Tag Archives: Venue

USPTO Maintenance Fees

Academic Studies, Articles and Publications, Revival, USPTO News

A large portion of PTO revenue comes through applicant’s payment of maintenance fees. Under the current fee structure, three post-grant maintenance fees must be paid in order to keep a patent from prematurely expiring. A large entity pays $980 3.5 years after issuance; $2,480 7.5 years after issuance; and $4,110 11.5 after issuance. If the fee is not paid then the patent will expire at the next 4, 8, or 12 year mark. In FY08, the PTO reported over $500 million in revenue from maintenance fees.

I wanted to look at how maintenance fees are being paid, so I downloaded the past decade of OG Notices and parsed-out notices of patent expiration. The chart below shows some results.

PatentLawPic686

The chart shows survival rates for the four (red), eight (blue), and twelve (green) year marks. Each datapoint represents the average survival rate for patents that would have expired on that date. For instance, of the 2229 utility patents that issued on December 31, 1996, the first fee was paid for 84% of the patents, the first two fees were paid for 63% of the patents, and all three fees were paied for 49% of the patents. (Note – I did not yet add-back cases that were revived due to unintentional abandonment.)

The median patent has an ordinary enforceable term of about 17 years. This is based on the twenty year term which begins at filing of the non-provisional application minus three years of prosecution. If prosecution takes longer than three years, then the term will likely be extended under the PTA provisions.

However, this data shows that the median patent term is actually cut short by about five years because applicants decide not to pay the large final fee.

A third feature to recognize from this chart is that the percentage of patents whose fees are being paid is increasing over time. However, the PTO has indicated that it expects a drop in maintenance fee payments due to the economic slump.

Judge Moore looked at expiration data for patents issued in 1991 in her paper on “Worthless Patents.” Her result is that patents were more likely to “survive” (i.e., have their maintenance fees paid) when they have more claims, more art cited, more related applications, and longer prosecution times. US corporate owners were more likely to pay the fees than individual or foreign owners. She also found that Semiconductor and Optics patents were the most likely to survive. Amusement patents were unlikely to survive.

The Exodus: Following TS Tech, Patent Lawsuit Transferred from E.D. Texas to Oregon

Jurisdiction, Patent, Patent Cases 2009,

A few days ago I was discussing TS Tech with a patent law guru. I suggested that TS Tech would not have a major impact on the location of patent cases – largely because local judges still retain a large amount of discretion in determining whether another venue is more convenient. . . . What do I know.

Odom v. Microsoft (E.D. Tex, Jan 30 2009)

Famed patent blogger Gary Odom sued Microsoft in the Eastern District of Texas – alleging that the Office 07 toolbar infringes Odom's software patent. Judge Love was assigned the case — but now he has granted Microsoft's motion to transfer the case to Oregon. You see, Odom is located in Oregon, Microsoft in Washington, the Klarquist firm (who once worked with both Odom and Microsoft) is in Oregon.

Judge Love relied on the Federal Circuit's TS Tech (J. Rader) opinion and the 5th Circuit's VW opinion (en banc) in determining that the suit should continue in the Northwest rather than Texas.

Under the circumstances presented here, the convenience of witnesses and localized interests weigh in favor of transfer with the other factors neutral or weighing slightly in favor of transfer. This is a case that is significantly localized in the Northwest. Both parties are residents of the Northwest, and Microsoft’s equitable defenses all arise out of conduct and contracts in the Northwest. No Texas resident is a party to this litigation, nor is any Texas state law cause of action asserted. All identified witnesses—with the possible exception of one—are located in the Northwest. This is not a case where witnesses are expected to be traveling from all over the country or world. In summary, there is little convenience to the parties for this case to remain in Texas, while there are several reasons why it would be more convenient for the parties to litigate this case in Oregon.

Case transferred.

Notes:

  • Order to transfer order to transfer from texas
  • E.D. Texas Blogger Michael Smith has more details
  • It remains to be seen if Judges Ward and Davis follow suit.
  • In the opinion, Judge Love did distinguish some portions of TS Tech. Importantly, much of the likely evidence is in electronic form. The court found that the physical location of the servers holding that electronic evidence did not impact the inconvenient forum analysis.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 87

Bits and Bytes, Patent
  • For the first time in history, fewer than 50% of US patents issued in the past year originated from US applicants. [Zura] IBM received 4,000+ patents in 2008.
  • In 2007, I asked the question: How will the US patent lobbying change when most new patents are held by foreign companies?
  • Brian Moriarty and Deirdre Sanders (Massachusetts patent litigators) discuss the combination of the Texas Venue problems (TS Tech, VW) and new D.Ma. local patent rules. Their conclusion: “Patent Suits – Massachusetts In, Texas Out.” [LINK]
  • More Patent Jobs:

    • Godfrey & Kahn (Milwaukee) needs an “IP Generalist” with “excellent academic credentials” to help with litigation, trademarks, patent prosecution, and transactions. [Link]
  • Baker & Daniels (Indy) needs a MechE (or mechanically inclined equivalent) associate to handle patent prosecution. [Link]

Federal Circuit Transfers Case Out of Texas (Applying New Fifth Circuit Precedent)

Patent, Patent Cases 2008,

In re TS Tech USA Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2008) (precedential order)

Responding to an interlocutory petition for a writ of mandamus, the Federal Circuit has ordered a patent case transferred from Judge Ward’s courtroom in the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern District of Ohio. Both venues were “proper,” but the appellate panel found the Ohio venue “far more convenient.”

In 2007, Michigan based Lear Corp (not Lear Jets) sued TS Tech for infringing its patent covering a pivotable vehicle headrest. The accused TS headrest assemblies were supplied to Honda and used in the Civic and Accura RDX. TS is a Japanese company, but the defendants are TS’s North American subsidiaries headquartered in Ohio and Canada.

In 2008, the Fifth Circuit (TX, LA, MS) decided another venue case on mandamus – finding that cases should be transferred from the Eastern District of Texas when the new venue is “clearly more convenient.” In re VW (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)(cert petition pending). On mandamus, a lower court’s refusal to transfer will only be reversed if it produces a “patently erroneous result.”

