to resemble inequitable conduct, though here the applicant is penalized regardless of their intent. . . . With all due respect to the majority, I do not believe a new “affirmative duty” to disclose is warranted, nor do I believe Hyatt was “required by law” or “obligated” to provide his declaration to the PTO. While Mr. Hyatt may have failed to overcome the rejections or to convince the Board based upon his submissions to the PTO, he did not fail to fulfill an “obligation” or “affirmative duty” as the majority alleges.   

. . .

In this case, the district court found that Mr. Hyatt’s failure to proffer his

declaration to the PTO was merely negligent. . . . I find troubling the majority’s characterizations of Mr. Hyatt. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 51 (Mr. “Hyatt purposefully kept [the Board] in the dark”); id. (his “blatant non-cooperation”); id. at 50 (Mr. “Hyatt willfully refused to provide evidence in his possession”); id. (Hyatt “refused to cooperate”); id. (“Hyatt’s willful non-cooperation”); id. at 55 (“Hyatt willfully refused”); id. at 49 (providing his declaration “should have been simple for him”); id. at 55 (that Hyatt’s failure “to perform a simple task that it was his burden to perform is inexcusable”); id. at 54 (“Hyatt’s perverse unhelpfulness”). None of this appears in the district court proceedings, the PTO proceedings, or the record— these fact findings ought to be left to the district court which is in the best position to weigh the contradictory evidence.

. . .

Contrary to the appellate finding of willful withholding, the record contains ample evidence of a lack of willful withholding. Here, the examiner rejected all of Mr. Hyatt’s 117 claims for lack of written description, failure to enable, obviousness-type double patenting (over 8 separate references), and Schneller-type double patenting (over the same 8 references). The examiner also rejected 9 claims as anticipated (Hill reference) and 7 as obvious (over a combination of three references). Technically, Mr. Hyatt was appealing 45 separate issues totaling 2546 separate rejections of his 117 claims to the Board. He wrote a 129-page appeal brief addressing all of these different rejections. And, to be clear, the Board reversed all the examiner’s rejections for obviousness, anticipation, obviousness-type double patenting, Schneller-type double patenting, and many of the written description and enablement rejections. With regard to the written description rejections in particular, the Board reversed the rejections of 38 claims and sustained the rejections of 79 claims. Mr. Hyatt prevailed on 92% of all the examiner’s rejections at the Board level. Despite Mr. Hyatt’s success, the majority declares Mr. Hyatt’s response to be “completely and wholly inadequate” and Mr. Hyatt to have been perversely unhelpful. Maj. Op. at 55, 56.

. . .

Although Mr. Hyatt may have failed to overcome all of the written description rejections based upon his submissions to the PTO, he did not fail to fulfill an “obligation” or “affirmative duty,” and he certainly was not “perversely unhelpful” as the majority alleges. . . I believe the court is wrong to hold that breach of the newly created affirmative duty, i.e., not producing evidence to the PTO, is willful withholding as a matter of law.

. . .

In hindsight, perhaps Mr. Hyatt should have submitted his declaration or that of any other expert earlier in the prosecution process. But hindsight is misleadingly acute. Declarations and expert reports are time consuming and expensive to prepare. It is hardly reasonable or even desirable to require patent applicants to put massive declarations into the record at an early stage of prosecution, weighing the cost to both the applicant and the PTO. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1495 (2003) (arguing that it would be inefficient for the PTO to overinvest in examination because so few patents are enforced). In this case, for example, the examiner rejected the claims on many different bases (double patenting on 8 different references, obviousness, anticipation, enablement, written description, etc.), totaling 2546 separate rejections. The Board overturned nearly all of them. It is easy with the benefit of hindsight to say Mr. Hyatt should have introduced more evidence on written description to the Board. But Mr. Hyatt was not facing merely a written description rejection, he was facing 2546 separate rejections on many, many different bases. The majority implausibly asserts that 2546 separate rejections is “proportional to Hyatt’s prosecution of an application containing 117 pending claims spanning 79 pages.” Maj. Op. at 56 n.35. An average of 21 rejections per claim is hardly proportional. Mr. Hyatt was forced to appeal 45 independent issues to the Board when the average is two. Dennis D. Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals in Ex Parte Appeals, 4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1423922. Despite this challenge, Mr. Hyatt was largely successful on appeal. Further, the length of Mr. Hyatt’s application suggests that his efforts to pinpoint pages containing certain terms was helpful and in good faith. Mr. Hyatt’s response may have been especially valuable in the time before searchable electronic applications.

To say that Mr. Hyatt had an affirmative duty to introduce all evidence to the Board or that he “owed” (Maj. Op. at 56) all the evidence he possessed is to put an enormous and undesirable burden on the patentee, one that will foreclose patent protection for many small inventors. Congress foresaw exactly this problem and ameliorated it with § 145 by providing applicants a way to initiate a civil action and introduce new evidence after Board proceedings when the issues are much more succinct and consolidated. This is illustrated perfectly here, where the applicant was contending with 2546 rejections on many different bases before the Board. After the Board overturned nearly all of them, only a small number of rejections—based on written description/enablement—were maintained. Hence at the district court the applicant could proffer much more extensive evidence because the universe of issues was greatly narrowed. This is the sensible approach Congress enacted. The statute even places the cost of the proceeding on the party better positioned to know the value of the application—the applicant. The majority’s new exclusionary rule based upon its new affirmative duty upsets this balance.

Notes: I expect that Hyatt will ask for reconsideration and will then push for Supreme Court review.

Bilski’s Patent Application

Patent, , , , , ,

The Supreme Court is reviewing Bernard Bilski’s patent application to consider whether the application appropriately claims “patentable subject matter” under 35 U.S.C. 101 as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Much of the focus in the case is on the Federal Circuit’s exclusive “machine or transformation” test. However, I thought it would also be important to look at the underlying Bilski patent application because of how it may drive the debate at the Court.

Bilski’s application is not published. However, a copy of the 14-page application was included in a joint appendix submitted to the Federal Circuit during the en banc appeal. The application includes one independent claim; eight subsequent dependent claims; no drawings; and a priority claim to a 1996 provisional application. It appears that Buchanan Ingersoll (Pittsburgh) led the prosecution. The BPAI opinion rejected eleven claims – indicating that some amendments occurred during prosecution. (A docket sheet also indicates that drawings were later added.) Amazingly, Bilski’s case is based on an appeal from a March 2000 final rejection.

The Invention focuses on a method of managing consumption risk by commodity trading something that – in 1996 was “not currently managed in energy markets.” According to Bilski there was a “need for a fixed bill product to manage total energy costs including the consumption of risk.” The general idea of using commodity trading as a hedge against risk has been well known for years. However, Bilski proposes that consumers purchase commodities “at a fixed rate based on historical averages.” In a dependent claims, Bilski indicates that the risk to be avoided is a “weather-related price risk.” Later, that risk is drilled-down to focus on temperature shifts (heating and cooling degree days). Another dependent claim spells-out the equation for calculating the fixed cost based on prior fixed and variable costs, transportation costs, local delivery costs, and a location specific weather indicator. Additional dependent claims require specific Monte Carlo simulations and statistical tests to better calculate the fixed rate. In some claims, the commodity being traded is identified as “energy” and the market participants as “transmission distributors.”

