Preissuance Submissions: A Description of the Relevance to Examination but Not an Explanation

by Dennis Crouch

The USPTO is struggling somewhat with how to implement preissuance submissions. 

Required Concise Description: The new provision created by the America Invents Act (AIA) opens the door for any third party to submit “any … printed publication potential relevance to the examination of the application” if submitted within the proper window following application publication.  35 U.S.C. 122(e)(1).  The preissuance submission must also include a “concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document.” 35 U.S.C. 122(e)(2)(A).

The senior managers at USPTO learned patent law in the days when patent prosecution was extremely ex parte. Before 2001, pending applications were not published and were instead kept in complete confidence within the USPTO.  File wrappers were only reviewed in paper copy form and patent law was not generally thought of as much of a public concern.  Those days are gone, but fragments of that history remain.

In 1999 the omnibus appropriations bill included American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.  The AIPA implemented a new program of publishing pending patent applications 18–months after filing.  Applicants still have the option of keeping their applications secret while pending. However, that option requires that the applicant forego non-US patent rights. As the chart shows below, the vast majority of applications are published prior to issuance.  Further, about half of the non-published applications are ones that issued within 18 months of filing.


The new publication system raised a concern that third parties would begin challenging patents before issuance. As part of the legislative compromise, the 1999 AIPA legislation also included a special provision that blocks preissuance protests and oppositions. The provision authorizes the USPTO Director to establish procedures to ensure that no pre-issuance opposition is initiated following publication.

Protest and Pre-Issuance Opposition.— The Director shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure that no protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition to the grant of a patent on an application may be initiated after publication of the application without the express written consent of the applicant.

35 U.S.C. 122(c). The USPTO recognizes that the new preissuance submission system is in tension with the rule against allowing pre-issuance oppositions. In its implementation regulations the USPTO attempts to provide some limitation on the submissions in order to avoid the conflict. In the explanation of the final rules, the USPTO writes:

The third party should present the concise description in a format that would best explain to the examiner the relevance of the accompanying document, such as in a narrative description or a claim chart. The statutory requirement for a concise description of relevance should not be interpreted as permitting a third party to participate in the prosecution of an application, as 35 U.S.C. 122(c) prohibits the initiation of a protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition for published applications without the consent of the applicant. Therefore, while a concise description of relevance may include claim charts (i.e., mapping various portions of a submitted document to different claim elements), the concise description of relevance is not an invitation to a third party to propose rejections of the claims or set forth arguments relating to an Office action in the application or to an applicant’s reply to an Office action in the application.

PreIssuance Final Rules (July 2012). In its discussion of the new rules, the USPTO also suggested that the concise description is “limited to a description of a document’s relevance” cannot include “arguments against patentability.”

Unlike the concise description of relevance required by 35 U.S.C. 122(e) for a preissuance submission, which is limited to a description of a document’s relevance, the concise explanation for a protest under 37 CFR 1.291 allows for arguments against patentability.

Clearly there is a limit here to the scope of the description that can be filed. However, the USPTO’s distinction between a description and explanation is not entirely clear. 

The USPTO’s approach here makes some sense but is somewhat misguided.  In my mind, the statutory mandated description of relevance seems to requires at least some indication the statutory hook.  This is especially true because the preissuance submissions are not limited to 102/103 related prior art submissions. Rather, the submissions merely need to be potentially relevant to examination.  The best interpretation of the statute is that the discription of relevance is a description of how the submitted document is relevant to the examination.  In my mind, this sets up a three way network and the required description should discuss how (1) the submitted document changes how we think about (2) the patent application based upon some (3) law or other element of patent examination.  In the context of a claim construction chart, the link to 102/103 will likely be implicitly understandable without discussing the statutory elements.  Explanations regarding claim construction, subject matter eligibility, indefiniteness, or other examination issues likely will not make sense unless at least those particular labels are provided in the explnation of how the document is relevant to the examination.

Alleged Copyright Infringement by Patent Prosecutors

By Dennis Crouch

American Institute of Physics and John Wiley & Sons v. Schwegman Ludberg (D.Minn)

Publishers John Wiley & Sons and American Institute of Physics have asked the Minnesota District Court for leave to amend and narrow their complaint against the Schwegman law firm. The amendment would drop any allegation that submitting copies of copyright works to the USPTO constitute copyright infringement. The plaintiffs write that the amended complaint

does not allege that this unauthorized copying includes (i) making such copies of a copyrighted work for submission to the PTO as may be required by the rules and regulations of the PTO, (ii) transmitting such copies to the PTO, or (iii) making an archival copy of that work transmitted to the PTO for Defendants’ internal file to document what has been transmitted.

To be clear, however, the plaintiffs have not dropped their case, but continue to allege that other copies and transmission do constitute copyright infringement. Further, because Wiley does not have any proof of those other activities, it argues that the now unchallenged submission to the PTO serves as “evidence of broader use and circulation” sufficient to permit the complaint to move forward.

The newly amended complaint thus recites no factual basis other than the fact that Schwegman is a law firm that prosecutes patents and that, because Schwegman submitted copies of certain articles to the USPTO that it must have also made unauthorized copies. The complaint:

14. Upon information and belief, Defendants have engaged in Unauthorized Copying with respect to the copyrighted articles from Plaintiffs’ journals, including but limited to the articles identified on Schedule A.

15. Plaintiffs cannot know the full extent of Defendants’ Unauthorized Copying without discovery.

The amended complaint also adds a further list of obscure scientific articles that were submitted to the PTO by Schwegman and were allegedly copied internally in an unauthorized manner. The plaintiffs have not yet filed any proposed amendments in the MBHB case.

The USPTO intervened in these cases supporting the law firms. It appears that this amendment is meant to appease the USPTO so that it will fall out of the case – making the defendants look much less sympathetic.


The Impact of Patent Reform on Filing Strategy (I)

The new law defining prior art would become effective 18–months from the date of enactment of H.R. 1249.  Patent applications filed after that date would be bound by the new first-to-file rules. The major exception is that old invention-date rules will also apply to any application having a claim having a proper priority filing date of prior to the change-over. 