Here, the lower court erred in its application of 5th Circuit law in several ways:

  • Plaintiff’s Choice: The lower court gave too much (“inordinate”) weight to the plaintiff’s choice of venue.
  • Distance from Home: When a defendant is more than 100 miles from home, “inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Here, all the witnesses are in Michigan, Ohio, and Canada. All of those witnesses “would need to travel approximately 900 more miles to attend trial in Texas than in Ohio.”
  • Physical Evidence: “Because all of the physical evidence, including the headrests and the documentary evidence, are far more conveniently located near the Ohio venue, the district court erred in not weighing this factor in favor of transfer.”
  • Public Interest: Texas has no interest in handling this patent dispute since the only relevant connection to the venue is that some vehicles containing the accused headrest assembly were sold in the venue. “None of the companies have an office in the Eastern District of Texas; no identified witnesses reside in the Eastern District of Texas; and no evidence is located within the venue.” Thus, the “citizens of the Eastern District of Texas have no more or less of a meaningful connection to this case than any other venue.”

Patently erroneous: Although “patentably erroneous” is difficult to define, the Federal Circuit found the errors sufficient to grant the writ. They reasoned that the 5th Circuit VW case – where mandamus was also granted – was based on essentially identical errors.

Transfer Ordered.

Tags:

Constitutional Separation of Powers

Patent,

The structure of the US Constitutional is designed to separate governmental powers. In patent law, separation of powers issues continue to arise – largely because the executive branch (PTO) and the judicial branch (Federal Courts)* decide many of the same patent law issues. Post-grant procedures such as reexamination and reissue complicate the scene because those avenues allow for parallel decisionmaking by the two bodies. Notably, most inter partes reexaminations involve parallel patent infringement litigation. Usually, a district court will reach its result before the PTO, and questions then arise as to the PTO’s subsequent power to affirm or deny patentability.

Although it appears to be more of a statutory construction issue, BlackBoard recently sued the USPTO (Dudas) in a case involving these issues. Originally, BlackBoard sued Desire2Learn for patent infringement and Desire2Learn subsequently requested inter partes reexamination of the asserted patent. In February 2008, a Texas jury found the asserted claims valid** and infringed. (**i.e., not invalid). The District Court did not issue its final judgment until May 2008. That case is pending appeal at the Federal Circuit. In the meantime, in March 2008, the PTO issued an initial rejection of the claims and has, more recently, refused to end the reexamination.

Under 35 U.S.C. §317(b), an inter partes reexamination must be stopped by the PTO if the requestor’s invalidity argument is rejected in a civil action and a “final decision has been entered.”

FINAL DECISION – Once a final decision has been entered against a party in a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, that the party has not sustained its burden of proving the invalidity of any patent claim in suit … [then] an inter partes reexamination requested by that party or its privies on the basis of such issues may not thereafter be maintained by the Office, notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter. This subsection does not prevent the assertion of invalidity based on newly discovered prior art unavailable to the third-party requester and the Patent and Trademark Office at the time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings. 35 U.S.C. §317(b)

BlackBoard argues that the final decision by the Federal Court in Texas strips the PTO of authority to maintain the inter partes reexamination. The PTO, on the other hand, maintains that the litigation is not really final until Desire2Learn exhausts all appeals.

Notes:

  • In addition to the PTO and Courts, the International Trade Commission (ITC) is a third decisionmaking body that is considered a quasi-judicial governmental agency. There are some cases where the same patent and same parties have been simultaneously involved in disputes in all three forums.
  • BlackBoard complaint
  • Desire2Learn Patent Infringement Blog
  • As a work-around, Desire2Learn has its servers located Canada. The only valid BlackBoard claims are “method” claims, and, under RIM v. NTP, a method claim is only infringed if each step of the method is performed in the USA.

Applying Bilski to Metabolite’s Diagnosis Claim

Patent, ,

Metabolite’s broadest method claim has two steps: First, assay a body fluid to determine its homocysteine level. Second, correlate the homocysteine level to a vitamin deficiency. It reads as follows:

13. A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.

In 2006, the Supreme Court almost took the time to reject this claim under Section 101, but decided that the issue had not been properly raised on appeal. Dissenting from the last minute denial of certiorari were Justices Breyer, Stevens and Souter. In a dissenting opinion drafted by Justice Breyer, the three would have held the invention as claimed an unpatentable “law of nature.” The same anti-preemption theme of Bilski also runs through the Breyer opinion. The courts are concerned with the potential (but unidentified) problems of having a patent that

There can be little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a “natural phenomenon.” . . . .

Claim 13 . . . tells the user to use any test at all. Indeed, to use virtually any natural phenomenon for virtually any useful purpose could well involve the use of empirical information obtained through an unpatented means that might have involved transforming matter.

I thought it would be interesting to attempt to apply the Bilski decision to Claim 13 to judge its patentability.

[SURVEY: DOES CLAIM 13 PRESENT PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER]

Bilski offers two avenues for showing that a claimed process is patentable. First, the process will be patentable if it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus. Alternatively, the process will be patentable if it “transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” According to the court, “particular article” does not necessarily need to be physical, but it must at least be “representative of physical objects or substances.”

Machine: Metabolite’s Claim 13 easily fails the first prong of the machine-transformation test because the claimed method is not tied to any particular machine.

Transformation: The “correlating” step could be performed in a human mind and consequently cannot serve as the basis for finding patentable subject matter. As the court noted in Bilski – a process step that “may be performed entirely in the human mind is obviously not tied to any machine and does not transform any article into a different state or thing.”

The “assay” step could follow the same analysis – if it is possible to “assay a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine” only using the human mind then no there is no credible transformation. The mental step potential may be true if, for example, the body fluid’s homocysteine level is visually apparent. [Interesting timing issues here, at the time of the invention, the assay involved extensive lab work, but later-invented technology has dramatically changed the process.]

Assuming that “assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine” cannot be done in the mind, we must then ask whether the claim requires a transformation of a particular physical object or substance or at least transformation of a particular article that is “representative of physical objects or substances.” Perhaps the best physically related transformation involves transforming the “body fluid” into an indication of elevated homocysteine level and then into an indication of vitamin deficiency. Under Abele, both homocysteine level and vitamin deficiency do represent physical substances – consequently their ‘creation’ may be “sufficient to render that … process patent-eligible.” [Of course, this analysis may apply a loose definition of ‘transformation.’]

Notes:

Intellectual Property in a Public Health Crisis

Academic Studies, Articles and Publications, Patent

On Friday, I will be speaking at the Seton Hall Law Review’s Health Law Symposium. This year’s topic is focused: Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza. [LINK] A portion of my talk will focus on how patent law may react during a public health crisis.

