In a significant post-trial reversal, the Federal Circuit set aside a Delaware jury’s willful-infringement verdict and directed entry of JMOL of non‑infringement on two Mass General patents now owned by LabCorp. The panel (Judge Lourie, joined by Judges Dyk and Cunningham) held that the district court improperly let the jury decide a disputed claim construction (O2 Micro error) and that the patentee’s doctrine‑of‑equivalents showing failed the function-way-result test under Warner‑Jenkinson and VLSI.
The case centered on U.S. Patents 10,017,810 and 10,450,597, both directed to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing through "enrichment" techniques. Rather than sequencing entire genomes, these patents describe methods for producing copies of specific regions of interest - such as sections suspected of containing disease-causing mutations - to make sequencing more efficient and cost-effective. The technology relies on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to amplify target areas using various types of primers, including "target-specific primers" that anneal to sequences of interest, "adaptor primers" that work with artificial sequences attached to the native DNA fragments, and "sequencing primers" that enable the enriched fragments to be read by sequencing instruments.
After a five-day jury trial, the jury found that Qiagen's accused products willfully infringed both patents and awarded about $5 million in damages. Delaware Federal Judge Noreika subsequently denied Qiagen's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on infringement, invalidity, and damages. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has now reversed.
In a comprehensive 24-page opinion that may reshape intellectual property enforcement against foreign online merchants, Judge Kness of the Northern District of Illinois has systematically dismantled the already weak doctrinal foundations of "Schedule A" litigation in Eicher Motors Limited v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule "A", No. 25-cv-02937 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2025). The decision represents the most thorough judicial examination to date of whether this mass litigation mechanism comports with fundamental principles of civil procedure and due process. [Eicher Motors][Eicher Motors II].
Schedule A cases typically involve brand owners suing dozens or hundreds of foreign defendants for trademark, copyright, or patent infringement, seeking ex parte temporary restraining orders and prejudgment asset freezes against online marketplace accounts. The names of the defendants are not found on the complaint but rather listed in an attachment ("Schedule A") that is filed under seal and without immediately informing the defendants of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs use this secrecy to seek TROs and asset restraints before defendants can move their money or modify their online operations. When defendants finally learn about the litigation, it is typically only after their marketplace accounts have been frozen and funds restricted. The vast majority of defendants subsequently default, with Schedule A cases "almost exclusively get[ting] resolved after the entry of a preliminary injunction, dismissal of some defendants, settlements with others, and a default judgment against the remainder." In this case, motorcycle manufacturer Eicher Motors sued fifty defendants for allegedly selling counterfeit ROYAL ENFIELD products through platforms like Aliexpress and Alipay. After imposing a comprehensive stay on all Schedule A cases, Judge Kness concluded that the mechanism violates multiple procedural requirements and denied plaintiff's motion for emergency relief.
But, as I note below, I see Schedule A cases as representing a symptom of a larger structural problem in intellectual property enforcement against the modern reality of cross-border e-commerce. The surge in Schedule A litigation reflects the absence of practical enforcement mechanisms when rights holders face hundreds of small, foreign marketplace sellers whose individual economic impact cannot justify single-defendant federal litigation or Section 337 proceedings at the International Trade Commission (ITC). In essence, Schedule A has evolved into "337-Lite" - a rapid, low-cost substitute for ITC exclusion orders that targets the same imported articles through marketplace compliance rather than Customs enforcement. While Judge Kness's procedural analysis exposes serious constitutional and rule-based deficiencies in current Schedule A practice, his decision also highlights a potential enforcement gap that may require congressional rather than judicial solutions. The thousands of Schedule A cases filed annually suggest genuine "demand" for middle-tier remedies against fast-moving, offshore infringement that neither individual civil actions nor comprehensive ITC investigations can adequately address.