That date will likely be a filing bonanza, much like the what occurred in the lead-up to the June 8, 1995 change in patent term as shown in the chart below.


Applicants who beat the 1995 deadline were granted given either a patent term of 17 years from issuance or else 20 years from filing, whichever was longer as calculated at issuance. In that scenario, there were very good reasons to file before the deadline.

When the new deadline comes, I suspect that the current regime will look more favorable than the new because of the new limits on swearing-behind prior art based upon a prior invention date and claiming a grace period for third-party disclosures. One reason an applicant might delay is because of the new “micro-entity” status that offers lower fees, but even then the best course of action would be to file a provisional application early followed by non-provisional at the lower fee.

Are there reasons why a patent applicant would choose to delay filing an application until after the new deadline?

A Modest Proposal?: Identifying the Invention within the Patent Application

Well known patent attorney Hal Milton recently published a new article in John Marshall’s Review of Intellectual Property Law (RIPL) that argues for the presentation of a “new result” within every patent application.  The majority of newly drafted patent applications do not follow Milton’s approach and instead seem to obscure the innovative elements of the claimed invention and fail to identify the problem being solved by the invention.  Milton writes:

Fifty years of examining, drafting, and prosecuting patents, including the patent at issue in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., coupled with the KSR opinion and the lessons therefrom, led the author herein to the objective standard of a new result.  Inventors should be counseled that a new result should be sought out to justify the exclusive right of a patent.

Milton’s approach builds upon Paul Cole’s 2008 post-KSR article also published in RIPL. In that article, Cole reiterated that that evidence showing a new result is “necessary” under the European Patent Convention (EPC).

Milton’s approach also complements Ron Slusky’s approach to claim drafting that focuses a claim drafter’s attention first on the problem being solved by the invention. A major difference, however, is that Slusky does not explicitly advocate identifying the new result as part of the application itself.

Milton again:

In addition to identifying the new result or function to justify the exclusive right
of a patent, … that new result [should be] systematically recited throughout all sections of a patent application.  Because a court may interpret a patent based upon the intrinsic patent alone, without regard to extrinsic evidence presented in advocacy outside the patent document, extreme care should be exercised in preparing the original patent application with consistency throughout.  It is important to realize that patent offices, for the most part, grant patents based upon claims whereas the courts enforce patents based upon the entire patent.

Patent Term: Comparing 17-years-from-issue to 20-years-from-filing

One of the most important attributes of a patent is its term or duration of enforceability.  In 1995, the US patent system began calculating patent term based on the priority filing date of an application rather than a patent's issue date. Under the prior rule, a patent would remain in force for 17 years from the date of issue. Under the “new” system, the term is 20–years from the priority filing date. The three extra years were intended to account for a typical prosecution delay of three years. In addition, Congress added a patent-term-adjustment (PTA) provision to lengthen the patent term in instances where the USPTO unduly delayed in issuing a patent.

Study: For this study, I wanted to consider how the change has actually impacted patent term. To do this, I created a database of 50,000 recently issued patents and calculated the term under both the old and new system.  For the calculation under the new system, I added 20–years to the earliest priority date (excluding provisional and original foreign filing dates) and then added any patent-term-adjustment.  To calculate the term under the old system, I added 17–years to the issue date unless the patent had a family member (e.g., continuation application) with an earlier issue date. In that case, I added 17–years to the issue date of the family member based on an assumption that a terminal disclaimer would have been filed in the case. Because of some potential data discrepancies, I excluded the extreme 1% of results and also patents on applications filed proir to the 1995 change-over. 

Results: Most patents (64%) have a longer term under the new system than they would have been entitled under the older system. Under the new system, the median patent has a term of about 8–months longer than if the term had been calculated under the old system. For 43% of the patent, the terms are are within 1–year of what would have been calculated in the old system; and 89% are within 2–years. Of course, there are some extremes. As you might imagine, patents that benefit most under the new system are those that have the greatest patent term adjustment (PTA).  Patents in TC 1600 (Biochemistry and Organic Chemistry) comparatively fared the worst.  Those patents on average lose 11–months of patent term in the new system as compared to the old system.

Supreme Court to Decide Microsoft Patent Case that Could Make it Easier to Invalidate Patents

By Dennis Crouch

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. (Supreme Court 2010)

The Supreme Court has granted Microsoft's petition for a writ of certiorari and will consider whether patent law requires clear and convincing evidence of invalidity in order to invalidate an issued patent. Microsoft asks that the standard be lowered – at least for the situation where the evidence of invalidity was not considered by the patent office before the patent issued. The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue. However, in KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court did note that the "the rationale underlying the presumption — that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim — seems much diminished" in cases where the patentee "fail[ed] to disclose" the key prior art to the PTO.

I expect that the court will agree that the statutory presumption of validity does not require a clear and convincing standard and that the standard should be lowered when a court is presented with evidence that is substantially different from that considered by the USPTO. Without explanation, Chief Justice Roberts has recused himself from this case – leaving eight justices to decide. At this point, I expect that all members of the court will agree that the standard should be lowered with some disagreement on the exact rule.

Clear and Convincing Evidence: Felony criminal cases require that prosecutors prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. Most civil cases only require a preponderance of the evidence – often referred to as "more likely than not." Thus, in patent infringement cases, the patentee need only prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant infringed. However, the Federal Circuit has long required that invalidity defenses be proven with clear and convincing evidence. The clear and convincing standard is somewhere between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt and is sometimes referred to as "substantially more likely than not." Microsoft has not directly challenged the CAFC's rule of corroborative evidence that a single person's testimony is never sufficient to invalidate a patent.

i4i's case: In 2009, an Eastern District of Texas jury awarded $200 million + interest to i4i after finding that Microsoft willfully infringed the Canadian company's patent. Judge Davis subsequently added-on $40 million for willful infringement. The judge also issued an injunction ordering Microsoft to stop selling Word Products with the capability of using "custom XML." That injunction was stayed by the Federal Circuit pending appeal. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's findings of validity, willful infringement, enhanced damages, and permanent injunctive relief. In the meantime, the USPTO has concluded its reexamination of the i4i patent — confirming that the claims at issue are patentable. Microsoft filed a second reexamination request in August 2010 (shortly after it filed its petition to the Supreme Court). However, on November 24, 2010, the USPTO denied the request to begin a new reexamination – finding that the newly asserted prior art failed to raise a substantial new question of patentability (SNQ) as required by statute. Microsoft will likely appeal that denial. In addition, Microsoft apparently patched its software to prevent someone from using custom XML in Word in an effort to avoid the injunction and any further damages.