The Claims do not focus on any particular machine or software implementation. Rather, they are organized as “methods” followed by a series of steps such as “initiating a series of transactions . . . “; “performing a Monte Carlo simulation . . .”; and “continuing to re-price the margin in the transaction until the expected portfolio margin and likelihood of portfolio loss is acceptable.”

No Machine: Even an amateur implementation of these methods would make extensive use of software and computer hardware. However, those elements are not present in the claims. Why did Bilski not include software and computer hardware in his application? My speculation: First, it does not appear – at least from the patent application – that he invented any software application of his hedging theory. Second, perhaps Bilski believed that a computer implementation element would unduly limit the scope of his invention.

Obvious and Not Enabled: The claims are likely obvious based on extensive prior art in the industry. In addition, the claims may well fail the tests of enablement and/or written description (if it survives Ariad v. Eli Lilly). However, the PTO worked-hard to properly couch this case as a test of patentable subject matter.

The abstract reads as follows:

A method is provided for managing the risk-associated costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price. Such risk-associated costs include the weather-related costs of a fixed price-energy bill. The commodity provider initiates a series of transactions with consumers of the commodity wherein the consumers purchase the commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages. The fixed rate corresponds to a risk position of the consumers. The commodity provider then identifies market participants for the commodity who have a counter-risk position to that of the consumers. The commodity provider then initiates a series of transactions with the market participants at a second fixed rate such that the series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of the series of consumer transactions.

Read the application here: BilskiApplication.pdf

Blackboard: Federal Circuit Again Find Software-Related Means-Plus-Function Claims Invalid for Failing to Disclose Sufficient Structure

CAFC, Claim Construction, Means Plus Function, Patent, Patent Cases 2009, , ,

Blackboard v. Desire2Learn (Fed. Cir. 2009) 08-1368.pdf

Blackboard’s patent covers an internet-based educational support system and method. (U.S. Pat. No. 6,988,138). On summary judgment, the district court (Judge Clark, E.D. Tex.) found claims 1-35 invalid as indefinite, but a jury found found that Desire2Learn liable for infringement of claims 36-38. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that Claims 1-35 are indefinite, and – after altering the claim construction – held that the remaining claims were also invalid as anticipated. pic-54.jpg

Means-Plus-Function: Blackboard’s seemingly broadest claim (claim 1) includes several means-plus-function clauses, including a “means for assigning a level of access and control.” The specification briefly discusses an “access control manager” (ACM) with an “access control list.” On appeal, however, the court found that brief description to be an insufficient “disclosure of the structure that corresponds to the claimed function” and consequently indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112 ¶2. See In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc).

“[W]hat the patent calls the ‘access control manager’ is simply an abstraction that describes the function of controlling access to course materials, which is performed by some undefined component of the system. The ACM is essentially a black box that performs a recited function. But how it does so is left undisclosed.”

Important for patent drafter, means-plus-function claims require disclosure in the specification even if the means are already well known in the art.

The fact that an ordinarily skilled artisan might be able to design a program to create an access control list based on the system users’ predetermined roles goes to enablement. The question before us is whether the specification contains a sufficiently precise description of the “corresponding structure” to satisfy section 112, paragraph 6, not whether a person of skill in the art could devise some means to carry out the recited function.

Because claims 2-35 all depend upon claim 1, they are all invalid as indefinite

Claim construction: At the trial, Blackboard’s expert could only identify one difference between claims 36-38 and the prior art. Namely, that the Blackboard patent identified a “single login” feature that allowed one user to have various roles within the system. “For example, Blackboard asserted that its claimed method would allow a graduate student who was a student in one course and a teacher in another to use a single login to obtain access to both courses and to obtain access to the materials for each course according to the graduate student’s role in each.” However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims do not actually require that feature — leading them to hold the claims invalid based primarily on the admissions of Blackboard’s own expert.

[O]nce the claims are properly construed, the conclusion of anticipation is dictated by the testimony of Blackboard’s own witnesses and the documentary evidence that was presented to the jury. Based on that evidence, and in the absence of a “single login” requirement in claims 36-38, it is clear that the prior art contains every limitation of those claims.

Defendant Desire2Learn wins a complete victory (after a few million in attorney fees).

Centocor v. Abbott (E.D.Tex.)

Patent, ,

Centocor v. Abbott (E.D.Tex.)

Abbott has two chances to block the $1.67 billion jury verdict while the case is still in the hands of E.D. Texas Judge Ward.

Inequitable Conduct: Because inequitable conduct is an equitable doctrine, it is determined by a judge. In this case, Judge Ward bifurcated the trial and will hold a one-day bench trial on inequitable conduct on August 4, 2009. On the 4th, parties will each have three hours of witness time and 25 minutes for argument.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV): This is unlikely in Judge Ward’s courtroom – especially here since the Judge has already denied Abbott’s motions for summary judgment.

On appeal at the Federal Circuit look for a number of different disputes, including:

  • Priority dates and anticipation: Centocor’s patents claim priority to 1991 via a series of continuations-in-part, but the claims at issue were probably not enabled until a 1994 filing. In 1993, a foreign counterpart of the original application published – becoming prior art against the 1994 CIP filing. The appeal may focus on the symmetry (or lack therof) between enablement and anticipation.
  • Damages: The damage calculation here is somewhat complex and could lead to important Federal Circuit precedent on lost profits

Inventorship: Conception does not Require Scientific Certainty; Rather, “Proof that the Invention Works to a Scientific Certainty is Reduction to Practice”

Inventorship, Patent, Patent Cases 2009,

University of Pittsburgh v. Marc Hendrick (Fed. Cir. 2009) 08-1468.pdf

The patent at issue (6,777,231) relates to a method of creating stem cells from liposuction residue. In an inventorship dispute amongst former Pitt scientists, the district court held that the Hendrick was not a co-inventor. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed – based primarily on the corroborating evidence found in one of the listed inventor’s laboratory notebook.

Inventorship is a question of law, although a challenge to inventorship must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. In a joint invention situation, “each inventor must contribute to the joint arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in practice.” However, there is no requirement that the inventors actually work together; that all asserted claims be jointly invented; or that all inventors realize that they invented something.