The fact that it has taken this long to see a strong anti-Schedule-A opinion is also remarkable, given that Schedule A cases have been proliferating for years. Federal litigation is fundamentally designed as an adversarial system with competing parties presenting their best arguments to neutral judges who facilitate resolution through reasoned decision-making. This system works pretty well when both sides actively and proportionately participate, but it systematically breaks down in default scenarios where defendants simply don't show up (or here, where they are never notified). In those default situations, judges cannot rely on the usual adversarial testing of facts and law, and should instead (IMO) step up as more active gatekeepers to ensure that the unrepresented party is not being unduly duped through procedural manipulation or legal overreach. The Schedule A phenomenon suggests that many N.D. Ill. courts have been too willing to grant extraordinary ex parte relief based on boilerplate allegations, essentially permitting plaintiffs to short-circuit the adversarial process without the heightened scrutiny that such departures from normal procedure should require.
After a second trip to the Federal Circuit and back, Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (W.D. Tex. No. 1:21-cv-00896-ADA) has ended with a final judgment for Apple. On August 7, 2025, Judge Alan Albright granted summary judgment of noninfringement on most of the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,843,125, finding that Fintiv failed to identify any actual “widget” in Apple’s accused mobile wallet products as required by the claims. Fintiv then voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims - indicating that it will appeal yet again.
Having lost its patent clam, Fintiv has also filed a new corporate theft and racketeering lawsuit against Apple. This post first looks at the dismissed patent case and then moves over to the RICO claims.
R.J. Reynolds has petitioned the Supreme Court to review a $95 million patent damages award that relied on the Federal Circuit's "built-in apportionment" doctrine, setting up a potential Supreme Court showdown. In R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company v. Altria Client Services LLC, Reynolds argues that the Federal Circuit effectively nullified the Supreme Court's 140-year-old mandate in Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884), that patent damages "must in every case" be apportioned between patented and unpatented features. [RJR v Altria Petition][RJR v. Altria - Appendix]
The RJR opinion released prior to the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025), and that case may be enough to warrant a new outcome (although note that EcoFactor does not mention RJR). And, the petition for certiorari asks the Supreme Court to "grant, vacate, and remand in light of the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in EcoFactor."
The petition also asks a more fundamental question focusing Supreme Court precedent: "whether the Federal Circuit's "built-in apportionment" exception violates Garretson's apportionment requirement."
Meanwhile, EcoFactor has filed for an extension application so that its own petition for certiorari will be due mid-September 2025, with a likely parallel focus on the Federal Circuit's approach to patent damages expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A third case focusing on apportionment, Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance Co. v. CH Lighting Technology Co. (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2025), would make an interesting trio for the Supreme Court to consider.
In a decision that should provide welcome clarity for mechanical device patents, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of patent infringement claims involving automated exercise equipment, holding that claims incorporating an electric motor to automate previously manual dumbbell weight selection are not directed to abstract ideas under Alice step one. PowerBlock Holdings, Inc. v. iFit, Inc., No. 24-1177 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). While the decision provides a victory for mechanical automation patents, the court's reasoning appears to turn primarily on the physical nature of the claimed system - using an electric motor to move mechanical components.
A few issues buried inside:
Mechanical vs. software distinction - Court emphasized the physical nature of the invention (electric motor moving mechanical components) as distinguishing it from purely software-based automation patents. In other words physical automation is much more likely eligible.
CAFC Erred in decided on narrow claim - Court focused analysis on detailed claim 1 then summarily declared broader claim 20 also eligible, despite parties arguing the claims separately and meaningful distinctions between them. I see this as an error that should get a rehearing.
Section 101 boundary warning against ignoring old elements - The decision included an explicit caution to "parties and courts" against conflating patent eligibility with novelty/obviousness inquiries by ignoring conventional elements in the eligibility analysis. The interesting bit is that the court inverted quotes from Mayo and Flook to justify its statements.
Last week a friend of mine was stopped by the police for jaywalking across Ninth Street here in Columbia, Missouri. If you know that block by Sparky's, you know it functions almost like a pedestrian mall. She was asked to sit on the curb while the officer wrote the ticket -- meanwhile a dozen other folks made the same cross‑over. Same place, same manner of crossing, but only one citation. The experience was mildly absurd and somewhat humiliating and it captures a basic fairness intuition that also animates administrative law: treat like cases alike.