Microsoft has now moved-on to the Supreme Court — asking the high court to reject the "clear and convincing" evidence standard for proving a patent invalid. As Microsoft wrote in its petition for writ of certiorari, the question is "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Microsoft's invalidity defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence" when the prior-art was not considered by the USPTO. This is essentially the same question that Microsoft raised in its 2008 petition in z4. That petition was withdrawn after the parties settled.

The Patent: i4i's asserted patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449) covers a system for editing the metacodes of an HTML or XML document. The system uses a metacode map that is stored separately from the XML document and provides a menu of potential metacodes. The patent application was filed in 1994 and should remain in-force until 2015.

Microsoft's Invalidity Argument: Microsoft was not able to uncover any prior publication or patent that would invalidate the invention. However, the software giant argued at trial that i4i had sold an embodiment of the invention in the US more than one year prior to the 1994 patent application date. In particular, Microsoft argues that the invention was "embedded in a system called S4 - that the inventors of the ′449 Patent developed and sold to SEMI, a client of i4i's predecessor, over a year before applying for the ′449 Patent." That sale was not disclosed to the USPTO during the original prosecution and could not be presented during reexamination because reexaminations are limited to a review of prior art patents and publications. At the trial, the inventors (Vulpe and Owens) testified that the S4 system did not include a metacode map or separate the map from the marked-up document – two key features of their invention. Because the source-code for the 1993 custom software was no longer available, Microsoft primarily relied on testimony from a former i4i employee and upon written statements that Vulpe had made to investors and to the Canadian Government suggesting that the S4 software did separate metacode information.

The jury form asked "Did Microsoft prove by clear and convincing evidence that any of the listed claims of the '449 patent are invalid?" The jury answered "no." On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the jury had sufficient evidence to rule that the patent was not anticipated by S4.

Importance of the Rule: A recent study conducted by Etan Chatlynne and published on Patently-O looked at all 119 Federal Circuit decisions on patent validity for the past several years. The study found that lowering the burden of proof would not have made any difference for 74% of those cases but might have made a difference in 26% of the cases. None of the decisions expressly stated that the result would be different if the standard had been reduced.

The clear and convincing standard probably has an important psychological impact in jury (and judicial) deliberations where the defendant's high burden for proving invalidity is contrasted with the plaintiff's lower burden for proving infringement.

How Effective are Pre-Appeal Brief Conferences?

As part of its appeal rules package, the USPTO has released further information on the role of pre-appeal brief conferences in the prosecution process. As its name suggests, the pre-appeal brief conference program involves a meeting that occurs before an applicant files the formal appeal brief. The "conference" is an internal meeting between examiners and does not actually include the patent applicant or its representative. Rather, the applicant submits a short (5-page) memo that is reviewed at the conference. The program was introduced in FY2005 as a mechanism for helping to avoid unnecessary appeals.

The table below shows that the number of pre-appeal brief conference requests has been steadily rising since being introduced. The results have stayed relatively steady. During the five-year reported period. 56% of the pre-appeal brief conferences resulted in a decision by the conference members that the examiner's rejection was proper and that the case should proceed to the BPAI. 38% of the conferences resulted in the examiner withdrawing one or more rejections and then re-opening prosecution. 4% of the conferences resulted in a decision that all claims were patentable. And, 2% of the conferences rejected the pre-appeal brief conference request as defective.


Number of Pre-Appeal Brief Conference Requests

Percent of Appeals

Proceed to Board

Reopen Prosecution

Withdraw Rejections

Defective Request




































Prior to the pre-appeal brief conference program, a majority of appeals cases never reached the Board because the rejections were withdrawn after the applicant filed its formal brief. The pre-appeal brief conference program appears to have shifted that decisionmaking process forward. Now, examiners are much less likely than before to withdraw their rejections after an applicant files its formal appeal brief. That decision is made at a separate conference termed the appeal brief conference. In FY2010, the appeal brief conference resulted in a decision to file an examiner answer in 59% of cases. That is up from 39% in FY2005. Thus, the pre-appeal brief conference program does not seem to actually reduce patent examiner workload. However, it does help speed prosecution and allows a substantial number of applicants to avoid filing the formal appeal brief.

In an e-mail, Foley partner Stephen Maebius focused on the relative rates of re-opening prosecution. Pre-appeal brief conferences are relatively more likely to determine that prosecution should be re-opened (and presumably a new rejection issued). As compared with the pre-appeal brief conference results, appeal brief conferences are much more likely to determine that all rejections should be withdrawn. Maebius writes that "re-opening prosecution may increase the chance of lengthening a patent term adjustment, depending on the dates associated with earlier periods of the prosecution history. This may be an advantage where immediate issuance is not an objective and patent life is more valuable at the end of the patent term as in the case of pharmaceuticals. . . . On the other hand . . . filing a full appeal may be a better strategy when gaining immediate allowance is the objective."

PDF of Rules with Data:

Discussion: Patent Prosecution Rates

A Patently-O Reader e-mailed with the hope of starting a discussion on the topic of patent attorney and agent fees for patent prosecution. 

He writes “large clients have … pushed down their rates, some in 2009 and some in 2010. In at least two cases, these are clients flush with incredible amounts of cash. Thus, this is not a problem of client-liquidity.” His clients have created rules that would block both a partner and an associate from billing on the same response. “To some clients, this appears to be two attorneys doing work that can be finished by a single attorney.” In addition, his clients are “unwilling to allow their prosecution to be used as a type of training exercise. They want the work done quickly, at the lowest cost. Being part of a training exercise does not achieve this purpose.”  In the background is the reality that there are “many unemployed or underemployed patent attorneys willing to do this work and do it effectively, at [under 2007] rates.”