The reality is that in a pandemic situation, the patent rights covering important treatments will be ignored. Under TRIPS, during a national emergency would-be patent infringement becomes a legitimate unauthorized use. At some later point, the patent holder should receive payment based on “the economic value of the authorization.” In all likelihood, however, that ex-post payment will be a small fraction of the potential monopoly profits that could have been earned.

There are several legal avenues to allow “unauthorized use” in the US. One avenue is by denying injunctive relief. Even before eBay, no court would order an injunction in the face of a public health crisis that could be mitigated by allowing infringement. The test for injunctive relief specifically looks to the public interest. And here, easy access to treatments would weigh heavily in the public interest. Further, a patentee has no right to injunctive relief if the infringer is the US Government. 28 U.S.C. §1498. Thus, another avenue for unauthorized use is through direct government intervention. In 2001, Congress and the Administration were reported to have seriously considered “breaking” Bayer’s patent on Cipro in order to stockpile the drug against a potential anthrax attack. In the Cipro case, the Government apparently used the threat of breaking the patent to negotiate a long-term contract with Bayer at an unusually low price. This approach might be termed ‘bending’ the patent. Individual states within the US may also apply pressure and threat of unauthorized use while retaining immunity from suit under the 11th Amendment of the Constitution.

What Incentive?: We all understand that governments will not be able to avoid the temptation of breaking (or bending) patents covering important treatments that may be useful in some future crisis. Unfortunately, this prediction of the likely future greatly diminishes today’s incentives to innovate crisis-specific treatments. Many empirical questions remain: Will the ex post compensation be a sufficient incentive to innovate? Will the most valuable treatments have non-crisis uses where patent rights will operate more normally? Are the potential crises so well defined that a grant or prize system could work better?

Notes:

  • The tables below show patenting and patent application data for patents relating to influenza (search influenz$). For applications filed in 2001, almost 2,500 have been published. Less than 50% of those published applications have issued as patents in the seven year interim. Although we will never be sure, it looks like a little under 20% of the “influenza” applications filed in 2001 kept secret rather than publishing.

  • The next chart shows the average number of non-patent references cited in the influenza patents as compared to patents in general.

PatentLawPic533PatentLawPic532   

CAFC allows Venue Transfer to Texas

Patent, Patent Cases 2008,

In re Volkswagen (Fed. Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential denial of mandamus)

In July 2007, MHL filed a patent infringement suit against VW in the Eastern District of Texas. Hoping to avoid that venue, the automobile company countersued in the Eastern District of Michigan. Although primarily a declaratory judgment action, VW included Michigan state law claims of unfair competition, defamation, trade disparagement, and abuse of process. In a preliminary hearing, the Michigan court declined its powers of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and ordered the case be transferred to Texas. Because the transfer was not a final action, VW had no right to an appeal. Instead, it filed a writ of mandamus.

The Federal Circuit considered the writ, but ultimately declined to exercise authority over the case – finding that VW had not shown the importance of immediately deciding the issue. “A party seeking a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief desired.”

In Texas, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals just released its en banc opinion in another In re VW case. In that case, the 5th Circuit held that the E.D. Texas (Marshall) court had unreasonably refused to transfer VW’s case to a Northern District court in Dallas. The AIPLA filed a brief in that case, noting that the Eastern District of Texas rarely allows an out-transfer. From the AIPLA brief: “The routine filing of patent infringement complaints in the Eastern District of Texas that have essentially no connection to that district has been encouraged by the seeming reluctance of courts in that district to transfer cases under § 1404(a).” [Link]

In another venue case, Judge Patel of the Northern District of California noted that venue games are “perfectly legitimate”

“It is clear that both parties are attempting to achieve tactical advantage in the choice of a forum (which is a perfectly legitimate goal in an adversarial system of justice).” 

In Sorensen v. Phillips, Judge Patel transferred the case to the Southern District of California where a parallel proceeding was already underway (and stayed pending reexamination).

Notes:

 

Tags: ,

Venue: East Coast Wins

Patent, Patent Cases 2008

Third Dimension v. Fairchild (E.D. Tex. 2008)

  • Third Dimension sued Infineon in the E.D. Texas for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,216,275, et al.
  • One month later, Fairchild filed a declaratory judgment action against Third Dimension in D. Maine on the same patents.
  • Later that same day, Third Dimension sued Fairchild for infringement in the E.D. Texas on the same patents.

Holding: The first case stays in Texas. The second two cases are consolidated in Maine. “Third Dimension argues that the Maine case should be denied first-filed status because it filed an earlier case against Infineon involving the same patent as this case. . . . While this case and the Infineon case involve the same patent, that is the extent of the similarity.”

Time Zone Problem: An interesting aspect of this case is the inherent time-zone problem. Fairchild filed its action in Maine at 12:01 a.m. EST on May 17. Third Dimension at 12:00 a.m. CST on the same day. Fairchild wins because it filed on the East Coast. Can that be right? (This conflict usually arises when a right is cemented on a particular day — such as a patent issuing.)

NYTimes: Universities, Patents, & Profits

Patent

The New York Times today published an editorial about the problems created by the Bayh-Dole Act that promotes the patenting and licensing of university inventions that arise from federally supported research. [Read the editorial] The author – Janet Rae-Dupree – is concerned that the focusing on patenting and business development has “distorted the fundamental mission of universities.”

‘In the past, discovery for its own sake provided academic motivation, but today’s universities function more like corporate research laboratories. Rather than freely sharing techniques and results, researchers increasingly keep new findings under wraps to maintain a competitive edge. What used to be peer-reviewed is now proprietary. “Share and share alike” has devolved into “every laboratory for itself.”‘

Dupree’s recollection of the golden era where labs shared everything is admittedly wrong. As she explains: “When James Watson and Francis Crick were homing in on DNA’s double-helix structure in the 1950s, they zealously guarded their work from prying eyes until they could publish their findings, to be certain that they would get the credit for making the discovery.”

The important bit of truth comes from Jennifer Washburn‘s findings that most university technology transfer offices lose money:

“To date, Ms. Washburn says, data gathered by the Association of University Technology Managers, a trade group, show that fewer than half of the 300 research universities actively seeking patents have managed to break even from technology transfer efforts. Instead, two-thirds of the revenue tracked by the association has gone to only 13 institutions.”

This problem may well be the result of growing pains – it is expensive to start from scratch and build a patent and licensing department. Many universities are actually turning to other directions: finding that local economic development – regardless of immediate licensing returns – is one of the most effective ways to ensure a continued supply of future research funding.