In this case, the timeline is important: The two listed inventors had written evidence (in lab notebooks and elsewhere) from before Hendrick arrived on campus that they believed their liposuction derived stem sells could transdifferentiate into various types of cells such as bone, cartilage, nerves, and muscles. At that time, however, they were not “scientifically certain” that nerve cells had been created. And, almost certainly, the two did not have enough evidence to patent their specific claim to adipose-derived stem cells that can differentiate into nerve cells. Hendrick and his REBAR team of researchers then came along and confirmed that the “highly speculative” suggestions of the original listed inventors was indeed correct.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that despite the lack of scientific certainty, the invention had been conceived before Hendrick joined the team.

[Hendrick’s] is premised upon a misapprehension of what it means to “know” the limitations of the claims.

Knowledge in the context of a possessed, isolated biological construct does not mean proof to a scientific certainty that the construct is exactly what a scientist believes it is. Conception requires a definite and permanent idea of the operative invention, and “necessarily turns on the inventor’s ability to describe his invention.” Proof that the invention works to a scientific certainty is reduction to practice. Therefore, because the district court found evidence that Katz and Llull had formed a definite and permanent idea of the cells’ inventive qualities, and had in fact observed them, it is immaterial that their knowledge was not scientifically certain and that the REBAR researchers helped them gain such scientific certainty.

Here, the lab notebooks were important to to show that the listed inventors had “sufficiently described to those skilled in the art how to isolate the cells from adipose-tissue … [and] thus they had disclosed a ‘completed thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art to make the invention.'” Citing Coleman.

Affirmed

Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal

BPAI, Patent, , , , , ,

Every proposed patent reform measure includes an expanded role for the US Patent & Trademark Office’s administrative patent court – known today as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the BPAI, or simply the Board. Even without legislation, the role of the BPAI has expanded greatly in the past few years. The number of ex parte appeals in FY2009 is expected to at least double the record-filing of 6,400 appeals in FY2008. I suggest that two factors have led to this short term dramatic rise in appeals: (1) an increase in rejection-rate by patent examiners; and (2) attempts by the PTO to limit non-appeal avenues for achieving full claim scope. These limits include the PTO’s proposed rules that would curtail the applicant’s ability to file multiple requests for continued examination (RCEs), continuation applications, and a multitude of claims. Although these rules have only been threatened, they impact appeal practice because they may apply to already-pending applications. Although more gradual, two additional influences on the rise in appeals include: (1) the continued perceived value of patent rights and (2) the continued rise in the number of patent application filed each year.

During patent prosecution, an applicant has a right to appeal to the Board after its application is twice rejected. 35 U.S.C. 134. In this short article, I look at how the Board responds to those rejections on appeal. Many appeals involve multiple rejections each of which may be affirmed or reversed. In addition, the Board occasionally introduces a new ground for rejection even after reversing an examiner decision. This analysis opens-up these decisions and provides data issue-by-issue.

My data comes from two primary sources. First, using Westlaw, I downloaded copies of the approximately 6,000 ex parte BPAI decisions issued between January 2008 and May 2009. Using an automated script, I extracted data from each of those appeals, including the holding and the extent of discussion of various issues. (i.e., how often “obviousness” or “enablement” is discussed in the opinion.) In addition, just under 200 ex parte decisions from 2009 were randomly selected and scored by hand to determine how the BPAI decided individual issues within the appeals. Board decisions typically identify a series of issues and then decide each issue. In Ex Parte Cypher, 2009 WL 1162435, 2008-4722, (Bd. Pat. App. Inter. 2009), for instance, the Board identified two issues: “(1) Claims 1-4 … are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Loh in view of McFarling. (2) Claims 9-11 … are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Loh and McFarling in view of Yeh.” In Cypher, both issues were affirmed. As a consequence, the data for this case reflects that two obviousness issues were raised, both of which were affirmed.

Results:

In the hand-scored sample, the average Board decision considered 2.1 issues (median of two issues). Approximately 61% of decided issues are affirmed on appeal and 39% are reversed. (In this study, fewer than 1% of issues were expressly not decided.) The issue-by-issue analysis fits with the overall holdings for cases on appeal. In the hand-scored sample, 59% of the cases were affirmed as a whole, 12% were affirmed-in-part, and 29% were reversed. (This sample parallels the Board’s own statistics for FY2009 which indicate that 60% of its decisions on the merits are affirmances, 15% affirmance in part, and 25% reversals). Table 1 shows the issue-by-issue results alongside the overall case-holding for the hand-scored sample.

  

Issue-by-Issue Results

Case-by-Case results

Affirmed

61% of issues affirmed

59% of cases affirmed

Affirmed-in-Part

N/A

12% of cases affirmed-in-part

Reversed

39% of issues reversed

29% of cases reversed

Table 1

    

As you might expect, when there is a strong correlation between the overall case holding of an appeal and the holdings on individual issues at issue in the appeal. When the overall case-holding is affirmed, the vast majority of issues are also affirmed. However, in the hand-scored sample, about 10% of cases that were affirmed included some individual issues that were reversed. Often, the reversed issues were rejections argued by the examiner in the alternative. In Ex Parte Mcquiston, 2009 WL 598537, 2008-3224 (Bd. Pat. App. Inter. 2009), for instance, applicant’s claim 1 had been rejected as (1) anticipated by Golds; (2) obvious over Golds; (3) anticipated by Simso; and (4) obvious over Simso. The Board rejected the first three of these rejections, but the claim remained unpatentable as obvious over Simso and the examiner’s decision affirmed as a whole.

Table 2 compares the case-holding with the issue-by-issue analysis based on our hand-scored sample of 200 BPAI decisions. As seen in Table 2, when a case is affirmed-in-part, roughly half (on average) of the issues are affirmed and half are reversed. In cases that were reversed, every issue was also reversed. (?2 P<.01).

Case Holding

Percent of Issued Affirmed

Percent of Issues Reversed

Affirmed

92%

8%

Affirmed-in-Part

51%

49%

Reversed

0%

100%

Table 2

    

Number of Issues on Appeal: In Mcquiston, the applicant needed to address each alternate reason for rejection in order to win on appeal. In most cases, however, each claim is rejected for only a single reason – usually obviousness. See infra. The applicant can then choose how to group issues on appeal. If, for instance, claims 1-10 are each rejected as obvious, the applicant could choose to argue each claim separately or cluster the claims into one or more groups that are then argued as a unit. Chart 1 uses the hand-scored data to presents the likelihood of a particular case-holding as a function of the number of issues on appeal.

When only one issue is presented, the result in the case tracks the result of that issue. As more issues are presented, the likelihood of a split affirmed-in-part decision rises dramatically while the likelihood of either complete affirmance or complete reversal drops. Chart 2 is a cumulative frequency for the number of issues presented on appeal. In our sample, the number of claims ranged from 1 to 8. The median was 2 claims and the mode 1 claim. About 94% of decisions discussed four or fewer issues.

The Board is authorized to offer new grounds for rejection, and did-so in about 4% of the cases in the hand-scored study. The most common new ground was for obviousness.