Cancer Research Technology v. Barr Laboratories: Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct

By Jason Rantanen

Cancer Research Technology Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Panel: Newman, Lourie (author), Prost (dissenting)

Although overshadowed by the en banc Federal Circuit arguments in TheraSense v. Becton Dickinson this morning, Cancer Research Technology v. Barr Laboratories may provide a preview of what the opinions in TheraSense could look like – although it doesn't necessarily indicate which view of inequitable conduct will ultimately prevail.  In Cancer Research, Judges Lourie and Newman reversed a district court finding of prosecution laches and inequitable conduct, while dissenting Judge Prost would have reached the opposite result.

The patent at issue (the '291 patent) involved a set of thirteen tetrazine derivatives that the original 1982 specification identified as possessing anticancer activities based on animal studies.  During the first nine years of prosecution, the examiner repeatedly rejected the claims due to lack of utility; rather than file a response to the office actions, the applicant instead filed continuation after continuation.  In 1991, Cancer Research obtained ownership of the patent application and shortly thereafter responded to the examiner's arguments.  The patent issued in 1993 and expires in 2014. 

Following Cancer Research's clinical testing, the FDA approved one of the compounds covered by the '291 patent (marketed as TEMODAR) for the treatment of one type of cancer in 1999 and a second in 2005.  In 2007, Barr Laboratories filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") for a generic form of TEMODAR.  Cancer Research sued Barr for infringement four months later.  During the district court proceedings, the parties stipulated to validity and infringement and, after a bench trial, the court found that the patent was unenforceable due to prosecution laches and inequitable conduct. 

Prosecution Laches
Given the nearly ten-year delay before any meaningful response to the examiner's rejection was filed, Barr contended that the patent was unenforceable due to prosecution laches.  The district agreed, concluding that the delay in prosecution was unreasonable and unexplained.

On appeal, the majority reversed the finding of prosecution laches, holding that the doctrine requires not just unreasonable delay, but also a showing of prejudice.  The majority further held that "to establish prejudice, an accused infringer must show evidence of intervening rights, i.e., that either the accused infringer or others invested in, worked on, or used the claimed technology during the period of delay."  (Slip Op. at 9).  Here, there was no evidence of intervening rights during the prosecution period, such as evidence showing that someone other than the patent holder attempted to develop the claimed compounds.  Even Barr itself waited until 2007 – four years later than required – before filing its ANDA.  The majority also noted that there was no public harm: in the absence of the patent, Cancer Research likely would not have been incentivized to develop TEMODAR at all. 

Writing in dissent, Judge Prost rejected the notion that prosecution laches requires prejudice, let alone intervening rights; rather, under her reading of the precedent such a requirement is not part of the laches determination.  Furthermore, in her opinion, both Barr and the public were harmed by Barr's inability to market a generic version of TEMODOR.

Comment: I'm unconvinced by Judge Prost's argument on this point.  If she is correct, then the '291 patent was never enforceable – be it in 2007, when Barr filed its ANDA, or 1993, when it issued.  Yet without an enforceable patent, Cancer Research would never have developed TEMODOR, let alone engaged in the expensive Phase III clinical studies necessary to demonstrate its safety and efficacy.  Thus, the "harm" to the public would been greater in the absence of the '291 patent, not less.

Inequitable Conduct
The majority also rejected the district court's finding of inequitable conduct, while the dissent reached the opposite conclusion.  Both opinions focused on the subject of intent to deceive. 

The inequitable conduct issue in this case revolved around an extensive series of articles by an inventor on the '291 patent that presented data from post-application clinical trials of the claimed compounds.  These articles included conclusions indicating that some of the claimed compounds demonstrated high toxicity and low anticancer activity, which the district court found to be highly material to the patent claims because it directly contradicted statements in the '291 patent regarding the compounds' utility in treating cancers, as well as the patentability of a broadly written claim.

The majority, following the "intent cannot be inferred from materiality" line of thought, concluded that the district court's only basis for finding intent was its determination that the withheld articles were highly material.  "Because the district court did not rely on any other evidence to support its finding of deceptive intent beyond that used to find the withheld data material, the court in effect relied solely on its materiality finding to infer intent to deceive."  Slip Op. at 17.  The majority also concluded that the inference of deceptive drawn by the district court about the inventor's publication of data was not the only reasonable inference; rather, the broad publication of this data in multiple articles is inconsistent with an inference of intent to deceive.  Thus, an equally reasonable inference is that the inventor did not appreciate the potential importance of the published data to the patentability of the patent claims.

Judge Prost, again writing in dissent, would have affirmed the district court's determinations.  In contrast to the majority, which required independent evidence of intent, her view of inequitable conduct is that it does not require separate evidentiary bases for materiality and intent; rather it is appropriate to cite to the same evidence for materiality and intent.  Furthermore, here there was additional evidence of intent in the form of the district court's credibility findings, "which are virtually unreviewable by this court."  Thus, under her approach to intent in inequitable conduct, "[w]e should not draw inference that the district court has already excluded based on its own credibility findings."

Comment: The majority and dissent's views on intent can be partially reconciled under the position that, although an intent to deceive may be partially based on evidence of materiality, materiality cannot be the sole basis for the finding of intent to deceive.  Here, in the majority's opinion, the finding of materiality was the sole basis for the intent to deceive determination, because the only additional factor – the credibility determination – was based on an erroneous inference.  On the other hand, in the dissent's view credibility determinations are unreviewable and are sufficient to provide the "beyond the materiality" support for an intent to deceive finding.

USPTO’s Data Visualization Center and Patent Dashboard

The USPTO has publicly released its data visualization center and patent dashboard. The site does an excellent job of providing a visual overview of the current USPTO state-of-affairs in terms of patent backlog, pendency, and allowance rate. The site also breaks-down those numbers in various ways that may be useful for advising your clients.  Data-downloads on the site provide unprecedented public access to PTO numbers that were previously either uncalculated or largely kept secret.