Notes:

  • Read Kevin Noonan’s take [LINK]
  • The NYTimes note that many corporations are beginning to cooperate with foreign universities – essentially because US schools have become too complex and greedy.

Patently-O Bits and Bytes

Patent
  • Preference Prediction Patent for sale on eBay (LINK).
  • Google has released a new browser known as “CHROME.” Law firms and others should take care to ensure that their websites display properly. [LINK]
  • The Wolf Greenfield firm is hosting a Webinar on Sept 25 on “The Real Impact of Ebay, KSR, MedImmune, Seagate and Translogic” [Free]
  • The PTO is now considering Jan Buck’s “Method of operationalizing a venture fund vehicle” by “creating a governing operating business plan, commercializing early stage academic science, generating operating revenue from more than one commercialization vehicle, using generated revenue to invest in new projects and/or ventures to achieve liquidity thereby generating cash for further investment in projects and/or ventures.” No assignee is listed. [LINK]

Inequitable Conduct: Out of the Frying Pan?

Patent, , , ,

By Prof. Paul M. Janicke, HIPLA Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center< ?xml:namespace prefix ="" o ns ="" "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

In the 1980s patent practitioners were being pressed by clients to keep costs down. At the same time they were seemingly presumed by courts to understand right away any prior-art reference that made its way into their offices, and how that reference might relate to patent applications they were writing or prosecuting. They were rather upset with the drift of the law on inequitable conduct. It seemed the courts were allowing something short of intentional deception to make out that defense and to ruin a client’s otherwise solid case for validity and infringement. Language like “gross negligence” had crept into some of the appellate decisions. With enough time and funding by the challenger, many non-cited things in a patent practitioner’s possession could be made years later to look important to patent prosecution, and explanations for non-citation always seemed at that late date a little lame. All the challenger needed to do is find one of those things and persuade the judge to label the non-citation as gross negligence.

Patent.Law129The Federal Circuit recognized the problem and in 1988 handed down Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,[1] wherein the court reiterated that intent to deceive the PTO had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In an in banc section of the opinion labeled “Resolution of Conflicting Precedent,” the court held that gross negligence could not alone suffice to make out inequitable conduct.[2] The profession breathed a little easier. They were perhaps out of the frying pan.

However, shortly after Kingsdown a number of other cases rightly pointed out that deceivers seldom come forth and say they acted with intent to deceive. “Such intent usually can only be found as a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence.”[3] Through the 1990s the Federal Circuit appreciated the continuing need to make an actual finding that a particular person acted to mislead the PTO in a particular way. It told us “a finding of intent to deceive the PTO is necessary to sustain a charge of inequitable conduct.”[4] In a withholding-type accusation, reaching that conclusion of course requires a subsidiary finding that the person appreciated the significance of the withheld item. Without that appreciation, he can hardly be trying to deceive the examiner about the item. 

In the last three years Federal Circuit panels have slipped back into “should have known” language to arrive at the conclusion of intent to deceive or mislead the PTO.[5] That is the language of simple negligence. Even more troublesome, they seem to have reached the “should have” finding by reference to the importance (materiality) of the item to the prosecution proceeding, the logic of which is somewhat elusive. In 2008 a number of cases have now explained how all this is consistent with Kingsdown. Negligence alone might not be enough, but when material information is found in the hands of persons connected to patent prosecution, they need to provide a “credible explanation” or suffer a finding of bad intent.[6]

The trouble with this approach is that it allows even simple negligence (“should have known”) to shift the burden of persuasion on intent to the patent owner. This shift will happen in just about every case, because the finding of materiality in a combative courtroom setting will nearly always generate the “should have known” prong, shifting the entire burden of credibly showing benign intent onto the patentee. In the dynamic of actual patent litigation years after the events in question, that burden is indeed a fearsome one. In life, consider how often we ask ourselves when bad situations arise: “Why did I do that? Why didn’t I see the connection?” Credible-sounding explanations are not that easy to come by, even when we know we are innocent. Explanations on the ground of human fallibility feel hollow, and this is especially so in the majestic setting of a court proceeding. The patent bar and their clients have gone out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Some rays of hope have appeared for rectifying the situation. Judge Newman dissented in Nilssen, the small-entity status case.[7] And Judge Rader has seen the problem in what I regard as its proper light. In May of this year two panel judges sitting with him upheld a district court’s finding of inequitable conduct in a withholding-of-information case. The two were unwilling to reverse the lower court’s conclusion that the explanation given for non-citation was not credible.[8] Dissenting, Judge Rader said: “[M]y reading of our case law restricts a finding of inequitable conduct to only the most extreme cases of fraud and deception. . . Although designed to facilitate USPTO examination, inequitable conduct has taken on a new life as a litigation tactic. The allegation of inequitable conduct opens new avenues of discovery; impugns the integrity of patentee, its counsel, and the patent itself; excludes the prosecuting attorney from trial participation (other than as a witness); and even offers the trial court a way to dispose of a case without the rigors of claim construction and other complex patent doctrines.”[9] Amen to that. This is not the place to try to rectify perceived weaknesses in the patent examination process or to make amends with district judges by according more weight to their rulings. Worthy and important goals those may well be, but shifting burdens on inequitable conduct is not the way.

Inequitable conduct burdens have in the past rightly been placed on the challenger. Establishing this defense has required a finding not about what a person should have known, but that the person involved actually did appreciate of the significance of the information to the prosecution process. Now the burden on the intent prong has de facto shifted. Hopefully it will return to where it was. I have always thought the relative importance of the item as seen years later has little to do with finding an intent to mislead. Most of the time it is just as easy in life to fail to connect important dots as unimportant ones.


[1] 863 F.2d 867 (Fed.Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 < ?xml:namespace prefix ="" st1 ns ="" "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" />U.S. 1067 (1989).

[2] Id. at 876.

[3] Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, 882 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

[4] RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989), emphasis in original.

[5] See Ferring BV v. Barr Labs. Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applicant should have known non-disclosed relationships of affiants to assignee company were important); Cargill Inc. v. Canbra Foods Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applicant should have known lab tests on a property were important); Bruno Indep. Living Aids Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (from what was said to FDA, applicant should have known prior powered staircase was important to PTO).