Obviousness: Obviousness is the bread and butter of patent examinations. In this study, I also show that it is the mainstay of BPAI ex parte appeals. 90% of appeals in my hand-scored study included at least one obviousness issue that was decided on appeal. More than half of the appeals (54%) focused only on obviousness. The closest runner-up issue – anticipation – was an issue in 37% of the appeals. Other issues on appeal (each with a frequency of < 5%) included in descending frequency: written description requirement; indefiniteness, patentable subject matter, obviousness-type double patenting, and enablement.

For applicants, the fact that the majority of issues involve obviousness spells trouble for applicants. In the hand-scored data, the Board affirmed obviousness findings much more often it did for other grounds of rejection. Specifically, the Board affirmed 65% of the appealed obviousness issues, but affirmed only 52% of the appeal issues made on grounds other than obviousness. Table 3 compares these results for the hand-scored sample of 200 cases. (?2 P<.05).

Issue Holding

Obviousness Rejection

Other Grounds of Rejection

Affirmed

65%

52%

Reversed

35%

48%

Table 3

    

The pervasiveness of obviousness issues is further confirmed by the larger sample of 6,000 ex parte decisions issued between January 2008 and May 2009. Using a parsing script, I looked for discussions of obviousness issues by counting the number of times that the terms such as “obvious” and “35 U.S.C. § 103(a)” appeared in each opinion. In that sample, 87% of the decisions discussion obviousness while only 13% do not discuss obviousness. Table 4 shows the roughly parallel results.

  

Hand-Scored Sample

Automatically Parsed Sample

  

(n ˜ 200)

(n ˜ 6,000)

Obviousness at Issue

90% of cases decide an obviousness issue

87% of cases discuss either obviousness or Section 103(a)

No Obviousness Issue

10% of cases do not decide any obviousness issue

13% of cases do not discuss obviousness or Section 103(a)

Table 4

    

In order to ensure that I was picking up an actual obviousness issue, I created a script that looked for cases where obviousness was more intensely discussed, i.e., where obviousness terms were mentioned at least three times. In those cases where obviousness was intensely discussed, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejections decisions 59% of the time. In cases where obviousness was not discussed at all, the examiner was affirmed in only 37% of cases. Table 5 compares these results for the automatically-parsed sample of 6000 cases. (?2 P<.01).

Case Holding

Obviousness Intensely Discussed

No Discussion of Obviousness

No Discussion of Obviousness or Novelty

Affirmed

59%

37%

22%

Affirmed-in-Part

15%

10%

4%

Reversed

26%

47%

74%

Table 5

      

The far right column of Table 5 provides a compelling statistic. 358 cases in the sample had no discussion of either obviousness or novelty. Of those cases, 74% were reversed on appeal.

Technology Center Specific Results: Patent examination is divided amongst various technology centers. Although the substantive patent laws do not vary across technology lines, patent practice can vary greatly. The BPAI regularly updates a statistical breakdown of its opinions by tech center. [Link]. Table 6 is derived directly from the BPAI statistics for FY2009 through May 2009 and shows the percentage of decisions on the merits from each tech center that arrive affirm, affirm-in-part, or reverse, respectively.

Technology Center

Affirmed

Affirmed-In-Part

Reversed

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry

59%

15%

27%

1700 Chemical and Materials Engineering

69%

11%

20%

2100 Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security

63%

13%

24%

2600 Communications

64%

14%

21%

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

65%

11%

24%

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture,

47%

22%

31%

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products

53%

17%

30%

Table 6

      

Focusing in on obviousness again, it is interesting to see that appeals from Tech Center 1600 (Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry) are the least likely to discuss obviousness. The most appeal decisions emerge from Tech Center 1700 (Chemical and Materials Engineering), and those appeals are the most likely to include a discussion of obviousness. In particular, a discussion of obviousness is found in 92% of TC 1700 appeals but only 76% of TC 1600 appeals. (?2 P<.01). The difference is partially explained by TC 1600’s more rigorous application of the Section 112 issues of written description, enablement and indefiniteness. Table 6 is again derived from the automatically-parsed sample of 6,000 Board decisions. For each tech center, Table 7 indicates the percent of cases that discuss obviousness; both obviousness and novelty; novelty; and neither obviousness nor novelty. This table again highlights (1) the focus of the PTO on obviousness issues (and to a lesser extent novelty issues) and (2) the differences of TC 1600 from the rest of patent practice.

 

Percent of Cases Issue on Appeal

Technology Center

Obviousness+

Obviousness and Novelty

Novelty+

Neither Obviousness Nor Novelty

All

87%

31%

40%

4%

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry

76%

20%

26%

18%

1700 Chemical and Materials Engineering

92%

29%

34%

3%

2100 Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security

82%

29%

43%

3%

2600 Communications

89%

31%

39%

3%

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

88%

35%

45%

3%

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture,

87%

30%

40%

2%

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products

87%

37%

47%

2%

Table 7

        

 

Notes:

  • Thanks to two of my research assistants – Patrick Barnacle and Jaron Brunner – for helping me to score the individual decisions by hand.
  • The BPAI only publishes opinions once the underlying application is either published or issued as a patent. Consequently, this article misses those

Written Description: Araid Petitions en banc Federal Circuit to Eliminate Separate Written Description Requirement

En Banc, Enablement, Patent, Patent Cases 2009, ,

Ariad v. Eli Lilly (en banc suggestion 2009)

Ariad has petitioned the Federal Circuit for an en banc rehearing – boldly asking the court to eliminate the written description test as a distinct requirement of patentability under 35 USC Section 112, paragraph 1. The petition – drafted by Professors Duffy and Whealan – is essentially a well-formed collage of quotations from Federal Circuit dissents and 19th Century Supreme Court decisions.

The petition raises the following two questions:

(1) Whether this Court has erred by “engrafting . . . a separate written description requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 …. ” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring).

(2) What is the proper test to satisfy the requirement in Section 112, paragraph 1, that a patent specification contain “a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same”?

Apart from the merits of this case, the brief notes that half of the Federal Circuit judges “have either voted to grant en banc review of this Court’s written description jurisprudence (Newman, Rader, Bryson, Gajarsa, and Linn, JJ.), or have expressly noted that future en banc review may be appropriate because this Court’s written description standards are unsatisfactory. (Dyk, J.).

Notes:

  • Ariad Brief: ariadrehearingpetition.pdf
  • Federal Circuit Decision
  • The original opinion was written by Judge Moore and joined by Judge Prost. Judge Linn wrote a concurring opinion as a reminder of his belief that the written description requirement should be eliminated and enablement be allowed to do its job.
  • Patent Docs has more.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 103: Events and Jobs

Bits and Bytes, Patent

Upcoming Events:200904151129.jpg

New Source of Upcoming Events: The Patently-O Events Calendar (BETA VERSION). HTTP://www.patentyo.com/calendar. We’re still working on the formatting & integration. The best way to post an event is to use create the event in your calendar (such as Outlook, Google Calendar, or iCal), and then invite patentevents@gmail.com. Be sure to include a URL in the description.