PTO Director Dave Kappos additionally sees the dashboard as providing patent office accountability and publicly facing the challenge of reducing patent pendency. Kappos writes on his blog:

An important part of the effort to reduce pendency is better understanding the numerous factors that contribute to examination delays and measuring their impact in a way that makes the USPTO more transparent to the public.  By looking at the whole picture, we can more effectively develop ways to increase the efficiency of the examination process.  While we know we have to hire more examiners to reduce the backlog, we also know that we must re-engineer the way we do business at the USPTO and have already implemented a series of initiatives designed to improve efficiencies.  These process changes will empower our workforce to be more effective and have already begun to yield important gains.

. . . [The Dashboard] will help the entire IP community to better understand our processes, and enable applicants to make more informed decisions about their applications, especially as we develop more opportunities for applicants to control the timing at which their applications are examined.  The new dashboard, which will be updated monthly, will also be used internally by the USPTO to analyze and improve our examination process and to track the effectiveness of our improvement efforts.  We intend to further refine the dashboard and welcome your input about ways we can improve it.  A dedicated mailbox [] has been set up for your comments and we intend to monitor your feedback carefully. 
The dashboard introduces six new measures of pendency designed to give a better overall picture of the contributions of different parts of the examination process to application pendency.  For example, the traditional total pendency measure stops the clock with the filing of an RCE, which may not provide an accurate measure of the total time it takes to complete the examination of an application through request for continued examination (RCE) practice.  A new measure, called "Traditional Total Pendency Including RCEs," looks at pendency of applications from filing of the original application to ultimate disposal of that same application, including any additional time attributable to RCE filings in those applications where RCE filings are made.  Similar measures are provided relative to divisional applications and other types of continuation practice.  We also provide information about pendency for applications in appeal practice.


USPTO Guidelines for Determining Obviousness

The USPTO has released a set of updated examination guidelines on the core patentability issue of obviousness. The 18–page guidelines do not have the force of law, but will impact how examiners judge obviousness in practice. The updates primarily focus on Federal Circuit opinions that interpret and implement the holdings of KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S 398 (2007). I have copied the following tables from the Federal Register. [].


Combining Prior Art Elements

In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 536 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Even where a general method that could have been applied to make the claimed product was known and within the level of skill of the ordinary artisan, the claim may nevertheless be nonobvious if the problem which had suggested use of the method had been previously unknown.

Crocs, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n., 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

A claimed combination of prior art elements may be nonobvious where the prior art teaches away from the claimed combination and the combination yields more than predictable results.

Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A claimed invention is likely to be obvious if it is a combination of known prior art elements that would reasonably have been expected to maintain their respective properties or functions after they have been combined.

Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A combination of known elements would have been prima facie obvious if an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized an apparent reason to combine those elements and would have known how to do so.

Wyers v. Master Lock Co., No. 2009–1412, —F.3d—, 2010 WL 2901839 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2010).

The scope of analogous art is to be construed broadly and includes references that are reasonably pertinent to the problem that the inventor was trying to solve. Common sense may be used to support a legal conclusion of obviousness so long as it is explained with sufficient reasoning.

DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Predictability as discussed in KSR encompasses the expectation that prior art elements are capable of being combined, as well as the expectation that the combination would have worked for its intended purpose. An inference that a claimed combination would not have been obvious is especially strong where the prior art's teachings undermine the very reason being proffered as to why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the known elements.


Substituting One Known Element for Another

In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

When determining whether a reference in a different field of endeavor may be used to support a case of obviousness (i.e., is analogous), it is necessary to consider the problem to be solved.

Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Analogous art is not limited to references in the field of endeavor of the invention, but also includes references that would have been recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art as useful for applicant's purpose.

Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Because Internet and Web browser technologies had become commonplace for communicating and displaying information, it would have been obvious to adapt existing processes to incorporate them for those functions.

Aventis Pharma Deutschland v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

A chemical compound would have been obvious over a mixture containing that compound as well as other compounds where it was known or the skilled artisan had reason to believe that some desirable property of the mixture was derived in whole or in part from the claimed compound, and separating the claimed compound from the mixture was routine in the art.

Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A claimed compound would not have been obvious where there was no reason to modify the closest prior art lead compound to obtain the claimed compound and the prior art taught that modifying the lead compound would destroy its advantageous property. Any known compound may serve as a lead compound when there is some reason for starting with that lead compound and modifying it to obtain the claimed compound.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

It is not necessary to select a single compound as a ''lead compound'' in order to support an obviousness rejection. However, where there was reason to select and modify the lead compound to obtain the claimed compound, but no reasonable expectation of success, the claimed compound would not have been obvious.

Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Obviousness of a chemical compound in view of its structural similarity to a prior art compound may be shown by identifying some line of reasoning that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to select and modify a prior art lead compound in a particular way to produce the claimed compound. It is not necessary for the reasoning to be explicitly found in the prior art of record, nor is it necessary for the prior art to point to only a single lead compound.


The Obvious To Try Rationale

In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A claimed polynucleotide would have been obvious over the known protein that it encodes where the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in deriving the claimed polynucleotide using standard biochemical techniques, and the skilled artisan would have had a reason to try to isolate the claimed polynucleotide. KSR applies to all technologies, rather than just the ''predictable'' arts.

Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

A claimed compound would not have been obvious where it was not obvious to try to obtain it from a broad range of compounds, any one of which could have been selected as the lead compound for further investigation, and the prior art taught away from using a particular lead compound, and there was no predictability or reasonable expectation of success in making the particular modifications necessary to transform the lead compound into the claimed compound.

Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Where the claimed anti-convulsant drug had been discovered somewhat serendipitously in the course of research aimed at finding a new anti-diabetic drug, it would not have been obvious to try to obtain a claimed compound where the prior art did not present a finite and easily traversed number of potential starting compounds, and there was no apparent reason for selecting a particular starting compound from among a number of unpredictable alternatives.

Bayer Schering Pharma A.G. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A claimed compound would have been obvious where it was obvious to try to obtain it from a finite and easily traversed number of options that was narrowed down from a larger set of possibilities by the prior art, and the outcome of obtaining the claimed compound was reasonably predictable.

Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A claimed isolated stereoisomer would not have been obvious where the claimed stereoisomer exhibits unexpectedly strong therapeutic advantages over the prior art racemic mixture without the correspondingly expected toxicity, and the resulting properties of the enantiomers separated from the racemic mixture were unpredictable.

Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp., 603 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

An obvious to try rationale may be proper when the possible options for solving a problem were known and finite. However, if the possible options were not either known or finite, then an obvious to try rationale cannot be used to support a conclusion of obviousness.

Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Where there were a finite number of identified, predictable solutions and there is no evidence of unexpected results, an obvious to try inquiry may properly lead to a legal conclusion of obviousness. Common sense may be used to support a legal conclusion of obviousness so long as it is explained with sufficient reasoning.


Consideration of Evidence

PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Even though all evidence must be considered in an obviousness analysis, evidence of nonobviousness may be outweighed by contradictory evidence in the record or by what is in the specification. Although a reasonable expectation of success is needed to support a case of obviousness, absolute predictability is not required.

In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

All evidence, including evidence rebutting a prima facie case of obviousness, must be considered when properly presented.

Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Evidence that has been properly presented in a timely manner must be considered on the record. Evidence of commercial success is pertinent where a nexus between the success of the product and the claimed invention has been demonstrated.

Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Evidence of secondary considerations of obviousness such as commercial success and long-felt need may be insufficient to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness if the prima facie case is strong. An argument for nonobviousness based on commercial success or long-felt need is undermined when there is a failure to link the commercial success or long-felt need to a claimed feature that distinguishes over the prior art.

Interim Guidelines on Examining Statutory Subject Matter

The USPTO has issued a set of interim examination guidelines for determining whether a claim is properly directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. ? 101, relevant Supreme Court precedent, and Bilski. The instructions begin with a realization that the area is in flux and that more permanent guidelines will be established once the Supreme Court rules on Bilski v. Kappos. In addition, these are guidelines rather than rules or laws. Thus, an examiner's failure to follow the guidelines is "neither appealable nor petitionable."

Download 101 Memo to Directors | Download 101 Examiner Instructions 8 24 09 | Download FLOWCHARTMORT 8 24 09 | Download FLOWCHARTPROD 8 24 09

The guidelines appear to do a good job of synthesizing the highly confusing area of law into a straightforward algorithm. The problem is that next spring the Supreme Court is almost sure to reject the Federal Circuit's Machine-or-Transformation test. At that point, all of the examiner time and applicant money focusing on this "threshold issue" will have been wasted. I understand that the business of the PTO must continue even in the face of potential policy shifts. However, I would have suggested that examination of Section 101 eligibility be put on a back-burner - especially in light of the fact that most questionable subject matter cases will also fail the tests of obviousness, enablement, and indefiniteness.

The guidelines bear the signature of Drew Hirshfeld, Acting Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy. The PTO recently posted a notice looking to permanently fill this extremely important position.

Estimated Workload of Preparing and Filing Reexaminations

As part of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)), the USPTO is required to evaluate its methods of collecting information from the public. In a recent Paperwork Act notice & publication, the Office offered the following estimates for reexamination practice.


Estimated Time Response (hours)

Estimated Number of Annual Responses

Total Hours

Request for Ex Parte Reexamination Transmittal Form (PTO/SB/57)

18 minutes



Request for Ex Parte Reexamination

40 hours



Request for Inter Partes Reexamination Transmittal Form (PTO/SB/58)

18 minutes



Request for Inter Partes Reexamination

90 hours



Petition to Review Refusal to Grant Ex Parte Reexamination

15 hours



Petition to Review Refusal to Grant Inter Partes Reexamination

25 hours



Patent Owner's 37 CFR 1.530 Statement

7 hours



Third Party Requester's 37 CFR 1.535 Reply

7 hours



Amendment in Ex Parte or Inter Partes Reexamination

20 hours



Third Party Requester's 37 CFR 1.947  Comments in Inter Partes  Reexamination

25 hours



Response to Final Rejection in Ex  Parte Reexamination

15 hours



Patent Owner's 37 CFR 1.951 Response in Inter Partes Reexamination

25 hours



Third Party Requester's 37 CFR 1.951 Comments in Inter Partes  Reexamination

25 hours



Petition to Request Extension of  Time in Ex Parte or Inter Partes  Reexamination

30 minutes








Are these estimates in the ball park? How many hours are spent preparing a request for ex parte reexamination? Perhaps most importantly - what is missing here from the time spent in reexamination practice? Comments may be submitted to (Subject: A0651-00XX Patent Reexaminations comment). Notice at 74 FR 39916.

Assuming that the total -- 111,336 hours -- represent the entire amount of attorney time spent on reexaminations. Those hours are the equivalent of about 60 full time patent attorneys.

Patent Application Pendency: Percent of Applications Still Pending

The large backlog of cases at the PTO has added greatly to the problem of long patent application pendency. There are other contributors to the problem – such as applicants and examiners unwilling to reach a compromise solution (often based on the demands of superiors).

To provide some measure of pendency, I created a database of 20,000+ randomly selected patent applications and issued patents filed 2000 - 2007. For each of case, I tallied the final status as of mid-July 2009. (Status is either patented, abandoned, or pending). Using that data, I created a chart of the percent of utility applications still pending as of July 2009. This data can be helpful for someone considering whether their still-pending application is an anomaly. Over 84% of the applications filed in 2007 are still pending (+/– 2% at 95% CI) , while less than 1% of applications filed in 2000 are still pending (+/– 1% at 95% CI).


The second chart standardizes the same data according to the amount of time in prosecution.



  • This data only includes applications that were either (1) published or (2) patented. I do not know the percentage of cases unpublished cases that are still-pending versus those that are abandoned.
  • The data presented here does not distinguish between technology centers, continuations, etc. The still-pending rates varies considerably within those different categories.
  • The pendency rate for applications filed Q4 2004 appears unexpectedly high and the rate for Q1 2005 appears unexpectedly low.. That is at least partially explained by a data collection artifact. My data sample includes a relatively large number of applications filed in late December 2004 and early January 2005 rather than being more evenly distributed throughout the respective three months.

Office Actions

Although not necessarily any indication of quality, the length of non-final office actions has been increasing over time – shifting from an average of 7.5 pages in 2003 to 10.7 pages in 2009. The chart below – shows that the increase has been relatively steady over the past six years based on a sample of 8400 non-final office actions from patent applications filed 2001–2007. (Page count includes cover page and summary).