[6] See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 528 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (inequitable conduct finding upheld based on wrongful claiming of small entity status, where explanation testimony was not credible); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 518 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding of no inequitable conduct in non-citation of reference showing similar structure affirmed where explanation was credible); Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (inequitable conduct finding upheld where explanation for non-citation of meeting notes was not credible).

[7] Supra, note 6, 528 F.3d at 1362-65.

[8] Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm. Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

[9] Id. at 1349-50.

What’s Sauce For the Private Goose…

Articles and Publications, Patent,

Ilya Shapiro is a Senior Fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute in DC. He was also my classmate in both college and law school. In a recent op-ed for the Legal Times, Shapiro supported BPMC’s contention that the state of California should not be immune from charges of patent infringement.

What’s Sauce For the Private Goose…

by Ilya Shapiro (This article appeared in the Legal Times on June 2, 2008.)

… In Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v. California Department of Health Services, the biotechnology company known as BPMC is suing the state of California for patent infringement—specifically, of the company’s patent on a form of prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities. Ignoring the merits of the suit, the federal district court in San Francisco dismissed it on the ground of “sovereign immunity”: Under the Supreme Court’s reading of the 11th Amendment, a state cannot be sued in federal court without its consent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—which handles all appeals in patent litigation—affirmed the lower court decision.

So BPMC has turned to the Supreme Court, which in recent years has been increasingly willing to reverse the Federal Circuit. The company wants the Court to strip California’s immunity in this case because the state’s Department of Health Services previously waived immunity when it joined a suit brought by a state contractor about the same patented procedure. That is, after California actively litigated the earlier suit (which sought and failed to obtain a declaratory judgment that the contractor was not infringing BPMC’s patent), the state should be precluded from turning around to claim immunity when it gets sued over the same issue.

Moreover, as BPMC notes, the University of California (among other state agencies) routinely submits to federal court jurisdiction when it pursues claims for violations of its own patent rights. Given that California uses the patent system (and courts’ enforcement thereof), it has relinquished whatever sovereign immunity the state enjoys—immunity that is legally suspect in any event when the sovereign engages in commercial activities.

And, boy, does California use the patent system. The state universities alone own more than 3,300 patents that generate $210 million in annual revenue. California has filed 21 patent infringement suits since 1990 and won more than $900 million in judgments since 2000.

And yet the state has also wielded sovereign immunity arguments to get suits dismissed at least six times since 1987 (including suits by Genentech and Eli Lilly & Co.).

While the worst peddler of this double standard, California is by no means alone. At least 32 states have filed at least 173 patent suits since the mid-1990s.

UNFAIR ADVANTAGE

Business groups hope that the Supreme Court will remove what they see as a competitive advantage enjoyed by state entities: Private patent holders can’t seek recompense for a state’s unlicensed use of software or medical devices, while states can turn to the courts to protect their patents. Medical innovators and technological entrepreneurs in the private sector suffer.

“It’s audacious for a state to use the federal courts to sue for patent infringement, but to block infringement suits against it as a sovereign that cannot be sued,” says Robin Conrad of the National Chamber Litigation Center in a press release. The center has filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the case—only the second time the Chamber has ever filed in a Supreme Court patent case.

This hypocrisy should not even be in play any more, not since Congress passed the Patent Remedy Act of 1992. That legislation was intended to “clarify that states .?.?. are subject to suit in federal court by any person for infringement of patents.”

That sounds clear enough. But in 1999 the Supreme Court ruled in a trademark case, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, that Congress’ legislative powers under Article I of the Constitution were insufficient to trump states’ sovereign immunity. Except in 2006 the Court held the opposite in a federal bankruptcy case, Central Virginia Community College v. Katz. The votes in these seemingly contradictory decisions were 5-4.

In fact, neither case should have been close: When a state repeatedly and voluntarily invokes federal court jurisdiction in a series of similar cases—under patent or any other law—it generally has waived immunity against suits brought by private parties under those same laws. And the precedent is well established that a state waives sovereign immunity when it seeks to adjudicate its rights in federal court. For example, the Supreme Court unanimously held in the 2002 case of Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia that a state loses its 11th Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state to federal court.

EASY CALL

So, as the solicitor general’s office collects agency views and mulls the administration’s position, it should recognize that Biomedical Patent Management Corp.—an unwieldy name for an important case—not only represents the chance to right the balance between a state and its citizens with respect to intellectual property. It also provides the perfect opportunity for the Court to clarify its jurisprudence on the relationship between Congress’ Article I powers and states’ 11th Amendment immunity.

Sovereign immunity is properly a shield against lawsuits challenging a state’s governmental action, not a sword with which to carve out economic advantage over private competitors. If the Supreme Court declines to hear this case, thereby letting the Federal Circuit ruling stand, it would reinforce that unfair advantage—and strike a blow against private sector innovation.

Whoever it is that replaces the outgoing Paul Clement should not agonize over this one. The next solicitor general should advise the Supreme Court to grant this petition for review. And the justices should take his advice.

The Death of Google’s Patents?

Patent, Patentable Subject Matter, Software, ,

By John F. Duffy* [File Attachment (42 KB)]

            The Patent and Trademark Office has now made clear that its newly developed position on patentable subject matter will invalidate many and perhaps most software patents, including pioneering patent claims to such innovators as Google, Inc.

            In a series of cases including In re Nuijten, In re Comiskey and In re Bilski, the Patent and Trademark Office has argued in favor of imposing new restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter set forth by Congress in § 101 of the Patent Act.  In the most recent of these three—the currently pending en banc Bilski appeal—the Office takes the position that process inventions generally are unpatentable unless they “result in a physical transformation of an article” or are “tied to a particular machine.”[1] Perhaps, the agency has conceded, some “new, unforeseen technology” might warrant an “exception” to this formalistic test, but in the agency’s view, no such technology has yet emerged so there is no reason currently to use a more inclusive standard.[2]  

            The Bilski en banc hearing attracted enormous attention, and yet there has remained a sense among many patent practitioners that the PTO’s attempts to curtail section 101 would affect only a few atypical patent claims.  The vast bulk of patents on software, business and information technology are thought by some not to be threatened because those innovations are typically implemented on a machine—namely, a computer—and the tie to a machine would provide security against the agency’s contractions of § 101.  Even if that view were right, the contraction of patent eligibility would be very troubling because the patent system is supposed to be designed to encourage the atypical, the unusual and the innovative.  But that view is wrong.