Job Postings from April 2009:

Query:

  • I should know this, but I don’t recall the answer: Suppose a recently issued patent was filed in 2004 and claims to be a continuation-in-part of another application filed in 2000. In the new patent, some of the claims were fully described and enabled in the 2000 application while other claims in the new patent include matter only found in the 2000 application. Will the enforceable patent term differ between the two sets of claims? If so, does the PTO require a terminal disclaimer if the claims are not patentably distinct?

Patent Reform: First to File

Patent,

Patent Reform 2009 is rolling along. The Senate Judiciary Committee has approved an amended form of S.515. Some notes on the first-to-file portion of the amended bill: S515Amended.pdf

·         First-to-File: One of the greatest changes to ordinary prosecution would be the move to a system where the effective date of invention is the filing date. This means no more swearing-behind prior art based on the date of the invention.

·         Effective Date: The language of the bill would define a the “effective filing date” of “the patent or application” as “the filing date of the patent or application for the patent containing a claim to the invention” or the earliest §§ 119, 120, 121, or 365 priority date associated with a document in which the “claimed invention is disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112.” (i.e., described, enabled, and best mode provided). The “claimed invention” is then described as “the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent.’’ There appears to be is an important technical problem with this language because it considers the effective filing date of the patent or application as a whole. However, there are many cases where only some of the claims are fully described in priority documents. Under the language in S.515, the “effective filing date” of the patent would be the earliest priority date for any one claim in the patent. Thus, the provision would allow an applicant to reach-back to a provisional or parent document to claim an effective date for the entire patent document even if the priority document discloses information directed to only a portion of the claims.

·         Obviousness: To operate within the first-to-file schema, the obviousness provision needs to be keyed to the “effective filing date” rather than the “time the invention was made.” However, the proposed bill makes another couple of tweak to the provision. For instance, rather than looking at the “subject matter sought to be patented … as a whole,” the new provision would look to the “claimed invention as a whole.” Difference?

Written Description: Pioneering Claims Require More Expansive Written Description

Patent, , , ,

Ariad v. Eli Lilly (08-1248.pdf, Fed. Cir. 2009) (Judge Moore; Concurring opinion by Judge Linn)

Ariad sued Lilly for infringing its patent that claims a method of reducing NF-κB (“en eff kappa be”) activity. The listed inventors of the patent include, inter alia, two Nobel Laureates, and the original assignees include Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute. A jury found that both Evista and Xigris infringe, and the judge denied Lilly’s JMOL motion on invalidity. The resulting judgment was for $65 million in past damages and an ongoing royalty of 2.3% of sales.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision – finding the asserted claims invalid for lack of written description. The written description requirement is intended to ensure that the inventors “disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based [and] demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” (Quoting Capon). Consequently, the disclosure in the patent document “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed” and was in “possession” of the invention at the time of filing including “all elements and limitations.” In other words, Ariad “must describe some way of performing the claimed methods.”  The actual level of disclosure depends upon several factors such as the extent of prior art, maturity of the science, and the “predictability of the aspects at issue.”

Here, it was clear that the invention was “extraordinarily creative” in a highly unpredictable field with little prior art available. Ariad’s expert even testified that the invention necessitated the development of a new vocabulary. All these factors indicate that the written description bar will be set high.

Here, Ariad’s description was scant on real examples

The ’516 patent discloses no working or even prophetic examples of methods that reduce NF-κB activity, and no completed syntheses of any of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-κB activity.

Without specific examples, Ariad attempted to show that its description was sufficient by bolstering the skill of a PHOSITA. Unfortunately for the Patentee, the Jury found an early effective filing date and much of Ariad’s evidence showed skill in the art after that 1989 date.

Because written description is determined as of the filing date—April 21, 1989 in this case—evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew in 1990 or 1991 cannot provide substantial evidence to the jury that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written description.  

Although important, these small date issues probably made no difference because the description was so lacking and the prior art so sparse.

The state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its disclosure.

“We therefore conclude that the jury lacked substantial evidence for its verdict that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written description, and thus hold the asserted claims invalid.”

Caveat Vindicor: In its conclusion, the court noted that this result likely turned on clam construction. If Ariad had agreed to a narrower construction in litigation or narrower claim language during prosecution, then the written description requirement might have been satisfied. Of course, if it had pursued that strategy, infringement would have likely been lost.

Although Judge Linn concurred in the opinion, he wrote separately to remind readers of his belief that the written description requirement should be eliminated and enablement be allowed to do its job.

Notes:

  • Pioneering inventions are less likely to be found obvious or anticipated. However, one problematic result highlighted by this decision is that those pioneer patents are more likely to be trapped by the formalities of the patent system.

In re Kubin: Federal Circuit Expands Obvious-to-Try Jurisprudence

Patent, , ,

In re Kubin (Fed. Cir. 2009), 08-1184.pdf (Opinion by Judge Rader)

In a much anticipated biotech case, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a BPAI obviousness decision and in the process expanded the court’s obvious to try jurisprudence. The Kubin opinion found that the Supreme Court’s KSR decision overturned In re Deuel and its admonition against an “obvious to try” test for obviousness.

To be clear, Kubin does not hold that an invention that was “obvious to try” was necessarily obvious under Section 103(a). Going forward, however, the question in this long-running debate will be “when is an invention that was obvious to try nevertheless nonobvious?” (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Kubin revives the O’Farrell analysis of obvious to try and carves-out two factual situations where obvious-to-try analysis should not apply.

(1) Throwing darts versus a finite number of Identified, predictable known options:

In such circumstances, where a defendant merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities, courts should not succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness. The inverse of this proposition is succinctly encapsulated by the Supreme Court’s statement in KSR that where a skilled artisan merely pursues “known options” from a “finite number of identified, predictable solutions,” obviousness under § 103 arises. 550 U.S. at 421.

(2) Exploring new technology versus improving known and predictable technology:

[An] impermissible “obvious to try” situations occurs where ‘what was “obvious to try” was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.’ (Quoting O’Farrell).

Again, KSR affirmed the logical inverse of this statement by stating that § 103 bars patentability unless “the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.”

Application: In this case, the court finds that neither of the O’Farrell exceptions apply. The invention is old-school biotech: isolating and sequencing a human gene that encodes for a protein. People do this in high school now, and the application explicitly states that the DNA and Protein sequence may be obtained through “conventional methodologies known to one of skill in the art.” Likewise, the protein in question had already been identified and the prior art suggested that the protein plays an role in human immune response.

KSR moves to Non-Predictable Arts: Biotech has traditionally been thought of as unpredictable. Here, Judge Rader may have dismantled the art-level distinction in holding that KSR applies to the unpredictable arts. The issue rather is if the particular invention in question was predictable.