That is the theme of a new petition for certiorari in USAA v. PNC, arguing that the USPTO's IPR decision was "arbitrary and capricious" because it failed to "justify a different result reached on saliently similar facts, but involving a different party." [20250805161943722_1. Petition][20250805161952153_1a. Petition Appendix]
In this short non-precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the PTAB's anticipation conclusion -- finding too many gaps in the Board's analysis. The invention here is an X-Ray inspection system used for moving objects. The claims require two "pencil-beams" shot in specific perpendicular directions with reference to the object's direction of motion. Detectors are then used to collect the scattered radiation and integrate the overlapping bi-directional results. In the IPR, the PTAB found a number of claims anticipated by "Seppi" and AS&E appealed - arguing that the finding lacked substantial evidence.
The central complaint is that the Board failed to explain its intermediary fact finding -- i.e., that "the Board failed to find Seppi’s scatter detectors can detect scattered radiation from two perpendicular pencil beam sources."
The Federal Circuit recently expanded its doctrine associated with specification changes in family member patent applications -- using minor changes in the specification justify differing claim construction across a patent family. FMC Corporation v. Sharda USA, LLC, No. 24-2335 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025). This is helpful for careful patent attorneys, but also requires care when drafting non-provisional applications claiming priority back to a provisional. Notably, in both FMC and the 2024 DDR case, the construction hurt the patentee.
The Federal Circuit has denied en banc rehearing in Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., leaving in place a February 2025 panel decision that significantly limits the collateral estoppel effect of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) unpatentability determinations. The denial includes contrasting from Chief Judge Moore and Judge Dyk. [23-1359.ORDER.8-1-2025_2553055]
A former USPTO patent examiner has petitioned the Supreme Court to review his exclusion from practicing before the USPTO. Shah Behnamian argues that the USPTO wrongfully denied his application to register as a patent attorney based on a disciplinary suspension that he claims was discriminatory retaliation. The case raises some questions about how the USPTO evaluates the moral character of former employees seeking to practice before the agency, and whether patent examination itself constitutes a "profession" warranting certain procedural protections under federal regulations. Behnamian v. Coke Morgan Stewart, No. 25-5251 (U.S. July 26, 2025) (Behnamian Petition) (Behnamian Appx).
Behnamian worked as a patent examiner from 2009 until May 2020, advancing to GS-14 level primary examiner with consistently outstanding performance ratings until close to the end of his employment. He ultimately resigned following what he alleges was discriminatory suspension related to his wife's pregnancy. In particular, in 2019, he was charged with being Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for 30 hours and 15 minutes over several days between April and June 2019, while still allegedly logging hours. He received a five-day suspension that he served in March 2020 and resigned a couple of months later.
After resigning, Behnamian applied to practice before the USPTO as a patent agent. The USPTO Office of Enrollment and Discipline initially granted his application, but then reversed course after learning (1) about the suspension that (2) Behnamian did not disclose in his registration application. Behnamian has been pursuing registration since then, in litigation that has now reached the Supreme Court.
In a brief order, the Federal Circuit has denied Fintiv's mandamus petition seeking relief from Judge Alan Albright's decision to move forward with an expedited trial in Fintiv v. Apple. Jury selection started this week and the trial is set to begin on Monday, August 4, 2025.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance Co. v. CH Lighting Technology Co., decided July 28, 2025, represents the first significant application of the court's recent en bancEcoFactor decision to patent damages expert testimony. The appellate panel vacated the $14 million damages award and remanded for a new trial once the district court applies EcoFactor's heightened reliability standards to evaluate the damages expert's testimony regarding apportionment of portfolio license agreements.
Separately, the court also reversed a JMOL of no-invalidity regarding two other patents -- finding that the district court abused its discretion by excluding key evidence that would have supported the invalidity defense. In the post, I take these issues in reverse order - first the JMOL then Damages.