            The logic of the PTO’s positions in Nuijten, Comiskey and Bilski has always threatened to destabilize whole fields of patenting, most especially in the field of software patents.  If the PTO’s test is followed, the crucial question for the vitality of patents on computer implemented inventions is whether a general purpose computer qualifies as a “particular” machine within the meaning of the agency’s test.  In two recent decisions announced after the oral arguments in the Bilski case, Ex parte Langemyr (May 28, 2008) and Ex parte Wasynczuk (June 2, 2008),[3] the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has now supplied an answer to that question: A general purpose computer is not a particular machine, and thus innovative software processes are unpatentable if they are tied only to a general purpose computer.  

(more…)

Reigniting the Engine of Growth with the Sparkplug of Invention

Patent,

By Michael Martin.

Why do patents end up in litigation? Typically, people answer that it is the amount of money at stake. This answer is not wrong. Since the cost of litigation is relatively constant, people should be (and in fact are) more willing to pay lawyers to litigate claims that are very large compared to the cost of litigation. But this is not a full answer to the question. For this answer does not explain why patents specifically should end up in litigation more often. In fact, trillions of dollars in legal rights are exchanged everyday around the globe without litigation. By comparison, the amount of money at stake in patent lawsuits is relatively small.

The Theory of Focal Points

Economist Thomas Schelling is famous for advancing a theory of conflict and cooperation. According to Schelling, even when communication (and hence negotiated agreement) are difficult or impossible, two people can cooperate through a shared focal point. For example, if I told you to meet me in New York City tomorrow but for some reason I couldn’t tell you where and when, we might still meet by going to a famous spot at noon, such as Grand Central Station or the top of the Empire State Building. Our shared vision of these famous spots is a focal point that permits us to coordinate.

The theory of focal points explains why some groups of people fight and some cooperate. When the focal point for a first group is mutually exclusive to the focal point for a second group, conflict emerges. When the focal point is shared or non-mutually exclusive, cooperation emerges. To some extent, all conflict between people can be viewed as a costly renegotiation of focal points.

With Schelling’s theory in mind, let’s revisit the question of patents. What are the focal points for the various parties involved in patent litigation? To simplify the question, suppose there are only two groups involved in patent litigation: “inventors” (or their employers) and “producers” (i.e., the people who sell products or services that practice a claimed invention). Ignore for now the detail that some inventors are also producers, and that some producers are also inventors.

When patents are litigated, the focal point for inventors is on obtaining a large royalty or payment for the right to practice the invention. By contrast, the focal point for producers is on paying a small (or no) royalty or payment to practice the invention. Although both inventors and producers seek profit, at the point in time when patents are litigated, these focal points are mutually exclusive because (at worst) both have incurred costs of R&D for developing the invention. Patent litigation thus becomes a zero sum game.

The Focal Point of Profit

At first glance, therefore, one might think that inventors and producers are doomed to conflict. Before rushing to that conclusion, however, it’s worth noting that in some broader sense, at least, inventors and producers share a focal point — namely, profit.

Profit is an unusually broad focal point. As Adam Smith is famous for pointing out, the voluntary exchange of goods and services creates profit. With profit the focal point, the problem of avoiding conflict between inventors transforms into a problem of identifying and promoting the circumstances in which the voluntary exchange of inventions for cash can take place between inventors and producers.

If such voluntary exchanges never occurred, we might have reason to doubt whether conflict between inventors and producers could ever be avoided. Fortunately, such exchanges do, in fact, occur. Thus, it can be inferred that the conflict arises over how what is exchanged (services and patent rights) should be valued.

Again, this might seem puzzling at first because, at least in principle, there should be no difference in how value is measured. At least within the United States, the same rules for accounting and reporting financial statements apply to both inventors and producers. In principle, the inventors and producers should be able to compare their financial statements, and reach some agreement over the value of an invention.

But since this never seems to occur, the most reasonable inference seems to be that the conflict arises from a difference in how we interpret accounting and financial statements. In fact, it is precisely here that the focal points of inventors and producers diverge. Having had the rare opportunity of working both in patent law and accounting, it has been my privilege to be one of the first to have noticed this. In short, a better theory of accounting would help resolve conflicts over patented inventions and restore a cultural norm of cooperation within patent law. Astute readers should note that, in addition to patent law, Venice was the birthplace of double-entry accounting in the 15th century.

Problems with the Static Picture of Cost Accounting

As described by William H. Waddell and Norman Bodek in Rebirth of American Industry, the theory behind the most dominant method of accounting (which is called “cost accounting”) was developed at General Motors in the early 20th century by Alfred Sloan, Pierre DuPont, and Donaldson Brown. The relevant detail about this theory is that it was designed to measure (and hence manage) return on investment (ROI). To that end, the paradigm that Sloan, DuPont, and Brown had in mind in developing their rules for accounting was a static picture. Specifically, their picture was of what the corporation would be worth in liquidation.

With the picture of the corporation in liquidation in mind, it is easier to understand why so many things that we might intuitively imagine to be costs are instead treated as assets under cost accounting. For example, under the cost accounting system, unsold inventory is reported as an asset. Cost accounting assumes that the inventory could be sold at cost in liquidation. The reporting ignores, of course, the fact that unsold inventory will incur expenses. More importantly, it ignores that what’s unsold before liquidation is less likely to sell at cost in liquidation.

Under the cost accounting system, IP is called an asset on balance sheets. Again, the assumption is that patents can be sold at cost during liquidation. Again, this assumption begs several important questions. Perhaps most importantly is the question of why, if the IP is so valuable, it could not be used to attract financing or revenue, thereby avoiding liquidation. There were (and are) reasonable answers to that question when debt or equity are unavailable for reasons that have nothing to do with the demand for the patented invention. But its salience suggests that there might be better ways to measure the value of IP.

Whereas all patents cost something to procure, market demand only emerges for a handful of all patented inventions. Thus, the system of cost accounting has given managers and investors the perverse incentive to aggregate thousands of patents, inflating their balance sheets, much like we saw prior to the subprime mortgage debacle. Firms invest billions of dollars in new technology, spend millions on patent portfolios, inflating their asset accounts — all before attracting a single customer! Not to be outdone, when the corporation fails, the cost accounting system encourages us to sell the patents at auction, and let third-parties extract whatever they can from the legal rights. On my view, the system of cost accounting, coupled with the shortage of patent lawyers who really understand technology, are responsible for the emergence of the worst kind of patent trolls.