Therefore this court cannot deem irrelevant the ease and predictability of cloning the gene that codes for that protein. This court cannot, in the face of KSR, cling to formalistic rules for obviousness, customize its legal tests for specific scientific fields in ways that deem entire classes of prior art teachings irrelevant, or discount the significant abilities of artisans of ordinary skill in an advanced area of art.

Affirmed.

Notes:

  • Kevin Noonan provides an important critique of the case – focusing primarily on the court’s mishandling of the factual issues. [Link].
  • I should note here that the PTO is well ahead of the Federal Circuit. MPEP 2141 indicates that being “obvious to try” is a proper rationale to “to support a conclusion of obviousness.” The big book does hint that such an application would only be proper if the “trying” means “choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success.”
  • This case makes clear that the level of enablement of the prior art is very important to any obviousness conclusion. That result is in contrast to the recent Gleave case that found anticipation absent known utility.

In re Gleave: Reference with Unknown Utility Still Anticipates

Fees, Guest Post, Interference, ITC, Law Firm Practice, Patent, Post Grant Review, Trade Secret,

In re Gleave (Fed. Cir. 2009)

In 2008, the BPAI affirmed the examiner’s rejection of Gleave’s claims as anticipated. The claims focus on an antisense oligodeoxynucleotide designed to bind two different types of insulin-dependent growth factor binding protein (IGFBP). The prior art included a document that listed the genetic sequence of the complementary sense strands but did not identify any utility of the sequence.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the anticipation rejection – basing its decision on the rule that anticipatory prior art does need to be functional, useful, or show actual reduction to practice. Rather, to be anticipatory, the prior art must enable the skilled artisan to make the claimed invention.

In the 1973 Wiggins case, the CCPA ruled that the “mere naming of a compound in a reference, without more, cannot constitute a[n anticipatory] description of the compound.” The Federal Circuit here distinguished Wiggins – noting that in Gleave’s case, the sequence listing was sufficient to allow a skilled artisan to “at once envision each member of this limited class.”

Notes:

Written Description: Federal Circuit Again Invalidates Broadened Claims

Enablement, Patent, Patent Cases 2009, , , ,

ICU Medical v. Alaris Medical System (Fed. Cir. 2009)

This is the second post on the ICU case. Part I discusses the $4.6 million award of attorney fees to the accused infringer based on the patentee’s litigation misconduct.

The district court found several of ICU’s claims invalid for lack of written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. (Judges Michel (CJ), Prost, and Moore; Opinion by Moore). Although similar to enablement, the written description requirement pushes an applicant to “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Most often, written description arises in cases where new matter is added to the claims during prosecution. That is also the case here – during prosecution ICU amended its claims to include “spikeless” claims — directed to a valve mechanism for adding drugs to an IV without using needles.

To be clear – the original claims included the “spike.” That element was removed during prosecution – seemingly broadening the claims. As the court stated “we refer to these claims as spikeless not because they exclude the preferred embodiment of a valve with a spike but rather because these claims do not include a spike limitation—i.e., they do not require a spike.” It is that failure to include any discussion of a spike in the claim that lead to the claim being held invalid for lack of written description.

The Federal Circuit does not cite Gentry Gallery or the infamous “omitted element” or “essential element” theories. However, the court does rely heavily on LizardTech. In that case, the court did not point to any claim limitation that was not sufficiently described. Rather, the court found the claim invalid because an embodiment arguably covered by the claim was not sufficiently disclosed.

We addressed a similar issue in LizardTech . . . We explained that “the specification provides only one method for creating a seamless DWT, which is to ‘maintain updated sums’ of DWT coefficients. That is the procedure recited by claim 1. Yet claim 21 is broader than claim 1 because it lacks the ‘maintain updated sums’ limitation.” We determined, however, that “[a]fter reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand how to make a seamless DWT generically and would not understand LizardTech to have invented a method for making a seamless DWT, except by ‘maintaining updat[ed] sums of DWT coefficients.'” We therefore concluded that claim 21 was invalid under the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.

In LizardTech, the court explicitly rejected the argument that the written description requirement “requires only that each individual step in a claimed process be described adequately.”

In this case, ICU’s original disclosure focused on spiked embodiments, but the more generic claims are not so limited.

ICU’s asserted spikeless claims are broader than its asserted spike claims because they do not include a spike limitation; these spikeless claims thus refer to medical valves generically—covering those valves that operate with a spike and those that operate without a spike. But the specification describes only medical valves with spikes.

Since all the embodiments included the “spike,” the court concluded that “Based on this disclosure, a person of skill in the art would not understand the inventor … to have invented a spikeless medical valve.”

Invalidity affirmed

Notes:

  • This case also includes an important discussion of claim differentiation that will be dissected in a later post.  
  • Of course, this case suggests the best patent drafting practice of providing multiple embodiments of each claim element, and considering whether each and every limitation in the broadest original claims are necessary.
  • ICU broadened its claim by dropping a limitation — did ICU introduce new matter?
  • In a powerful rhetorical approach, Judge Moore chose to refer to the broad claims as “spikeless claims.” As mentioned, those claims do not include a “spikeless” limitation. Rather, they simply omit a “spike” element. As it turns out more than 99.9% all patent claims issued in 2008 are silent about “spikes,” and under the traditional interpretation of the “comprising” transition – all those claims would literally cover embodiments without spikes. The holding here cannot be that all those claims are invalid. I believe that the holding here is largely a result of the fact that the accused device was in-fact spikeless. Unfortunately, this decision does not provide helpful guidance as to when it will apply. Rather, it appears to simply be an additional vague tool available to defense attorneys.
  • The court did not mention enablement – since it was easy to remove the needle from a syringe and the disclosure includes a preslit seal that could arguably work with a spikeless syringe. That modification would have been enabled based on the original disclosure.

In re Ferguson: Patentable Subject Matter

BPAI, Patent, Patent Cases 2009, Patentable Subject Matter, Software, , ,

In re Ferguson (Fed. Cir. 2009)

Scott Harris has been discussed several times on Patently-O. Harris is a former Fish & Richardson partner. Fish handles the most patent litigation of any firm in the country. In addition to being a patent attorney, Harris is an inventor. He has contracted with the plaintiffs firm Niro Scavone in several actions to enforce patents against Google and other companies. Harris is one of the named inventors of the Ferguson application and he handled the [futile] appeal.

The claimed invention focuses on a “method of marketing a product” and a “paradigm for marketing software.” These claims focus on methods and structures for operating a business.

Methods Under Bilski: Claim 1 reads as follows:

A method of marketing a product, comprising:

developing a shared marketing force, said shared marketing force including at least marketing channels, which enable marketing a number of related products;

using said shared marketing force to market a plurality of different products that are made by a plurality of different autonomous producing company, so that different autonomous companies, having different ownerships, respectively produce said related products;

obtaining a share of total profits from each of said plurality of different autonomous producing companies in return for said using; and

obtaining an exclusive right to market each of said plurality of products in return for said using.