The USPTO moved swiftly to shut down any hope that the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., No. 2023-1864 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2025) had opened a broader pathway for using applicant-admitted prior art (AAPA) to supply missing claim limitations in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. In a memorandum dated July 31, 2025 (two weeks after Shockwave), Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart announced that the agency will "enforce and no longer waive" the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) that IPR petitions "must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon." This regulatory enforcement appears to effectively prohibits the use of AAPA, expert testimony, common sense, and other forms of "general knowledge" to supply missing claim limitations, regardless of whether petitioners carefully avoid labeling such evidence as the "basis" of their challenges.
In my recent post, I traced how the Federal Circuit’s composition has shifted from a 10-1 Republican majority in the early 1990s to its present 8-3 Democratic-appointed tilt. Dennis Crouch, The Federal Circuit's Shifting Political Balance, Patently-O (June 15, 2025). That transformation has not only symbolic weight, but also real jurisprudential and institutional consequences, especially as the court faces more politically charged litigation such as the pending V.O.S. Selections v. Trump case. I note that the Federal Circuit’s response—en banc proceedings and unanimous per curiam orders—may reflect an institutional effort to shield itself from claims of partisanship.
Jason Rantanen and co-authors Paul Gugliuzza and Jonathan Nash have added more empirical substance to this conversation with a major study of separate opinions and dissents at the Federal Circuit from 2008–2021. Their article, Expertise, Ideology, and Dissent, provides powerful data to help make sense of how political ideology, judicial expertise, and institutional dynamics intersect at this court.
In an unusual move, the Federal Circuit on July 29, 2025, ordered Apple to respond to Fintiv's petition for writ of mandamus seeking to halt the upcoming August 4 trial date over unresolved discovery disputes. In re Fintiv, Inc., Docket No. 25-00142 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2025). Fintiv Petition.
Fintiv is primarily seeking discovery related to meetings between Fintiv's predecessor (CorFire) and Apple three years before Apple Pay's launch. In those meetings, CorFire allegedly shared key aspects of its patented mobile wallet technology. This includes documents and depositions of three individuals with deep knowledge of those meetings, including one who at the time worked for CorFire and later became Apple's Director of Apple Pay & Wallet Product Management.
The Trump administration is reportedly considering a radical transformation of the US patent system that would replace the current flat-fee maintenance structure with a percentage-based "property tax" on patent value, according to a recent Wall Street Journal report. Howard Lutnick and his Commerce Department team are discussing a tax of between 1% and 5% of overall patent value annually, a shift that could dramatically increase costs for certain patent holders while making the US an international anomaly among major patent systems. The report led to market drops - especially in biotech.
Under the current system established by the Patent Act, patent holders pay three flat maintenance fees: at 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years after patent issuance. The final fee is the largest (currently $8,280), and almost half of all patents are abandoned without paying this final fee. For patents that have become virtually worthless by their 11.5-year mark, owners might actually prefer a value-based tax (2% of nothing...). However, any new proposal would likely be additional to existing maintenance fees rather than a replacement.
One potential approach would focus revenue collection on patents that are demonstrably high-value, using existing public mechanisms for identification. This targeted system could include:
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Jilin v. US underscores how US courts are fortifying legal foundations for aggressive trade enforcement against China as part of the ongoing global power competition between the two great nations. In a unanimous ruling reversing the Court of International Trade (CIT), the Federal Circuit validated Commerce's decades-old presumption that all Chinese exporters are government-controlled unless they can prove otherwise. See Jilin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. v. United States, No. 2023-2245 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2025). Some presumptions are easy to overcome, but this burden that has proven nearly insurmountable in practice.