Dynamic Accounting and the Promise of Cooperation

Fortunately, there is now a light at the end of the tunnel. In fact, many corporations have shifted away from the static picture of corporations inherent in cost accounting to a more dynamic picture. Lean accounting, in fact, was practiced at Ford Motor Company almost 100 years ago, before Ford was eclipsed by the success of General Motors. It turns out that cost accounting is a perfectly fine system of accounting when demand is basically infinite relative to the cost of supply. If the market is never cleared, then the corporations that use cost accounting will end up reporting higher return on investment (ROI) than the corporations that use lean accounting. Lean accounting is an inherently more stable mechanism for promoting growth within a corporation in part because it does not tradeoff short-term gains in income against long-term sustainable growth. But once GM started doing it, everybody else in the automobile industry, and eventually the entire economy, had to follow.

Under a dynamic theory of accounting, IP is more like equity than it is like an asset. That’s because the primary value of patent rights is in promoting invention and collaboration, both of which are dynamic because people are dynamic. Elsewhere I have explained how inventors are customers. Within the cycle of growth of corporations, inventors and customers are the source of information about demand. It is no accident that unmet need was considered by Judge Learned Hand to be the most important of the secondary considerations on obviousness.

By contrast, assets are static. By adopting rules for reporting and managing the IP that are more consistent with the actual mechanism whereby it increases profit, we will in turn discourage wasteful conflicts. A very important corollary to this is that stronger patent rights would be beneficial in promoting collaboration and avoiding conflict. Strong property rights discourage people from litigating what could be solved through negotiation at an earlier point in time. As Robert Frost noted, “Good fences make good neighbors.” With a change to the accounting rules, these early negotiations will happen more often.

Finally, let me emphasize that changes to financial statements need not be dramatic. For example, the simple addition of average daily debit and credit flows for each balance sheet account would permit the shift in managing and investing that I’m advocating here. Since most accounting is now done by computers, this kind of change is actually very cheap. The value of inventions could then be measured easily by comparison between the average daily debit and credit flows before and after an invention had been implemented. Suddenly, inventors and producers have a numerical way to measure the value of an invention.

[Michael Martin is a former in house counsel and founder of Venetian Capital Management.]

Anti-TrafFix: Design Patent Provides Evidence of Non-Functionality in Trade Dress Claim

Design Patent, Patent

PatentLawPic302In TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, the Supreme Court held that the existence of an expired utility patent covering a particular product design provides strong evidence that the design is “functional.”* Consequently, a party would be had-pressed to claim non-functional trade dress protection for the previously patented design. In Keystone Mfg. v. Jaccard Corp., the W.D.N.Y. federal court explored how trade dress protection is impacted by an expired design patent.

Expired Design Patent: Jaccard’s hand held meat tenderizer is covered by its U.S. Design Patent No. D 276,685. The design patent expired in 1998 – seemingly leaving an open avenue for direct copycat competition.  As part of a larger lawsuit, however, Jaccard asserted trade dress rights over its product.

Functionality: Jaccard argues that design patents should be treated as the mirror image of utility patents in a functionality analysis: If a utility patent creates strong proof of functionality, a design patent should provide presumptive evidence of non-functionality.

The district court rejected the suggestion that the design patent creates a presumption of non-functionality.  Instead, the court held that the design patent simply serves as another piece of evidence to be used by the jury in determining non-functionality. This conclusion comports with McCarthy on Trademarks:

“A design patent, rather than detracting from a claim of non-functional trade dress or trademark, may support such a claim . . . [W]hile a design patent is some evidence of non-functionality, alone it is not sufficient without other evidence.”

Curiously absent from this decision is any analysis of the populist notion that expiration of a patent transfers to the public a right to copy and use the patented elements.  

  • * Although there are various definitions of functionality, in trade dress law the term generally refers to whether the element is essential for the product’s use or affects the cost/quality of the product. Only non-functional designs are protectable as trade dress.
  • Keystone Mfg. v. Jaccard Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13094 (W.D.N.Y. Feb 26, 2007).
  • There are several cases in conflict with Keystone Mfg on this point. Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that a design patent serves as presumptive evidence of non-functionality).

 

Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 31

Bits and Bytes, Patent, ,
  • PatentLawPic286In re Volkswagen(5th Cir. en banc). A self-titled “ad hoc committee of intellectual property trial lawyers in the Eastern District of Texas” have filed a brief in the pending VW case arguing on the substance that the E.D.Tex. courts do not excessively retain cases in a way that is any different from other jurisdictions.  The AIPLA amicus brief in the same case argues that too many cases are being heard in Texas. [Trial Lawyer Brief] [More Info].
  • The non-profit IP Hall of Fame is asking for nominations for inductees in the 2008 IP Hall of Fame.  The award is designed to honor individuals who have made significant contributions to today’s Intellectual Property System. www.iphalloffame.com. The award will be limited to five inductees this year. A couple of notes: (1) The Hall of Fame is non-profit, but sponsored by the for-profit IAM-Magazine. (2) I am a member of the Hall of Fame Academy and will vote on the inductees. (Being on the academy is different from being an inductee).
  • John Doll (Commissioner for Patents) will be taking questions on May 13 (11:00 am CST) as part of a webinar sponsored by Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. It appears that you must pre-register for this FREE event. LINK.
  • While much of the proposed patent reform legislation has been directed toward easing pain felt by major corporations being sued for patent infringement, one proposed measure would move inequitable conduct issues to the PTO for a decision. NY Times discussed this last week as a battle between Innovator and Generic Pharma – with the lobbyists winning. [LINK]
  • USPTO Publishes Common Application Format for EPO and JPO  [Via IP/Updates]
  • Pfizer’s Lipitor ‘893 Patent Survives Reexamination [Via Patent Docs]

E.D. Texas Venue Case Goes En Banc; AIPLA Amicus Brief

Patent, ,

The AIPLA believes that the Eastern District of Texas is hearing too many patent cases. Legally, the organization has decided that E.D. Texas judges are “misapplying federal transfer rules by giving too much weight to plaintiffs’ choice of venue.”

In re Volkswagen is up for an en banc hearing in the 5th circuit court of appeals. The VW case is a product liability case stemming from a VW Golf crash that killed a 7–year old girl. The accident occurred in Dallas (location of the N.D. Tex.), but the case was filed 150 miles away in Marshall. 

VW argues that the District Court (Judge Ward) abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s §1404 venue transfer motion — arguing that it would be “unduly burdensome” for the multinational to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas rather than the Northern District of Texas.