Under Bilski, this case is open and shut. The claim is not even arguably tied to a machine — especially under the Nuijten construction of machine to be a “concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices [including] every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.” (Quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863)). Thus, the 1863 touchability definition of machine appears to hold weight. On the second Bilski prong, the claim does not require transformation of any article into a different state or thing. The only transformation is that of legal rights and organizational relationships that were explicitly excluded in the Bilski decision: “transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”

Harris asked the court to consider a different test of patentable subject matter: “Does the claimed subject matter require that the product or process has more than a scintilla of interaction with the real world in a specific way?” The CAFC panel rejected that proposal primarily based on the precedential value of Bilski: “In light of this court’s clear statements that the “sole,” “definitive,” “applicable,” “governing,” and “proper” test for a process claim under § 101 is the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test, see Bilski, passim, we are reluctant to consider Applicants’ proposed test.” The court went on to determine that the “scintilla” test would create too much ambiguity as well.

Non Method Claims: The application also included claims directed to a “paradigm for marketing software” made up of a marketing company that markets software in return for a contingent share of income. Although “instructive,” the Federal Circuit did not directly follow Bilski. Rather, the court looked to determine whether the claimed paradigm fit within one of the four statutory classes listed in Section 101:

Inventions Patentable: “… any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof…”

In a gentle Koan, the Court stated that it “need not resolve the particular class of statutory subject matter into which Applicants’ paradigm claims fall, [however], the claims must satisfy at least one category.” In fact, the court did attempt to resolve the particular class, but was unable to fit the paradigm claim into any of the four.

Applicants’ paradigm claims are not directed to processes, as “no act or series of acts” is required. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1355. Applicants do not argue otherwise. Applicants’ marketing company paradigm is also not a manufacture, because although a marketing company may own or produce tangible articles or commodities, it clearly cannot itself be an “‘article[]’ resulting from the process of manufacture.” Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356. Again, Applicants do not argue otherwise. And Applicants’ marketing company paradigm is certainly not a composition of matter. Applicants do not argue otherwise.  

Again applying the touchability notion of machine, the Court also rejected the notion that the company paradigm could be a machine:

Applicants do assert, however, that “[a] company is a physical thing, and as such analogous to a machine.” But the paradigm claims do not recite “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices,” Nuijtent, and as Applicants conceded during oral argument, “you cannot touch the company.”

Ending in a flourish, the court found that in fact, the Ferguson paradigm claims are “drawn quite literally to the paradigmatic abstract idea.” (quoting Warmerdam).

Judge Newman offers a poignant concurring opinion.  

Accelerated Examination Case Study

Patent, ,

The quickest patent issued in 2008: U.S. Patent No. 7,408,364 is assigned to Advanced Sensor Technologies, Inc. (King of Prussia, PA). When ASTi filed its application on a sensor for measuring moisture and salinity in May 2008, it included an accelerated examination petition, a statement of pre-examination search, and a set of examination support documents. Three weeks later, the PTO granted ASTi’s petition for accelerated examination. On June 19, the Examiner began his examination, and issued a notice of allowance for the single claim on June 20. The patent issued on August 5, 2008 – 76 days after the application was originally filed. ASTi has filed multiple continuations – at least one of which has already issued. The patent was prosecuted by longtime patent attorney Mike Catania. The median pendency for the art unit (2831) during the past year was 2.2 years – more than ten-times longer than it took ASTi to get its patent. The median pendency for the primary examiner handling the case during the same period was 2.7 years.

ASTi’s examination support documents include a discussion of nine prior art references. Catania steps through each of the cited references and explains what claim elements are missing from the references. This discussion very much parallels what an attorney would have written in an office action response. The document also discusses nonobviousness and asserts that a prima facie case of obviousness cannot be made because several claim elements are not found in any of the cited prior art references. The document then goes through each claim element and points to particular disclosure in the specification that describes and/or enables the element.

Inequitable Conduct & Cost: The two knocks against the accelerated examination system are the potential for inequitable conduct and the cost of the procedure. I have heard patent attorneys say they would never use the process because of the inherent risk. Part of the vehement reaction is historic. Before the accelerated examination process was created in August 2006, it was much easier for an applicant to put an application on the accelerated examination track through the process then known only as a petition to make special.

Inequitable conduct fears are related to potential charges of failure to conduct a proper search or misrepresentation of the prior art. Both of those are legitimate. Here, however, Catania explained the exact search terms used and the databases searched. This organized and transparent approach coupled with a competent search is unlikely to create inequitable conduct. Regarding discussion of the prior art, Catania’s write-up looks like a response to an office action. Almost every case includes at least one response to an obviousness rejection. Most cases include multiple such responses. It is difficult to tell how this strategy is more problematic than the standard approach. In fact, by providing the opening volley, Catania seems to have set the stage in a way that reduced further need to respond. The cost is certainly more because it requires a well done prior art search, search report and a discussion of the references in relation to the claims. The search & report should run under $1,000 and the discussion should be about the same cost as responding to a well reasoned office action. Although, the attorney will not need to step through the sometimes painful process of amending claims. Almost certainly, prosecution of this case was cheaper than the typical case that is allowed after an RCE and amendment. Of course, the process has a learning curve   [Mike – can you tell us how much did this cost here, and who did the search?].

What’s the Benefit: The greatest benefit of accelerated examination practice is that the patent issues much more quickly. For some clients early issuance is strategically important. From anecdotal evidence – such as this case – it appears that the PTO is more willing to immediately allow cases rather than going through the rejection churn. I believe that the PTO is assigning accelerated examination cases to primary examiners who are already more likely to allow cases quickly, without amendment, and without the notice of allowance being withdrawn because of a second-pair-of-eyes review.

For some firms, there may also be a benefit of getting the work done and paid for up front when the client is excited about the technology and the inventor still works at the company – rather than three years later when the traditional response to an office action would be done.

Documents:

Federal Circuit Finds DJ Jurisdiction Even After Time-Limited Covenant Not To Sue

Declaratory Judgment, Jurisdiction, Patent, Patent Cases 2009

Revolution Eyewear v. Aspex Eyewear (Fed. Cir. 2009)pic-8.jpg

After several years of litigation, the patentee-plaintiff Revolution delivered a covenant not to sue to Aspex. The covenant was limited to the asserted patent and to activities prior to dismissal of the action. The district court dismissed the case, but Aspex did not let go. The accused infringer wanted assurances that it could continue selling the accused version of its eyeglass design without worrying about future charges of infringement.