China's designation as a "non-market economy" (NME) lies at the heart of the case. Under WTO antidumping rules, investigating authorities typically compare export prices to domestic prices in the exporting country to determine if "dumping" has occurred. However, NME status allows the US to disregard Chinese domestic prices entirely, instead using "surrogate country" methodology that substitutes prices from third countries deemed more "market-oriented." The US Tariff Act defines an NME country as "any foreign country that the administering authority determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). This use of surrogate markets produces systematically higher dumping margins, with Chinese companies face antidumping duties that are substantially higher than other countries. China has (unsuccessfully thus far) argued that this discriminatory treatment should have ended in 2016 when certain provisions of its WTO accession protocol expired.
In its decision, the CIT sided with Jilin on multiple grounds that challenged the fundamental legal basis of Commerce's NME presumption that all Chinese exporters are government-controlled. The court found that Commerce had failed to identify any statutory authority for its policy of presuming all Chinese exporters are government-controlled, noting that "Commerce makes no claim to Chevron deference and . . . identify[ies] no statutory source for the NME presumption." More importantly, the CIT determined that Commerce's presumption directly conflicts with the Anti-Dumping Act's explicit statutory requirement to calculate "individual weighted average dumping margins" for each "known" exporter, including mandatory respondents like Jilin. The court emphasized that while Commerce may apply adverse facts available in certain circumstances, "the statute does not indicate that Commerce can simply assign a rate to a mandatory respondent based on its relationship to an NME government." As Jilin argued in its CAFC brief: "An agency policy is not tantamount to a statute or regulation and is not entitled to deference under Chevron or any other framework."
By my count, we have nine patent cases with en banc petitions pending before the Federal Circuit. I have divided these up into five categories: patent eligibility, claim construction, IPR procedures and estoppel, equitable defenses (estoppel), and design patent infringement.
In July 2025, the Federal Circuit reversed a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissal of a likelihood of confusion opposition in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Intrastate Distributors, Inc., No. 24-1212 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2025), finding that substantial evidence did not support the Board's conclusion that the marks SUNKIST and KIST have sufficiently different commercial impressions to avoid consumer confusion. The complete reversal appears to mean that KIST will be blocked from registration.
I am familiar with the SUNKIST brand based upon its popularity rise as part of my sugary childhood in the 1980s. When I started reading the decision, I thought KIST must be a new upstart, but then I saw that their bottles include the year "1929." As it turns out, both KIST and SUNKIST have surprisingly robust heritage -- both dating back about 100 years. And both with with trademark registrations for soft drinks and soda syrups dating from the 1920s.
The KIST brand changed multiple times over the decades and ultimately, their old registrations were all abandoned in the 2000s for failing to file the required statements of use. Under standard US trademark law, once a mark has been formally abandoned, later resumption of use does not resurrect the original priority date.
The new owners of KIST filed their re-registration efforts in 2019, both with the word mark KIST and also a very simple stylized block letters shown here.
Interestingly, despite KIST's historical longevity, the evidentiary record from recent trademark litigation did not identify any sales between 1970 and 2000. This is important because SUNKIST had relaunched its brand in the mid 1970s and has operated continuously since then. Thus, the case seems to operate from the framework that SUNKIST is the superior mark, and KIST can only be re-registered if there is no likelihood of confusion between the two marks in the minds of consumers.
Since Gunn v. Minton (2013), the Federal Circuit has been quite shy about non-patent patent cases. These are cases where the cause of action is not something like infringement, but that still involve substantial patent law analysis. The newest example is Acorda v. Alkermes (Fed. Cir. 2025) involving a petition to modify an arbitration award based upon patent law public policy issues. The Federal Circuit ultimately transferred the case to the Second Circuit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the petitioner had pleaded alternative non-patent grounds for relief alongside its patent law arguments, the patent law issue was not "necessarily raised" under Gunn's first prong—meaning the district court could have granted relief without resolving any substantial question of federal patent law. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Alkermes PLC, No. 2023-2374 (Fed. Cir. July 25, 2025).
This narrow holding allowed the court to sidestep broader questions about when patent law issues arising in arbitration contexts warrant Federal Circuit review, leaving practitioners and lower courts without clear guidance on the boundaries of Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent-related arbitration disputes.