28 U.S.C. §1391, the venue statute, broadly allows cases to proceed in any venue where a defendant corporation “is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”  Even when venue is proper, a court may still transfer the case to a more convenient location. 28 U.S.C. §1404 provides that a district court may transfer a civil action when it is both more convenient for the parties and witnesses and is “in the interest of justice.” 

In an amicus brief filed in the case, the AIPLA argues that there are many cases sitting in the Eastern District of Texas that should more properly be heard elsewhere, and that the district court has been too slow to transfer venue.

“The routine filing of patent infringement complaints in the Eastern District of Texas that have essentially no connection to that district has been encouraged by the seeming reluctance of courts in that district to transfer cases under § 1404(a).”

As a backstop to its arguments, the AIPLA also raised the threat of legislation:

“It is also worth noting that legislation on patent reform currently before Congress seeks to narrow drastically venue in patent cases, driven to a great extent by a desire to address the kind of forum shopping that occurs in the Eastern District of Texas.4 Providing the district courts clear guidance on applying the transfer provision will go a long way toward solving the forum shopping problem that is the impetus behind the pending venue legislation.”

The AIPLA Argument:

  1. The location of filing should only be a presumptive starting point in the venue analysis. If a defendant shows “good cause” reason to transfer, then the presumption should evaporate.
  2. “Proximity of evidence” should be a major factor.
  3. This decision is made at a very early stage in the litigation, thus the court should not require a high level of precise evidence to prove convenience.
  4. The “public interest” is usually a sham argument. (That the people of E.D. Tex. have an interest in having their courts adjudicate patent cases if the goods are sold there).

Read the AIPLA Brief

Troll Tracker, Defamation, and Splitting the Bar

Patent,

Rick Frenkel – who until recently was known only as the Patent Troll Tracker – has now been sued for defamation by two Eastern District of Texas lawyers: Johnny Ward, Jr. and Eric Albritton.  Frenkel recently revealed himself as an IP Director at Cisco Systems. Cisco is also a named defendant in the lawsuit. Ward has represented many plaintiffs in E.D. Texas patent cases and is the son of Federal Judge John Ward of the Eastern District of Texas.

The whole case seemingly stems from a Patently-O posting on October 16, 2007. That post, titled “Patent Office Has Stopped Examining Patents with 25+ Claims,” included a short blurb about a seeming “preemptive strike” by the patent holder ESN:

From Patently-O: In another preemptive strike, on October 15th, ESN sued Cisco for infringing Patent No. 7,283,519.  Unfortunately, the patent did not issue until the 16th of October. [Link] 

ScreenShot039Of course, a patentee has no standing to sue until after the patent issues, even if you know that the patent will issue the next day. The Patently-O post included a link to ESN’s complaint that had an October 15 electronic time-stamp and a civil cover sheet dated October 15.  Ward and Albritton were involved in this case, apparently serving as local counsel for the McAndrews firm.

ScreenShot040By October 18, the PACER filing information still reflected that the case had been originally filed on the 15th, but the PACER complaint filing date now indicated October 16. (See thumbnail screenshots.)  This date became potentially important because, in the meantime, Cisco had filed a declaratory judgment action against ESN in Connecticut.  (First-to-file with standing usually wins venue.)

On October 18, the Troll Tracker posted what are seemingly his most pointed comments about the case:

“I got a couple of anonymous emails this morning, pointing out that the docket in ESN v. Cisco . . . had been altered. One email suggested that ESN’s local counsel called the EDTX court clerk and convinced him/her to change the docket to reflect an October 16 filing date, rather than the October 15 filing date. I checked, and sure enough, that’s exactly what happened – the docket was altered to reflect an October 16 filing date and the complaint was altered to change the filing date stamp from October 15 to October 16. Only the EDTX Court Clerk could have made such changes. . . . This is yet another example of the abusive nature of litigating patent cases in the Banana Republic of East Texas.”

In a different post, PTT mentioned that Ward and Albritton represented ESN and that they might not “play well” in a Connecticut court.

Moot Point?: Since then, ESN v. Cisco has been dismissed by agreement of the parties, and the original filing dates have become meaningless and moot. However, Ward and Albritton remembered Frenkel’s comments. Within three days of Frenkel’s “outing” a defamation lawsuit had been filed in Texas state court. At this point, none of the parties are discussing either case in public except that Cisco “continue[s] to have high regard for the judiciary of the Eastern District of Texas and confidence in the integrity of its judges.” 

Seeing an opportunity, the Howrey firm has now declared that it “absolutely won’t represent trolls.”  Is the patent bar in the midst of a split? [Joe Mullin has the Howrey Advert]

Documents:

  • File Attachment: Defamation Complaint filed by WARD (383 KB)
  • File Attachment: Defamation Complaint filed by ALBRITTON (452 KB)
  • Original ESN v. CISCO complaint 

    • Notes:

    • Although I have not always agreed with Frenkel’s opinions, he has been a great addition to the public debate over patents and patent reforms. His analysis has always been fresh. On several occasions, I double-checked the factual basis of his reports, and each time found them spot-on.  I do hope that he’ll be back with more caustic analysis. I’ve been sitting on this story for a while now. Although not a named party, my name appears in the filings. Craig Anderson (DailyJournal) apparently broke the story in a hardcopy version.

    • This case may serve as a caution to Patently-O “anonymous” commentors. A defamed individual may have ways to figure out your identity.

    • ESN has explained that it actually filed the complaint at 12:01 am on October 16.

    • A couple of days after posting the comment above, PTT deleted the above quoted material and replaced it with the following: “You can’t change history, and it’s outrageous that the Eastern District of Texas may have, wittingly or unwittingly, helped a non-practicing entity to try to manufacture subject matter jurisdiction. Even if this was a “mistake,” which I can’t see how it could be, given that someone emailed me a printout of the docket from Monday showing the case, the proper course of action should be a motion to correct the docket. (n.b.: don’t be surprised if the docket changes back once the higher-ups in the Court get wind of this, making this post completely irrelevant). EDIT: You can’t change history, but you can change a blog entry based on information emailed to you from a helpful reader.” [Mullin]

    • Reporter, Joe Mullin has more background — According to his report, Ward filed the complaint in November and had been in the process of unmasking the troll.  

    • Joe Mullin Reports on the Case

    • Legal Blog Watch

    • Legal Pad reports on the Case

    • Forbes has a quite flippant view

    • Zura Reports

    • Mark Randazza

    • Robert Ambrogi