In the appeal, Judge Newman agreed that a case or controversy continues to exist and that under MedImmune, the district court still retains jurisdiction. In the backdrop, the Newman was careful to differentiate this case from those where an accused defendant may be hoping to seek a speculative judicial opinion on future product lines:

This case is of larger substance than merely a would-be competitor seeking to test the waters by way of an advisory judicial opinion on an adverse patent….These parties are already in infringement litigation initiated by the patentee, the case has been pending since 2003, and already has produced a summary judgment of invalidity (which was later vacated by this court, 175 Fed. Appx. 350); the patentee filed its covenant in 2007, after four years of litigation, on the eve of trial of the question of enforceability. Throughout this period the accused eyewear were removed from the market by Aspex, and would not be shielded by the covenant should it be returned to the market, as Aspex states is its intention. Aspex states, and Revolution agreed at the argument of this appeal, that it is reasonable to believe that Revolution will again file suit should Aspex return to this market with the same product as it previously sold. By now barring the counterclaims that have been pending since 2003, Aspex states that this court would enable the “scare-the-customer-and-run” tactics that were deplored in Arrowhead.

Dismissal Reversed. On remand, the lower court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment counterclaims.

BPAI Appeal Statistics: The Plummeting Reversal Rate

Academic Studies, Articles and Publications, BPAI, Patent,

In an earlier post, I examined what happens to patent applications after the BPAI reverses an examiner rejection. [LINK] This next post looks at the BPAI reversal rate itself. Here, I define the reversal rate as the percentage of cases where the Examiner rejections are completely reversed (as opposed to partial reversals).

Over the past several years, the BPAI reversal rate has dropped dramatically. From FY1999-FY2005, the reversal rate remained relatively steady between 35% and 40%. Then, in FY2006 we began to see a smaller proportion of reversals. By the first two months of FY2009, the reversal rate had dropped to 20%. Part of the drop is likely attributable to new filtering mechanisms that keep low-quality rejections from reaching the Board. The pre-appeal brief conference program started in 2005 and allows a patent applicant to request an internal review of the examiner’s final rejection at the Tech Center (TC) level before an appeal brief is filed. Even if no pre-appeal brief conference request is made, the examiner’s case for a rejection is usually reviewed at the TC level before the examiner is allowed to file a responsive brief.

In recent years, these filters have operated to weed-out 80% of the cases where an appeal brief or pre-appeal brief conference request had been filed. Prior to implementation of these filters, the majority of appeal briefs led to BPAI decisions. [See Katznelson, Slide 15]

When the low quality rejections are eliminated from consideration, we should expect that the BPAI reversal rate would drop – as it has. The BPAI is no longer seeing many of the easy reversal cases where the examiner made a clear legal error. Rather, today’s cases before the board tend to be more focused on arguable issues involving obviousness, enablement, and patentable subject matter.

The filters only tell part of the story, and the reversal rate masks the fact that – in absolute numbers – the Board is reversing more cases than ever. Over this same period, the number of appeals filed has increased dramatically. And, although the BPAI has increased its throughput, the backlog has grown five-fold since 2005. These pendency pressures give the Board an incentive to make appeals less hospitable – as we saw with the new (not-yet-final) BPAI appeal rules.

Notes:

Federal Circuit Affirms Narrow Construction of “Internet Billing Method”

Patent,

Netcraft Corp v. eBay and PayPal (Fed. Cir. 2008)

Netcraft sued eBay and PayPal for infringement of its patents that cover an “internet billing method.” During claim construction, the Western District of Wisconsin found that the limitation of “providing a communications link through equipment of the third party” requires that an infringer “provid[e] customers with internet access.” Of course, eBay and PayPal do not provide internet access.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction and summary judgment of non-infringement.

Three reasons why the claim was narrowly construed:

  1. In many cases, claim construction issues are won or lost in the process of defining which “term” is going to be construed. The patentee argued that the term “communications link” was broadly written and amenable to broad construction. The defendants argued that the element in question was actually the entire process of “providing a communications link through the equipment of the third party.” That entire process is more amenable to a narrow interpretation.”
  2. The patentee did not help its cause by adding the “communications link” to the claims during prosecution. The term is not used anywhere in the specification – consequently, the patentee had little ammunition for arguing for a broad interpretation.
  3. The specification declares several “objects of the present invention,” including providing internet access. Also, the abstract includes a statement regarding an “agreement between an Internet access provider and a customer.” And, there is no specific language indicating that these statements are directed at “alternative embodiments.” [Note here, a distinction between alternative embodiments and optional functions.]

Affirmed.

Federal Circuit Affirms Narrow Construction of “Internet Billing Method”

Patent,

Netcraft Corp v. eBay and PayPal (Fed. Cir. 2008)

Netcraft sued eBay and PayPal for infringement of its patents that cover an “internet billing method.” During claim construction, the Western District of Wisconsin found that the limitation of “providing a communications link through equipment of the third party” requires that an infringer “provid[e] customers with internet access.” Of course, eBay and PayPal do not provide internet access.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction and summary judgment of non-infringement.

Three reasons why the claim was narrowly construed:

  1. In many cases, claim construction issues are won or lost in the process of defining which “term” is going to be construed. The patentee argued that the term “communications link” was broadly written and amenable to broad construction. The defendants argued that the element in question was actually the entire process of “providing a communications link through the equipment of the third party.” That entire process is more amenable to a narrow interpretation.”
  2. The patentee did not help its cause by adding the “communications link” to the claims during prosecution. The term is not used anywhere in the specification – consequently, the patentee had little ammunition for arguing for a broad interpretation.
  3. The specification declares several “objects of the present invention,” including providing internet access. Also, the abstract includes a statement regarding an “agreement between an Internet access provider and a customer.” And, there is no specific language indicating that these statements are directed at “alternative embodiments.” [Note here, a distinction between alternative embodiments and optional functions.]

Affirmed.

During prosecution, claims are indefinite when amenable to multiple plausible constructions

Indefinite, Patent,

Ex parte Miyazaki (BPAI Precedential 2008)

In a rare precedential opinion, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has re-defined the standard for a §112 indefiniteness rejection during patent prosecution. The BPAI’s definition for pre-issuance indefiniteness focuses on ‘plausible’ indefiniteness and varies dramatically from the Federal Circuit’s standard of ‘insolubly ambiguous.’ The BPAI argues that a lower threshold of ambiguity is justified pre-issuance because it gives the PTO power to ensure that claims are “precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous.”

As such, we employ a lower threshold of ambiguity when reviewing a pending claim for indefiniteness than those used by post-issuance reviewing courts. In particular, rather than requiring that the claims are insolubly ambiguous, we hold that if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.

The expanded indefiniteness examination runs parallel to the PTO’s approach of broadly construing claims during prosecution. Both tactics are intended to better ensure that issued patents can be counted-on as being valid patents.

The Federal Circuit’s insolubly ambiguous standard is premised on the strong presumption of validity associated with an issued patent. The BPAI grounds its lower threshold in the notion that patent applications have no presumption of validity.

Read the BPAI Miyazaki Opinion: /media/docs/2008/12/fd073300.pdf