What is the cause of this rise?

BPAI Shuts Down Dissent in Favor of Efficiency

The Board of Patent Appeals (BPAI or Board) is very much a quasi-judicial body. The emphasis for today is on quasi. 35 USC §6 calls for each appeal to be heard by at least a three judge panel. Yet, the Board appears to be taking steps to limit the effectiveness of those panels. These changes are apparently motivated by a need for efficiency in the face of budget shortfalls and increased appeals.

Like examiners, BPAI judges have a count system. BPAI Judges are expected to sit on about 300 panels per year and draft about 100 opinions. In the past, judges would receive credit for drafting full dissents and concurring opinions. That has changed. In an internal email, BPAI Vice-Chief Jay Moore has indicated that these extraneous opinions will no longer ordinarily garner any credit. According to Vice-Chief Judge Moore, "[c]oncurrences, dissents, and remands are not normally efficient mechanisms for securing the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive' resolution of an appeal before the Board." The e-mail is reproduced below:


From: Moore, James T
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2009 9:57 AM

To: All BPAI Judges
Cc: MacDonald, Allen; Fleming, Michael R.; Santiago, Amalia

Subject: Policy Clarification on Dissents, Concurrences and Remands

Importance: High


Please note that, effective immediately, if you would like a dissent, concurrence, or remand to be considered towards your productivity totals, you must submit a request. The form is attached, and may be used retroactively for cases prior to this date. For cases after this date, it must be submitted to your Vice Chief Judge within one week of mailing of the dissent, concurrence, or remand in order to be considered.

Concurrences, dissents, and remands are not normally efficient mechanisms for securing the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of an appeal before the Board. (Bd. R. 1). As indicated in the PAPs, a productivity credit is not automatically earned for a concurring opinion, dissenting opinion, or remand. Accordingly, justification is required to explain the need to undertake the extra work and occasion the extra delay in order to ensure efficient and proper utilization of our resources. Further, any credit given for a concurring opinion, dissenting opinion, or remand will be commensurate in scope with the justification provided and the scope of the extra work.

Please see Al or Jay if you have any questions.


Jay Moore
Allen MacDonald


The push for efficiency at the BPAI is also seen in the non-judge "patent attorney" program. Many of the BPAI opinions are now ghost written by newly minted patent attorneys and then signed by the BPAI judges. The real problem with this program is that when the patent attorneys are used, the BPAI judge is given a much higher throughput quota.

According to an anonymous observer - "the time constraints [under the Patent Attorney program] are so serious that for many cases, not a single one of the judges signing off on a decision will have read the underlying papers detailing the facts of the case." This observer asked to remain anonymous based on "the intolerance of dissent at the Board."

This need for efficiency is also the driver behind the still-pending BPAI appeal rule changes.

Percentage of Patents that were Initially Rejected

This relates to my statements regarding the percentage of applications that receive at least an initial rejection. The graph below shows the percentage of patents issued (2000-2006) that were initially rejected by the PTO broken up into groups of art-units. Thus AU 1630 group actually includes AU 1630 – 1639. Close to 95% of the patents issued through the AU 1630 group during that period were initially rejected before being eventually allowed.


As with the design patent discussion yesterday, the rejection rate above is for applications that eventually issue as patents. For any given application, the effective rejection rate was likely higher because abandoned applications are probably more likely to have been rejected.

This data is now getting a bit old – but it is what it is. This data came from public PAIR before researchers were blocked from accessing it in any substantial way. Since 2006, applicants have complained of increased rejections. My perception that this change is not a shift toward more first office action rejections, but rather a shift toward sustaining more of those rejections in the second and subsequent office actions.

Design Patents: Sailing Through the PTO

Over eighty percent of utility patent applications are initially rejected during prosecution. Some areas of technology – such as semiconductors – have a lower rejection rate while others – such as electronic commerce methods – have an even higher rejection rate.

I wanted to compare the result for utility patents with design patents. I pulled up information on 1000 of the most recently issued design patents (all issued in March, 2009) and parsed through the file histories to see how design patent prosecution compares. As the graph below shows, in my sample, only 25.6% of the recently issued patents received an initial rejection during prosecution. To be clear, this 25% rejection rate is for applications that eventually issue as patents. To get an overall picture of design patent rejections, we need to also consider the applications that are abandoned and never issue as patents. Recent PTO statistics show that a bit under 20% of design patent applications are abandoned. Because design patent file histories are kept secret unless a patent issues, we cannot know why any individual case is abandoned – However, the two most likely situations are that the applicant (a) failed to respond to a rejection or (b) failed to pay the issue fee. Even if we assume that 100% of the abandoned cases are initially rejected, that only pushes the initial rejection rate to about 40%.

As the graph below shows, of the 1000 issued design patents in my sample, only 4.1% received a final rejection during prosecution; and only 0.2% cases (2 out of 1000) included a notice of appeal. None of the 1000 cases included an appeal brief.

The design patents in the study had an average pendency of 15.3 months calculated by finding the number of months between the filing date and the issue date. As may be expected, applications that included at least one rejection took considerably longer to issue (21.5 months) as compared to those that were never rejected (13.2 months). (These means are different at 99.9 CI).

Most design patents (58%) in my sample have only one inventor. However, 69% of the inventors are listed as joint inventors. A number of the muliti-inventor patents included trans-national inventorship with inventors originating from two or more separate countries. About 1% of the applications listed at least one inventor from the US & Great Britain. Another 1% listed at least one inventor from both the US and China.

Tuesdays with Aaron

12:01 am on Tuesday morning is a special time for patent attorneys. That is when the USPTO releases the newest batch of issued patents. Usually, over 3,000 issue each week.

