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The Costs and Benefits of Patents to Innovators

Patent

by James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer

Do patents encourage economic growth, stimulate R&D investment, or deliver wealth to innovators? In our previous post we reviewed the empirical research in economics and we could not find consistently positive evidence about the performance of patents.

In this post we narrow our focus. We ask whether the modern American patent system encourages innovation by large (publicly traded) American firms. We answer this question with empirical research that is presented in chapters 5 and 6 of our book Patent Failure. We find that the patent system discourages investment in innovation by the average publicly traded American firm. Although the patent system provides positive incentives in some industries like pharmaceuticals, it provides negative incentives in most industries. Further, the performance has deteriorated over time.

Our conclusion is based on separate estimates of the benefits and costs of patents to innovative firms. We use two different techniques to estimate the value of patents to their owners.

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Do Patents Stimulate R&D Investment and Promote Growth?

Academic Studies, Patent, ,

James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer have authored a new book presenting a careful empirical analysis of whether patent rights encourage innovation. Their conclusion: for the most part, today's patent system does not achieve its stated goal. I asked them to provide Patently-O readers with a cut from their analysis. The following post is the first in a series of four by the authors. The book is titled: Patent Failure and published by Princeton [Web Link]. The analysis done in this book put Bessen and Meurer at the forefront of leaders in economic analysis of patent laws. I suspect that their results will become the talking points of the next round of patent reform discussions. A live symposium will be held at UGA Law School on March 29 focusing on the book and its results. [LINK]

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by James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer

As background material, this post reviews the sizable body of empirical research analyzing the impact of patents on R&D investment and economic growth. Three future posts will present new empirical research featured in our book Patent Failure. The theme across all four posts is that patents often fail to perform effectively as property rights. [DDC: To work well as property, the right should be predictably valid; have discernible boundaries; and not have an overly fragmented ownership scheme.]

Economists cherish property rights that provide strong incentives for investment and trade, and that thereby contribute to economic growth. Potentially, patent rights could accomplish these three goals, and surely they sometimes do. Apparently though, it is hard to set up and maintain a patent system that works as property.

The rise of new market economies and strengthening of property rights around the globe in the last two decades provides economists with "natural experiments" that help us evaluate whether and how much property rights contribute to investment and growth. The empirical results are impressive. Countries that expanded the role of markets and strengthened property rights have prospered from these choices. Economic historians find the same results hold going back to the Industrial Revolution.

Comparable studies of patent systems are discouraging. The evidence certainly is consistent with the notion that patents encourage American pharmaceutical R&D. But otherwise, it is hard to find evidence suggesting patents are a major factor spurring R&D investment, that patents contribute to economic growth, or even that the patent system is a source of great wealth to important inventors and innovators (outside of a few industries like pharmaceuticals).

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Bilski: Full CAFC to Reexamine the Scope of Subject Matter Patentability

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In re Bilski (Fed. Cir. 2008 - en Banc)

Taking sua sponte action, the Federal Circuit has ordered an en banc rehearing of the In re Bilski case – asking the following five questions:

  1. Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
  2. What standard should govern in determining whether a process is patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
  3. Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because it constitutes an abstract idea or mental process; when does a claim that contains both mental and physical steps create patent-eligible subject matter?
  4. Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible subject matter under section 101? 
  5. Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in this case and, if so, whether those cases should be overruled in any respect?

The Patent Application and Patent Applicants: Bilski involves claims to a method of managing the risk of bad weather through commodities trading. The claims are not tied to any particular form of technology — thus, they do not require a computer or particular storage media. In some quarters, this process lacking a technological tie-in is termed a “mental method.” 

Bernie Bilski apparently was the CEO and owner of a small company called WeatherWise. At least some WeatherWise patents were purchased in 2007 by the “Pittsburgh Technology Licensing Corp”  According to court documents, PTL is a wholly owned subsidiary of WeatherWise holdings. (See WeatherWise v. WeatherBill).

Although we don’t have the text of the application yet, this case looks problematic because of serious obviousness problems and lack of specificity in the claims.  Thus, the court will have no sympathy for Bilski — making this the perfect test case for someone wanting to strink Section 101 coverage and eliminate business method patents.  Representative Claim 1 reads as follows:

1.  A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o />

(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;

(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and

(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.

Procedure: This cases arises out of a rejection from the Patent Board of Appeals (BPAI). In its opinion, the Board asked for assistance from the CAFC in addressing Subject Matter Patentability of non-technological method claims: “The Federal Circuit cannot address rejections that it does not see. . . . It would be helpful if the Federal Circuit would address this question directly.” BPAI Decision. Bilski then apealed directly from the BPAI to the CAFC and oral arguments were held in October 2007.  Rather than issuing an opinion, the court convened and voted to rehear the case en banc.

Timing and Amicus: The parties (Bilski & PTO) have already fully briefed the case. Thus, the CAFC is only allowing one supplimental brief each to be filed simultaneously on March 6, 2008. Amicus briefs discussing the five questions are requested by the court and may be filed without specific permission. Amicus briefs will be due 30 days later and must otherwise comply with FRAP and FCR 29.  (Thanks Joe: Amicus should be due April 5th, but because that falls on a Saturday, they will be due April 7). The hearing is scheduled for May 8 at 2:00 pm.

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