Patent Attorney Aaron Feigelson (Leydig Voit firm) has started a great new blog: covering PTO events. Aaron writes with an eye toward patent prosecution and does a good job of finding examples from recently issued patents that raise important practice issues. He has also been closely following the aftermath of Bilski. Aaron describes his project as follows:

I started regular weekly monitoring of issued patents a few years ago for some particular client-related matters, but my intrigue grew after stumbling upon certain patents, unrelated to client matters, with stories that were too interesting to keep to myself. Like U.S. Patent No. 6,097,812 and its 67-year prosecution history (thanks to a very long lasting secrecy order). Or U.S. Patent No. 7,472,070 for a seemingly innocuous grain aeration system — but granted to Microsoft, that well-known player in agricultural technology. Or trends, like the trickling-off of issuances to applications filed the first week of June 1995 (when there was a pre-GATT filing surge). Or Jerome Lemelson being granted U.S. Patent No. 7,343,660 more than a decade after his death, with priority going back over fifty years to 1954.

Lately, my attention has turned to the fallout from the Federal Circuit’s recent decision of In re Bilski and its effect on patentable subject matter under Section 101. In particular, I was curious (to aid my own practice) to see what sorts of claims had been allowed pre- and post-Bilski, and what techniques applicants had used to address or circumvent the machine-or-transformation test. I began sending my weekly findings internally to a few attorneys in my firm. Then to a few more. Then to a few more..

After a few months of these “Bilski Watch” emails, this blog was created.

I enjoyed Aaron’s recent post regarding patents issuing from applications filed in early June 1995 – just before the patent term reference was switched from the issue date to the filing date.


  • For those of you who don’t know, the IP blogging community is rather inter-connected. For instance, Aaron Feigelson was a 2L at UChicago Law when I started there as a 1L. He was also a summer clerk at the MBHB firm. I started at MBHB soon after Aaron left and actually took over his desk and sat next door to his classmate Aaron Barkoff of the Orange Book Blog. Also at the MBHB firm are the PhD’s who blog at Patent Docs (both Aarons hold PhD’s as well). I interviewed at Matt Buchanan’s (Promote The Progress) former Chicago firm, which is just across the Chicago River from Feigelson’s office. Matt has participated in several business ventures with Steve Nipper (Invent Blog) and Doug Sorocco (PHOSITA). Matt and I are also working on a project for this fall. My old firm also paid for my patent bar review course with PLI partially taught by Gene Quinn (IPWatchdog). I could continue…

Independent Inventors: Five Ways to Reduce the Cost of Patenting and Get a Better Patent Application

Patent Attorney Mark Bergner provided the following five points that may help independent inventors control the cost of their patent application.   

Many small inventors contact me for preparing a patent application and asking that costs be kept to an absolute minimum. Recognizing that most such inventors do not have a great deal of money, I usually offer the following advice:

1) Provide me with the best write-up that you can up front with some illustrative (even hand-sketched) diagrams, along with any design documents you may have.

Often, inventors will provide a one-page summary or a sales brochure of their invention that leaves out a significant amount of detail. It is going to drive up costs if I have to drag each and every relevant aspect of the invention out. Additionally, there may be ample design documents that are provided to me after a significant amount of work has already been done. It will take much more effort for me to integrate this newly added information with a nearly complete draft specification than it would have taken if all information had been provided up front.

2) Try to do as much of the work as you can yourself.

I tell clients that I am knowledgeable in patent prosecution, but generally not knowledgeable about the subject matter of the invention. It will cost considerably more if I am required to do extensive research in the field of the invention in order to fill in a sparse invention disclosure. I will often point inventors to a patent in their general field and suggest that the detailed description and figures shown in the patent provide roughly the level of detail needed for their patent application. While I am not expecting draftsman-quality drawings and use of the words “wherein” and “said” in their description, I am expecting something more than a 3-block single figure illustrating a complex client-server architecture.

Also, there are many inventors who are wonderful technical people, but simply cannot communicate well in writing (that’s why they majored in physics and not journalism). It might be a good idea for such an inventor to work with someone (under a confidentiality agreement) who can write well to prepare an initial description. I had an inventor who enlisted the support of a graduate student at a significantly lower hourly rate than I charge. Although I can get all of the relevant information by talking with the inventor in person and over the telephone, if that is the sole means that I have of obtaining descriptive information, it is going to cost more. If the inventor has difficulty in communicating ideas and concepts both in writing and orally, it is going to be a very expensive patent application–no two ways about it.

3) Provide me with a nearly completed concept of the invention.

Nothing drives up costs more than to have the inventor continue to invent as the application is being drafted. One common issue: if a patent attorney does a good job with the subject matter, the draft of the patent application may be the first time the inventor has ever seen his idea expressed in such a clear and organized manner. This may spawn the inventor to come up with alternate embodiments or to provide other features that might prevent a design-around. While I generally expect some minor refinement of an inventive concept during the course of preparing the application, the addition of completely new or different embodiments will substantially increase costs.

4) Answer any questions provided in a draft clearly and completely.

Often I will prepare a draft application with a number of questions or comments, requesting clarification or additional detail. Some questions are intended to solicit lengthy responses, but only a bare minimum is provided or, worse, the information provided is completely non-responsive. Example: “You indicated that a series of messages flow between the client and server in order to implement the invention, but you have not provided any description as to what these messages are or what they contain. Can you please provide me with a detailed description of these, possibly with a table or diagram?” The entire reply received back: “The messages contain information that allows the server to act on client requests.” Very often I have an inventor who promises to do most of the work themselves, only to put forth a minimal effort when asked to provide additional information.

5) The costs of obtaining a patent, even a relatively complex one, pale in comparison to the costs you will encounter in trying to commercialize your product.

I know I’m in trouble with an inventor if I throw out a fair cost estimate for preparing an application and the inventor breaks out in a cold sweat and starts suggesting a cost that is 50% of the estimate. It’s one thing for an experienced business professional to haggle for lower costs, but in most situations involving the individual inventor, there is a significant lack of appreciation for what it will cost to do prototyping or pilot production runs, legal costs associated with non-disclosure agreements, trademarks, production and supply agreements, Underwriters Laboratories certification, FDA approval, etc. In the vast majority of cases, it is very expensive to bring an inventive idea to the marketplace, and the patent costs are typically a minimal part of those costs. If the inventor is not prepared for the entire undertaking, he is probably not going to willingly and cheerfully pay the bills, regardless of the quality and efficiency of the work done.